

**THE IMPORTANCE OF GENDER PARITY IN THE UN'S
EFFORTS ON INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY**

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“Another world is not only possible, she is on her way. On a quiet day, I can hear her breathing.”

- Arundhati Roy

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**Diplomacy:
The Future is Female**

INTRODUCTION

In January 2017, Antonio Guterres began his tenure as the ninth Secretary-General of the United Nations. In taking the oath of office, he pledged to achieve gender parity in the world body for the first time in seven decades. In just over a year, gender parity was reached in 2018 in both the Secretary-General's senior management group – his 'cabinet' made of many the heads of various UN departments and agencies in headquarters – and among Resident Coordinators, effectively the heads of the UN at the country level.¹ The road to the ultimate goal of parity at all levels across the Organization will be a longer process, as laid out in the *Secretary-General's System-Wide Strategy on Gender Parity*. But the rapid transformation at the top has sent a signal to all, particularly with regards to political will. It has also prompted broader reforms, including efforts to address staffing rules and regulations, introduce greater transparency in staffing numbers, root out unconscious bias in recruitment, enforce temporary special measures, and provide an enabling environment through policies on parental leave and flexible work arrangements.

While it would be a reasonable expectation that the shift in numbers at the top of the world's body would have a cascading impact on the inclusion of more women in all spaces of international diplomacy and peace and security – from the composition of peace negotiations, to peacekeeping missions, or national public institutions –, inclusion in these spaces has remained contested and resisted, often in ways that are neither public nor documented. In our view, this resistance partly explains the gigantic gap between the rhetoric of speeches and statements and the goals of policy documents, on one hand, and the dismal reality of the numbers of the representation of women in 2019 in many aspects of the international community's work. In the main, this resistance comes from actors who either actively object to or do not prioritize feminist goals. However

even among gender equality advocates, some have voiced doubts about emphasizing parity as a goal, and a concern that these efforts may distract from, or come at the expense of, a focus on gender equality and social change more generally.² Sometimes this reflects an underlying skepticism towards the capacity for significant social change of the institutions and processes that are the target of calls for greater gender balance or gender parity. Sometimes it is simply a lack of interest or faith in what is seen as a crudely mechanical and quantitative approach of counting women in specific policy spaces and measuring progress by tracking numbers and percentages.

This article makes the case that these numbers matter a great deal. It highlights the continued stark absence of women from key policy spaces and sites of power and restates the case for the importance of gender parity as a fundamental building block of both gender equality and the overall effectiveness of institutions and outcomes. It does so through a focus on the area of international peace and security and the UN's efforts, highlighting the way in which women's inclusion is critical for efforts to secure sustainable peace. At a time when both the movement for gender equality and its backlash are ascendant political forces, and the proliferation of armed conflict is testing the credibility of multilateralism, it is significant that the UN is demanding transformation, starting with its own work force; and essential that this focus also include an emphatic insistence on the question of 'where are the women' in all areas of peace and security, serving as a model for other international and national actors.

GENDER PARITY IN THE UN

Beyond a democratic right to equal participation and representation, the business case for gender parity has already been made in virtually every sector, from the increased bottom line in the private sector³ to better outcomes for society as a whole through women's equal political participation.⁴ Girls equal access to and numbers in education has been called the 'silver bullet,' impacting everything from maternal mortality, to poverty reduction, to climate change.⁵ It is estimated that parity in the labor force would unlock trillions of dollars globally, money that could be invested into greater social protection for populations and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.⁶

By contrast – women's exclusion from public spaces has had fundamentally distorting effects on almost every part of our lives, from the micro to the macro. When women are absent, the default setting for how we view, define, and set policy for the world is that of a male experience. This gender gap affects every aspect of daily life for women, from the mundane,

like too-cold temperatures in offices, to the potentially fatal, such as the increased likelihood to die in a car accident, or a misdiagnosed heart attack because prototypes are the average male body.⁷ It is not just women who are affected however. Women's exclusion from decision-making has led to a world in which economic and political systems are defined from a single perspective. Feminist theorists have for many years made the case that the worst global challenges we face today, of inequality, militarism, entrenched cycles of conflict, and climate change, are rooted in distorted systems and linked to gender inequality and the absence of women from public spaces.

