Masculinity and Gendered Concepts of Honor, Shame, Humiliation, and Vulnerability (focusing on the Middle East)

Annotated Bibliography

2011

The Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights created this Annotated Bibliography to provide a guide to the landscape of academic research on masculinity and gendered concepts of honor, shame, humiliation, and vulnerability. Our goal is to provide the policy, activist and scholarly communities with access to the findings of academic research; therefore, the extensive and valuable resources produced by policy agencies, NGOs, and international organizations are generally not included here. Of course, we assume that readers will use this Annotated Bibliography only as a guide to help find useful readings, and that anyone wishing to cite these sources in their own work will go back to the original sources.

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The Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights created this Annotated Bibliography to provide a guide to the landscape of academic research on masculinity and gendered concepts of honor, shame, humiliation, and vulnerability (focusing on the Middle East); the principal research for it was done by Emily Parker.

This bibliography is by no means an exhaustive listing. We have focused on the academic literature, so most of the numerous publications originating from within the policy and NGO communities have not been included here. This bibliography is also limited to articles published in English.

Insofar as possible, entries includes citations, published abstracts, quotations of key sentences (indicated in quotation marks, and followed by page number) and additional annotations by the interns who worked on this bibliography, and URLs for articles that are available on line. Books usually are only briefly summarized, often with the table of contents included.

This annotated bibliography is meant to introduce readers to the landscape of academic research and debate in this field, and to help support the reader in her or his own research. Despite the inclusion of quotations and page numbers in the annotations, we strongly advise the reader not to quote directly from this document, but rather to use it to direct you to the literature that will be of use to you.

If you are familiar with resources that you think should be included in this annotated bibliography, please send the citation, or, better yet, an annotation, and we will add it to the bibliography, with your name as reviewer. Resources can be submitted through our website at: genderandsecurity.org/projects-resources/annotated-bibliographies.

Abstract:
America’s “war on terror” and Al Qaeda’s “jihad” reflect mirror strategies of imperial politics. Each camp transnationalizes violence and insecurity in the name of national or communal security. Neoliberal globalization underpins this militarization of daily life. Its desire industries motivate and legitimate elite arguments (whether from “infidels” or “terrorists”) that society must sacrifice for its hypermasculine leaders. Such violence and desire draw on colonial identities of Self vs. Other, patriotism vs. treason, hunter vs. prey, and masculinity vs. femininity that are played out on the bodies of ordinary men and women. We conclude with suggestions of a human security to displace the elite privilege that currently besets world politics (Abstract from ibid, 517).

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“Assumptions about ‘national security’ and ‘national wealth’ also crumble in light of September 11. How could the world’s richest, most heavily-armed state have been so vulnerable?” (518).

“…hypermasculinity reflects a reactionary stance. It arises when agents of hegemonic masculinity feel threatened or undermined, thereby needing to inflate, exaggerate, or otherwise distort their traditional masculinity. We extend this usage of hypermasculinity to security and economic domains, especially as one hypermasculine source (e.g., US foreign policy) provokes another (e.g., Al Qaeda) to escalate with iterative bouts of hypermasculinity (e.g., ‘jihad’/”war on terror’)” (519).

“National security and transnationalized insecurity affect men’s bodies most directly on the battlefield. These policies also engender constructions of masculinity. America’s newfound concern for Afghan women, for example, swells a reciprocal appreciation, announces the New York Times, for ‘[b]rawny, heroic, manly men’ (Brown, 2001: 5). These are exemplified by ‘…stoic, muscle-bound [firefighters and police officers]…exuding competence from every pore…” (Brown, 2001: 5). The venerable newspaper quotes what seems to be a growing, national sentiment: “…there’s a longing for manliness. People want to regain what we had in World War II. They want to believe in big, strapping American boys’(Brown, 2001: 5). Given the military’s racial segregation during World War II and mainstream America’s general neglect of heroic duty undertaken by its ‘colored troops,’ both African and Asian American, these images implicitly evoke ‘big, [white] strapping American boys’” (527).

“For Bush and the U.S. government, the pursuit of bin Laden and Al Qaeda (re) invigorates a sense of American manliness. Lost in the bravura is an examination
of the relationship between hunter and prey. The hunter becomes a lethal lover of the hunted; indeed, the prey allows a manly life. But consummation comes only when the hunter annihilates his prey. This cycle of love and extinction dooms the hunter to remain forever unrequited, pathologically chasing after his elusive object of desire” (529).

“Colonial fantasies provoke a ‘reactionary reverie’ in the Other, dreaming himself into a vengeful ‘Warrior Prince’ (Ling, 2002: 46). Too long the emasculated prize of predatory colonizers, he, too, trucks in violence and desire, security and insecurity to declare his public hypermasculinity” (530).


Abstract:
This paper examines rape and other forms of sexual violence in the context of war. It is only very recently that wartime rape has been conceptualised at both academic and international policy-making levels (through UN resolutions) as a human rights violation, a war crime and as potentially a crime of genocide. Sexual violence in war has historically been dismissed as being an unfortunate by-product of armed conflict and has been seen as a crime against the male relatives of female victims. In fact, the rape of ‘enemy’ women and girls has often been seen as ‘booty’, as being part of the ‘spoils of war’ for male combatants, which raises the question of what this tells us about the construction of masculinity/sexuality in relation to war and to rape. Meanwhile, it has been argued that protecting ‘their’ women from rape has historically been a significant factor motivating men to fight in wars. This can, in part, be traced back to Western models of citizenship that have linked military participation (of men) to citizenship. However, this claim sits uneasily alongside the reality that it is combatants who are primarily responsible for wartime sexual violence. As feminists have long asked in relation to domestic violence, who protects us from those who are supposedly our protectors? The paper argues that both traditional and some feminist approaches to the issue of wartime sexual violence offer incomplete and to a certain extent inadequate theories. Feminist theorists sometimes view rape in armed conflict as being the product of universal male violence against women and unequal gender relations. However this leaves much unexplained when we look at the specificities of particular conflicts, the varying manifestations of rape and other sexual violence, and the varying degrees of brutality involved. Our understanding of wartime rape is further challenged by the increasing presence of women as combatants/protectors/perpetrators, not just as civilians/protected/victims, both in state and non-state military groups. Recent events in Iraq have graphically illustrated that women in combat are no more immune to the pressures of militarism and gendered enemy images than are men. The recent enormous publicity surrounding the involvement of a few female soldiers in the sexual humiliation and torture of male Iraqi prisoners (and the
relative lack of publicity surrounding the fate of female Iraqi prisoners) indicates perhaps a persistent societal discomfit with women in uniform and a (threatened) comforting myth that women in the military will be somehow 'nicer' than men. This leads us to further important questions. How are our ideas about gender and wartime sexual violence challenged or altered by the presence of male victims? And what does the rape of men tell us about gender constructions and the rape of women in war? (Abstract from All Academic).

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“Tosh points out that the term ‘implies that control (even oppression) is in some way integral to masculinity, providing a framework for placing men in relation to women and to those males whose manhood is for some reason denied’. The assumptions of hegemonic masculinity become naturalised through social hierarchies and cultural mediums, as well as through force. However, women may challenge ideas of male supremacy and some men do not subscribe to the practices and values of hegemonic masculinity. Therefore, ‘[h]egemonic masculinity is always in a tense – and potentially unstable – relationship with other masculinities’” (76).

“For the purposes of this article Connell’s most interesting assertion is about ‘[t]he contradiction between this purged definition of [heterosexual] masculinity, and the actual conditions of emotional life among men in military and paramilitary groups’. Though Connell does not discuss this, I suggest this provides us with one of the rationales for wartime rape in certain contexts. The homosocial nature of militaries may be necessary for cohesion but its attendant danger of homosexual behaviour does not sit well with the hetero-normativity of hegemonic masculinity. Rape (even, as discussed later, rape of men) serves to reassert heteromasculinity” (77).

“As Ruth Seifert puts it, the female body is ‘a symbolic representation of the body politic’ and rape of women is ‘the symbolic rape of the body of [the] community’. Relatedly, it has been argued that wartime sexual violence functions as a form of communication between men and a measure of victory and of masculinity, with women’s bodies the vehicle of communication, the site of battle and the conquered territory. It is a communication, then, between hegemonic and subordinate masculinities. As Rhonda Copelon argues, however, the fact that rape of women performs a communicative function between men also illustrates more than anything else women’s fundamental objectification” (80-81).

“In wartime, then, male to male rape (as male to female rape) humiliates and feminises the victim whilst asserting the perpetrator’s dominant (heterosexual, ethno-national) masculinity. The ethnonational element means that symbolically the victim’s national identity is also feminised and humiliated. Sexual violence is ‘preferred’, Inger Skjelsbæk suggests, because ‘this is the form of violence which most clearly communicates masculinisation and feminisation’” (81).

Abstract:
No abstract found.

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“But the Palestinian national narrative of defeat exists, and according to it, the Palestinian male fails to possess the land; the homeland in this narrative is a female body possessed by others. The Palestinian Authority on its web site laments ‘the rape of Palestine.’ This metaphor of the loss of Palestine as rape, which has been a constant in the Palestinian and wider Arab political nationalist discourse, signifies the loss of Palestine as loss of female virginity but also of male virility, since the virile actor now is the rapist/enemy. This male loss of virility is inscribed as Palestinian defeat” (751).

“Kanafani, who was one of the prominent leaders of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), believed that the Palestinians could regain their manhood and land only through armed struggle…The transformation of the humiliated refugees into a people comes about through armed struggle, which, beginning in the early 1960’s onward, redeems the emasculated Palestinian man” (754).

“…Women’s visibility and participation [after the first intifada and the Oslo Accords] seriously challenged and threatened to destabilize traditional gender roles. As one scholar puts it, the intifada ‘feminized Palestinian society…’ This new image clashed with the image of the Palestinian freedom fighter that up to the intifada was the hero of the Palestinian national narrative. The anxiety about the intifada’s destabilization of gender roles was expressed in sexual terms as male fear of the female body” (758).

“The use of weapons in the latter stages of the intifada, while limited and largely symbolic, sidelined the majority of the civil population but resurrected the traditional Palestinian national male hero who almost disappeared in the early years of the intifada. The use of arms by Palestinian men allows them to assert their manhood in relation to their opponents by putting them on more equal footing with the Israeli soldiers. It also distinguishes the Palestinian men from the Palestinian women by making the former adopt a kind of resistance to the occupation that was always monopolized by men” (760).

“Supposedly, veiling was necessary to guarantee national security and to preserve the national honor. Actually, it allowed men to assert their power over women by controlling women’s bodies at a time they felt their own male bodies were being violated…[This] coincided with the use of rape and sexual harassment of Palestinian men by their Israeli male prison interrogators in an attempt to ‘deprive
young men of claims to manhood and masculinity’” (760).


**Abstract:**
In this article, I examine the ideology of honor among West Bank Palestinians most particularly as it relates to sexuality and gender relations within families. I contend that the iconic Arab and Palestinian subject of the ideal, gendered, connected self—a central concept that undergirds most representations of honor—elides the significance of the individual and obscures the rights and strengths of women and the obligations, vulnerabilities, and anxieties of men. Beyond a critique of representations of honor, subjectivities, and patriarchy, I suggest that ideological-culturally-based explanatory models of behavior favor coherency over ambivalence and untidiness. In terms of honor and the subjectivities that inform it, such explanations have led to an over-reliance on resistance as a method of analyzing “anomalies.” I argue that for Palestinian women and men, subjectivity and agency are achieved within and are a reflection of structural, ideological, and experiential configurations, rather than as resistances to them (*Abstract from ibid, 737*).

**Additional Notes and/or Quotes:**
“Generally, honor has been represented as a reward which men bestow on other men based, in large part, on their women following a particular sexual code. Women’s comportment, then, provides a fundamental axis of evaluation (Dundes and Falassi 1975)” (741).

“Throughout the Mediterranean area, male honor derives from the struggle to maintain intact the shame of kinswomen; and this renders male reputation insecurely dependent upon female sexual conduct. Men are responsible for the shame of their women ‘which is associated with sexual purity and their own honor derives in large measure from the way they discharge their responsibility’ (Pitt-Rivers 1977: 78). When men are unsuccessful in this they are shamed, that is diminished in relation to other men (Gilmore 1987:4)” (741-742).

“Honor ideology imparts responsibilities and rights, regulates, restricts, disciplines, and denies. It calls for certain beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors while devaluing or prohibiting others. For those who do not live up to its principles, the psychological consequences may be enormous: feelings of embarrassment, humiliation, shame, and guilt which can be deeply troubling and lead to mechanisms of defense, coping strategies, and acting out” (746).

“A damaged reputation leaves a family vulnerable. Losing honor – particularly over the sexual misbehavior of its women – means families are exposed to ridicule and derision. Their dreams of a ‘good life,’ of establishing and/or maintaining their dignity and their right’ to social, political, and economic well-
being are threatened” (746).

“Although a significant part of male honor rests on the sexual comportment of the family’s women, females, in turn, are also subject to a gain or loss of honor, based on the deeds of their men. For example, women gain honor when their husbands (fathers and brothers) provide well for, support and nurture them, when they are viewed as generous and trustworthy and/or when they are judged to be supportive of the nationalist cause” (747).

“In terms of honor ideology, Palestinians have responded [to Occupation] by lowering expectations of what constitutes economic well-being and by placing less emphasis on it and land ownership…This does not mean financial stability and success – however it is defined – has become irrelevant. Families carefully weigh the economic status of future sons- and daughters-in-law not only since money brings valued commodities, but, additionally, because it remains, in diminished form, a part of the honor complex” (749).

“At the same time, the Israeli Occupation and the increasing popularity of the national movement have tended to heighten familial concern about and, in some cases, control over female sexuality…Katz (1996: 87) argues that as Palestinian nationalism became linked to the ‘achievement of manhood,’ the capacity of males to take charge of female sexuality took on patriotic significance, at least in some quarters. Massad (1995) makes a similar point as he suggests that, as it developed, Palestinian nationalism “became masculine” (749).

“Sabbagh (cited by Goodwin, 1994: 299-300) suggests that [the oppression of Palestinian men by Israelis being transferred onto women] is a ‘psychological backlash:’ men, who have lost their authority due to the occupation are threatened by women, particularly those who have begun to find their political voice” (750).

“It can be argued that honor ideology, specifically as it relates to sexuality, is a hegemonic discourse as, in ideal terms, it establishes, reinforces, and idealizes males (and, to some degree, older women) as authorities. Men are guides and protectors who, as part of their commitments, punish, if they see fit and this, too, is seen as natural and obvious. Yet while it reflects and reinforces male privilege in particular arenas, the hegemonic discourse of honor puts grave responsibilities on men. Indeed some men feel beleaguered by and frightened of it as they plausibly consider themselves to be at the mercy of their women’s reputations…Men are deemed authorities, but are vulnerable…There is no shortage of ‘reluctant patriarchs’ or women who feel powerful and in charge” (784).

**Abstract:**
During the first intifada uprising (1987–1993), thousands of Palestinians were arrested annually, and mass incarceration affected as many as 100,000 families. Relying on several recent ethnographies, and other published research including some of my own, this article describes the contests over Palestinian prison ontology as organized by (a) the jailers, (b) the prisoners, (c) the families of prisoners, and (d) a service agency in the emerging Palestinian Authority. What becomes evident is that mass incarceration involves ontological struggles over the framing of justice, agency, and gender. The conclusion asks how these ontological struggles may be part of other modern prisons (*Abstract from ibid, 459*).

**Additional Notes and/or Quotes:**
“...such Israeli violence is a tragic aspect of a new Jewish identity, ‘a sign of a recovered masculinity, a repudiation of anti-Semitic stereotypes of the Jew as weak and impotent, a means of restoring Jewish pride, a symbolic revenge for past crimes against the Jews or as the instrument of a redemptive messianic Jewish mission’ (Ezrahi 1997: 226–227).”

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“Almost all reported that their mothers, sisters, or wives were cursed by their interrogators: ‘we will bring your sister and your mother here and we will fuck them while you watch,’ is one of the sayings reported; ‘Your mother is pregnant by a GSS man,’ or, ‘Your wife is already pregnant? Good thing for you,’ are also phrases often attributed to the interrogators (B’tselem 1991: 56). The attention given by interrogators to beating the testicles and threatening to rape female relatives strikes at the masculinity of the victim.”

“While ‘the steadfast struggler joins the historical train of heroes’ (Nashif 2008: 111), to give information to the interrogator ‘is to descend to the state of an animal...The Palestinian’s humanity/soul is expressed through this agency of resisting the colonizer.”

“Instead of being isolated, dependent, and obedient, the organized prisoners build an identity of themselves as men on the front line of resistance to
occupation and at the political center of the struggle.”

“Prisoners emerged as party leaders and maintained their status after their release. Incarceration gave them political authority and connections. Rosenfeld illustrates their improved social and network status by noting that it was easier for them to marry compared to ex-prisoners in former generations (2004: 309–310). Nevertheless, former prisoners are not likely to receive work permits for Israel, and they missed many years of education, making employment a serious problem: ‘Thus, one finds an increase in the number of households where the main breadwinner is the young woman in her twenties or thirties with fixed work in her profession, while the former prisoner is a part-time earner’ (Rosenfeld 2004: 311).”


Abstract:
In this article we examine the debate preceding the most recent war in Iraq to show how gendered framing can compromise the quality of debate. Drawing on a sample of national news discourse in the year before the war began, we show that both anti-war and pro-war speakers draw on binary images of gender to construct their cases for or against war. Speakers cast the Bush administration’s argument for invasion either as a correct “macho” stance or as inappropriate, out-of-control masculinity. The most prominent gendered image in war debate is that of the cowboy, used to characterize both President Bush and US foreign policy in general. The cowboy is positioned against a diplomatic form of masculinity that is associated with Europe and valued by anti-war speakers, but criticized by pro-war speakers. Articles that draw on gender images show a lower quality of the debate, measured by the extent to which reasons rather than ad hominem arguments are used to support or rebut assertions (Abstract from ibid, 1).

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“As cowboy became synonymous with hegemonic masculinity, ‘sissiness’ and ‘wimpiness’ are used to devalue other kinds of masculinity (Kimmel 1996). Connell argues that the ‘lone ranger’ cowboy shuns international cooperation and diplomacy, which may be associated with weakness and femininity (2000). In opposition to diplomacy and refinement, the cowboy is constructed as a ‘man of action, grim, lean, of few topics and not too many words’ and that cowboy masculinity is associated with simplistic, binary language (Kimmel p.149). As Scott theorizes that gender is ‘empty and overflowing’ at the same time with multiple meanings for different contexts, the cowboy is an ambivalent gender image with different symbolic meanings that can be mobilized differently in war debate (1986)” (6).
“Cowboy’ is the most frequently gendered theme but there are key differences in which sources use certain gendered themes. The US is constructed relationally as masculine through constructing the United Nations or Europe as unmanly (wimps, weak), and the US is directly constructed in terms of ‘bully’ masculinity and ‘cowboy’ masculinity, descriptions that frame Europeans and the United Nations as less than masculine (‘weak’ or ‘wimpy’) come from primarily pro-war actors” (8).

“In further framing of the United Nations as not masculine, the UN is constructed by pro-war actors as impotent and therefore less than masculine. A pro-war discussant on Fox News uses the description of impotence to describe the future of the United Nations based on their lack of support for invading Iraq by stating; ‘this may be one of the great side benefits of this whole thing is that they render themselves impotent.’ (Fox News 2/7/03)” (9).

“In a New York Times debate piece, a pro-war actor argues that macho masculinity is exactly what is needed for war; ‘in diplomacy macho behavior comes across as highhanded, but in wartime, it looks strong’ (NYT 2/13/03). European and United Nations preference for diplomacy over military action is also criticized as less than manly. The constructed connection between diplomacy and feminity is the most striking in the discourse surrounding Europe. Those who are pro-war discredit Europeans and European leaders as ‘weak,’ ‘wimpy,’ ‘sissy.’ A pro-war actor in a discussion on NPR describes ‘the EU is a bunch of worthless wimps, they're not good for anything, you can't take them seriously, they're not valuable partners’ (NPR 4/21/02)” (10).

“Framing international politics around a binary of countries that emulate the correct kind of masculinity and countries that are unmanly poses a challenge to other countries to live up to a specific form of pro-war masculinity” (11).


Abstract:
In this landmark exploration of how male anxiety has come to define our political culture, Stephen J. Ducat shows the link between the desperate macho strutting of male politicians, the gender gap in voting behavior, and fundamentalist holy wars. He argues that a direct association exists between the magnitude of a man's femiphobia—that is, his terror of being perceived as feminine—and his tendency to embrace right-wing political opinions.

From the strenuous efforts by handlers to counter George H. W. Bush's "wimp factor" to the swaggering arrogance that led to the moral and military quagmire
in U.S.-occupied Iraq, anxious masculinity has been a discernible subtext in politics. Ducat shows how this anxiety has been an underlying force in public life throughout the history of Western culture, and also explores why and how certain political issues get gendered. Analyzing various aspects of popular culture and drawing on pioneering research on the gender gap, *The Wimp Factor* is a fascinating exposé that will alter our understanding of contemporary politics (*Abstract from book description*).

**Additional Notes and/or Quotes:**

“For many men, masculinity is a hard-won, yet precarious and brittle psychological achievement that must be constantly proven and defended. While the external factors may appear to be that which is most threatening—gay men in military shower rooms, feminist women in civilian bedrooms, or audible female footsteps in the Taliban-era marketplace—the actual threat that many men experience is an unconscious, internal one: the sense that they are not ‘real’ men… this fantasy of being under constant siege by a multitude of external feminizing forces is really an unconscious defense that is employed to keep out of mind something even more disturbing—an identification with women” (1).

“Athenian manhood, the reader may recall, had nothing to do with the gender of one’s sexual partner. Rather, manliness was determined by the position one occupied in relation to the partner. Real men were dominators…This cultural and psychological link between masculinity and domination has been expressed in a multitude of ways across the centuries. This may be why rape has not only been used as a metaphor for military conquest but has often been employed literally as a strategy of physical, psychological, and genetic invasion” (52).

“As part of the Serbian strategy of ‘ethnic cleansing,’ the rapes were designed to shame the women (many of whom feel they have been defiled and thereby rendered worthless), humiliate the men by befouling their ‘property…’ Muslim men have been raped as well, which suggests another important psychological aim: to feminize Serbia’s perceived enemies” (52).

“It becomes readily apparent from these accounts of the political use of rape that, in addition to being a direct assault on women, it is intended to be a vicarious attack on and feminizing humiliation of the men in their lives. This has roots that go all the way back to the ancient Babylonian code of Hammurabi in 1800 B.C.E., in which the rape of a wife or daughter was seen as a property crime committed against a man” (53).

“…men who feel that the ‘feminine’ parts of themselves are bad, frightening, and destructive of their manliness will project them onto women or enemy males and unconsciously fantasize that, by overpowering and destroying the women or men, they are subjugating and annihilating the unwanted aspects of themselves” (53).

Abstract:
*No abstract found.*

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“Muslim men are described as sexually humiliated at Abu Ghraib. And white women of the working class are used to ‘pussy whip’ Muslim men. I keep wondering about the significance of this dyad. I am struck by the use of the phrase of ‘humiliated’ rather than ‘tortured’ or ‘raped.’ The women I met with during the Bosnian war whom had been forced into the rape camps there were not described as humiliated, but rather, as raped. The choice of words is revealing. Men who are raped and sexually degraded are ‘humiliated’ because they are treated like women; they are forced to be women—sexually dominated and degraded. Men who are naked and exposed remind us of the vulnerability usually associated with being a woman. The brown men at Abu Ghraib are then constructed as effeminate and narrate a sub-text of homosexuality” (320).

“[The three female American torturers—Megan Ambuhl, Lynddie England, and Sabrina Harman] are gender decoys. As decoys they create confusion by participating in the very sexual humiliation that their gender is usually victim to…This gender swapping and switching leaves masculinist/racialized gender in place. Just the sex has changed; the uniform remains the same. Male or female can be a masculinized commander or imperial collaborator while white women look like masculinist empire builders and brown men look like women and homos. Whenever power and domination are exposed in their ugly form like at Abu Ghraib the embedded sexual and racialized meanings of power are revealed. Racism and sexism are always in play together because they each construct the other. When one is revealed the other is laying in wait” (320).