The United Nations has been championing this view for decades, including in resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Calls for greater representation of women in every aspect of the UN's work are routine and appear to be almost universally recognized as a common goal. Since the early 1970s, the General Assembly has highlighted the need to achieve parity in successive resolutions, including in 1975 when the body stated that '...equitable distribution of the positions between men and women in the Secretariat is a major principle governing the recruitment policy of the United Nations.'⁸ Today, the Group of Friends for Gender Parity in the UN, a group of Member States supporting the agenda, boasts the membership of approximately 150 countries – roughly three-quarters of the membership of the UN.

However, in the staffing of the Secretariat and the representation of Member States on committees and in delegations, the UN continues to be dominated by men. Women are significantly under-represented in the two areas with highest visibility for the organization: in Director-level positions, and in peace operations in conflict-affected countries, where the UN plays a prominent role and where it is most visible to the communities who benefit from its work. The UN had previously committed to reaching gender parity by the year 2000 but did not implement sufficient measures to accomplish it and missed that target altogether. As noted already, with the current Secretary-General came renewed impetus to transform the institution to reflect both gender parity and geographic diversity, and in the past two years the organization has since devoted significant resources and attention to attaining the goal of parity in senior leadership by 2021, and across all levels by 2028. The first goal, of parity in senior leadership, is well ahead of target. Equally important, with appointments to leadership positions many firsts and milestones have followed, as have appointments which have deliberately challenged the 'traditional' roles of women in leadership positions: for example, the first female head of the Department of Political Affairs, the first all-female leadership of a peacekeeping mission

in Iraq, the first time that the civilian, police, and military components of a peacekeeping mission were all led by women, as in the case of the UN mission in Cyprus, and the appointment of women as heads of UN in countries where the role of women in public life have been contested terrain.⁹

Despite the milestones and scaled up efforts, it is still not a given that parity will in fact be reached across the Organization without changes to outdated staff rules and regulations or the adoption of General Assembly decisions needed. Here is where all the talk and support to gender parity meets considerable resistance.¹⁰ This paragraph in the UN's system-wide strategy explains the main argument used against it:

“Perhaps one of the most concerning elements of the consultations process for this strategy has been an often-repeated claim by staff and management alike that parity must be done in accordance with Article 101 and the criteria of merit and should not weaken the quality of staffing. The assumption that the recruitment and promotion of women would somehow lessen standards rather than raise them is refuted by evidence; as is the assumption that our institutional processes at present are geared towards securing and promoting the most talented staff in an unbiased manner. A recent ImpactPool study of long-term staff compared those who had remained in the system and those who had left – disaggregating by sex and reviewing their career path trajectory. What was found was that women who left the system moved up in their career paths faster than those who remained in the System. For men this experience was the opposite – those that remained accelerated at a higher rate.”¹¹

Needless to say, considerations about merit have coexisted for decades with the UN's care to ensure geographic diversity, common in other international organizations. In fact, preparatory notes from early discussions between Member States on the possible tension between Article 101 and geographic diversity found that States did not feel that there was any contradiction, as greater diversity would ensure an institutional culture that challenged discrimination and served the needs of the communities the global body is intended to represent. It is difficult to believe that these same arguments would not apply to the equal representation of half the world's population.