“A man who is treated like a woman becomes less than human—not a white man—like the black slave woman, and not white women” (320).

“Females are present to cover over the misogyny of building empire but these low ranking women are clearly not in control of much of anything; they are a type of pawn” (321).

“Abu Ghraib showed us that humanity and inhumanity comes in all colors and genders” (322).

Abstract:
No abstract found.

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“For the photos also reveal the failures of Iraqi liberation. The scope and effectiveness of the Iraqi insurgency, the chronic attacks, the relentless casualties, the general antipathy of the Iraqi masses towards their putative liberators – all have positioned American soldiers in a “feminised” position of vulnerability and lack of control over the integrity of the American military body confronted with unmanageable terror: the very post-9/11 condition the invasion of Iraq was designed to end. The Abu Ghraib rituals are thus ceremonies of nostalgia by which the perpetuators reacquire, if only in an allegorical idiom, their former sense of mastery and command in a situation that is rapidly lurching beyond their grasp. That is why we know that the extraction of information was not the terminal goal of these rituals. For the hooded and faceless bodies that are being manipulated and posed are depersonalised specimens and not information-bearing individuals - merely emblems of a collective, recalcitrant Iraqi identity that has to be subdued” (3).


Abstract:
In this article, we argue that the sociology of gender can shed much light on our understanding of contemporary terrorism. We examine both contemporary cases of terrorism and terrorist movements as gendered; as enactments of masculinity. We suggest that the ideology and organization of many terrorist groups are saturated with gendered meanings, both as the analytic prism through which they view their situation, and also as a means of political mobilization. We provide an overview of the central insights of the sociology of gender and masculinity, and argue that terrorist social movements should be examined through a gendered lens. We then present an analysis of the two largest cases of terrorism in US history, the Oklahoma City bombing and the World Trade Center attacks, highlighting their gendered dimensions. Finally, we examine the discourse of the contemporary US white supremacist movement, where gender is a central organizing ideology, and a tool for attracting new recruits (Abstract from ibid, 1).

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“In America, ‘the hegemonic definition of manhood is a man in power, a man
with power, and a man of power. We equate manhood with being strong, successful, capable, reliable, in control” (Kimmel 2003). Kimmel draws upon psychologist Robert Brannon’s characterization of manhood as four phrases:

‘1. ‘No Sissy Stuff’: One may never do anything that even remotely suggests femininity. Masculinity is the relentless repudiation of the feminine.  
2. 2. ‘Be a Big Wheel’: Masculinity is measured by power, success, wealth, and status  
3. 3. ‘Be a sturdy Oak’: Masculinity depends upon remaining calm and reliable in a crisis...Boys don’t cry...  
4. 4. ‘Give ‘em Hell’: Exude an aura of manly daring and aggression.’ (Kimmel 2003)” (5).

“Sociologists of gender have demonstrated that gender is a social construct and masculinity and femininity performances. There is no biological or inner essence, but gender is constructed differently throughout history and across cultures. Masculinity must be performed; it can never be proven once and for all. It must be demonstrated again and again, and is always vulnerable and at risk. We go about our lives performing our gender all of the time, often unconsciously. Social movements are thus one site where gender is performed” (5-6).

“We believe that the gender of terrorism often is a response to the ‘terror’ of gender – especially the dramatic increase in gender equality, and changing definitions of femininity and masculinity, that have been attendant upon globalization” (9).  
“Terror proceeds less by rational calculation, and more by emotion. And the reigning motivation of terrorism is revenge for perceived humiliation. To be sure, the motivations for terrorism are often political, and the calculations of events rationally planned and technically coordinated. But underneath both the group’s planning and the individual’s decision to act, lie the specific emotion: humiliation. Terrorism is about the restoration of honor, the retrieval of something lost. It is about saving face, about revenge for wrongs already committed. And, in this way, terrorism is about the restoration of a damaged masculinity” (9).

“Kimmel, Connell and other sociologists have argued that the gender order is in crisis, and masculinity in particular. We are facing ‘a historic collapse of the legitimacy of patriarchal power and a global movement for the emancipation of women...feminist movements throughout the world have challenged and contested men’s institutional power and the ideas that support this power’ (Messner 1997:10)” (10).

“Various men’s movements are responding to what they see as the ‘feminization’ of men and are trying to retrieve and rediscover some masculine essence that they believe has been lost (Ferber 2003; Messner 1997). Most rely on some essentialist notions about gender, a belief that ideological and social changes attendant upon globalization – such as feminism and multiculturalism – have
inverted the traditional, natural order, and especially the natural gender order. The women’s and the gay and lesbian movements have also undercut male heterosexual authority” (10).

“Several themes run throughout our research on terrorism: the experience of humiliation; the attempt to recover something that is believed to have been lost; an attempt to reassert one’s masculinity” (10).

“Public policy analyst Jessica Stern spent six years interviewing terrorists that are members of various holy-war organizations. She found one central recurring theme throughout the interviews: the experience of humiliation…Similarly, Ayman Zawahiri, deputy to Osama bin Laden, ‘describes globalization and the new world order as deeply humiliating to Muslims. That’s why, he says, he encourages the youth of Islam to carry arms and defend their religion with pride and dignity rather than submit to the humiliation of globalization’ (Stern 2004)” (10-11).

“Stern concludes that, ‘Holy wars take off when there is a large supply of young men who feel humiliated and deprived; when leaders emerge who know how to capitalize on those feelings; and when a segment of the society is willing to fund them. They persist when organizations and individuals profit from them psychologically or financially. But they are dependent first and foremost on a deep pool of humiliation.’ She found that humiliation, at either the personal or cultural level, provides fodder for terrorist movements. In her analysis of Palestinian terrorists, she argues that ‘real or perceived national humiliation of the Palestinian people by Israeli policies, and often by Israeli individuals, has given rise to desperation and uncontrollable rage. Terrorist leaders have learned to harness’ this rage (Stern 2003:32)” (11).

“The Palestinian organization Hamas convinces disenfranchised, impoverished, hopeless youths, mostly boys, that becoming martyrs will turn them into real men, and bring their families wealth, and them the rewards of many virgins in heaven…One scholar argues that suicide bombing missions ‘dehumiliate the deeply humiliated and traumatized. They become involved in terrorism not only to belittle their enemies but also to provide themselves with a sense of power’ (Stern 2003:54)…[they] see the path of terrorism as the only avenue available for them to achieve manhood. It is in death, not life, that they are offered their manhood” (11-12).

“We argue that specific manifestations of terrorism provide men with an opportunity to perform their masculinity; in particular, men who feel humiliated and emasculated. One cannot fully understand either their analysis of their situation nor their vision of the future without understanding how these terrorist movements are gendered. A gendered lens reveals that this sense of humiliation is a gendered sense of emasculation” (13).
“Atta [the pilot of the first plane to hit the World Trade Center during the September 11th attacks] was...[t]he youngest child of an ambitious lawyer father and a pampering mother, Atta grew up shy and polite, a mama's boy. ‘He was so gentle,’ his father said. ‘I used to tell him, ‘Toughen up, boy...’ Defeated, humiliated, emasculated, a disappointment to his father and a failed rival to his sisters, Atta retreated into increasingly militant Islamic theology...” (14-15).

“Terrorist organizations provide men with an opportunity to prove their masculinity. They are invited to take up arms to defend both their ideals, and their manhood” (15).

“In a globalizing world of gender inversion, ‘real men’ – Muslim faithful – have been called to arms against pretenders, western men who are not ‘real men.’ Islamist groups remind us again and again how the Muslim World has been diminished, lowered, debased, used, occupied, and emasculated by the West--with all the same fatuity and hysteria used by the far right in Europe and the United States. Here, for example, is Osama bin Laden, in a statement to the Arab news network Al Jazeera in December 1998: ‘Our brothers who fought in Somalia saw wonders about the weakness, feebleness, and cowardliness of the US soldiers.... We believe that we are men, Muslim men who must have the honor of defending [Mecca] -- We do not want American women soldiers defending [it]... The rulers in that region have been deprived of their manhood ... and they think that the people are women. By God, Muslim women refuse to be defended by these American and Jewish prostitutes’” (23-24).

“In this way, acts of terrorism resemble traditional wars less well than they remind one of domestic violence. There, too, men describe their feelings of powerlessness, humiliation and shame at the collapse of their patriarchal authority. (It is axiomatic among analysts of domestic violence that men beat their wives not when their patriarchal authority is fully asserted, but when it is challenged and when it breaks down.) Domestic violence, like terrorism, is restorative, an act of retrieval, of reclamation of lost but rightful authority” (24).

“Terrorist discourses are remarkably similar, and we find the same emotions undergirding ideologies mobilizing terrorists of all stripes. Indeed, a central question for sociologists to address is how are terrorists created? While in the popular mind, it may be attractive to demonize terrorists as insane, driven, madmen, one is not born a terrorist. As Maalouf argues, no ‘particular affiliation, be it ethnic, religious, national or anything else, predisposes anyone to murder. We have only to review the events of the last few years to see that any human community that feels humiliated or fears for its existence will tend to produce killers. And these killers will commit the most dreadful atrocities in the belief that they are right to do so and deserve the admiration of their fellows in this world and bliss in the next’ (Maalouf 2000:28). Examining the gendered discourse of emasculation and masculinity provides us with some insight into the process of how societies give birth to terrorists” (25).

Abstract:
The present paper will attempt to conceptualise the mechanisms of honour humiliation in post-Saddam Iraq, in order to help prevent further escalation of violence within the region. While different variables can account for the present security situation, there is no doubt that the divide between foreign troops and the Iraqi population is growing. Indeed, communities that voiced their approval of the ‘liberation’ of Iraq to the author in June 2003, now refer to their country as being occupied, and are calling for an end to “American rule”. For this reason, the axis between occupier and occupied will be primarily analysed, this through the dynamics of humiliation, which in an Iraqi context is closely linked to the notion of honour and shame. The role of the media, national and international, will be assessed with regards to perpetration of perceptions on both sides of the divide. Is the increasing security vacuum the result of a self-fulfilling prophecy? (Abstract from ibid, 1).

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“Shame is the result of the self-perception of a failure to live up to certain standards and ideals. Of importance to the analysis of humiliation is therefore the perception of an event as shameful, itself depending on cultural parameters. What is considered shame-inducing in an environment, such as having a woman directing traffic and ordering cars to stop, might not only be considered as the norm in another culture, but also as reflecting gender equality” (2).

“‘Saddam never humiliated us the way the Americans do, I had a job, I was safe, and now look at me,’ said Ali Rasheed, exposing a large defence wound on his right leg. Ali Rasheed is a 38 year old ‘retired’ police officer who claims to have been robbed by four US marines on May 19th 2003, at an army checkpoint located in the south of Baghdad –on the road to Eskanderia” (4).

“Ali also felt humiliated for a number of other reasons, he was stripped of his social status as part of the CPA’s de-bathification program. He now is unable to provide for his family ever again as a civil servant, and has also lost his institutionalised monopoly of physical force” (5).


Abstract:
No abstract found.

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“Adorno also insisted that the global evolution of the media and new technologies that shrank distances as it eroded face-to-face-contact (and hence the ability to disregard the consequences of one's actions) had created a climate in which rituals of violence had become so entrenched in the culture that ‘aggression, brutality, and sadism’ had become a normalized and unquestioned part of everyday life. The result is a twisted and pathological relationship with the body that not only tends towards violence, but also promotes what Adorno called the ‘ideology of hardness.’ Hardness, in this instance, refers to a notion of masculinity based on an idea of toughness” (15).

“The rituals of popular culture, especially reality television programs like Survivor, The Apprentice, Fear Factor, and the new vogue of extreme sports either condense pain, humiliation, and abuse into digestible spectacles of violence or serve up an endless celebration of retrograde competitiveness, making the compulsion to “go it alone,” the ideology of hardness, and power over others the central features of masculinity. Masculinity in this context treats lies, manipulation, and violence as a sport, a crucial component that lets men connect with each other at some primal level in which the pleasure of the body, pain, and competitive advantage are maximized while coming dangerously close to giving violence a glamorous and fascist edge” (15).

“From video games to Hollywood films to children's toys, popular culture is increasingly bombarded with militarized values, symbols, and images. Such representations of masculinity and violence mimic fascism's militarization of the public sphere, where physical aggression is a crucial element of male bonding and violence is the ultimate language, referent, and currency through which to understand how, as Susan Sontag has suggested in another context, politics ‘dissolves ... into pathology’” (16).

“Such militarized pedagogies play a powerful role in producing identities and modes of agency completely at odds with those elements of autonomy, critical reflection, and social justice that Adorno privileged in his essay” (16).


Abstract
This paper examines G-Town, a Palestinian hip hop crew from Shu’afat Refugee Camp in Jerusalem. G-Town is part of a worldwide cultural phenomenon in which marginalized youths borrow and adapt African-American hip hop culture
to their socio-political contexts. Their ability to convey authenticity as rap artists comes from living in a refugee camp, where they are exposed to drugs, violence, and limited opportunities. While G-Town uses rap music as a vehicle to express their opposition to the Israeli occupation, they also use rap music to reclaim their masculinity, especially as Palestinian masculinity has become increasingly emasculated by the practices of the occupation. With Tupac Shakur as their model, the members of G-Town have created for themselves a hyper form of masculinity as a way of coping with the occupation. Rapping has enabled G-Town to emerge as self-appointed leaders of local camp youth, and through their music, they encourage their mainly male audiences to resist the Israeli occupation, while they criticize those who remain passive and whose masculinity thus becomes questionable. Not all their peers, however, are supportive of rap music, and criticize G-Town for having given up practices traditionally associated with the camp’s notion of masculinity (Abstract from ibid, 231).

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“More specifically, I contend that G-Town and their followers use rap as a means of reclaiming their masculinity, by reconstructing it through rap, and thus empowering themselves as men, particularly at a time when Palestinian masculinity is being challenged and significantly weakened” (234).

“More recently, this crisis in masculinity has been interpreted more severely as ‘emasculature’ or the total loss of male power. In the post Second Intifada period, Naaman claims that Palestinian men ‘interpret the humiliation [at the checkpoints] as feminization. They are questioned, searched, ordered around, and in general have little control over their agency. Since they associate lack of power with the feminine position, they feel doubly humiliated’ (2006: 175)” (239).

“Whereas during the First Intifada confrontations with soldiers and beatings endured were construed as empowering, today, it is just the opposite; the occupation humiliates and robs Palestinian men of their most precious characteristic, their rujula [manhood]. Young men whose masculinity has been challenged or questioned may suffer serious consequences. Hart has shown in his work on masculinity in a Palestinian refugee camp in Jordan that young men who strayed from the camp’s construction of masculinity were rendered as ‘tant,’ or as ‘homosexual,’ and subjected to abuse (2008: 8-12)” (239).

“Among Palestinians in Jerusalem and the West Bank, the weakening of masculinity parallels reports of increased domestic violence and my own observations of aggressive behavior (such as owning attack dogs and guns or driving recklessly), corroborating the findings of Sa’ar and Yahia-Younis (2008) who argue for a similar crisis of masculinity among Palestinian Israelis caused by ongoing political and cultural marginalization” (239).

“In the very emasculating context of the current practices of the occupation, rap has made the members of G-Town feel increasingly masculine in ways that other
typical male activities apparently have not. In particular, rapping has enabled G-Town to express their anger against the occupation, something that they are prevented from easily doing in their everyday lives” (239).

“Instead of taking risks or appearing passive, G-Town uses rap to openly criticize and confront Israel’s hegemonic practices while at the same time displaying a tough, resistant, masculine image” (240).

“The members of G-Town identify with Tupac [Shakur] because he also originated from the ‘ghetto’ and wrote about the institutionalized discrimination against African-Americans in the US, which they relate to as Palestinians under Israeli occupation. I further argue that Tupac, in addition to other African-American rappers, offers an alternative construction of masculinity, especially as the local notion of masculinity has failed youths in resisting the occupation. Tupac’s lyrics, his ‘thug life’ image, and his ‘cool pose’—his physical postures, clothing styles, social roles, behaviors, styles of walk, speech, hand shaking, and so forth—all emit a hyper, almost threatening, masculinity that serves as a kind of coping mechanism against oppression and racism (Iwamoto 2003)” (240).

“Mimicking this hyper-masculinity through hand signals (see Figure 3) and the ‘gangsta’ style of dress (baggy pants, ostentatious gold jewelry [‘bling’] and hooded sweat-shirts, but adding the Palestinian keffiya as representative of the local context as seen in Figure 1), the members of G-Town have constructed a new resistant and tougher masculinity that is rooted in the camp ‘ghetto,’ and with which Israeli authorities are unfamiliar” (240-241).

“The members of G-Town have also become empowered through their music. Through music, they have become self-appointed youth leaders in the camp, a role that otherwise would be denied to them by both the Israeli occupation and elite segments of Palestinian society because of their refugee status” (241).

“By representing the collective voice of Palestinians in Jerusalem, and not just rapping about their personal lives, G-Town has amassed a small following of youths from inside and outside the camp. They have taken some of these youths under their wings and taught them to rap. They also act as protective ‘uncles,’ scolding these youths when they engage in activities that might give G-Town and Palestinian rap music a negative image, such as drinking alcohol or smoking hashish (conversation, Ahmad, Malek, and ‘Imad, 12 October 2008). According to B-Boy, the fans listen to everything he says and will do whatever he tells them (interview, August 6, 2007), suggesting a set of power relations similar to that of urban gangs in the US” (241).

“Being critical of those who remain passive to the Israeli occupation and whose masculinity thus becomes questionable is a common theme in G-Town’s rap” (243).
“G-Town also uses live performances as a means of encouraging the practice of sumud [perseverance] and of imbuing the primarily male audiences with a renewed sense of masculinity. This was particularly noticeable with their performance at a musical hafla (party) at the al-Hakawati Palestinian National Theater. Organized by residents of Shu’afat camp, the management of the theater had expressed concern that the (male) camp residents in attendance would live up to their reputations of being ‘dangerous’ (B-Boy, personal communication, June 14, 2008). This perceived sense of danger may have been one reason that the management of the theater insisted that the majority of the audience, almost entirely shabab (young men) between the ages of 12 to 23, sit up in the balcony, far from the stage, segregated from the small number of women, families and foreigners who were seated close to the stage. When asked about the segregation, one of the ushers said that the young men had to sit upstairs so that they would not ‘disturb the girls…’ putting the males up in the balcony was clearly an attempt to rein them in and subdue their ‘dangerous’ masculinity for the evening” (244- 245).

“Despite the potential that rap music has to empower Palestinian males, not all are supportive of the hip hop culture that G-Town and other youths have embraced. Some of their peers, both inside and outside the camp, ironically consider rap music as being rather effeminate. According to one young man who worked closely with G-Town, some of their peers perceive G-Town as having gone ‘soft’ or weak in that they no longer have time to pick fights (Ahmad, personal communication, August 20, 2008). Another friend of theirs criticized the hip hop style of clothing that G-Town wears as being ‘homosexual’ (Tareq, personal communication, November 14, 2008)” (246).

“G-Town’s message, very much directed at young males, did not exactly correspond to the gender ideals of the mixed male and female crowd, reflecting Hart’s observation that the masculinity of refugee camp youth is very much bounded as well as reinforced by the camp itself (2008: 12-13)” (247).

“When G-Town climbed on top of the Hummer and began to rap in protest of the Mughrabi gate excavations, their rap voiced not only their anger at having come of age under Israeli occupation, but also empowered them as Palestinian men in the very emasculating context of the ongoing Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem. G-Town’s appropriation of rap has given them a kind of elevated stature within Shu’afat Refugee Camp” (247).


Abstract:
Taking as its starting-point emerging discussion about gender and nationalism, this article considers the masculinities constructed by and for adolescent males born into a Palestinian refugee camp in Jordan. I consider the relationship of these masculinities to the construction of the camp as a moral and socio-political space. Through the employment of ethnographic material, the article demonstrates the ways in which young males—through the performance of a particular, dominant vision of masculinity termed mukhayyamji—serve to reproduce the camp as authentic location of an exilic national community. The article also examines the implications for individual young men of this interplay between masculine performance and the reproduction of the camp as a moral and socio-political space. It explores the consequences both for those who fail or choose not to uphold the idealized, mukhayyamji adolescent masculinity and for those who evince the skills and qualities that this entails. It is argued that, while the former risk marginalization from the camp as a moral and socio-political community, the latter face marginalization from the economic life of wider Jordanian society and, with that, endanger the transition to social adulthood. Thus, a set of paradoxes emerge for young males that reflects the ambiguous position of the Palestinian refugees in Jordan at a specific moment in the history of Jordan and the Palestinian national struggle (Abstract from ibid, 64).

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:

“In his seminal study of nationalism, Benedict Anderson observed that ‘in the modern world everyone can, should, will ‘have’ a nationality, as he or she ‘has’ a gender’ (1991: 5). Over the past two decades numerous authors have brought these two themes together, exploring the relationship between nation and gender across diverse contexts (e.g. Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989; Kandiyoti 1991; Parker et al. 1992; Yuval-Davis 1997; McClintock et al. 1997)….Thus, the representation of gendered roles and practices as the immutable expression of biologically-rooted difference has been revealed for its relationship to historically-specific efforts to secure the viability of diverse projects of nation” (64).

“My second aim in this article is to consider the implications for individual young men of the interplay between masculinities and the reproduction of the camp as the heartland of the displaced Palestinian nation. We need to ask about the consequences both for those who fail or choose not to uphold the idealized, mukhayyamji adolescent masculinity as well as for those who evince the skills and qualities that this entails. As I shall argue, while the former risk marginalization from the camp as a moral and socio-political community, the latter face marginalization from the economic life of wider Jordanian society and, with that, endanger the transition to social adulthood. Thus, a set of paradoxes emerge for young males that reflect the ambiguous position of the Palestinian refugees in Jordan at a specific moment in the history of Jordan and the Palestinian national struggle” (65).

“In considering the relationship between nation and gender it is vital to
acknowledge the plurality of masculinities constructed in relation to different nationalisms (Cornwall and Lindisfarne 1994: 18; Connell 1995: 37). These various masculinities are liable to differentiation as they intersect with factors of class, ethnicity, and age (relative and chronological)” (69).

“As Connell [in his book Gender and Power, 1987] explained ‘hegemonic masculinity’ is not totalizing and exclusive but ‘is always constructed in relation to various subordinated masculinities as well as in relation to women’ (p. 183)” (69).

“Cut adrift from the PLO that had historically spoken for all Palestinians, and subject to a highly ambiguous relationship to the Jordanian state, the national community-in-exile lacked institutions that might call forth and legitimate specific masculinities. Various authors have shown how, in particular, the army plays a critical role in both representation of the nation and the construction of hegemonic masculinities (e.g. Kanitkar 1994; Allen 2000; Mayer 2000b; Sinclair-Webb 2000b; Kaplan 2000, 2003). However, no organized military force equivalent to a state army existed for the residents of the camps in Jordan. Although the fathers and uncles of young men in Hussein Camp had been active as fedayeen (freedom fighters) with the PLO, such opportunities had long since ceased by the late 1990s. Meanwhile the Jordanian Army was commonly seen as exclusionary…” (70).

“In the absence of support from formal institutions such as the military for models of masculinity, the family and local neighbourhood played an especially important valorizing role. Here, children from the earliest age were caught up in the processes of gendering, encouraged by older siblings and other household members into particular gendered roles, behaviours and dispositions. The disparity between boys and girls as well as between different masculinities was impossible to ignore” (70).

“From the perspective of mukhayyamji masculinity, full membership of the socio-political and moral community of the camp required physical strength by definition not possessed by the tant [which equates with the English slang words ‘poofter’ or ‘nancy-boy’]….a central concern of mukhayyamji adolescents was the aggressive protection of women. A neighbourhood unable to fight successfully left its female members open to unwelcome interference, dishonouring all. It was, of course, assumed in this that women were weak and in need of male protection” (73).

“Amongst older boys, from about 14 years of age, explicit reference was also made to sexuality and sexual desire. According to informal discussions and everyday references, it seemed that sexual activity amongst teenage boys, specifically anal intercourse, was fairly commonplace….In all cases, my informants stressed that they had taken the ‘insertor’ role. Nobody ever told me about their experiences as ‘insertee’ but all were quick to name others who were
reputed to so…” (74).

“Allowing other males to penetrate him was a sure sign that he must actually desire it and, thus, of inherent deviance and weakness. This was the clearest, most unambiguous expression of ‘tant-hood’—the diametric opposite of mukhayyamji. Young men who were believed to enjoy such sexual activity were routinely taunted as they passed through the neighbourhood, often by the same people who claimed to have penetrated them” (75).

“For a young man from his mid-teens on, demonstrating his strong appetite for women and his desirability were also facets of mukhayyamji masculinity. To do this, he would generally go to other parts of the city with his friends to see and be seen by women. The nearest suitable locale was a commercial district close by—Jabal Hussein—where young people would gather most evenings to drink fruit juice and flirt. The only young women from the camp allowed to socialize here were in family groups. The unaccompanied girls at this spot were, therefore, believed to be from Jabal Hussein itself which contributed to the perception amongst young males from the camp that their peers living in this area were all tantaat since they had not prevented their sisters’ unshielded appearance in front of so many unrelated young men” (75).

“The view that the camp was full of streetwise and menacing mukhayyamji males was one that I heard often from people of all social classes living outside the camp. This notion kept many of them out, serving to reinforce the separateness of the camp from the rest of the city and its distinctiveness as a socio-political and moral space. On the other hand, I met numerous people living outside the camp, all of them of Palestinian origin, who expressed admiration for the mukhayyamji adolescents. In their eyes, these young males had not become softened by the comfortable life in Amman that many Palestinians now enjoyed. They were still tough and would still be able, if required, to fight for the recovery of Palestine. In this sense, the mukhayyamji masculinity served to reinforce a view of the camp as the authentic heart of the Palestinian community-in-exile not only in the estimation of its residents but amongst outsiders as well” (76).

“As noted earlier, sexual acts between adolescent males were accepted providing these involved two people between whom a clear imbalance of power already existed—most commonly due to relative age…As Parker et al. have observed: Typically represented as a passionate brotherhood, the nation find itself compelled to distinguish its ‘proper’ homosociality from more explicitly sexualized male–male relations, a compulsion that requires the identification, isolation, and containment of male homosexuality (1992: 6)….The Palestinian nation-in-exile, as constituted in Hussein Camp, strongly invoked the ‘passionate brotherhood’ mentioned by Parker et al. Therefore, it was perhaps inevitable that a young man who was considered to enjoy the role of insertee could have no place within the camp as authentic location of that national community in exile” (78).
“In this setting, as elsewhere in much of the Arab Middle East, marriage and parenthood were important markers of respected adult status. However, in order to marry a young man would have to accrue considerable material resources to cover the costs of a marital home, a wedding party, and the mahr (‘brideprice’) which often took the form of items such as a wardrobe of new clothes for the bride and gold jewellery. Since employment opportunities within Hussein Camp were meagre, most young men were obliged to pursue livelihood strategies beyond the camp” (77-78).

“In practice, young men from the camp did succeed in gaining reasonable employment, and thereby acquiring the economic capacity to wed. However, in doing so they had not emphasized the traits of mukhayyamji masculinity—toughness, independence and strength. Through studiousness and diligence they managed to overcome the obstacles arising from residence in the camp. In their demeanour these young men generally did not display the kind of aggressiveness that was associated with the mukhayyamji in the minds of outsiders, and many seemed to build connections beyond the camp that were helpful for employment” (79).

“In the late 1990s the sentiments of secular nationalism were still strongly evident in Hussein Camp, particularly within the domestic sphere of home and immediate neighbourhood. This served as an important source for the reproduction of a particular, dominant model of masculinity that I have referred to in this article as mukhayyamji” (79).

“Nevertheless, beyond the camp, the difficulties encountered by those who maintained the mukhayyamji performance of toughness and independence in securing a livelihood indicates a paradoxical vulnerability created by this style of masculinity. In the late 1990s there were many unmarried young men in Hussein Camp who occupied a social space between adolescence and the social adulthood conferred by marriage and children. No longer admired symbols of youthful potency, independence and toughness, their position in the socio-political and moral life of the camp was ambiguous and uncomfortable” (79).

“On one hand, through the demonstration of toughness, independence, strength and potency they had served to reinforce the distinctiveness of Hussein Camp as a socio-political and moral space, preventing its submergence into Amman’s ever-expanding ribbon of working-class neighbourhoods that circled the city. These young men had been visible reminder of the refugees’ enduring self-identity and of their continuing ability and determination to reclaim their homeland. While other Palestinians accepted the compromises necessary to obtain some measure of comfort in Jordanian society, young mukhayyamji males amongst the population of the camps, such as Hussein, indexed a reassuring loyalty (ikhlaas) to the notional idea of return” (79).
“On the other hand, the ‘true’ mukhayyamji risked his own transition to social adulthood. Since the PLO had little interest in the Jordanian refugee camps, let alone a need for young fighters and activists, a validated route to an explicitly ‘Palestinian’ adulthood was not obvious. Furthermore, following the compromises of the Oslo Peace Process ‘return’ was a more distant possibility than ever. Meanwhile, prevented from migration in search of well-paid work, young refugees were unavoidably dependent upon economic opportunities within Amman. This was at a time, following Jordan’s peace treaty and growing co-operation with Israel, when overt expressions of toughness and potency identifiable with the refugee camps was little appreciated by the authorities and a potential embarrassment to upwardly mobile Palestinians. Caught between an insecure and fractured project of nation, and the demands of a local economy and polity for conformity, mukhayyamji masculinity appeared to offer adolescent boys in Hussein Camp a short-lived moment of empowerment” (79).


**Abstract:**
No abstract found.

**Additional Notes and/or Quotes:**
“But a close look at the patterns of murderous violence in the U.S. reveals some remarkable consistencies, wherever the individual atrocities may have occurred. In case after case, decade after decade, the killers have been shown to be young men riddled with shame and humiliation, often bitterly misogynistic and homophobic, who have decided that the way to assert their faltering sense of manhood and get the respect they have been denied is to go out and shoot somebody.”

“Dr. James Gilligan, who has spent many years studying violence as a prison psychiatrist in Massachusetts, and as a professor at Harvard and now at N.Y.U., believes that some debilitating combination of misogyny and homophobia is a ‘central component’ in much, if not most, of the worst forms of violence in this country. ‘What I’ve concluded from decades of working with murderers and rapists and every kind of violent criminal,’ he said, ‘is that an underlying factor that is virtually always present to one degree or another is a feeling that one has to prove one’s manhood, and that the way to do that, to gain the respect that has been lost, is to commit a violent act.’”

“Violence is commonly resorted to as the antidote to the disturbing emotions raised by the widespread hostility toward women in our society and the
pathological fear of so many men that they aren’t quite tough enough, masculine enough — in short, that they might have homosexual tendencies. In a culture that is relentless in equating violence with masculinity, ‘it is tremendously tempting,’ said Dr. Gilligan, ‘to use violence as a means of trying to shore up one’s sense of masculine self-esteem.’”


**Abstract:**
Much has been written about the contribution of Palestinian women to their nation's liberation struggle. They have not only survived in an atmosphere of remorseless violence, but have also made remarkable strides in terms of their rights and development as women. A question that has been less explored is the long-term impact of violence against women, whether in terms of their physical and psychological well-being or of their ability to participate in a meaningful way either in the conflict itself or in the post-conflict situation. This paper argues that, although Palestinian women are not simply victims but also agents of violence, such violence—whether random or institutionalised, perpetrated by the enemy or by their own people—places significant constraints on their ability to participate in the national liberation struggle. Consequently, they are inadequately prepared to contribute towards the peace process and, therefore, are prevented from realising their full potential in the new state (*Abstract from ibid, 223*).

**Additional Notes and/or Quotes:**
“...She argues that 'many of the Palestinian families who fled their homes did so primarily out of fear that their women would be raped by Zionist soldiers... For many Palestinian men, saving their women from rape was more important than defending their homes or showing personal bravery and defiance' (Warnock 1990:23). In Warnock's view, defence of the land and defence of women are closely connected. Peteet, too, suggests that, as the 'conflict spread and intensified, women were becoming victims of war precisely because they were women, the crucial repositories of family honor' (Peteet 1991:59)” (227).

“The shock of being abruptly removed from their land and dumped into the alien and crowded environment of refugee camps gave rise to feelings of despair and powerlessness among Palestinians, particularly among men. Having lost everything, many men found themselves with only one outlet through which to express their authority—the family—and, in some cases, this led to abuses of male power within the home. It is conceivable that such conditions, supported by a belief that Islam permits, under certain circumstances, the physical punishment by men of their wives, have been at least partially responsible for providing a basis for violent treatment. When traditional structures are combined with
Since the Palestinians lack a state and an army, they have been unable to wage war in the conventional sense. Theirs has been an unequal struggle, using non-violent means, such as civil disobedience and peaceful resistance, and, on occasions, violent methods, such as armed struggle and terrorism. Although there have been some successes in the fight against Israeli occupation, on the whole the Palestinian struggle can be said to have failed, and, in the process, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have experienced bitterness and disillusionment, as well as extreme forms of violence, in terms of forced removal from the land, the humiliation of occupation, negation of identity, and denial of basic human rights. As men have traditionally been responsible for defending the community, their inability to do so and their apparent powerlessness in the face of a militarily superior enemy has caused a crisis of masculinity (229).

In response to feelings of powerlessness and shame, young Palestinian boys and men took it upon themselves to confront the occupation. They did it by asserting their own strength, in the form of stone throwing and verbal taunts, and by turning the beatings, torture, and imprisonment inflicted on them by the occupying Israeli authorities into something positive, 'a critical rite of passage into adulthood' (Peteet 2000:114)” (229).

“The so-called 'new Palestinian masculinity' also had a number of negative implications for Palestinian women. To begin with, it reinforced the existing presumption of a masculine-based nationalism…Another outcome has been a rise in domestic violence, as some Palestinian men have turned their anger and frustration on female members of their own family” (230).


Abstract:
No abstract found.

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“Enloe disagrees[that the sexual humiliation/torture was used in this particular instance because it plays on Islamic male prejudices]: "I don't think this is especially humiliating for Arab men. It's like saying that form of torture is effective against 'them' but we tough guys can't be softened up that way. But the way torture is designed, it usually plays out the fears of the torturer themselves, not just the tortured."
Abstract:
This chapter examines the connections between ethnic violence, rural-urban migration, changing family structures and masculinities in the case of Lebanon. It argues that urbanization and the emergence of nuclear family forms have challenged traditional masculine identities. The resulting tensions have been partly resolved by adopting stronger ethnic identities. Ethnic nationalism is shown to have filled the moral vacuum created by the break from the ordered world of rural extended-kinship structures, and to have helped resolve difficult tensions within the urban nuclear family (Abstract from ibid, 113).

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“Wherever they are fought – in Lebanon (Johnson 2001), Bosnia (Gutman 1993) or India (Das 1997; Menon and Bhasin 1998) – what is striking about ethnic or communal wars is that the style of violence is so gruesome and nasty. The aim, it seems, is not just to ‘cleanse’ the space of the homeland by driving out or killing the Other but to kill in particularly brutal ways, involving the violation and mutilation of the bodies of men and women, and thus the utter degradation and humiliation of the enemy community” (113).

“The mutilations and other acts of war are heavy with symbolism, involving a particular construction of masculinity associated with the cultural values of honour and shame” (113-114).

“Family values are so powerful that social and political threats to them often provoke a romantic reaction…Similarly, the growing support for Amal in Lebanon can be seen, in part, as a romantic reaction by Shia men whose masculinity was threatened by difficulties in finding employment and by the ideas of gender-equality propagated by Lebanese socialist and communist parties” (118).

“In the contemporary world, those countries afflicted by ethnic nationalism all seem to share sexual or gender repression…In most of these societies, there is a pronounced sense of male honour and women’s shame where it is incumbent on the male to prevent his women descending into a shameless state of being. In Lebanon, ‘honour crimes’ involving a man killing his daughter, wife or sister for sexual misconduct are often only punished by a token prison sentence of a few months, and the newspapers regularly carry reports of men killing ‘their’ women in order to protect family honour (Younes 1999)” (118).

Abstract:
Ethnic conflict is a pervasive feature of the modern world, yet while there are many studies of the social construction of difference, there are few that deal with the emotional content of ethnic violence. Drawing on sociological and psychoanalytic theory and using comparative examples from other parts of the world, Michael Johnson examines the history of confessional or ethnic identity in Lebanon and the civil wars of the 1970s and 1980s. He demonstrates that far from being residues of a traditional society, the values of ethnic honor and shame are peculiarly modern phenomena. He explains the horrors of ethnic warfare in terms of social threats to patriarchal authority in sexually repressive families. These threats fuel a style of violence in which shame acquires its own dynamics (Abstract from book description).

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“The mutilations and other acts of [the Lebanese Civil] war were heavy with symbolism. Male bodies were castrated to strike at their manhood and reproductive capacity. Women were raped not just to provide recreation for the fighters but also to dishonour the victims’ men who should have protected them. The wombs of pregnant women were cut open to destroy the accursed progeny of the hated Other” (61).

“In times of peace men might lust after the women of the Other but to interfere with them invited reprisals, and ‘honour crimes’ were usually treated leniently by the courts. For a time this ‘entente’ shielded women in the early days of the civil war (Sharara 1978: 12). Women were rarely taken hostage and those who were were quickly released…To harm a woman was haram, ‘ayb, shameful…Gradually, however, the boundaries were crossed and men entered the Other’s field of shame. After all, honour was in part an expression of communal pride and vengeance. It required that any attack against one’s own people or their property should be repaid and, as the protagonists became inured to violence, large-scale massacres and associated rapes became more common” (62).

“What is important to recognize is that such slaughter not only served as a deterrent and therefore conformed to the cultural rule that honourable men should defend their community, but it was also retributive – a just and many would say divinely sanctioned punishment for the outsiders’ affront to the community’s honour” (62).

“Now [after the development of a free peasantry in Lebanon], though, even men from humble social backgrounds could lay claim to [honour] by asserting themselves against others in acts of violence that had previously been the prerogative of the lords and their retainers. In a normative sense, all men who were not subjected to the control of landlords had an ‘equal opportunity’ to be honourable in modern Lebanon. The use of the male noun is crucial here
because, of course, women continued to be excluded. Women remained the 
‘property’ of men, the difference being that they now ‘belonged’ to their 
husbands or fathers instead of their lords. Any man who aspired to honour would 
defend ‘his’ women from violation by others and would protect his family from 
impurity by imposing a sexual discipline on wives, daughters and sisters – even, 
occasionally, to the point of killing those who became shameless” (67-68).

“In warfare honour changed again. It became more of a matter of domination 
than egalitarianism…But whereas men had previously competed with each other 
largely to protect the honour of themselves and their families, they now fought to 
dominate and impose shame on a socially defined Other” (68).

Johnson, Penny, and Eileen Kuttab. “Where Have All the Women (and Men) Gone? 
Gender and the Intifada.” Review of Women’s Studies 1 (2002). 
http://home.birzeit.edu/wsi/images/stories/Where_have_all_the_women.pdf.

Abstract:
This is an abbreviated, and slightly revised and updated, version of an article 
first published in Feminist Review No. 69 (Winter 2001) in an issue edited by 
Amal Treacher and Hala Shukrallah entitled “The Realm of the Possible: Middle 
Eastern Women in Political and Social Spaces.” It is an initial attempt to 
understand the gendered forms of Palestinian activism during the second 
intifada, and, crucially, the crises men, women, and youth face in meeting their 
gender roles and responsibilities, including the responsibilities of mothering and 
fathering, in circumstances where protection of children is almost impossible.
Dynamics in the family, in the authors' framework, are integrally linked and 
interact with political dynamics and processes. These linkages are of crucial 
interest to a number of research projects at the Institute of Women's Studies 
(Abstract from ibid, 1).

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“The sacrifice and struggle of Palestinian young men and children in 
demonstrations at Israeli checkpoints placed at the borders of Palestinian towns 
and areas cannot be reduced to a simple crisis of masculine identity - crises in 
national, class and ethnic identity are deeply entwined. In this second intifada, 
young men and male children coming to the checkpoints are first and foremost 
protesting the confined conditions of their lives and futures, whether 
unemployed workers, refugee children who have never left Gaza, or even 
security and police personnel who have been patrolling these borders while they 
cannot themselves leave them. But they confront there a power that has defined 
them as marginal and constrained them as lesser beings” (8).

“More empirical investigation is needed to contrast the ‘rites’ of the second 
intifada, but we would suggest that there are significant differences [with those
of the first intifada]. First, there is the much greater presence of death and injury at the relatively stationary ‘flashpoints’ where demonstrators in effect expose themselves to Israeli fire… Although the first intifada also honored its martyrs, its images were guerilla in character, where protestors and stone-throwers emerged from the community, hurled their messages and missiles, and then returned to the community, living for another day. In the confrontations of the second intifada, the community is not a sustaining and protecting environment, but rather, eerily, an audience, both literally at the checkpoint and virtually whereby national and satellite television bring live minute by minute coverage into the home. In the later stages of the intifada, the young men who carried out suicide bombings only came home in another media form - posters plastered on the walls of refugee camps and urban main streets” (8-9).

“But there also may be an important difference in the re-entry into the community and masculine credentials and political capital acquired, given that for most of the young demonstrators, there is not forward movement into cadre roles or wider community leadership. Here, the system of rule that we have termed ‘authoritarian populism’ comes into play, a system which depends on ‘the people’ or ‘the street’ for legitimation, but constrains democratic politics and democratic participation. Whether the Authority itself, or Fateh, the dominant political party which is both the leading force in the intifada and the government, political leaders both use and are hostage to the power of insurgent young men - but without changing the relations between them… the crisis in masculinity was not resolved through popular resistance - and indeed increased militarism is perhaps the only ‘solution’ that was offered and it is certainly the direction that was taken” (9).

“The crisis in gender identities is also produced by a series of related crises, both in Palestinian nationalism after Oslo on the political level, and the multiple economic, social and humiliating effects of the Oslo apartheid system (as well as the long-term effects of occupation on the economy) which has marginalized some groups of men as providers and breadwinners, and destabilized male roles as heads of households… At the same time, young male roles as heroes and agents of national resistance have also been destabilized by the humiliating conditions of Oslo” (9).

“Thompson calls the linked reactions to stress in household, community and polity a ‘crisis in paternity’ (Thompson 2000, 6). Palestinian dislocations at these three levels - in households coping with shocks and in community and polity living in the tension between a weakened national authority and a dominant Israeli colonialism - also produce stress in gender roles that have been highly accentuated in the current intifada” (10).

“An underlying and urgent theme, voiced 'over and over again, by poor men and women as they describe the reasons and conditions of their impoverishment and vulnerability, is a profound crisis in the ability of male breadwinners to support
their families. This is an intensification of a trend clearly visible in the National Poverty Report 1998 where labor force participation did not prevent poverty for the three-quarters of poor households who were headed by a labor force participant, mostly male. (National Commission for Poverty Alleviation 1998, 43-44)” (10).

“The crisis of the male breadwinner is a gendered crisis and a family crisis. The effects of unemployment - whether psychological problems, loss of self-confidence, disruptions and tensions in family life, a rise in illness and morbidity or the "hardening of gender asymmetries" (Sen 1999,9) are effects that occur in the family and among its members and which place enormous stress on gender roles” (11).

“[A famous picture from the second intifada depicts] a young father in Gaza [as he] futilely attempts to shelter his son, 12-year old Mohammed Durra, as repeated Israeli fire takes his young life. Among the many ways this image, repeated in all Palestinian media, resonate is as a drastic, and tragic, image of a "crisis in paternity" (Thompson 2000, 284), denoting not simply a failure in paternal authority, but in paternal protection” (11).

“…a highly vulnerable male child is the symbol of a national struggle” (11).


Abstract:
It is impossible to watch, as Iraq spirals out of U.S. control (I write at the end of April 2004), without noting the depth and combustibility of the masculine crisis that has taken hold in and around Iraq. The crisis is double-edged and dialectical; it has both Iraqi and American dimensions. The purpose of this brief article is to examine the parameters and politico-military implications of this masculine crisis, which can be defined as the traumatic psychological and material consequences of the inability, or threatened inability, to conform to masculine role expectations (Abstract from ibid, 70).

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“[The masculine crisis] can be defined as the traumatic psychological and material consequences of the inability, or threatened inability, to conform to masculine role expectations” (70).

“I argue that it is typically the case that militarized conflicts and uprisings lead to disproportionate violence against younger adult males – those of imputed ‘battle age’ (military capability). Iraq is no exception. There, younger adult males constitute the most vulnerable population group in the present occupation and military struggle, if by ‘most vulnerable’ we mean the group most liable to be
targeted for killing, torture (including sexual torture and humiliation), and other acts of repression” (70).

“With the dismissal of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi soldiers, it may be that male unemployment has increased more dramatically than in the case of women. These mass layoffs also likely exacerbated the humiliation that many Iraqi men, including these soldiers, felt after Iraq’s rapid defeat on the battlefield. Furthermore, because of their suspicions about the political loyalties of Iraqi men, the occupation authorities have flown in contract workers from as far afield as Bangladesh and Nepal, rather than hiring locally. Economically desperate Iraqi men see this, too, as a humiliating slap” (70-71).

“For women, as well, growing unemployment and confinement in the home (exacerbated by the widespread insecurity in Iraq) represents an enormous and humiliating setback. Nonetheless, it can be contended that given patriarchal role expectations, a failure to find formal or adequate informal employment impacts existentially upon men-as-men to a greater extent than upon women-as-women. In any case, given men’s domination of the public sphere, this masculine crisis has direct and profound political consequences. The ranks of demobilized soldiers were probably the key ingredient in the early months of the Iraqi insurgency, while the more recent Shi’ite uprising has mobilized predominantly poor and unemployed men and male adolescents” (71).

“The element of gendered humiliation that runs through this account seems vital to understanding the atmosphere of masculine crisis. American commentator Thomas Friedman defines humiliation as ‘the single most underestimated force in international relations’” (71).

“Objective factors – particularly the socioeconomic ones just described [unemployment due to Occupation, etc] – are vital in setting the contours of masculine crisis in Iraq. Also key, however, is the strategy of gender-selective victimization of Iraqi males that lies at the heart of U.S. occupation policies. The measures directed overwhelmingly at males include harassment, humiliation before family members, mass roundups, incarceration, torture, selective killing, and denial of the right to humanitarian evacuation from besieged cities” (71).

“There was humiliation, too, in the sophisticated and widespread insurgency against the US occupiers that left the US occupation reeling in April 2004. ‘In the space of two weeks,’ notes the Washington Post, the insurgency ‘isolated the U.S.-appointed civilian government and stopped the American-financed reconstruction effort... pressured U.S. forces to vastly expand their area of operations within Iraq, while triggering a partial collapse of the new Iraqi security services ... [and] stirred support for the insurgents across both Sunni and Shiite communities.’ This massive blow paralyzed the US authorities on the ground and shocked their masters in Washington, along with those trying to ensure George
W. Bush’s re-election. The contrast between the macho “mission accomplished” rhetoric of the immediate post-conquest period, and the collapsing occupation structure at present, could hardly be more stark. Such contradictions injure a specifically masculine pride; they are the politico-military equivalent of a kick to the cojones” (72).

“Likewise, under conditions of protracted occupation of an alien population whose public face ranges from the sullen to the murderously hostile, the stress and isolation have increased, while discipline and self-esteem have declined; and so it is that once- or sometimes-stable masculinities have tilted towards abuse and atrocity” (73).


Abstract:
Several thousand Palestinian citizens of Israel currently volunteer to serve in various branches of the Israeli “security” apparatus. Members of this small group of mostly men are commonly perceived by other Palestinians as traitors to their people and are socially marginalized. Even soldiers who strain and sometimes break the limits of social acceptance, however, relate to their communities in dominant gendered terms. The critiques, explanations, and, occasionally, defenses of soldiering represent much larger concerns about the relationship of Palestinian citizens to the Israeli state, particularly concerns about Israelization, but are measured in relation to a family-centered provider masculinity. What the state offers or withholds from Arab soldiers plays a powerful role in shaping Palestinian discourses on masculinity and citizenship (Abstract from ibid, 260).

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“My project…[points to] the role of the state and colonial powers in setting the parameters for contests over the masculinities of both dominant and nondominant men. Not unlike Joseph Massad’s suggestion that Palestinian nationalist masculinity is ‘a new type of masculinity’ that has ‘little to do with ‘tradition’ (1995:467), I suggest that the agency of Palestinian men in Israel, both inside and outside the military, is better understood within strict limits set by the Israeli state. In this way, debates about masculinity are deeply caught up in debates about citizenship and nationalism” (261).

“A substantial body of scholarship argues that, for Jews in Israel, military service and masculinity are the focal points for debates about citizenship and identity. Indeed, the Israeli polity is said to be based on ‘a holy quartet’ of interrelated features: ‘Jewishness, masculinity, military service and collective membership’ (Lomsky-Feder and Ben-Ari 1999:162). Given the settler colonial history of the establishment of the state (Pappe 1994), ‘Israeli society was from the outset a ‘war society’ needing loyal and trained human power to help with
the military effort” (Yuval-Davis 1987:190). Moreover, the military has played a central nation-building role (Helman 1997, 2001). As the ‘workshop of the new nation’ (Peled 1998:128), universal (read Jewish) conscription was used to create and socialize new Jews (Weiss 2002:44). Service in the military and participation in ‘the ritual of security’ is a ‘second Bar Mitzvah’ (Kaplan 2000:138), a crucial rite of passage to full Israeli citizenship (Aronoff 1989:132) that indoctrinates cohort after cohort of Israeli Jewish youth” (261).

“That Palestinian soldiering is discussed in highly gendered terms is not surprising. Deborah Bernstein (2001) argues that the crossing of the boundaries of the collective is often linked with the crossing of boundaries of gendered morality. Palestinian women suspected of ‘collaboration,’ that is, of working with the Israeli secret service, are considered prostitutes, and some of the men suspected of collaboration are considered homosexual ‘deviants’ (B’Tselem 1994). The collaborators’ questionable loyalties are linked to their so-called questionable sexualities” (262).

“Indeed, one of the images emblematic for many Palestinians of the political compromise embodied in the Oslo and subsequent accords is that of Yasser Arafat kissing Yitzhak Rabin. Although physical greetings among Arab men are standard, the emphasis on the ‘eagerness’ and ‘cheapness’ of the kiss in this case carries sexual undertones. ‘They sold Palestine for a kiss’ again conflates national betrayal with ‘questionable’ sexuality. This is not to argue that the majority of Palestinians necessarily rejected the accords at the outset but that, when critical of them, they often used gendered tools. Five of the soldiers I interviewed used the image of the kiss; as one soldier told me, ‘If they sold the cause for an Israeli kiss, why should I fight for them?’ In this sense, national honor is closely associated with gender and sexual honor” (262).

“Daniel Monterescu argues that Palestinians living as a marginalized minority inside Israel—with ‘relentless contact with the occupying regime, and the ‘local’ other’ (2001:167)—are continuously involved in a process of negotiating cultural boundaries. This negotiation is often expressed as ‘the intensive definition and redefinition of the sexual boundaries of manhood’ (Monterescu 2001:167). Similarly, the discussion of soldiering and other forms of Israelization is articulated in terms of discussions of masculinity” (262).

“Like the condemnation of collaborators, the criticism of [Palestinians who volunteer to serve in the Israeli army] was often launched on the level of gendered morality. The belief that all such volunteers ‘are sons of prostitutes; not one of them is moral or decent’ is widely repeated. I also frequently encountered gendered criticism of a more subtle form, however—one that attributed a superficial, individualistic, immature, pubescent masculinity to the soldiers...Soldiers are widely perceived as needing the military to bolster their weak masculinities” (263).
“Fuad is a member of the Communist Party who has been active in trying to dissuade men who were considering enlisting. He described one young man whom he was unsuccessful in dissuading: ‘He thinks that because he is in the army he can do whatever he wants. He is hiding behind the uniform and the weapon because of his weak personality’” (263).

“Men evincing such masculinities were considered so clearly weak and vulnerable that the Israeli authorities supposedly preyed on them in an effort to gain young recruits and to divide and rule the Arab community. Palestinian soldiers were accused of “seducing” other young men into soldiering, under direction from the Israeli authorities, by showing them their guns” (264).

“One of the soldiers I interviewed described himself as having in the past performed a shallow masculinity like the one described to me by the therapist and others…The implication of these deployments is the dismissal of military service as a form of false or superficial masculinity—a masculinity that requires military props and cannot stand on its own. Although not considered alien or unnatural, this masculinity is seen by many as part of a pubescent phase that should be quickly outgrown and transcended—usually with the guidance of mature fathers. Idealized Palestinian masculinity, in contrast, is not self-centered but, rather, focused on mature and enduring commitments to the valorized family” (265).

“The association of immature masculinity with soldiering in the Israeli army is so common that soldiers themselves often criticize and distance themselves from the shallow and weak desire for the masculinizing accoutrements of the military. I heard over and over from soldiers that ‘I was not seduced by the uniform and gun.’ Nihad, for example, emphasized that ‘I tried to avoid wearing the uniform in town. Just as an appearance, a guy wearing the uniform and strutting around in the streets saying, ‘Every-body, look at me. I’m strong.’ . . . I don’t like these external appearances. I don’t need the uniform to feel like a man in society’” (265).

“Not surprisingly, Palestinians who serve in the Israeli military imagine a different masculinity for themselves— one that mimics the nationalist ideal and is constructed as centered on heterosexual marriage and the family and its support. Rather than the shallow, pubescent, and weak masculinity attributed to them by their detractors, many soldiers deployed a stronger version that emphasizes their roles as family providers and breadwinners. Although soldiers offer many explanations for their decisions and actions, ranging from Zionist beliefs to upholding the law to seeking upgraded citizenship, the masculine narratives have wide resonance in their communities and soldiers commonly used them” (265).

“…a major theme in the defense of [Palestinian soldiers who volunteer to fight in the Israeli army is] the construction of their masculinity as household heads
and providers. Indeed, the explanation for military service I heard most frequently from soldiers can be termed a familial economic one—the desire to secure the future of one’s family. Over and over, I heard that when one joins the army, one becomes misudar, Hebrew for ‘organized.’ The passivity implied in this term highlights the active role of the state in producing such organization in soldiers. Perhaps the English terms made or set up better capture its meaning. By serving, one receives a regular paycheck, tax breaks, increased child allowances, easier loans, educational grants, and an early and comfortable pension (for career soldiers). Indeed, in some Bedouin communities with high rates of military service and poverty, the term for military service is mitwazzif—simply meaning ‘employed’” (266).

“This ‘economic opportunity’ [that Palestinians gain by joining the Israeli army] should be understood as a product of particular state policies. The confiscation of Arab land…and interior ministry planning that seeks to Judaize it (Falah 1989; Yiftachel 1995), discriminatory employment policies (Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov 1993), segregated and hierarchical education systems (Human Rights Watch 2001b), and differential treatment by welfare agencies (Rosenhek 1999), together with the linking of citizenship rights to military service (Helman 2001:303), all contribute to positioning soldiering as an economic opportunity” (266).

“A central component of this family-based masculinity is having a house for the nuclear family. One of the important economic benefits of being ‘made’ seemed to be the soldier’s opportunity to lease land from the state at discounted prices, available in some, but not all, Arab locales…The masculinity of a family provider is not only about putting food into children’s mouths but also about a more elaborate notion of being a head of a household. The notion of masculine ‘provider’ is embedded here in a particular vision of household, family, and class…Being a ‘made’ soldier facilitates ‘key transactions with the state’ (Gill 1997:537) and can help provide for a family in a number of ways” (266-267).

“The narratives of mature ‘householder’ masculinity I quote here vary in terms of the actual economic ambition they embody. Whereas some soldiers argued they were feeding and clothing hungry children, others argued they were buying necessary computers for them. All such statements, however, reflect changing class-linked Palestinian conceptions of what being a good family man requires” (267).

“In contrast to the male soldiers I interviewed, who all pointed in one way or another to their role as family supporters, the one policewoman I spoke to complained that her service prevented her from supporting her family properly…This single case stands in stark contrast to those of the male soldiers, suggesting the centrality of gender to military service” (267-268).

“Significantly, the soldier narrative of desired masculinity is, to some extent,
understood in Palestinian communities in Israel. This is not to say that these communities accept service in the Israeli military (far from it) but that they sympathize with the economic predicament that it is supposedly born of and with the masculine desires of men to provide for and support families. Even the harshest critics readily agree that the economic situation is difficult and that employment opportunities are extremely limited. That men resort to soldiering to provide for their families is, thus, understandable if not acceptable. The soldiers’ explanation has a limited sort of legitimacy, certainly more than the gun-toting pubescent scenario does” (268).

“Of course, according to the more common idealized masculinity, to be poor and honorable is far better than to be ‘made’ and a traitor. In this worldview, the poorest unemployed laborer can see himself as superior to an Arab general—because his honor is not based on money, but on nation” (268).

“The ‘family provider but traitor’ prospect had limited legitimacy, but the ‘poor but honorable’ prospect had limited appeal. This ideal is not without its practical weaknesses—poverty is not embraced with the gusto that this narrative of honor implies… In the context of the Israeli state, Palestinian commitments to the nation and commitments to the family are often at odds, rather than in congress, with one another” (268).

“Indeed, many of the soldiers emphasized their independence as free thinkers, rather than as followers of cultural or national norms. One eloquent soldier explicitly argued that he ‘transcended taboos in pursuit of a higher personal dignity.’ This nonnationalist masculine dignity is built on commitments to the family, but also on the value of independence… Nonetheless, while emphasizing their ideological independence, [several Palestinian soldiers] also framed their accounts in terms of the support of families. Even while contesting nationalist masculinity, they continued to claim its family orientation and, in essence, reinforced the centrality of provider masculinity” (269).

“Moreover, this gendered articulation of national issues is not confined to the specific and numerically marginal case of soldiers. A much larger concern about Israelization of Palestinians living in Israel is expressed in similar terms. The attempted assimilation by young men—wanting to get into the Jewish disco, to compete in the Hebrew Macabia sports competitions, or to work for the state environmental ‘protection’ agency (notorious for harassing Arabs)—is also often considered symptomatic of an immature masculinity similar to that attributed to soldiers. By characterizing Israelization as pubescent, critics essentially point to its naïvete’—as an uncritical desire to join Jewish institutions and mimic cultural norms in a society that will, in the end, continue to exclude them” (269-270).

“The two versions of Palestinian masculinity can be understood as two versions of relating to the Israeli state. The efficacy of each and its success are, thus,
affected by state actions. How do assimilationism and its masculine forms gain a particular level of currency among Palestinians in Israel? That level of currency is certainly affected by the level of reward that the state gives such behavior. The extreme example of the soldiers in this study and their provider narratives demonstrates that the state gives—land, income, and access—with one hand as a reward for certain assimilationist behaviors. But it also takes away with the other hand, by continuing to enforce policies of racial discrimination, underlined by its conception as a Jewish state. According to Monterescu, the regime’s policy toward Palestinian citizens ‘employed a combined tactic: drawing both nearer and farther away, offering citizenship while imposing martial ruling’ (2001:162)” (270).

“Key to provider masculinity, job opportunities for released minority soldiers remain meager by the military’s own admission (e.g., Harel 2001a). Moreover, although Druze males have been conscripted since 1956, Druze villages are in dire economic straits, similar in this regard to other Arab villages in which the male population is not drafted” (271).

“That soldiering and other more minor assimilationist behaviors are widely criticized as the actions of duped boys indexes, at some level, their failure to gain the desired rewards—of providing for families…That Arab soldiers often cannot seem to shake the label of ‘duped boy’ masculinity is influenced by the state’s reluctance to turn soldiering and citizenship into a level playing field for Arabs and Jews and by its ongoing prioritization of constructing and reconstructing its own Jewishness. Gender is one of the powerful ways in which soldiering and larger debates about assimilation get articulated and played out” (271).


Abstract:
This essay explores the controversy spawned by the release, in April, 2004, of the photographs taken by U.S. military personnel at the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad. Its particular concern is with those photographs that depict American servicewomen engaged in various forms of abusive conduct against Iraqi prisoners. In its opening half, the essay examines and criticizes the responses to these photographs offered, first, by right wing commentators and, second, by American feminists, most notably Barbara Ehrenreich. All read these photographs as a referendum on feminism and, more particularly, its commitment to the cause of gender equality; and all do so, I argue, on the basis of a naïve understanding of gender. In its latter half, accordingly, the essay offers a more adequate understanding of gender, one loosely grounded in the work of Judith Butler and the concept of performativity. Referencing various official interrogation manuals as well as the investigative reports released in the wake of
this scandal, the essay employs this concept in offering a more adequate account of the gendered import of the deeds depicted in the Abu Ghraib photographs. The essay concludes by arguing that what is important about these photographs in neither whether the perpetrators of the exploitation they depict are male or female, nor whether the deeds they portray somehow compromise the feminist quest for gender equality. Rather, what is important are the multiple ways in which specifically gendered practices, which can be detached from the bodies they conventionally regulate, are deployed as elements within a more comprehensive network of technologies aimed at disciplining prisoners and so confirming their status as abject subjects of U.S. military power (Abstract from ibid, 597).

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“...specific performances sometimes unsettle foundational illusions about the dependence of gender on sex. This redirection of inquiry suggests that much, but certainly not all, of what happened at Abu Ghraib can be understood in terms of what I will call the “logic of emasculation,” where the aim of disciplinary techniques is to strip prisoners of their masculine gender identity and turn them into caricatures of terrified and often infantilized femininity….Consider, for example, the stripping of male prisoners, who were then forced to stand before American servicewomen. In addition to offending cultural sensitivities, especially those dictated by Islamic law regarding proper attire, this technique emasculates prisoners by exposing them in a way that is familiar from representations of women, including but by no means limited to those conventionally labeled ‘pornographic.’ What one sees here, in inverted form, is a sort of enforced vulnerability joined to a fantasy of absolute sexualized power…. In each of these cases, misogyny is deployed as a tactic to humiliate prisoners, where the term ‘humiliation’ can be translated as ‘treat like a woman’” (606-610).

“Making clear that many of the abuses now associated with Abu Ghraib were put into play in Cuba and later ‘migrated’ to Iraq, Schmidt [Lt. Gen. Randall Schmidt of the Air Force, 2005] codified these techniques under the rubric of ‘gender coercion,’ which, on his account, includes authorizing servicewomen to ‘perform acts designed to take advantage of their gender in relation to Muslim males’” (610).

“American military police and their military and CIA intelligence colleagues might have been guided by their own masculinized fears of humiliation when they forced Iraqi men to go naked for days, to wear women’s underwear and to
masturbate in front of each other and American women guards. That is, belief in an allegedly ‘exotic,’ frail Iraqi masculinity, fraught with fears of nakedness and homosexuality, might not have been the chief motivator for the American police and intelligence personnel; it may have been their own home-grown American sense of masculinity’s fragility . . . that prompted them to craft these prison humiliations. (Enloe, 2004, 99)” (612).

“… the aim of hazing techniques employed in basic training is to destroy deficient forms of masculinity, but then to replace these with a construction built on what R. Claire Snyder has aptly characterized as an ‘unstable masculine identity predicated on the denigration of femininity and homoeroticism’ (1999, 151)” (614).

“… the well-disciplined serviceman [must] perpetually reiterate what Snyder calls the ideal of ‘armed masculinity: He must constantly reestablish his masculinity by expressing his opposition to femininity and homoeroticism in himself and others. The anger, hostility, and aggressiveness produced in the process of constituting armed masculinity gets channeled into a desire for combat against [or, I would add, abuse of] the enemy’ (1999, 151). In short, the exploitation at Abu Ghraib is perhaps best understood as an externalized projection of the anxieties bred by a masculine identity that cannot help but subvert itself” (614).

“What we see here, in sum, are so many scripted practices of subordination that achieve their ends through the manipulation of gendered stereotypes, all of which work precisely because degradation, weakness, and humiliation remain very much identified with matters feminine. If Barbara Ehrenreic is shocked by Lynndie England, I would maintain, it is not because she is not a ‘true’ woman, but because her conduct reveals the artificiality of normative constructions of gender” (616).


Abstract:
Gender segregation among groups of Bedouin now living in Ramla, Israel, is examined and compared with the parallel phenomenon among the Bedouin of the Negev Highlands. Both groups leave to the mother the task of inculcating in girls the notions of clusturation and propriety and, frequently, of supervising the mutilation of genitals. Why do mothers accept this role and thereby perpetuate the gender-related perceptions of shame (femininity) and honor (masculinity)? Several rationalizations are examined. My explanation relates to social structure and conventions of group dynamics. The link between shame and gender also supplies the metaphor for the superior status of big agnatic groups over small ones. The perpetuation of women’s inferiority is here read through the code of symbols underlying community politics (Abstract from ibid, 34).
**Additional Notes and/or Quotes:**

“The paradoxical affinity of shame and femininity has often been imputed to a psychological perception which is based on the view of the ‘private parts’ (Pitt-Rivers 1968: 505); penis pride on the one hand and, on the other hand, penis envy, imply in the broader symbolic context the inferiority of the female (Pitt-Rivers 1977). A more cultural interpretation infers female inferiority from the ‘monogenetic perception of procreation,’ (cf. Delaney 1987) which is prevalent in Middle Eastern societies. Hence, not the sex organs in their encounter, but the metaphor of ‘seed and soil’ provides the logic which deprives the female of pride. Accordingly, the mother does help the growth of the tender child but in no way affects its essential identity, which is determined by the seed. As Turkish villagers put it: ‘If you plant wheat you get wheat, if you plant barley you get barley’ (Delaney 1987: 37)” (39).

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**Abstract:**

No abstract found.

**Additional Notes and/or Quotes:**

“Honour is not only a collective concept, but also heavily gendered. Joshua Goldstein makes the point that war shapes gender roles and vice versa. The past 10,000 years were years of war, and indeed they were also years of heavy gender division and ranking. Men were sent out to put themselves in harms way in war, and in a number of societies, their women’s intact hymen was to ‘prove’ whether their men succeeded in ‘protecting’ them or not. Some honour cultures in the Arab world and in Africa, until today, regard the woman’s intact hymen as a symbol of the family’s honour. Practices of honour killings and female genital mutilation are embedded into this particular cultural web of meanings” (7).

“In many traditional honour societies, a female is a token, or representative, of the family or group to which she belongs; daughters are needed for marriage into those other families ‘her’ males want as allies. Only ‘undamaged,’ ‘honourable’ girls make honourable gifts. During my field work in Somalia in 1998 and 1999, the ‘exchange of women’ was a solution mentioned to me by many elders as a way to heal the rifts caused by past inter-clan abuse” (7).

“All the first paragraph of article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948, reads: ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.’ In this context, ‘humiliation’ is to transgress the rightful expectations of every human being and of all humanity that basic human rights will be respected...As old ideas of natural order were overtaken by new ideas of natural rights, humiliation was transformed from an ‘honourable social medicine’ into a ‘dishonourable social disease.’ Stripping away one’s dignity became as profound a violation as stripping away one’s flesh, and humiliation was redefined as a mortal wounding of one’s very being” (10).

“The human rights call for equal dignity for all represents a transition from one normative universe to another, from the legitimate ranking of human worth and value, to de-legitimising this very practice and labeling it a violation. It is like switching from right-hand to left-hand driving, or vice versa. There is no way a world can work in which some people drive in the left lane and others in the right lane and some in the middle. The problem is that ranking and not-ranking cannot be combined, one excludes the other” (11).

“Currently, we are in the midst of this historic transition, with many communities and societies still applying the honour code, while others, more or less wholeheartedly, attempt to enshrine human rights in their rules and institutions. It is not surprising that numerous ‘accidents’ occur in the course of these transformations and that painful feelings of humiliation abound on all sides...However, apart from the qualitative conversion from ranking to not-ranking, another gradual transition takes place within the ‘dignity camp.’ The scope of the concept of dignity itself is not fixed either, but in flux” (11).

“Feuchtwang responded with an observation that impacted me: ‘to recognize humanity hypocritically and betray the promise humiliates in the most devastating way by denying the humanity professed.’ In other words, humankind manages the transition from ranked worthiness to equal dignity for all unprofessionally, inefficiently, and unwisely. It is unwise to preach ideals and not let reality follow. It is hurtfully inconsistent to invite the downtrodden of the world as equals into the family of humankind and then, when they knock at the gates of the rich, full of hope, shut the door in their face” (15).

“When I came back to Africa in 1998, my motivation to do research was suspect to many. I encountered the following complaints: ‘First you colonise us. Then you leave us with a so-called democratic state that is alien to us. After that you watch us getting dictatorial leaders. Then you give them weapons to kill half of us. Finally you come along to ‘measure’ our suffering and claim that this will help us!? Are you crazy...We feel deeply humiliated by your arrogant and self-congratulating help!’” (15-16).

Abstract:
This article is about humiliation, globalization, human rights, and dignity. The central question is the following: Could it be the case in a globalizing world in which people are increasingly exposed to human rights advocacy, that acts of humiliation and feelings of humiliation emerge as the most significant phenomena to resolve? This paper suggests that this is the case. It claims that all humans share a common ground, namely a yearning for recognition and respect that connects them and draws them into relationships. The paper argues that many of the observable rifts among people may stem from the humiliation that is felt when recognition and respect are lacking. The article proposes that only if the human desire for respect is cherished, respected, and nurtured, and if people are attributed equal dignity in this process, can differences turn into valuable diversities and sources of enrichment—both globally and locally—instead of sources of disruption (Abstract from ibid, 1).

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“I believe that today’s living generations find themselves in a crucial historical transition shifting from an older world grounded in ranked honor—an honor world (with the experience of honor-humiliation)—to a potential vision of a future world of equal dignity (and the quite distinct experience of dignity-humiliation)” (4).

“Human rights stipulate that every human being is equal in dignity. Yet, this ideal is attained nowhere. On the contrary, we find many social settings where human worthiness and value are ranked (men are regarded to possess more worthiness than women, colored people face discrimination), and it is this ranking of human worthiness that human rights declare to be illegitimate. We have to overcome what Fuller (2003) calls rankism. Rankism has humiliating effects as soon as we take human rights ideals seriously” (15).

“Historically, the use of physical force as a strategy had been common and efficient, in marriages and elsewhere. But today, relationships are expected to be maintained differently. Human rights ideals turn the use of force into illegitimate humiliation. No wife, no fellow human being, in a world steeped in the human rights message can accept sheer force and respond with humility; violence is the more likely outcome. No longer do old methods work in a new framework of novel moral norms and expectations” (16).
Abstract:
Usually, science, at least until recently, has been dominated by Western scholars. Therefore, much research is situated in Western cultural contexts. A Western scholar typically begins research within his or her own cultural setting and then makes some allowances for historic and cultural variations. In the case of research on emotions, the focus is usually on affect, feeling, emotion, script, character and personality, while larger cultural contexts and an analysis of historic periods in human history are less emphasized. Dialogue and bridge-building with other academic fields and other cultural realms are not easy to achieve even in today’s increasingly connected world. The author of this article has lived as a global citizen for more than thirty years (due to being born into a displaced family) and has thus acquired an understanding not just for one or two cultural realms, but for many. The result is that she paints a broad picture that includes historic and transcultural dimensions. In this article the usual approach is inversed: Larger cultural contexts as they were shaped throughout human history are used as a lens to understand emotions, with particular emphasis, in this article, on humiliation and shame. This is not to deny the importance of research on affect, feeling, emotion, script, character and personality, but to expand it. Subsequent to the conclusion of the doctoral dissertation on humiliation in 2001, the author has expanded her studies, among others, in Europe, South East Asia, and the United States. She is currently building a theory of humiliation that is transcultural and transdisciplinary, entailing elements from anthropology, history, social philosophy, social psychology, sociology, and political science. The central point of this article is that shame and humiliation are not a-historic emotional processes, but historical-cultural-social-emotional constructs that change over time. Humiliation began to separate out from the humility-shame-humiliation continuum around three hundred years ago, and there are two mutually excluding concepts of humiliation in use today around the world, one that is old, and one that is new. (Abstract from ibid, 1).

Additional Notes and/or Quotations:
“Women’s worth lay primarily in embodying the proof that their men could protect them against hostile male intruders – for example by displaying an intact hymen – as well as in maintaining the inside sphere and therein create the next generation. Women were not regarded as actors, but as ‘substrate’ and were supposed to be killed when they were ‘rotten”’ (12).

Abstract:
The chapter “humiliation, killing, war, and gender” analyzes these phenomena in their embeddedness in the current transition to Human Rights ideals that promote equal dignity for all. Honor norms are anchored in a social context that is deeply different from contexts of equal dignity for all. Currently, both, honor and equal dignity are cultural concepts that are significant for people world-wide. The problem is that they clash and are incompatible in many ways.

The chapter sheds light on the transition from norms of honor to norms of equal dignity, and how this is played out in the field of gender, killing, and war. Also the phenomenon that people can feel humiliated and retaliate with acts of humiliation is discussed in relation to this transition. The chapter is rounded up by a call for a Moratorium on Humiliation in order to safeguard a world that is livable for coming generations. (Abstract from ibid, 2).

Additional Notes and/or Quotations:
“…the men cannot live with the humiliation caused by the fact that they were not able to defend their women against the soldiers who raped them. The husband cannot live together with his wife, because he cannot bear to be reminded of his inability to protect her. The perpetrators intended to humiliate their enemies and they succeeded thoroughly. Rape creates social destruction more “effectively” than any other weapon….Humiliation through rape and its consequences divides us. The traditional methods of reconciliation are too weak for this. It will take at least one generation to digest these humiliations sufficiently to be able to sit together again” (3).

“And as you also see, in much of traditional warfare – and incidentally also in blood feud – women go free. They are, ideally, spared selectively while men are targeted selectively…In different situations, women were – and in numerous cultural contexts still are – the ones to be killed selectively, for example, in cases of so-called honor killings. When family honor is perceived to be soiled and humiliated through the rape of a daughter, for example, it is first and foremost the raped daughter who is killed, and rarely also the rapist” (4).

“Thus, women and men – in what I, in the spirit of Weber’s ideal type approach, call traditional hierarchical honor-based societies – are either selectively identified as persons to be spared or selectively identified as persons to be killed, according to certain rules. And the violation of such rules carries the potential to elicit or maintain feelings of humiliation” (5).

“Humiliation means the enforced lowering of a person or group, a process of
subjugation that damages or strips away their pride, honor or dignity. To be humiliated is to be placed, against your will (or in some cases with your consent, for example in cases of religious self-humiliation or in sado-masochism) and often in a deeply hurtful way, in a situation that is greatly inferior to what you feel you should expect. Humiliation entails demeaning treatment that transgresses established expectations. It may involve acts of force, including violent force. At its heart is the idea of pinning down, putting down or holding to the ground. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of humiliation as a process is that the victim is forced into passivity, acted upon, made helpless” (7).

“People react in different ways when they feel that they were unduly humiliated: some just become depressed – anger turns against oneself – others get openly enraged, and yet others hide their anger and carefully plan for revenge. The person who plans for revenge may become the leader of a movement….feelings of humiliation may lead to rage, that may be turned inwards, as in the case of depression and apathy. However, this rage may also turn outwards and express itself in violence, even in mass violence, in case leaders are around who forge narratives of humiliation that feed on the feelings of humiliation among masses” (7).


Abstract:
No abstract found.

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“What is this crisis about? Many involved in the Middle East crisis (as well as in the ‘war on terror) are adamant that the other side chooses to attack them without any reason, out of pure evil, nothing but evil, thus forfeiting all rights to respectful treatment. Everybody reacts, everybody is an outraged victim, a victim of the other’s evil. Whatever one side describes as ‘necessary and heroic defense’ is seen from the other side as cold-blooded aggression.’ ‘Oppression’ on one side is ‘benevolent patronage on the other’” (2).

“During the past 10,000 years, honor has dominated human communities all over the globe. I define honor as the ranking of human worthiness and value, as the acceptance that there are higher beings who preside over lesser beings” (3).

“Ranked honor is still strong in two realms: in certain segments of societies all around the world, and at macro levels, namely at the level of powerful international elites dealing with each other. Honor often plays a stronger role in
foreign policy matters, in armed services and diplomatic staffs, than among the lower echelons of the average citizen. Thus, a passion to retain a state’s ‘honorable’ preeminence, as Donald Kagan (1998) proposes, applies in today’s world no less than it did earlier, even when “national honor” is partly concealed by human rights rhetoric and no longer invoked as openly as in the past” (4-5).

“Conceptualizations such as “‘they’ want to break our will, but ‘we’ won’t let it happen,” or “‘they’ are cowards,” or ‘The enemy’ are embedded in gut feelings imbued with masculine norms of honor that thrive on contests of “strength,” on ‘keeping the upper hand,’ on ‘victory,’ and on avoiding appearing to be a ‘wimp’ or a ‘sissy,’ in other words, avoiding to appear ‘female.’ In such a context, humiliating ‘The enemy’ is felt to be legitimate, especially when this enemy does not act ‘manly’ and thus is felt to forfeit the status as equal in honor. Terrorists are ‘unlawful’ in this frame of mind because they ‘hide behind civilians’ and are ‘cowards,’ regardless of how much actual courage might be invested (even if misinvested). ‘Unlawful combatants’ commit ‘treason’ against traditional honor norms, which makes them ‘free’ to be tortured. The introduction of categories such as ‘unlawful combatants’ informs us that Southern Honor, though no longer openly invoked, is still permeating certain policies in the United States of America” (5).

“Today’s world is defined by three clashes of humiliation: First, clashes of humiliation between opponents who both adhere to the normative universe of honor, second, clashes of humiliation where one side adheres to the honor code, and the other to human rights, and, third, we have clashes of humiliation between opponents who both adhere to human rights ethics” (10).

“Clashes of honor-humiliation are clashes within the old world. Now, let us look at four kinds of clashes between the old and new world. We find two scenarios in which opponents feel humiliated by the other side’s moral orientation and two scenarios where the other side’s moral setup is exploited. Let us begin with the case of human rights being exploited for honor. We find those in today’s world, who adhere to the honor code, but use human rights arguments to vilify their ‘enemy’ and bolster their own ‘honorable’ strategies. In such cases, usually, the ‘enemy’ is branded as violating human rights. When the ‘enemy’ kills ‘civilians,’ for example, the ‘enemy’ is accused of violating human rights and this is taken as proof of the ‘enemy’s’ moral inferiority. As soon as ‘my camp of honor’ kills civilians, however, this is ‘collateral damage,’ and therefore not diminishing ‘my side’s’ moral high ground. In other words, in a world where human rights are ‘on offer,’ they can easily be abused by adherents of the old honor code. The argument of dignity humiliation is exploited to promote honor-humiliation and its scripts” (11).

“Let us now look at the case where human rights are felt to humiliate honor. While some believe that human rights are universal, others brand them as an imperialistic attempt on the part of the West to humiliate the rest” (11).
“The third case is the inverse of the second. Human rights defenders feel humiliated by every detail in the honor script. The very idea that some people may arrogate superiority over others in an Apartheid style is humiliating for the humanity of all human rights advocates, not only on their own behalf but also on behalf of all the downtrodden around the world. However, as mentioned earlier, precisely since human rights do not condone arrogating superiority, human rights defenders have the difficult task of refraining from taking a stance of superiority over people of honor” (11-12).

“Fourth, some people employ honor strategies to defend human rights and this has humiliating effects. People, who advocate human rights and rave at human rights violators in humiliating ways, betray their own moral stance. They need to learn from Mandela and Gandhi how to walk the talk. As I said in the introduction, I feel personally humiliated by people who use the methodology of honor-humiliation in order to supposedly remedy dignity-humiliation and defend human rights. In the same vein, the instrument of war and violence to uphold human rights (even in self-defense) is humiliating and counterproductive to its own goals, first because honor strategies discredit human rights, but also because fear of attack reverses the transition toward human rights backward, back to a fragmented world pitched against each other in the honor code” (12).

“As we see, in times of global interdependence, a local conflict, if subjected to ‘solutions of violence, will merely turn into a global conflict and set on fire the whole world. Monty Marshall (1999) writes remarkably on protracted conflict and how insecurity gets diffused. The increasing interdependence of our world, today, puts human kind into a larger frame and turns former ‘might is right’ into ‘might is suicide…’ In the world of human rights, the very thought that it might be possible to achieve peace by humiliating ‘enemies’ into submission, is obscene and humiliates the dignity of all humankind. The new world is a world of coexistence, even in the face of antagonism, of negotiation and open networks, of democratic structures, globally and locally, structures, which make ‘might-is-right’ strategies redundant at all levels” (12-13).


Abstract:
No abstract found.

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“Pritchard’s research gives plausibility to the suggestion that patterns of suicide (and, perhaps, by implication, patterns of gendercide) alter as societal structures change over time. I want to add another dimension by proposing that one of the
key transmitting agents that communicates the pressures leading to gendercide and gender-specific suicide is humiliation. As patterns of humiliation change in the course of the transition from the honor code to the human-rights code, so patterns of gendercide and suicide may also be transformed, although the lines of causation are neither simple nor one way” (41).

“In an honor society, the man is defined as the principal actor, no matter how functionally important female activities might be. He is the ‘subject,’ she is the ‘object.’ He is the defender of honor against humiliation. He is defined as being responsible, self-reflexive, and rational. He is expected to protect ‘his’ women, at least as long as he values them as a ‘resource,’ for example, as prizes and symbols of his honor, or as mothers of ‘his’ children” (45).

“A woman who lives in an honor society learns either that she is not regarded as a human being at all, or that she is a lowly human being. In the first case, she is perceived as a passive recipient of male actions, as ‘material’ to be either used or thrown away by him; she is on the same level as house- hold items or domesticated animals. In the second case, she is also seen as a passive recipient, but also as a human being whose rank is lower than a man’s; in this case, she is on the same level as children or slaves” (46).

“Furthermore, in all militaristic cultures, where the male is trained to be tough and fearless when facing death in battle, he may resent women because they remind him of desires that he deems unmale or female: for example, his desires to be cared for, to be emotional, or to be weak. In all such cases, women will be in danger of receiving hostility rather than protection from ‘their’ males” (46).

“Ahmeti points out. ‘Once you touch the woman, you touch the honour of the family and you provoke the man to react’” (48).

“To summarize, in an honor society women are ‘material’ for demonstrations of the male ‘power play.’ By contrast, in a human-rights society, males and females are actors in the social world, and keen defenders of their personal dignity against humiliation. Both are defined as being responsible, self-reflexive, and able to combine rationality with mature emotions. Both are seen as endowed with an inner core of dignity on the grounds of belonging to humanity, without reference to gender, ethnicity, or other ‘secondary’ criteria” (49).

“In a society ruled by an honor code, a male is ‘worthy’ when he can defend his own and his people’s honor against the threat of humiliation. This is well expressed in the ideal of knights who successfully defend fortresses and slay dragons, as related in the innumerable fairy tales that still form children’s view of the world to a great extent. The fearless, brave, and glamorous prince who undergoes difficult trials and wins the hand of the princess at the end remains the blueprint for male success, even today. However, in an honor society, a male is liable to be cast out or killed if he fails to meet the ‘knightly’ standards just
described. The unsuccessful warrior faces humiliation and death, perhaps by his own hand” (49).

“It is important to realize how strong an influence these traditional values were on a leader such as Hitler, who presented himself as someone seeking ‘honorable’ vengeance for the insults that the German people had been forced to endure in the past. As is well known, when his failure became impossible to deny, Hitler committed suicide. He paid the price for his dishonor. Similarly, in a very traditional honor context, all men of ‘battle age’ lose their right to live if they are incapable of defending themselves. This is because to be a male is to be a warrior; the concept of the noncombatant male does not exist in such societies” (49).

“In an honor society, a female is ‘worthy’ with reference to the interests of her male protector, her husband. Her task is to give birth to ‘his’ children, and serve as symbol and prize for ‘his’ male honor. This is the traditional ideal of the ‘proper’ woman. It was an ideal nourished not only by the men, but also by the women themselves” (50).

“However, males and females are ‘unworthy’ in a human-rights society, and consequently at risk from the hostility of others or themselves, if they cannot meet or fail to acknowledge the standards just set out. Uneducated young men in the West have particular problems with the transition to the new ways and find themselves without a respectable role. They are humiliated in terms of both the honor code and the human-rights code” (51).

“The same fallacy happens when maleness is equated with the old honor code, and women ‘occupy’ the new normative stance of human rights in an exclusive manner, not allowing males to be a part of it. Wherever this happens, it means that men are locked in their role as dominators in oppressive patriarchal systems and are not allowed to be victims, since women have claimed a monopoly in this sphere” (54).

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Abstract:
This paper addresses the dynamics of humiliation in their interplay with terrorism. It searches for the ‘why’ behind terrorism and highlights the role of women in this context. It is built on four years of research on the phenomenon of humiliation, as well as more than twenty years of practical experience as a psychologist in Europe, the Middle East and Africa. Alternative ways of responding to humiliation are suggested and third parties are called upon to increase their engagement (Abstract from ibid, 1).
Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“The terror attacks of the 11th September 2001 in the United States, that shocked the world, show – at least to my understanding – that the entire world community is caught in a cycle of humiliation. Men such as Osama bin Laden would never have any followers, if there were not a pool of feelings of humiliation in large parts of the world, feelings that are so intense that young intelligent men, who could found families and have satisfying careers, are willing to lose their lives in suicide attacks. The rich and powerful West has long been blind to the fact that its superiority may have humiliating effects on those who are less privileged, especially during times when the West simultaneously teaches the world the ideals of human rights, ideals that heighten feelings of humiliation” (5).

“The core of their problem is – this is my evaluation after more than 20 years of work – the phenomenon of humiliation. Many scholars and experts identify deprivation as the main culprit of problems such as ‘grievances,’ ‘resentment,’ ‘embitterment,’ or ‘backlash’; however, I believe that this is too superficial an analysis. Victims of deprivation do not automatically perceive it as a form of suffering that calls for action. It is only deprivation that is perceived as an illegitimate violation of ideals of equality and dignity that is perceived as a humiliation that has to be responded to with profound sincerity” (8).

“Women in many societies traditionally are given the task of carers, while men are educated to fight. Because of this caring role, women tend to react with depression when they feel helpless, oppressed or humiliated. When I worked as a medical student at a psychiatric hospital, in 1983, I was amazed, how clear this tendency was. Women are not supposed to fight and tend to turn the expression of their feelings inwards. Farida did not want to take up weapons herself, however, she wanted to give birth to sons who could fight. Rita did not know against what to fight; she retreated to mere asceticism. My male Palestinian clients, however, thought of taking up weapons. Rita’s male friends with similar sets of problems as hers were drawn to alcohol or other, more exteriorised, ways of expressing their problems as opposed to Rita’s inwards orientation” (9).

“Furthermore, and this is another effect of human rights teachings, it is no longer just male honour that is involved in feelings and acts of humiliation. Women have also arrived on the stage of the world, when they feel that their own lives and their own dignity, allegedly protected by human rights, are violated. Farida, my Palestinian client who wanted to give birth to suicide bombers, still formed her response to feelings of humiliation within the old male honour order, as did those of her male colleagues who wanted to take up arms. My female German clients, on the other side, who felt depressed about the state of the world and responded with eating disorders, would perhaps have developed into devout wives and happy mothers in former times. However, now, they had no way to go but into self- destruction, since they were caught between new ideals and old realities” (10).
“Humiliation, Rape and Love: Force and Fraud in the Erogenous Zone.”


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**Abstract:**

This paper is about the intersection between war, sexuality and gender. It encompasses micro-social relations and macro-social structures and integrates several theoretical and disciplinary traditions (social psychology, sociology, anthropology, philosophy, feminism, history and international relations). Its object is to discern the logic of male-female relations expressed in two kinds of society: those societies that accept the standards associated with human rights and those societies based upon the principle of honour that reject or are unfamiliar with human rights as a framework for living. The paper brings to visibility the meta-logic of humiliation that informs these two frameworks based, respectively, upon the idea of human rights and the idea of honour. Once this meta-logic has been understood, it allows strong links to be seen between public and private spheres: on the one hand, the arena of warfare between nations and ethnic groups, on the other hand, the arena of love and sexuality between individuals (Abstract from ibid, 1).

**Additional Notes and/or Quotes:**

"Imperative of Honor Societies: ’Protect the public honour of the group (family, village, clan), especially its male membership. Inter-personal and inter-group humiliation is a routine and legitimate strategy for maintaining social hierarchies’" (6).

-Imperative of Human Rights Societies: “Protect the inner core of dignity possessed by each individual without exception. Humiliation is unacceptable. Care to avoid humiliating others is routine. The psychological damage caused by humiliation is more intense than in honour societies” (6).

“In honour societies, the honour of the group is damaged if the worthiness of any single member of the group is attacked or compromised. If the damage cannot be made good, avenged, or ‘paid for’ in some way, then the damaged element has to be cut out or destroyed. In such societies, families treat unmarried females as exchangeable property for use in making marriage contracts with other families. The honour of the family is closely tied to the virginity of unmarried daughters…One of the family’s fears is that their daughter’s damaged hymen could be understood by her future husband as an attempt to dishonour his family. A damaged hymen is a dishonourable gift to give from one family to another. It is humiliating to receive such a gift and humiliating to be accused of offering it. All members of the raped girl’s family feel ‘soiled’ or ‘damaged’ by the rape” (6-7).

“Honour-killings appall a human rights society. This is because in such a society rape is primarily seen as a violation of the girl’s inner core of dignity. To view
the young woman only as a token of a family’s public honour is intolerable in a human rights context. To punish her further by killing her is seen to compound the offence in an incomprehensible way” (7).

“To summarise: Rape can have humiliation as its primary goal, or humiliation may be a ‘side-effect.’ A would-be humiliator may look for ways to humiliate other people, let us say people of another ethnic group, and find that raping the enemy’s women is one possible tool among others for humiliating the enemy. Rape in this case is carried out with the deliberate intention of causing humiliation. The main object is, typically, not to humiliate the raped woman herself, - she may be insignificant in the rapist’s eyes - but, much more important, to humiliate her ‘men.’ However, whether or not the deliberate objective of rape is to humiliate, to be raped is always painful and humiliating. This is so whether it is honour or dignity that is being attacked” (12).


Abstract:
This paper presents a theory of humiliation and identifies its significance as an interpretative tool for use by negotiators in many kinds of situations. Humiliation and its aftermath have an important impact upon patterns of conflict, culture and communication. The paper is organised in three parts. In the first part, following a brief introductory comparison between Hitler and Mandela, a sympathetic critique is undertaken of William Ury’s discussion of the socio-historical roots of conflict and strategies for handling it. In the second part, it is argued that the structures and processes identified by Ury may be further illuminated by identifying the part played by humiliation. This is then done, drawing upon the author’s research experience in Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia. The origins, characteristics and consequences of humiliation are examined, distinguishing between the forms it takes in three kinds of society: ‘pride’ societies, ‘honour’ societies’ and ‘dignity’ societies. Particular attention is given to the impact of the Human Rights Revolution. In the final part, the paper returns briefly to the comparison between Hitler and Mandela, identifies the challenges that humiliation and its aftermath pose for negotiators, and suggests how these challenges might be met (Abstract from ibid, 2).

Additional Notes and/or Quotes
“There are two differences between Hitler and Mandela. Firstly, they were responding to different kinds of humiliation. In Germany, as Norbert Elias has argued, what hurt most after 1918 was the damage done by military defeat to the sense of nationhood. It was a matter of collective honour, felt most keenly by the old political class but permeating throughout the society. In response, Hitler led a huge effort to put the German nation in a position where it could, in turn, deliver
thunderbolts from on high against enemies, rivals and scapegoats” (3).

“In South Africa, by contrast, humiliation was a matter of human rights denied. As Mandela put it, the solution was for ‘ordinary South Africans ...[to] produce an actual South African reality that will reinforce humanity’s belief in justice.’ To summarise: in Germany, national honour was felt to be at stake while in South Africa the issue was human rights” (3).

“The second difference is that Hitler’s road led to war, Mandela’s to peace. For Hitler, the intense anguish of German humiliation was a source of destructive energy to be directed against targets chosen by the Führer. For Mandela, the task was to dissipate the destructive energy engendered by bitterness, to concentrate on implementing human rights rather than victimising enemies” (3).

“Coercion is the most salient point for the introduction of the concept of humiliation. I suggest that the imposition of hierarchical structures typically involves a process of humiliation carried out by new overlords who reduce those around them to a subordinate situation” (6).

“In my interviews in Somalia (1998, 1999) I asked what circumstances Somalis would consider ‘humiliating.’ In fact, most people had little use for this concept. They frequently replied that when they had ‘grievances’ or ‘wrongs’ their clan would decide whether their claim was justified and, if it was, the clan would do what it could to obtain compensation. Barre’s quasi-genocidal onslaught on his own population inflicted enormous ‘grievances’ on the victims, - the use of humiliation through public rape was especially resented.22 The victimised clans responded with the creation of liberation armies which finally deposed of the dictator. I suggest that the near-absence of humiliation among the major Somali clans is a product of the near-absence of hierarchy. The sparse Somali semi-deserts do not provide material resources for building up such a hierarchy. Why should outsiders take the trouble to subjugate the Somalis?” (10).

“In other words, the Somalis, especially in the north, have not yet been ‘taught’ the lesson of hierarchy and humiliation. As a consequence, Somalis have a national habitus of immense pride, which I now want to differentiate from honour in hierarchical societal systems” (10).

“According to Elias, pacified and civilized people learn to feel embarrassed. Widespread ‘social anxiety’ among inferiors is one outcome of the successful implementation of honour-humiliation. This attitude among inferiors helps to keep the hierarchy in existence. Nothing serves a ‘master’ better than people who, humbly and fearfully, ‘keep their heads down’” (12).

“Honour-humiliation does not yet incorporate the idea that all human beings are equally worthy of respect and have a core of dignity irrespective of their particular place in any social hierarchy. By contrast, that very idea is central to
societies that accept the ideal of human rights. In societies based on human rights, humiliation takes a new form: human-rights humiliation. In cases of human rights-humiliation, the forceful imposition of inequality is regarded as completely and utterly unacceptable” (13).

“One aspect of the Knowledge Revolution is the startling advance in the technology of mass communications. Satellite television and the Internet mean that local evidence of conflict, cruelty and abuse almost always becomes visible, sooner or later, to a global audience. Oppression can no longer be perpetrated for long without being observed by third parties” (14).

“Among the global audience are institutions and groups who oppose honour-humiliation on the grounds that it undermines human rights. This global third party is deeply hostile to the suggestion that some people are ‘sub-human’ (at the bottom of social hierarchies) and others ‘super-human’ (at the top). From this critical point of view, the ‘legitimate’ humiliations of ‘honour societies’ are translated into illegitimate forms of ‘structural violence,’ to borrow Galtung’s term” (14).

“In ‘honour societies,’ the threat of dishonour endangers the public face presented by each individual or group. Honour-humiliation menaces the status enjoyed by each within an asymmetrical network of social relationships. This form of humiliation takes the form of dishonour done to the coat of arms, so to speak, displayed on one’s shield. By contrast, in ‘dignity societies’ humiliation is a lance that brushes aside the shield and penetrates the body. Human rights-humiliation attacks the very self” (14).

“In societies that value human rights, every human being is seen to possess an inner core of dignity in his or her capacity as a human being. This inner dignity is untouched by ‘outer’ characteristics such as social position. From this modern perspective, even criminal offenders should keep their dignity: they should be humbled (‘brought down to earth’) but not humiliated (ground down into the earth). To humiliate a person is now regarded as one of the worst violations possible. It is akin to the destruction of that person, an intolerable violation of their inner core of dignity as a human being” (15).

“…in some societies the rhetoric and practices of honour-humiliation remain dominant. In fact, this tradition remains strong in almost all political establishments, especially in matters where national sovereignty and external relations are at issue. Independent states today protect their honour as jealously as members of the French aristocracy at Versailles. This is as true of the British and American states as it is their Serbian and Iraqi counterparts. Indeed, it applies to practically every sovereign state represented in the United Nations General Assembly. Some of these ‘honourable’ states claim to be implementing universal human rights within the polities they control; others do not” (15-16).
“As already noted, economic inequality between poor and rich is actually growing at present, both locally and globally. The gap between the human rights’ vision of an equal and just world and the actual state of inequality in the ‘global village’ is creating feelings of humiliation that are intensely wounding. The world’s poor are facing a worsening life-situation at the same time as they are learning that such a situation ‘ought not’ to prevail” (19).

“However, Mandela is not just trying to prevent violence within the existing structures. He is also trying to change those structures” (20).


Abstract:
No abstract found.

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“A killing campaign moved across Iraq in the early months of 2009. While the country remains a dangerous place for many if not most of its citizens, death squads started specifically singling out men whom they considered not “manly” enough, or whom they suspected of homosexual conduct. The most trivial details of appearance—the length of a man’s hair, the fit of his clothes—could determine whether he lived or died” (2).

“Different descriptions of the campaign’s targets circulate. Most of the men whom Human Rights Watch interviewed for this report identified themselves as ‘gay.’ However, probably neither the murderers nor most ordinary Iraqis would recognize the term. Instead, many describe the victims and excuse the killings with a potpourri of words and justifications, identifying those they abominate in shifting ways—suggesting how concerns about an Iraq where men are no longer masculine drive the death squads, as much as fears of sexual “sin.” “Puppies,” a vilifying slang term of apparently recent vintage, implies that the men are immature as well as inhuman. Both the media and sermons in mosques warn of a wave of effeminacy among Iraqi men, and execrate the “third sex.” Panic that some people have turned decadent or “soft” amid social change and foreign occupation seems to motivate much of the violence” (3).

“Several people speculated to us that the Mahdi Army, striving to rebuild its reputation after this prolonged absence [after it declined to confront US troops during the surge of 2007], sought to rehabilitate itself by appearing as an agent of social cleansing. It exploited morality for opportunistic purposes; it aimed at popularity by targeting people few in Iraq would venture to defend. One “executioner” told a reporter in May that he and his fellow killers were tackling “a serious illness in the community that has been spreading rapidly among the youth after it was brought in from the outside by American soldiers. These are not
the habits of Iraq or our community and we must eliminate them” (4).

“Human Rights Watch heard accounts of police complicity in abuse—ranging from harassing ‘effeminate’ men at checkpoints, to possible abduction and extrajudicial killing” (4).

“Gender is also crucial to comprehending what propels the current campaign of violence. It is telling, as suggested above, to look at the words with which the Iraqi media and many ordinary Iraqis decry the people who call themselves ‘gay.’ Some of these terms voice moral disapproval predicated on certain specific kinds of conduct—such as luti or the ‘people of Lot, taken from the Quranic story and applied to people who practice liwat or ‘sodomy.’ Other, more demotic slurs, however, involve whether a man looks ‘masculine.’ ‘The police at checkpoints always give us grief about our clothes, our jewelry,’ one man said. ‘They call us kiki—it means someone who’s effeminate or soft.’ The notion that ‘gays’ embody not just a propensity for certain sexual acts, but a ‘third sex’ threatening the other two, is rife. One newspaper article implicitly applauded the killers by warning that ‘The legacy of inherited beliefs regarding manhood and morality that characterize the Iraqi people must be transmitted. These ideals go against the feminization of boys and the practice of [men] applying makeup, which have spread among many Iraqi youth, eliciting disgust.’ Enforcing manhood at gunpoint, the murderers arrogate to themselves the power to control people’s dress and appearance as well as their intimate lives. Men wearing cologne or walking the wrong way become victims of the crackdown” (10-11).

“The excruciating killing of victims by injecting glue in their anuses reached the press on April 19, in an al-Arabiya article that quoted the Iraqi women’s rights activist Yanar Mohammad condemning an ‘unprecedented form of torture against homosexuals.’ Other doctors in Baghdad confirmed the practice to Human Rights Watch…That is only one method, though, for staging a theater of humiliation. Mashal said: ‘Friends told me that last week in separate incidents they killed two guys, one from Sadr City, one from Ur—my area. They stripped them naked and put diapers and bras on them. Then the Mahdi Army beat them to death. They filmed at least one of the killings; I saw a video circulating via Bluetooth’ (21).

“Stanley Cohen, a British sociologist, wrote almost forty years ago that ‘Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic,’ irrational surges of fear when ‘A condition, episode, person or groups of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests.’ In such moments, deep uncertainties about rapid change gather to a head, with a strength that sidelines the usual processes—political or civic or personal—through which those communities can debate or settle their stresses. People look for scapegoats: not just to explain, but to incarnate the unsettling transmutations around them, shifts that they cannot fully articulate but are determined to stop…Cohen calls moral panics ‘condensed political struggles to control the means of cultural reproduction.’ In simpler terms: they are battles to define who belongs in a
community and who does not. The confrontations are waged with the weapons of opinion, in newspaper columns and places of worship—and sometimes with the tools of lynching, the noose and the gun. The murders in Iraq point to such a complex of fears” (34).

“The panic and the killing focus as much on how one looks and dresses—whether or not men seem ‘masculine’ enough—as on imputations about what ones does in bed. Moreover, in a country plunged into poverty over the last twenty years, resentments around class intertwine with rigid requirements about gender. Many people stressed to us that decadence—not just femininity but an aura of possessions or privilege—is one of the stereotypes about the ‘third sex” (38).

“Gay people are an easy target. They have no social support, and they are obvious to pick out. Those people can pour their class resentment into targeting these men. They become a focus” (38).

“If a diffuse anxiety over endangered masculinity perturbs mosques and media alike, the pressure to ‘be a man’ begins at home. Violence enforces it. Many we spoke with pointed to the intense patriarchal values of tribal structures, in which each member’s conduct can inflect the status of the entire extended unit” (41).

“Men, however, also bear the ‘honor’ of their families and tribes. Human Rights Watch heard testimonies from Iraqi men who faced violence or murder because they were not ‘manly’ enough, incurring shame on the whole extended household. These stories suggest the importance of treating ‘honor’ as an issue, and an incitement to rights violations, that cuts across genders” (43).

“Men seen as effeminate or suspected of homosexual conduct are not necessarily more intensely targeted than other groups or identities have been in recent years. However, they have certain specific disadvantages. Their isolated circles, organized round a few networks of friends or anonymous aliases on the Internet, constitute nothing like a cohesive community that could furnish mutual support. Nor, in most cases, are their families willing to offer any help or protection, even if they could. Many men who identify as gay have nowhere to turn, and no recourse but to leave the country” (53).

“Consensual homosexual conduct is illegal in all the countries surrounding Iraq except Turkey and Jordan. In Iran and Saudi Arabia it is punished, under certain circumstances, by death. Refugees fleeing persecution in Iraq because of their sexual orientation and gender identity may face renewed persecution in virtually all the countries where they can find interim refuge” (54).

**Abstract:**

No abstract found.

**Additional Notes and/or Quotes:**

“For the men in our National Security Council, proving manhood might mean showing how tough they are by going along with a military intervention that is not really necessary for our national security. (In the case of Vietnam this led to the death of at least fifty-eight thousand Americans and well over one million Vietnamese.) For the men in our nuclear think tanks, it might mean making sure we have at least as many nuclear warheads as ‘they’ do, regardless of whether we need them or not…” (xxiv)

“[There is the view that] giving up traditional standards of masculinity is both foolhardy and utopian, since it would leave us weak and ‘emasculated’ as a nation, vulnerable to attack and takeover by foreign powers. I argue that it is in fact the adherence to the masculine mystique by men in power that contributes to the serious endangerment of our national security” (xxvi).


**Abstract:**

This paper examines the rhetoric of emotion surrounding the first female Palestinian suicide bombers. The influence of gender in recruitment, training and compensation by the terrorist organization are considered within the context of the tension between gender equality and tradition in Palestinian culture. The carefully-edited discourse of the bombers themselves is juxtaposed with the discounting of those statements by friends, family and the media in an attempt to understand the motivations for engaging in terror. Media coverage, particularly in the West, appears to actively search for alternate explanations behind women’s participation in terror in a way that does not seem paralleled in the coverage of male suicide bombers, whose official ideological statements appear to be taken at face value (*Abstract from ibid*, 79).

**Additional Notes and/or Quotes:**

“Resentment and self-righteousness are often considered to be the underlying motivators for engaging in terrorism. Perceiving themselves as victims, the terrorists hone a hypersensitive awareness of slights and humiliations inflicted upon themselves or their particular group, and picture themselves as part of an elite heroically struggling to right the injustices of an unfair world” (80).

“While each of the female Palestinian suicide bombers to date arrived at the
decision to self-detonate by a unique path, their official statements share the same general tone as the officially-sponsored discourse as their male counterparts. Media coverage, particularly in the West, appears to actively search for alternate explanations behind women's participation in terror in a way that does not seem paralleled in the coverage of male suicide bombers, whose official ideological statements appear to be taken at face value. In the case of the relatively few female terrorists, media coverage profoundly emphasizes the emotional over the ideological in an effort to provide comprehensible explanations” (85).

“The second female suicide bomber, Dareen Abu Aysheh, 21 (detonation 2/27/02), was a student who highlighted the role of women in the struggle against the Israelis in her video (Palestinian Women Martyrs Against the Israeli Occupation, 2004)...During a humiliating encounter at an Israeli checkpoint, her honor was stained when she was forced by soldiers to kiss a male cousin in order to save a baby's life. However, she rejected the cousin's later offer of marriage in order to preserve her reputation. The event seems to have crystallized her rage at the occupation, and she accepted the cousin's offer of an alternative plan to avoid family disgrace, i.e. becoming a shaheeda (Victor, 2003). Dareen Abu Aysheh said in her suicide video, "Let Sharon [the Israeli Prime Minister] the coward know that every Palestinian woman will give birth to an army of martyrs, and her role will not only be confined to weeping over a son, brother or husband instead (sic), she will become a martyr herself (Palestinian Women Martyrs Against the Israeli Occupation, 2004)” (85).


Abstract:
This article examines ritualized inscriptions of bodily violence upon Palestinian male youths in the occupied territories. It argues that beatings and detention are construed as rites of passage into manhood. Bodily violence is crucial in the construction of a moral self among its recipients, who are enabled to juxtapose their own cultural categories of manhood and morality to those of a foreign power. Ritual as a transformative experience foregrounds a political agency designed to reverse relations of domination between occupied and occupier. Simultaneously, it both reaffirms and transforms internal Palestinian forms of domination. [Middle East, masculinity, ritual performance, violence, body, construction of self] (Abstract from ibid, 31).

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
““The potential for agential empowerment arising from ritual has been noted by anthropologists who study ritual in the context of politics. Kertzer argues that
rituals do more than simply maintain and reaffirm the status quo; they can be galvanized to accomplish things. They overturn political orders, and opposition politics can be expressed in ‘rites of delegitimation’ (1988:2)” (32).

“The daily inscription of power on the unwilling bodies of Palestinians, almost a routine occurrence, is an attempt to embed power in them as a means of fashioning a domesticated subject whose terrorized silence would confirm the mythical Zionist landscape of an empty Palestine…” (33).

“Foucault’s view of the body as text, as a site of inscription and exhibition by dominant force, shows little concern with peoples’ responses to having their bodies appropriated and designated as sites of inscription…Outran argues in her discussion of the French revolution that ‘bodies are active creators of new power relations and sustain individuals in their confrontations with and against systems of power’ (1989:23)” (33).

“…Israel intended to control, humiliate, and punish; the ultimate publicly recognized, and reiterated aim was to quell resistance. In other words, public spectacles of violence serve as a means of encoding and reproducing the Palestinians as Israel’s acquiescent, though not consenting, ‘other…’ But the Palestinians made of the signs something radically different. These were experiences of transformation and empowerment, not humiliation and pacification. These experiences have been construed as rites of passage into manhood, with its attendant status and responsibilities, and concomitantly as vehicles of entry and, to a large extent, initiation into underground political leadership” (33).

“The meaning of the beating and its construal as a rite of passage into manhood, with its attendant agential imperatives, has resonance throughout the occupied territories, upsetting established hierarchies of generation, nationality, and class, yet reproducing and reaffirming other hierarchies such as gender” (34).

“Arab masculinity (rujulah) is acquired, verified, and played out in the brave deed, in risk taking, and in expressions of fearlessness and assertiveness. It is attained by constant vigilance and willingness to defend honor (sharaf), face (wajh), kin, and community from external aggression and to uphold and protect cultural definitions of gender-specific propriety. The occupation has seriously diminished those realms of practice that allow one to engage in, display, and affirm masculinity in autonomous actions. Frequent witnesses to their fathers’ beatings my soldiers or settlers, children are acutely aware of their fathers’ inability to protect themselves and their children” (34).

“Among the Berbers of Algeria, Bourdieu located the man of honor in the context of challenge and riposte. A challenge confers honor upon a man, because it is a cultural assumption that the ‘challenge, as such,’ requires a ripostes and therefore is addressed to a man deemed capable of playing the game of honour’
(Bourdieu 1977:11). The challenge provides an opportunity for males to prove their belonging to the world of men” (34).

“For the Israelis, the beatings were an encoded medium intended to convey a message regarding the consequences of opposition. The young male is a metonym for Palestinian opposition and struggle against domination, the idea and symbols of which must be rooted out and silenced: the Palestinian population must be made acquiescent to the colonizing project…violence is directed at individual bodies as representations of a collective transgressive other” (36).

“Given the levels and continuity of U.S. financial support for the occupying power, [the Palestinians] consider it all the more appropriate to display the physical signs of their suffering to Westerners. The battered body is a representation fashioned by the Israelis but presented by Palestinians to the West. To the Palestinians, the battered body, with its bruises and broken limbs, is the symbolic embodiment of a 20th-century history of powerlessness—of ‘what we have to endure’—but also of their determination to resist and to struggle for national independence” (38).

“Displaying physical marks of violence, that one is usually powerless to avoid, stands as a ‘commentary on suffering’ (Keesing 1985; Peteet 1991) but also, I would suggest, as a commentary on sacrifice. As such they are poignant communicative devices. These displays are powerful statements belying claims of a benign occupation and resonate with the honor that comes from unmasking and resisting” (38).

“When Hussein would describe his prolonged torture at the hands of the interrogators, his father was quiet, only to occasionally interject ‘Prison is a school, a university’ and ‘Prison is for men” (38-9).

“In observing resistance activities in camps, villages, and urban neighborhoods, it was clear the older men played little, if any role. It was the preserve of the young (under 25 years of age), and as such they embodied the prestige and respect that come from, and yet gives one access to, leadership positions” (39).

“Upon returning to their communities, young men like Hussein have acquired the stature to lead. They have withstood interrogation and not given away information or become collaborators. More importantly however, they return ‘educated men.’ Hussein, and other released detainees spoke of prison as a place where they learned not only academic subjects, but also about power and how to resist” (39).

“Endowed with the qualities of adulthood, honor, and manhood, emergence from the ordeal dovetails with access to power and authority. In a reversal of meaning, the beating empowers the self and informs an agency of resistance.
Palestinians, as participants in and as audience to the public spectacle of beatings have consciously and creatively taken a coherent set of signs and practices of domination and construed them to buttress an agency designed to overthrow political hierarchies” (40).

“Despite a gendered division of roles, the moral reconstruction consequent to violent acts does indeed permeate gender boundaries…as the witnessing audience, women provide a running commentary intended to shame soldiers to cease beating or to stop an arrest” (42).

“Bodily inscriptions of violence are more prevalent in camps and villages and thus are somewhat class bound. The politically active urban elite, often from notable families, who have traditionally striven for leadership, are not usually exposed to bodily inscriptions of violence though they may well undergo periods of administrative detention. Indeed, they can be subject to derision for assuming a mantle of leadership when they have not been credentialized by violence” (43).

“Given the casting of the beating as a zone of prestige for young men, what does it mean for the women? The number of women beaten, arrested, and detained is small, and their status afterwards is more ambiguous than heroic. The number does not index women’s level of involvement in the uprising, which has been extensive. It does indicate, however, their less visible role, and the tendency of the Israeli Defense Forces to go for males first” (44).

“While femininity is no more natural than masculinity, physical violence is not as central to its construction. It does not reproduce or affirm aspects of female identity, nor does it constitute a rite of passage into adult female status. Women frame their physical violation as evidence of their equality with men and wield it to press their claims—‘We suffer like men, we should have the same rights,’ quipped one former prisoner…While the violence visited upon males credentializes masculinity, that visited upon women indicates a potential equality of citizenship (Peteet 1991)” (44).

“While beatings reproduce a masculine identity, they also reproduce men’s authority and physical domination in the family. Asymmetrical gender relations may be reaffirmed as a result of a young man’s assumption of adult tasks and authority that in this case are assumed through violent rites of passage. Young wives and sisters complained that their husbands and brothers returned from interrogation and detention with a new authoritarianism expressed in attempts to assert control over their mobility…Some men who were subjected to beatings and torture return home and inflict violence upon women” (45).

“The meaning of the beating is central to new conceptions of manhood and ultimately access to leadership positions. Violence has almost diametrically opposed meanings. For one, it is an index of a fictionalized fear and image of inferiority of a subject population and is intended to control and dishonor; for the
others, it is constitutive of a resistant subjectivity that signals heroism, manhood, and access to leadership and authority” (45).

“The act of incorporating beatings and imprisonment into a cultural criterion of manhood and assigning them status as a rite of passage is a ‘trick’ if you will, that reverses the social order of meaning and leads to political agency” (45).

“The occupying authorities, with constant attention directed to detecting ripples of change in Palestinian cultural categories and social relations, have by now caught on to the way applications of bodily violence and imprisonment have empowered a generation committed to resistance…Interrogation procedures now contain a sexual practice designed to thwart the meaning and agency of physical violence as rites of passage to masculinity and manhood. Rape during interrogation is now being more widely discussed among some released prisoners, as is fondling by interrogators with photographs taken of these incidents. Sexual forms of interrogation deprive young men of claims to manhood and masculinity. One cannot return from prison and describe forms of torture that violate the most intimate realm of gendered selfhood” (45).


Abstract:
Since September 11, 2001, the equation of Muslim with terrorist has lodged in the popular imagination in the United States. This conflation undermines the ability to distinguish between a few individuals who have committed or intend to commit acts of extrastate violence (terrorism) and the rest of the Muslim population, a population that consists of more than 1 billion people worldwide. Although public discussions of the so-called Muslim terrorist are often accompanied by disclaimers acknowledging that not all Muslims are a problem or that the political abuse of Islam, rather than Islam itself, is a problem, these caveats fail to dislodge the increasingly intractable conflation of Muslim with terrorist. This article examines how the racialized terrorist is produced through various war-on-terror tactics, including the indefinite detainment and torture of prisoners in the U.S. military detention centers and the circulation of torture photographs (Abstract from ibid, 1047).

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“Sexualized violence feminizes male detainees by forcing them to enact homosexual sex in scenes of simulated fellatio. Putting women’s under wear on their faces suggests a kind of lascivious desire for the intimate apparel of women, evidence of misdirected and immature sexual desire. Forcing detainees to remain naked displays their vulnerability and their lack of decency. Being held on a leash by a white, female soldier dehumanizes the detainee, likening him to a dog, while simultaneously suggesting the image of a dominatrix (Goldstein 2004)” (1061).
“As Puar argues, “The force of feminizing, then, lies not only in the stripping away of masculinity, the “faggotizing” of the male body, or in the robbing of the feminine of its symbolic and reproductive centrality to national-normative sexualities. Rather, it is the fortification of the unenforceable boundaries between masculine and feminine, the rescripting of multiple and fluid gender performatives into petrified sites of masculine and feminine, the regendering of multiple genders into the oppressive binary scripts of masculine and feminine, and the interplay of it all within and through racial, imperial, and economic matrices of power. That is the real force of torture. (Puar 2005, 28)” (1061).

“Whether they are a priori raced does not necessarily matter, just as it matters little what the actual sexuality of a body is in the process of being “faggotized” (Puar 2005, 28), and just as it matters little whether there is credible evidence to link the majority of the detainees to terrorist activity. Rather, the photos themselves produce the visible difference between those who are appropriately gendered and those who defy gender norms, establishing the clear boundary between masculinity and femininity as marks of the ideal human” (1061).

“Although there are few instances of documented torture that do not connect to a question or an investigation, there is more at stake in torture than eliciting information: “While the content of the prisoner’s answer is only sometimes important to the regime, the form of the answer, the fact of his answering, is always crucial” (29). The purpose of torture, then, is intricately tied to the wielding of power. Torture demonstrates both the ability and the willingness to inflict great amounts of pain to propagate fear, whether inside or outside the bounds of law” (1064).

“The process of decerebralization—an integral aspect of torture—entails physical and psychological practices that turn subject into object (Carby 2004). Psychological and mental cruelty, humiliation, shaming, religious and cultural defilement, sexualized violence, and attacks on masculinity and femininity are all elements that further remove the detainee from the terrain of the human” (1065).

“As John T. Parry (2005, 533) suggests, ‘when one is a ghost . . . one is already separate from one’s body, not to mention from one’s family, community, and other support networks. . . . The ghost . . . is by definition hidden, exceptional, and dominated’” (1065).

“Images that pose victims before multiple, anonymous onlookers while depicting emasculation, castration, and other forms of sexual attack participate in particular forms of decerebralization” (1065).

“The incorporation of sexual violation into the torture of detainees resurrects modes ofemasculcation and feminization that resinscribe rigid regimes of white heteronormative sexuality as the property of white Westerners and deviance as the hidden propensity of the orientalized Muslim terrorist” (1066).

Abstract:
No abstract found.

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
[Quoting Patrick Moore, author of ‘Beyond Shame: Reclaiming the Abandoned History of Radical Gay sex]: “But in the Arab world, the humiliating techniques now on display are particularly effective because of Islam’s troubled relationship with homosexuality… the shame lies in the gay identity rather than the act itself. As long as a man does not accept the supposedly female (passive) role in sex with another man, there is no shame in the behavior. Reports indicate that the prisoners were not only physically abused but also accused of actually being homosexuals, which is a far greater degradation to them” (526-527).

“Former prisoner Dhia al-Shweiri noted: ‘We are men. It’s OK if they beat me. Beatings don’t hurt us; it’s just a blow. But no one would want their manhood to be shattered. They wanted us to feel as though we were women, the way women feel, and this is the worst insult, to feel like a woman’” (530).

“These photos do not merely reflect the tortures committed; they also function as an integral part of the humiliating, dehumanizing violence itself: the giddy process of documentation, the visual evidence of corporeal shame, the keen ecstatic eye of the voyeur” (531).

“As Susan Sontag argues, ‘…the photographs are us’” (531).


Abstract:
How are gender and sexuality central to the current "war on terrorism"? This question opens on to others: How are the technologies that are being developed to combat "terrorism" departures from or transformations of older technologies of heteronormativity, white supremacy, and nationalism? In what way do contemporary counterterrorism practices deploy these technologies, and how do these practices and technologies become the quotidian framework through which we are obliged to struggle, survive, and resist? Sexuality is central to the creation of a certain knowledge of terrorism, specifically that branch of strategic analysis that has entered the academic mainstream as "terrorism studies." This knowledge has a history that ties the image of the modern terrorist to a much older figure, the racial and sexual monsters of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Further, the construction of the pathologized psyche of the terrorist-monster enables the practices of normalization, which in today's context often means an aggressive heterosexual patriotism (Abstract from ibid, 117).
Additional Notes and/or Quotes:

“Posters that appeared in midtown Manhattan only days after the [September 11\textsuperscript{th}] attacks show a turbaned caricature of bin Laden being anally penetrated by the Empire State Building. The legend beneath reads, ‘The Empire Strikes Back’ or ‘So you like skyscrapers, huh, bitch?’ [Once again, place ‘brown men’ in the ‘vulnerable/feminine’ position of homosexual relationships to emasculate them.] Or think of the Web site where, with a series of weapons at your disposal, you can torture Osama bin Laden to death, the last torture being sodomy; or another Web site that shows two pictures, one of bin Laden with a beard, and the other without—and the photo of him shaven turns out to be O. J. Simpson. What these representations show, we believe, is that queerness as sexual deviancy is tied to the monstrous figure of the terrorist as a way to otherize and quarantine subjects classified as ‘terrorists,’ but also to normalize and discipline a population through these very monstrous figures” (126).

“Though much gender-dependent ‘black’ humor describing the appropriate punishment for bin Laden focuses on the liberation of Afghan women (liberate Afghan women and send them to college or make bin Laden have a sex change operation and live in Afghanistan as a woman—deeply racist, sexist, and homophobic suggestions), this portrayal suggests something further still: American retaliation promises to emasculate bin Laden and turn him into a fag” (126).

“This promise not only suggests that if you're not for the war, you're a fag, it also incites violence against queers and specifically queers of color. And indeed, there have been reports from community-based organizations throughout New York City that violent incidents against queers of color have increased. So on the one hand, the United States is being depicted as feminist and gay-safe by this comparison with Afghanistan, and on the other hand, the U.S. state, having experienced a castration and penetration of its capitalist masculinity, offers up narratives of emasculation as appropriate punishment for bin Laden, brown-skinned folks, and men in turbans” (126).

“When a U.S. Navy bomb aboard the U.S.S. Enterprise had scrawled upon it "Hijack This Fags," national gay and lesbian rights organizers objected to the homophobia of this kind of nationalist rhetoric, but not to the broader racist war itself” (127).


Abstract:
This article introduces a gender-framed analysis of the Iraq war and continuing occupation. Through this analysis the author illustrates how the coalition forces’ ignorance of the cultural context within which their actions took place has
impeded upon women’s empowerment. By analysing the conflict and occupation within the framework of honour and shame, the further argument is made that, despite the rhetoric of ‘women’s liberation’ used to justify the war, the consequences of the conflict have run contrary to any claim made to emancipate women. The author concludes that it is only through re-framing our analysis of the Iraqi conflict, with gender at the fore, that we are better able to understand the conflict as a whole. Further that it is only through self-reflection and a concentration on the peaceful empowerment of society as a whole that we are able to counter all forms of violence against women (Abstract from ibid).

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“The importance of honour and shame, analysed above, allows us to understand the war and occupation of Iraq as a humiliation for Iraqi society, as Fontan highlights in Voices from Post-Saddam Iraq. The toppling of Saddam itself was viewed as a point of humiliation from the perspective of the Iraqi citizenry: ‘The greatest humiliation of all was to see foreigners topple Saddam, not because we loved him, but because we could not do it ourselves,’ construing a sense of disempowerment. Occupation itself must be understood as shameful for Iraqi society, the coalition forces came to save the population of Iraq from tyranny, removing a dictator through military force in a display of what the ‘west’ could do but the people themselves could not.”

“Soldiers on the ground seemed to have a distinct lack of cultural training, which led to gendered humiliation. One example is that, following a rocket-propelled grenade hitting a Military Police patrol, killing one, in June 2003, a raid was carried out on a road in Fallujah…One woman who was alone in her house refused to allow the soldiers to enter her home brandishing an AK-47 to protect herself. Within the context of honour in Iraqi society, it would have been unacceptable for these men to enter her home whilst she was there alone, ‘their intrusion would tarnish her honour and that of her family.’ She was arrested and taken to Abu-Ghraiib prison, upon her release she disappeared, neighbours professed that ‘she was thought to have been raped during her time in prison, and that she was killed in order for her family’s honour to be cleansed.’ Coalition forces throughout Iraq act out of fear and anger, whilst remaining simultaneously ignorant of the cultural context of their actions, thus feeding the perception that women are not being respected by coalition forces and further entrenching the idea that women need to be afforded protection.”

“The recent employment of a discourse of women’s liberation within the ‘war on terror’ is comparable to that used during colonisation. As a result, the perception of the ‘hegemonic western feminist’ has created division between the ‘west’ and those they declare themselves to be saving. It is an attitude of saviour or protector which feeds the division and indeed runs concurrent with established gender stereotypes; it is the woman that needs to be saved, as with every western fairytale, there is a damsel in distress. This stance denies the equality of the ‘oppressed’ woman, rejects her agency, pities her and elevates to a pedestal the western woman’s conception of liberation.”

Abstract:
Dominant discourses in the United States paint the acts of prisoner ‘abuse’ committed by US soldiers in Abu Ghraib in 2003 as either the obscene but exceptional example of some low-ranking soldiers gone mad, or as the direct result of the suspension of the rule of law in the global ‘war on terror’. Alternatively, feminist theorist Barbara Ehrenreich suggests that the pictures depicting female soldiers torturing prisoners are both horrifying and a sign of ‘gender equality’. This article departs from all three of these positions. I argue that the micro-level violences shown in the Abu Ghraib pictures are neither just aberrations nor a sign of gender equality. Rather they follow a pre-constructed heterosexed, racialized and gendered script that is firmly grounded in the colonial desires and practices of the larger social order and that underpins the hegemonic ‘save civilization itself’-fantasy of the ‘war on terror’. I explore how the participation of some of the US Empire’s internal Others, namely White western women, may disrupt some of the social processes of normalization underpinning this colonial fantasy, but nevertheless serves to re/produce the identity and hegemony of the US Empire and its heterosexed, racialized and classed World (Dis)Order (*Abstract from ibid*, 38).

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“The pleasure that the seven convicted military prison guards took in torturing detainees is grounded in colonial desires, similar to the nineteenth-century colonial fantasy of the ‘White Man’s burden’. The effect of these violences and violations is to (re)produce the current misogynist, racialized, heterosexed and classed neo-liberal World DisOrder, and therefore the torturing female-identified soldiers are not a sign of ‘gender equality’” (38).

“Enloe, Whitworth (2004: 16) argues that militaries rely on a certain kind of ‘ideology of manliness’ in order to function well, an ideology premised on violence and aggression, individual conformity to military discipline, aggressive heterosexism, misogyny and racism. The military compensates the soldier for subordination and physical stress with the promise of community, and physical and emotional toughness (Whitworth 2004: 16). Militarized masculinity is inherently fragile, due to the discrepancies between the ‘myths and promises’ associated with militarized masculinity as experienced and enacted in military training as well as in simulations of warfare, and the lack of control in the actual lives of soldiers (Whitworth 2004: 166). Whitworth further argues that, through violence and the denigration of Others who undermine their promised entitlements, soldiers seek to (re)constitute their militarized masculine self. Following Whitworth, I suggest that the various forms of torture enacted by the soldiers on the bodies of Abu Ghraib detainees were a way of reasserting control.
and reconstituting the soldierly Self, particularly after the ‘emasculating’ events
on 9/11 and the daily resistance against the occupation of Iraq” (44).

“From the ‘discoveries’ of the Middle Ages on, the racialized sexualization of
colonial conquests played a central role in western imperialisms in terms of
constructing boundaries along the intersecting lines of class, gender, race, nation
and civilization in ways that helped regulate the larger social ‘order…’ In these
colonial fantasies, the ‘Arabic Orient’ constituted the site of particular sexual
excess (see Said 1994; Boone 2003)” (46).

“In the late nineteenth century, the western colonial projects coincided and
intersected with the rise of ‘scientific’ racism and its systematic racialization of
Others in the colonies and in the mother country. In the colonies, ‘[t]he
personage of the savage was developed as the Other of civilization and one of
the first “proofs” of this otherness was the nakedness of the savage, the visibility
of its sex’ (Mercer and Julien cited in Somerville 2000: 5). ‘Back home’, the
twin processes of sexualization and racialization constructed internal Other(s) –
the degenerate European races such as the Jews and the Irish, prostitutes, the
unemployed, the insane (McClintock 1995: 50) and homosexuals. These
intersecting processes helped erect and police the boundaries between the
imperial elites and the European and non-European subaltern, and served to
rationalize, to render ‘natural’, the concomitant acts of exclusion and violence”
(46).

“The four official investigations, as well as the US mass media, overwhelmingly
reported that male detainees in Abu Ghraib were forced to have or simulate
‘homosexual sex’ or ‘sodomy’. The way this discourse frames these acts of
violence as ‘sex’ and not rape recalls the orthodox interpretation that male rape
of female bodies is about too much testosterone and/or the irresistible ‘sexiness’
of the victim/survivor (see Brownmiller 1975; Seifert 1993). However, there is
also a large contemporary body of literature, including work by non-feminists
and military psychologists, which argues that rape is about violence and
domination, making the Other lose control over her or his body, particularly her
or his sexuality (see Marlowe 1983; Goldstein 2001)” (48).

“Like colonial travellers and late modern tourists, the soldiers sought to enact
‘Whiteness’ by capturing the ‘exoticism’ of the Other with the help of video and
photo camera” (49).

“Over the period of three months, the soldiers took around 1,800 pictures of
their acts of violence. These pictures also depict grinning soldiers giving thumbs
up to the camera next to the wounded, naked flesh of the detainees, strongly
evoking the trophy pictures of colonial hunters standing proudly next to their
prey. Immortalizing the moment of triumph over the beast with the help of pictures allows them to relive the triumphant moment of ‘Whiteness’ and to
share it with friends and family”(49-50).
“My analysis of the acts of torture comes to the conclusion that they were staged according to a misogynist, heterosexed, racialized script. Enacting violences on the bodies of Abu Ghraib prisoners reasserted not only the perceived control of the individual, militarized Selves of the seven soldiers in the photographs, but also allowed them to enact ‘Whiteness’ – and thereby re/ produce the identity and hegemony of the US Empire and its heterosexed, racialized and classed World (Dis)Order.” (51).

“As my analysis of the sexed, racialized torture practices has shown, the ‘save civilization itself’-fantasy, that is, the hegemonic national fantasy envisaging the First World civilized Self bringing (liberal) democracy to the Third World Other incapable of self-determination, and the subject-position ‘Whiteness’, depend on the association of femininity with subordination, weakness and passivity, in short, inferiority. While the (hetero)sexualized humiliation of racialized men at the hands of White western women disrupts the fictitious clear-cut male/female dichotomy underpinning this fantasy, the violent practices constitute merely a reversal of that logocentrism, they do not displace it. To remain within Ehrenreich’s problematic framework, the female-identified soldiers ironically contributed actively to gender inequality” (51-52).

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Abstract:
This paper argues that the Palestinians in Israel are undergoing a deep crisis of masculinity that is at once a reaction to, and a reflection of, their collective situation. Notwithstanding some important benefits that accrue to them as citizens, they are subjected to structural violence, which includes policing, racism, and discrimination. Their socio-economic conditions are poor, and their sense of identity and cultural vitality are on the defense. The paper describes several coexisting scripts of hegemonic masculinity and their inbuilt tensions and reads the seemingly inward-turned wave of violence as emanating from blocked paths to masculine performance.

Despite the abundant literature on Palestinian women, the discussion of Palestinians as a national collective tends to be blind to the double role of gender, and particularly of masculinity, as a model of and model for the production of cultural meaning. Masculinity therefore is an apt site for a critical reading of the situation of Israeli Palestinians, whence to view the vulnerable side of what is usually considered the hub of power and control (Abstract from ibid, 305).

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“Next, like gender more generally, masculinity is embodied, which opens a
space for performativity. People do not ‘have’ gender. Rather, masculinities and femininities are things that people ‘do.’ In this respect, Esmail Nashif argues that Palestinian men tend to overdo their gender, and he marks ‘overmanning’ as a ritualistic response to the crisis of male productivity in the Arab world” (307).

“As Connell notes, the source of violence is probably the ongoing active construction of masculinity rather than the end state” (307).

“On the one hand, militaristic-heroic masculinity, which surrounds [the Palestinians in Israel] through the practices of Palestinians in the PA and of Israeli Jews, is a path not available to [Palestinians in Israel]. On the other hand non-violent forms of productive patriarchal masculinity, notably the possibilities to accrue political and economic power, are also largely limited, because of class and national discrimination against them” (308).

“In another ethnographic exploration of masculinity among Palestinian Arabs inside Israel, Rhoda Kanaaneh looks at the quite exceptional category of men who volunteer for the Israeli security forces, which include the police, the military, and border patrol. These men, who number several thousands, are usually seen as traitors in the Palestinian community, especially if they serve in the military. The discourse on their denigration, which is heavily gendered, reveals much about local understandings of masculinity” (312).

“Besides being cursed as sons of prostitutes, these volunteers ‘are attributed a superficial, individualistic, immature, pubescent masculinity . . . [and seen] as needing the military to bolster their weak masculinities.’ Because the Israeli military apparatus is geared, first and foremost, against Arabs, the Palestinian citizens are by definition excluded from its masculine culture. They cannot cash in on the invaluable symbolic capital that accrues to army veterans – tangible material benefits, important connections, and above all, entry into the inner circle of Israeli citizenship – because they are not invited to participate in the first place. They do not receive a draft order. However, even those who do serve, whether because they volunteer or if they happen to be Druze (the only ones who do get drafted), they still remain marginalized. To counter their stigmatization, Arab soldiers emphasize particular components of masculinity, the economic benefits that will allow them to fulfill the role of provider. ‘The response of many of the criticized men is that theirs is a pragmatic masculinity, not formed by outdated notions of national taboos but, rather, aimed at advancing their families or themselves as current or future family providers’” (312).

“Three objects that recur in the discourse on a violence got out of hand, and which are particularly laden with masculine symbolism, are arms, cars, and dogs” (315).

“A third type of driving-related violence is road rage. Drivers may consider overtaking as an offense to their honor and attempt ‘retaliation’ by driving faster,
running the other driver off the road, etc. Some traffic laws, such as yielding the right of way, are considered a particular affront to manliness. In fact, among young adult males unruly driving is a common masculine performance. Another corollary of road rage is the apparently expanding phenomenon of ‘taking the fight outside the car’” (316).

“Last but not least, training attack dogs and walking them in public seems to be one of the latest male fashions. One newspaper article that was dedicated to this trend was among the few that explicitly named men and masculinity. The fascination with these dangerous dogs, according to the explanation given in this piece, lies in the sense of control and power that they provide for their owners” (316).

“‘We raise these dogs in order to satisfy machismo (al-matshoism) . . .’ People say that they want the dogs for defense purposes, but the real goal is different. The dogs make for a display of masculinity (al-rujula) [and youngsters raise them] to be in line with their friends from the neighborhood or from school. As one dog trainer said: ‘We raise these dogs because they make us feel men and powerful. I can walk the street with this dog knowing that no one will challenge me, or the dog will attack him’” (316).

“In the hyper-nationalistic Israeli-Palestinian scene, violence is a central mode of behavior, yet within this complex, the Arabs inside are left with no defined role. Despite their Israeli citizenship they are not drafted into its armed forces. At the same time, as official citizens of the state they cannot join the organized Palestinian resistance either. They are at once potential traitors to their national group and a potential fifth column within their state. Considering the restricted space allowed for their collective expression, Israeli-Palestinian Arabs do not have legitimate, institutionalized channels for militaristic-violent masculine performances. They can neither identify with Israeli national military heroes nor endorse openly Palestinian heroes, whose very glory is derived from their resistance to Zionism and later to Israel. This blocked path is important for the interpretation of the local concern about growing communal violence that seems to have encroached ever closer to home” (318).

“…the sense of predicament among the Palestinian citizens is implicitly articulated in terms of a crisis in masculinity. Their political-economic location does not allow the realization of militaristic masculinities, which hold gross hegemony in the area, while alternative scripts of less violent masculinities are also hardly viable for them. Growing numbers of men are incapable of supporting their families, men generally are barred from positions of effective political leadership, and more generally still, because of their interstitial position in the region, Palestinian Israelis are marginalized in terms of cultural production” (322-323).

“The contribution of this paper lies in the application of gender theory to issues of
cultural morality and social order that are locally deemed collective, as opposed to being specific to women, hence in marking a layer of power dynamics that conventional studies of the collective affairs of this group usually leave unmarked” (323).

“While we have demonstrated destructive behaviors, and the anger and frustration that they evoke, our material also points to the potential of redirecting norms and behaviors toward more productive and plausibly somewhat less militaristic masculinities. Conceptualized in this way, masculinity comprises a timely site for critical reading of the situation of Palestinians inside Israel, as it allows a glance at the vulnerable side of what is usually considered as the hub of power and control” (323).


**Abstract:**
Despite a growing awareness about the importance of emotions to global politics, the discipline of international relations theory is still working towards adequate theorizations and investigations of their role. This is particularly noticeable in the fact that there has been little sustained, scholarly examination of the effects of various emotions on the shape and orientation of the U.S. foreign policy reaction to 9/11. This essay seeks to begin to address both of these gaps by examining the role that dynamics of humiliation and counterhumiliation have played in contemporary global politics. In particular, it develops a theoretical understanding of humiliation and then applies this framework to explain how dynamics of humiliation have impacted post 9/11 American global policy. It concludes that we cannot fully understand the sources, and the effects, of post 9/11 contemporary politics (especially U.S. global policy) without taking into account dynamics of humiliation (*Abstract from ibid, 495*).

**Additional Notes and/or Quotes:**
On the nature of humiliation:
“...the intensely negative visceral reaction is related to the inability to perform certain practices (or the requirement to undertake others) which ensure that the subjects and those around them perceive them as honourable subjects who live up to their own self-image and are thus due respect from themselves and others” (506).

“...the feeling of humiliation is deeply and closely linked to ideas about, and perceptions of, ‘honour’ and ‘respect’. In fact, the feeling of humiliation can be defined as the intense – and intensely painful – sensation of having one’s ‘dignity or self-respect lowered and depressed’. The feeling of humiliation is thus a social process that radically devalues one’s self-respect (and others’
respect of you) which in turn gives rise to an intense negative emotion” (506).

“…for humiliation to function, the humiliated party must have ‘pretensions’ (in a non-pejorative sense) to a higher value or position which are subsequently proved as false” (507).

“…the impact of humiliation is intensified if the unmasking of pretensions is made publicly known to a larger audience” (507).

“…if humiliation is to be deeply felt and for it to function effectively as a disciplinary force, there needs to be a normative standard of judgment and aspiration that is deeply embedded and accepted (both instantly recognised and widely respected) by a given community. For only if both the ‘humiliatee’ and an observing (or potentially observing) public share an intense respect for a commonsense standard can the public revealing of sub-standard behaviour (or attitudes, and so on) immediately inspire a deep emotion of humiliation that is powerful enough to transform their self-perceptions and behaviours” (508).

“If there were no powerful cultural standards which (a) defined honourable manliness as hetero-sexual and autonomous and (b) outlined commonly shared conceptions of how these values must be performed (for example, no public nudity – especially in front of women, no sexual acts between men), the tactics of humiliation would not function to lower the inmates’ self-respect and perceptions of dignity” (507-508).

“…humiliation is a culturally and historically specific phenomenon insofar as the elements that trigger humiliation depend heavily on a specific cultural sensibility (the meanings, expectations, judgments, affective and emotional reactions disciplined and enabled by a culture)” (508).

Possible reactions to humiliation: (1) “obeying the humiliating authority;” (2) “a reaction against the agent that is perceived to be trying to humiliate the individual or group” (particularly true in cases in which the humiliation is directed against masculine pretensions to power, honor and respect); (3) “attempt to overthrow the agent of humiliation in an effort to disprove the legitimacy of the attempted humiliation and thus overturn the lowering of one’s own dignity in the eyes of oneself and others” (reactions (2) and (3) are why Lindner believes humiliation as a torture tactic is so counterproductive to foreign affairs—it breeds terrorism and hate); (4) “overtly rebel and challenge the commonsense standards that underpin the assumed humiliation (like the Palestinians, who challenged the standard/idea that being subjected to violence was shameful, and turned it into something empowering) (5) “nothing overt – but instead develop and nurture a deep simmering resentment that lurks just beneath the surface and that might explode against the agent of humiliation (or someone else) at some point in the future” (508).

“For even if the policymakers, interrogators, and MPs were not all fully capable
of articulating that it was humiliation they were using, it is hard to believe that they didn’t all intuitively sense that they were seeking to discipline the inmates by manipulating them using emotions that were not simply fear of pain. As such, as a social practice, humiliation can be relevant to understanding social interactions either (a) as a spiral dynamic of more or less unconscious reactions to feelings of humiliation or (b) as a tactic of humiliation that is (more or less) intentionally used as a means of altering behavior” (509).

“Moreover, it should be noted that employing tactics of humiliation often lead to spiral dynamics – just as spiral dynamics of humiliation often inspire those involved to increasingly use tactics of humiliation in their reactions” (509).

On Humiliation and 9/11, Bush’s Role:

“And what are some of the elements that the American public commonly assumes are required for the President to retain his dignity and self-respect? While the precise bases of different presidents’ self-respect vary (Kennedy’s bases were certainly very different than Reagan’s), one theme that is common to virtually all occupants of the office is the appearance of strength, resoluteness, determination, invulnerability and power – in sum, masculinity” (511).

“John Ducat convincingly shows not only that the bases of much masculine self-respect is based on a deep phobia and disavowal of the feminine – but more specifically that modern American presidential politics have become fundamentally premised on the ability of office holders to prove that they are not wimps, wussies, mama’s boys or sissies. For as Ducat’s work highlights, Bush Jr. had a very personal connection to fears of being labeled a ‘wimp’. It was, after all, his father that had been decried as a ‘wimp’ on the cover of national magazines and many observers suggest that one of the key lessons Bush Jr. took from his father’s defeat was the cost of being publicly perceived as a ‘wimp’” (511).

“The [September 11th] attacks directly challenged the idea that the American President is the hyper-masculine Commander-in-Chief of the world – able to stand up with strength, determination, invulnerability and power without fear of reprisal or personal vulnerability…9/11 challenged the myth of omnipotence of American power and its ultimate office-holder” (512).

“It implicitly challenged the Republican faith that if you are tough enough, no one will dare mess with you. 9/11 either proved this faith to be radically naïve (humiliating in itself for the ‘tough love’ approach to defence) or, even worse, threatened to show that Bush and the Republicans, despite their efforts, hadn’t been ‘man enough’ to deter and scare evil-doers” (513).
Role of the Community/ Americans’ Perceptions:

“Moreover, if America is now the world’s policeman – and not merely a prime mover among several powers – then any disrespect that is shown is doubly insulting. Challenging the US is not only challenging a state. It is challenging the global authority… As the policeman of the world, it is also due the double deference and intensified respect that a recognised authority deserves” (514).

“…that there are some widely (but certainly not universally) held assumptions about what it means to be American – and that these assumptions and self-understandings become particularly solidified in times of crisis. Moreover, I would further suggest that many of these centre on notions of masculinity – strong, invulnerable, determined, and resolute – and thus create a very high standard for national self-respect. The fact that one of the most oft-cited claims following 9/11 was the idea that the US had never been subject to a significant foreign attack underlines the degree to which large segments of the public identified with a conception of America as the Invulnerable” (515).

“America embodies a can-do frontier attitude of a country literally constructed in 200 years out of pure nature. And what is a significant component of the frontier attitude? Strong masculinity. The cowboy who deals out rough justice when required. The self-sufficient, autonomous pioneer who has earned the right to protect the homestead against raiding marauders (see Adrian Wooldridge and John Micklethwait, The Right Nation (New York: Penguin, 2004)” (517).

“First, the attack challenged the deep assumptions about invulnerability and revealed them as over-confident and arrogant. Far from being exceptional, the US was revealed simply as one nation among many that was at risk of terrorist attack. I suspect, however, that many also felt that the US had been fundamentally disrespected by the attacks – a humiliation to its national masculinity that required a clear response to make sure that ‘they’ respected us. For what could be more humiliating than the fact that a group with no face, no visible power, and no body to call to account had symbolically emasculated and challenged – slapped in the face in the most public and devastating way – the entire United States? And the fact that they did it without technology, without state power, using nothing more devastating than box cutters to turn the very tools of everyday US commercial life into missiles capable of evading every defence, only rubbed salt into the humiliation” (517)

“One relevant indicator might be the work of Michael Adams – a pollster who has been tracking the evolution of values in both the US and Canada for the last 15 years. One of his particularly startling findings is that while acceptance of the patriarchal model of hyper-masculine authority is falling in many modern countries (including Canada), it seems to be experiencing a significant resurgence in the United States. According to Adams’ research, while the number of Canadians who agreed with the statement ‘the father of the family must be the
master in his own home’ fell from 26% in 1992, to 20% in 1996, to 18% in 2000, in the United States the number grew from 42% to 44% to 49% in those same years. See Michael Adams, Fire and Ice: The United States, Canada, and the Myth of Converging Values (Toronto: Penguin, 2003), p. 51” (517).

“What is central is not merely that punishment will be meted out, but that the humiliated nation, the humiliating terrorists, and the viewing world public will all be witness to a counter-humiliation that not only visits just retribution on the terrorists, but that also allows the pride and self-respect of the American nation to be publicly reasserted and regained” (518).

U.S. pursued a war, not legal action because of need to reassert status:
“The...For if 9/11 is interpreted as a gauntlet thrown down, a palpable disrespecting of American identity, then respect must be reasserted by wresting it from a vanquished, counter-humiliated opponent. A legal approach was precluded not merely because of doubts about the efficacy, the legalities, and so on. A legal approach would have been insufficient even if a much more efficient international system existed, because of its very nature. Courts provide justice – but they rarely provide effective counter-humiliation. And they never allow the victim to publicly highlight their re-respected status” (519).

“...humiliation can be reversed through counter-humiliation only if the counter-humiliation is clearly and publicly meted out. With bin Laden still at large, a stand-in was required – not merely to divert the attention of the public or to satisfy some public need for accountability, but also because the public humiliation of a symbolic figure was required to allow the rebuilding of American pride. For this purpose, Iraq worked perfectly, since Hussein was a very public figure who had not only humiliated the US by outlasting Bush Sr., but also by consistently thumbing his nose diplomatically and rhetorically in the decade that followed the first Gulf war” (520).

“...a desire to counter-humiliate might have dissuaded the administration from conducting – or taking seriously – realistic risk calculations that highlighted the serious strategic risks of an invasion of Iraq. It might even be the case that one of the reasons that much of the US public believed that Hussein was linked to al-Qaeda (despite clear indicators to the contrary) was because they intuitively understood the unspoken parallel – that both al-Qaeda and Hussein had tried to humiliate the US and therefore deserved counter-humiliation” (520).

“...distributing pictures of the Husseins – who had demanded to be viewed as Gods – served US purposes by revealing the Husseins as a humiliated scourge that had been forced to adopt disguises, hide and die, and be captured like rats without ceremony or pomp” (520).

Abstract:
Reports of sexual violence by men against men emerge from numerous conflicts, ranging in time from Ancient Persia and the Crusades to the conflicts in Iraq and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Despite these accounts, relatively little material exists on the subject and the issue tends to be relegated to a footnote. This article ascertains the extent to which male sexual violence is committed in armed conflict. It considers factors that explain under-reporting by victims and lack of detection on the part of others. The particular forms of male sexual violence are also examined: namely rape, enforced sterilization and other forms of sexual violence, including enforced nudity, enforced masturbation and genital violence. The dynamics present in these offences are explored, with issues of power and dominance, expressed through emasculation, considered. Thus, attention is paid to ideas of feminization, homosexualization and the prevention of procreation. The symbolic construction of male and female bodies in armed conflict is also explored (Abstract from ibid, 253).

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“If the abuse is recognized, it may not always be seen as sexual violence, for the issue is often buried under the rubric of 'abuse' or 'torture'. Often times, castration is seen as 'mutilation' and rape as 'torture', a view that becomes apparent when reading reports of non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations. This may be due to, and also reinforces, the view that men cannot be subjected to sexual assault. This is almost the reverse of the situation concerning the women's movement, which wanted, for example, rape to be recognized as torture” (256).

“In time of armed conflict, the traditional power dynamics are more susceptible to reconfiguration. Law and order has broken down, the balance of power is in the process of being reshaped and there may be room for movement within the pre-existing social hierarchies. As rape and other forms of sexual violence are about maintaining and restoring certain power balances, sexual violence will likely be committed in time of potential imbalance. Indeed, it has been noted that, '[a] comparison of low-rape and rape-prone societies reveals that the occurrence of rape is particularly high where male power has become unstable'. [Unstable where? In the society of the perpetrator or the victim? If in the society of the perpetrator, this would go along with other scholars’ assertions that it’s a way to reassert failing power/masculinity] But why then the high incidence of male sexual violence? It has been posited, persuasively, that sexual violence against men in war occurs for much the same reason as sexual violence against women striving for equality and independence in male-dominated societies, namely that in both situations, there is an attempt to suppress challenges to the social status of the dominant group” (267).
“Notions of power and dominance are present in constructions of chastity and virility. In some cultures, women are considered to represent the chastity of the family and the community. Accordingly, sexual violence against female members of a community is intended to suggest that the men of the community have failed in their duty to protect ‘their’ women. In this way, female rape is a form of communication between men. It reinforces the ‘conquered’s status of masculine impotence’” (268).

“The communication and the impotence are arguably more pronounced when it is the men themselves who are the victims of sexual violence. The construction of masculinity is that of the ability to exert power over others, particularly by means of the use of force. Thus, men are considered to represent the virility, strength and power of the family and the community, able to protect not just them but others. Sexual violence against male members of the household and community would thus suggest not only empowerment and masculinity of the offender but disempowerment of the individual victim. The effects of disempowerment do not just take place at the individual level. Sexual violence against male members of the household and community also suggest disempowerment of the family and community in much the same way as the chastity of the family and community is considered lost when female members are sexually violated. Disempowerment thus takes place not just through women's bodies, but those of the men themselves” (268).

“Sexual violence against women in conflict frequently takes place in public, in front of the victims' communities and their families. On an individual level, there is the added aspect of public humiliation and shame, an added stigma. There is also little chance that word of the rape will be kept quiet. Public sexual violence is also, then, a way of communicating to the rest of the community, of spreading fear and vulnerability throughout the area. An entire community may feel compelled to flee; indeed this may have been the very purpose of the public nature of the sexual violence in the first place. The power of the perpetrators is vindicated, on show for all to see” (268).

“These factors are also at play when male sexual violence is committed in public. At an individual level, the male is stigmatized as a victim and the community is informed that their male members, their protectors, are unable to protect themselves. And if they are unable to protect themselves, how are they to protect ‘their’ women and ‘their’ community? In this way, the manliness of the man is lost and the family and community are made to feel vulnerable. Disempowerment of the community is again had through the dominance over its male members” (269).

“Male sexual violence is, then, all about notions of power and dominance. Power and dominance are linked with masculinity and in the context of male sexual violence in armed conflict, power and dominance manifest themselves in the form of emasculation. Gender stereotyping suggests that men cannot be victims,
only perpetrators. Thus, men are not conditioned to think of themselves as potential victims of sexual abuse or potential targets for perpetrators in the same way as women. They see themselves as being able to resist any potential attack and this is how others see them. For example, sexual violence may be considered to be inconsistent with certain societies' understandings of masculinity. Victims are considered weak and helpless, while men strong and powerful. Masculinity and victim-hood are thus seemingly inconsistent. On this basis, when sexual violence occurs against men, their masculine attributes are considered to have been taken away from them - they have been emasculated. This is not a new phenomenon for in ancient history, a male who was sexually penetrated was considered to have lost his manhood and could no longer be considered a warrior or a ruler. Today, there is in society the idea that male victims of sexual violence are not 'real men' for 'real men' would not have let this happen to them” (270).

“Regardless of the actual gender of the perpetrator or victim, the characteristic of masculinity is attributed to the perpetrator and femininity to the victim…The treatment accorded to survivors of rape, whether male or female, by the community may also be similar. In some communities, female victims of sexual violence are shunned and considered to be outcasts; so too, in others, male victims of sexual violence. Thus, one male survivor of rape stated that, 'I feel that people in the community look down on me. When I talk to other men, they look at me as if I'm worthless now”” (271).

“The intention of the rape may be to 'lower' the social status of the male survivor by 'reducing' him to a 'feminized male', described by one commentator as '[o]ne of the most lethal gender roles in modern times'. The same commentator asks, 'what greater humiliation can one man impose on another man or boy than to turn him into a de facto 'female' through sexual cruelty?' This is mirrored in the comments of victims, one of whom has noted '[t]hey wanted us to feel as though we were women' and 'this is the worst insult, to feel like a woman'. The feminization idea may be further reinforced through the general view in society, even amongst those working in the field such as medical and aid workers, that only women can be raped. It certainly does not help that, as a matter of law, this may be true in any number of countries and, as regards those in which it is not, the change was relatively recent” (271).

“Another way in which male victims of sexual violence may feel emasculated is through the process of homosexualization. When reference is made to masculinity, the dominant construct is that of heterosexual masculinity. It is the heterosexual male that is the symbol of power. It is the heterosexual male that fills, or at least filled, the ranks of the armed forces. The homosexual male is considered less masculine and more effeminate than the heterosexual male. Constructing the male victim of sexual assault as homosexual is thus a means by which to emasculate him, thereby reducing his social status. It is also a means by which to 'taint' him with homosexuality” (272).
“Further, if it is recalled that rape is about power and dominance and not sex, this would explain why the male rapist retains his heterosexual (powerful) status, while the male victim loses his heterosexual status and is considered homosexualized (made weak, effeminate). However, when two male victims are forced to rape one another, the traditional power dynamic no longer applies. Both male victims lose their heterosexual status for the power rests with the perpetrator who was behind the rape. In this situation, the enforced rape 'taints' both parties with homosexuality, strips them both of their masculinity and with it any power they may have” (272).

“Concepts of masculinity also play out in ideas of virility and procreative capacity. As one individual who has worked with victims of sexual violence has noted, survivors of sexual torture 'often relate anxiety about the possibility of having children to injury to the sexual organs. Fears of no longer being considered fully a man, or of not being able to function as a man, were often mentioned. This may be due to the large number of castrations that take place in armed conflict as well as the frequency of violence aimed at male reproductive organs” (273).

“In much the same way as sexual violence against women may symbolize to offender and victim alike the destruction of the national, racial, religious or ethnic culture as appropriate depending on the context of the conflict, sexual violence against men symbolizes the disempowerment of the national, racial, religious or ethnic group. The castration of a man is considered to emasculate him, to deprive him of his power. The castration of a man may also represent the symbolic emasculation of the entire community. This is particularly pronounced in an ethnic conflict where 'the castration of a single man of the ethnically defined enemy is symbolic appropriation of the masculinity of the whole group. Sexual humiliation of a man from another ethnicity is, thus, a proof not only that he is a lesser man, but also that his ethnicity is a lesser ethnicity.' This is not particular to castration but is applicable to sexual violence more generally. Sexual violence against individual men of a particular group is thus a means of emasculating that entire group” (274).

“Notions of power and dominance are thus interwoven throughout ideas of emasculation, feminization, homosexualization and the prevention of procreation. It is the loss of power, amongst other things, that is common to all. Power is the essential attribute in all forms of sexual violence, be it rape, enforced sterilization or forced nudity. The heterosexual male is considered the all-powerful; rape and other forms of sexual violence against men and against women serve to reinforce this status” (275).

Abstract:
When Yasser Arafat in January 2002 called on Palestinian women—his "army of roses"—to join in the struggle against Israeli occupation, even he was surprised by their swift and devastating response. Later that same day, Wafa Idris would become the first female suicide bomber of the Intifada. Tragically, she wasn't the last. In *Army of Roses*, Pulitzer Prize-nominated author Barbara Victor profiles Wafa Idris and the other young women who have followed her violent lead toward a martyr's Paradise paved with personal desperation and deadly political maneuvering.

In this astonishing exposé of the political and cultural forces now pressing Palestinian women into martyrdom, investigative journalist Victor identifies what she calls "a new level of cynicism" that has destroyed normal, everyday existence in the Middle East, along with the possibility for lasting peace. Tracing the roots of the women's resistance movement back to so-called personal initiative attacks and a brief period of empowerment in the 1980s before religious leaders clamped down, Victor shows how the current generation of Palestinian women has been courted and cajoled into committing these self-destructive and murderous acts.

By presenting the intimate personal histories of the first five female bombers who have succeeded in blowing themselves up, as well as the troubling stories of some of those who've tried and failed, the author reveals not only the crushing poverty and religious zealotry that one might suspect as motivating factors in their fall, but also a startling emotional component to their death wishes: their broken dreams and blighted inner lives. Victor shows, without dismissing or diminishing the horror of their actions, how far a person can be pushed when she is convinced she has nothing to lose (Abstract from book description).

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“Immediately after the bombing, Wafa’s [the first female Palestinian suicide bomber] sister-in-law, Wissim, spoke up in a televised statement, saying that Wafa had often told her that it was better to die a martyr’s death than to live in humiliation. Mabrook Idris’s initial public response of pride and joy that her daughter had given her life for the Palestinian cause alluded to her daughter’s personal suffering at the hands of the Israelis” (27).

“And yet Masalqa believes that even as this ‘culture of death’ has permeated Palestinian society, there are still differences between a shahide [male suicide bomber/ “martyr”] and a shahida [female suicide bomber/ “martyr”]. ‘There are two different dynamics,’ Dr. Masalqa explains. ‘When an adolescent boy is humiliated at an Israeli checkpoint, from that moment, a suicide bomber is created. At the same time, if a woman becomes shahida, one has to look for
deeper, more underlying reasons. There are obviously cases where mental illness plays a part, since not all marginalized women within Palestinian society kill themselves. Pathology plays an important role in these cases. Not all people who try to kill themselves and kill others are desperate to such a degree that they simply cannot tolerate their pain. Often there are other, more personal reasons’’’’ (28).


Abstract:
No abstract found.

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“Paramount in international relations is the maintenance and enhancement of a nation’s reputation or honor--what is now usually rendered in secular language as national ‘credibility.’ It is a less comprehensive term than honor; it refers primarily to policymakers, not to a nation’s popular will. For instance, the Kissinger Commission of 1984 declared that beyond the issue of American security in Central America, our credibility worldwide is engaged, and any sign of passivity would be read in the Kremlin as ‘a sign of US impotence’” (2).

“Thus, the intensity of the southern inclination toward the ‘warrior ethic’ has helped to shape the meaning of honor even when it is not recognized as the compulsion it is. This code of conduct in political and international relations embraces these elements: that the world should recognize a state’s high distinction; a dread of humiliation if that claim is not provided sufficient respect; a yearning for renown; and, finally, a compulsion for revenge when, in issues of both personal leadership calculations and in collective or national terms, repute for one or another virtue and self-justified power is repudiated” (3).

“A book recently published by a Hoover Institute specialist and his wife, a media consultant, explores the dynamics of the Bush family. They claim to uncover oedipal factors underlying the current president’s determination for war. The son would succeed in toppling the Iraqi dictator when the father had failed to do so and thereby prove his greater sense of honor” (22).

“Even at the beginning of the ‘liberation,’ Iraqis were largely relieved that Hussein was overthrown. Yet many, including Shiites, were dismayed about yet another colonial Occupation. Hany Abu-Assad, a Palestinian filmmaker, detected little sign of religious dedication—‘just a ceremony.’ Instead, he explains, “The daily humiliation is so big that people agree to it. The biggest motivation is the
feeling of impotence. ‘You are captured in your own city; you can’t do anything about it; you are nothing.’ Likewise, Robert A. Pape points out that the suicide bombers in Iraq, as well as elsewhere in the Middle East, largely come from countries where the American presence has been greatest’ (27).

“In contrast, according to post-Saddam opinion polls, the coalition forces ‘are widely hated,’ to use the words of Edward Luttwak, ‘as the worst of invaders, out to rob Muslim Iraqis not only of their territory and oil but also of their religion and family honor’” (29).

“The suicide bombers in Iraq, as well as elsewhere in the Middle East, largely come from countries where the American presence has been greatest,” (27).

“From the Iraqi viewpoint, Bremer’s edict [the abolition of the Iraqi Army and Baathist bureaucracy, which took place on May 16, 2003 and left 450,000 soldiers and officials without incomes or status] grossly violated a common sense of honor. Some Baathist members of the police and army forces lost sharafr, by which is meant honor as applied to the dignity of Baathist loyalists. (Its original meaning was high birth, nobility of blood.) Though once honored, these well-trained professionals could no longer offer non-Ba’athist citizens a sense of security” (29).

“Many more were stripped of ihtiram, that is, the element of deference and respect which the holding of coercive might demands and receives. The disbanding of these agencies of the former government denied their leaders the weapons needed to protect their families, clans, and tribes. (Iraq has over 150 tribes and approximately 2000 clans) Already the unemployment rate under Hussein was well over half the population, but it grew much higher after the coalition conquest. The loss of economic power compounded the social declension of lost honor” (30).

“On another level, Bremer had not only humiliated considerable numbers of men but also denied them the ability to shield their women from the possibility and infamy of assault and rape. Protection of women’s honor, ird, inflames Iraqi males to near obsession. That is because in Middle Eastern cultures women are judged the very center of male ownership rights. Whether true or not, rumors that American soldiers take Iraqi women into their tanks and Humvees for lovemaking or rapes are pervasive in Baghdad. Whoever the rapist may be, to dishonor the woman in that fashion is to disgrace her and her kindred. In much of the region, to restore family honor, relatives feel required to kill the victim of rape, no matter what extenuating circumstances there might be” (30).


Abstract:
No abstract found.
Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
“First, United States foreign policy functions under the rules of honor and dread of humiliation like those of other nations with ambitions for aggressive power. If we had failed to answer the events of September 11 with bombs and troops, who would not have felt the shame and squirmed when others called us womanlike and cowards?” (1).

“The honor code privileges family over individual, reigning as a form of community law over civil jurisprudence, gift obligation over taxation or tribute. Honor relies heavily upon the need for reputation as a bulwark against a hostile world. The code demands conformity over all alien ideas and represses deviations from the established order of things...Above all, loss to an enemy arouses fears of impotence and vulnerability that must be avenged so that good may triumph eventually over wrong” (2).

“The second point of honor as the very root and cause for the call to arms is a factor not generally understood. Wars are triggered neither exclusively by threats to territorial security nor desire for territorial expansion, nor economic gains or some other concrete, materialist advantage. Instead, often uppermost is the need to prove a point of honor not only to the enemy and to the world—a large but also to the nation in its own zealousness and need to reinforce self-esteem” (2).

“We should recall President Bush’s remark about Saddam Hussein’s being the guy who tried to kill my dad. To imply that Bush began a war simply in honor’s name to avenge a conspiracy against his father in the fashion of Michael Corleone or the ‘Sopranos,’ might seem too reductionist. But an ex-White House aide argues that this explanation would at least be preferable to the idea that seizing Iraqi oil was the administration’s prime objective: ‘That’s not why Americans fight wars,’ he said. ‘Usually it’s about honor or pride’” (2).


Abstract:
This paper examines the representation of the distribution of agency and responsibility across gender roles in Palestinian political cartoons. Cartoons are read to discover the nature of family dynamics, the relationship between the home and what lies outside it, and public and private sources of culture and Palestinian identity. Included are the work of Naji al-Ali whose widely-read cartoons appeared in Arabic language newspapers from the 1960's until his assassination in 1987, and that of six contemporary cartoonists: Baha Boukhari, Khalil Abu Arafeh, Omayya Joha, Muhammed Sabaaneh, Naser al-Jafari, and Emad Hajjaj. In al-Ali’s cartoons, Palestinian men and their families are deeply
affected by the pressures of dispossession, violence, and exploitation by elites. However, because the disruption affects mainly the public sphere of military action, politics, and wage labor, it is men who are most negatively affected by those pressures. They are often at a loss as to how to respond, and do not always make wise choices. On the other hand, al-Ali locates the idea of Palestine squarely in the private sphere, in women's roles in biological and social reproduction. Because this idea is intact, women are able to perform their roles even in states of extreme violence and dispossession. The cartoons of later artists differ in that masculinity is divorced from military action, and although politics is largely ineffectual, men are endowed with agency in the public sphere. Women in the later cartoons continue to be defined chiefly, though not exclusively, by the domestic sphere, but Palestinian motherhood is in crisis and women in grave danger in many of these cartoons, a reflection of the crisis of the idea of Palestine as a whole and sound homeland (Abstract from ibid, 187).

Additional Notes and/or Quotes:
As Judith Butler has argued, gender is embodied through action, dramatization, and reproduction; it is culturally conceived in part through tacit conventions; and repetition is integral to its construction (Butler 1988). While on this last point Butler is primarily referring to the repetition of acts a link can be made between repetitive acts and the repetition of representation that characterizes the political cartoon, not only because cartoons are produced and read daily, but also because they depict many of the easily recognizable repetitive acts that are constitutive of gender” (188).

“More often, however, al-Zalameh [the patriarch and main character in Al-Aji’s political cartoons] is a victim, not only of various forms of violence (Israeli, American, Arab), but also of exploitation by the wealthy and powerful. Like Fatimah, [his wife] he speaks truth to power, but he is far more likely to suffer the consequences of such actions—he is humiliated, beaten, silenced, imprisoned, or killed. He is sometimes a resistance fighter, but more often is not, and even in uniform he is never shown in battle or inflicting violence on others, not even on Israeli soldiers. (In contrast, both Fatimah and children throw stones). Nonetheless, in cartoon after cartoon he is maimed, murdered, or tortured” (193).

“Unlike Fatimah, al-Zalameh has no defined, productive social role. He has no occupation other than engagement with politics and armed struggle, and both are ethically compromised realms of activity. His fatherhood is not as clearly delineated as Fatimah’s motherhood is, and when he is depicted as a father figure, his authority is usually subservient to Fatimah’s, or he exerts his paternal influence from beyond the grave, as a martyr. In addition, his mobility is constantly compromised; his travel documents are useless, he has trouble at airports (in one cartoon he is prevented even from using the restroom at an airport) and travel agencies. Sometimes he is forcibly moved from place to place. In one cartoon he appears as a resistance fighter words ‘Welcome to your thirteenth homeland, Canada!’” (193).
“Many of Naji al-Ali’s cartoons directly address the emasculation of Palestinian men and boys and deride the work of the public sphere that is their ‘natural’ domain. Often politics is simultaneously feminized and morally degraded. In one, the acceptance of UN resolution 242 is depicted as a sleazy wedding in which a decidedly unappealing bride walks past a row of fat, clapping men. At times the emasculation is literal; in at least two cartoons (also from the context of the Lebanese civil war) a small boy has the head of his penis cut off so that no one can tell whether he has been circumcised” (193).

“[The kufiyah’s] pattern appears on the hats, neckties, and briefcases of corrupt Palestinian elites. Sometimes it appears as a swaddling cloth for infants or around the necks of young boys and girls, suggesting the assumption of responsibility for resistance by children. Kufiyahs also appear as shrouds for the dead and covers for their graves, a reminder of the association between Palestinian manhood and death. It suggests that Palestinian political identity is simultaneously masculine and characterized by the emasculation that al-Zalameh continually encounters” (200).

“The violence of occupation plays out on [the main character in Baha Boukhari’s comics] Abu Abid’s body—in one cartoon he is shown with a rash of settlements growing out of his bare back. But the violence of the Fatah-Hamas conflict is just as ubiquitous; whip-lashings from a hooded Hamas member inscribe the word Gaza in blood on his back. Julie Peteet (2000) has argued that in the context of the first intifada the experience of imprisonment and beating at the hand of the Israelis has become a rite of passage for Palestinian men. However, while Boukhari (and other artists) depict the effects of Israeli violence on men’s bodies, they do not narrate the consequent rise in social status that Peteet found in her fieldwork. Thus the beatings are coded purely as a humiliation” (201).

“Palestinian men [in Hajjaj’s comics] are also the victims of Israeli and international politics. In one cartoon a Palestinian man is stripped and crucified on a banner labeled “peace.” Often, this humiliation is sexualized in Hajjaj’s work. Figure 6 plays on an image of al-Ali’s that treats the same theme (fig. 5). Both play on the associations between land, honor, and women to be found within the Palestinian narrative of the loss of Palestine, evoking the phrase al-`ird qabla al-ard (honor before land) that became a post-1948 explanation for the loss of Palestine; that is, that in the face of violence, Palestinians prioritized the protection of their women over the protection of their land. In both al-Ali’s and Hajjaj’s treatment of the theme the request for Palestinian concessions are presented as breaches of feminine modesty, the locus of male honor” (210).

“Finally, the recent cartoons depict a form of Palestinian masculine agency. Men’s role is to persevere, to be steadfast, and to rebuild, and to insist on living in the homeland” (211).