The gaps to gender parity are starkest in the efforts of the UN on peace and security. On the staffing side, this is particularly the case in peacekeeping missions, where the numbers are the lowest, the rate of change the slowest,

and the challenges the greatest. The reasons for this are multiple and historic. They have origins in the policies and rules that govern recruitment and staffing, where the original conception of the staff that would serve in the field was a man. This affected every aspect of how the Organization has evolved, from the classification of field posts as family or non-family, to accommodation standards, lighting, and recreational and health facilities in missions. It is also deeply ingrained in gendered assumptions in staffing rules. For example, until the 1970s, there was an assumption that only men could be the breadwinner, meaning that a woman who served in the field was not entitled to dependent benefits.¹² The inequalities have been compounded, however, by unconscious and conscious bias in recruitment and selection.

The under-representation of women in the most visible areas of the United Nations has negative everyday impacts in the UN's work that go beyond symbolism, credibility, or the importance of representing the population you are supposed to serve. As we will see below, it has real operational implications for the conduct of peacekeeping operations. But it also affects the UN's diplomacy and advocacy efforts, especially behind closed doors. It is difficult to meaningfully push for inclusive processes in conflict-affected countries when this is not modeled by those intended to be the international norms and standard bearers.

This issue goes beyond UN staff and is evident in the diplomatic teams of Member States that make up the UN and other international organizations. In a recent meeting of the Security Council that concluded with the adoption of another resolution on women, peace and security, focused specifically on sexual violence in conflict, many media articles highlighted that the threat of a veto by the United States had resulted in the removal of any mentions of reproductive rights or reproductive health in the text of the resolution. These articles failed to notice one stunning fact: that all fifteen representatives of the Members of the Security Council were men. And while this should be shocking, especially in 2019, it is not unusual. The first and only time that the Security Council has adopted a resolution about the sexual exploitation and abuse committed by the UN's own peacekeepers, resolution 2272 in 2016, Samantha Power of the United States was the only woman out of the 15 ambassadors at the table, delivered the most passionate and eloquent statement on the subject, and was the one that put the resolution up for adoption in the first place. The only previous occasion when the Security Council discussed this subject matter before that day was in 2005, when the Security Council was convened for that purpose by Norwegian Ambassador Ellen Loj, also one of the few women who have held the post of ambassador to the UN for their country.¹³ At present, 87 percent of Ambassadors to the UN

Security Council are men.¹⁴ And the people they hear from – the briefers who are invited to speak to the Council on a specific matter or country situation – are also mainly men, by a ratio that only last year *improved* to 70 to 30.¹⁵

In 2017, Margot Wallström of Sweden, famous for pursuing a feminist foreign policy, was the only female Foreign Minister among the 28 countries of the European Union. As a result, even when feminist issues make it to the top of the agenda of global policymaking, they are typically shaped by male policymakers and their predominantly male advisors, often in ways that feminist advocates take issue with. Few are aware of this missing analysis however, as it rarely makes the narrative of foreign policy analysis and discussion, which is also dominated by men. For example, a recent survey conducted by Women in International Security (WIIS) showed that still in 2018, only two out of the top 20 foreign policy think tanks in Washington, DC have achieved gender parity, that representation of women is below 30 percent in the overwhelming majority of them. This plays out in who speaks and influences policy. There was only one woman for every three men on foreign policy panels in DC that year, and that nearly a third of these panels were “manels,” a term popularized to refer to men-only panels. To make matters worse, in most cases, the woman on the panel was the moderator.¹⁶

To name one last example, every case that provided significant redress for sexual violence at the International Court for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) from 1994 to 2004 had a female judge.¹⁷ Students of gender justice are familiar with a consistent and well-established pattern: that the overwhelming majority of the advances on gender justice, particularly in the international arena, have been linked to the participation of trailblazing female judges, prosecutors and investigators, and courageous female litigants and witnesses. There is nothing coincidental about that. And yet, in November 2018 UN Member States were asked to provide nominees to the General Assembly for judges at the UN International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. Eleven countries provided nominees and every single one of them were men.¹⁸

WOMEN IN PEACEMAKING

There is increasing recognition that the numbers of women at all levels – from the local, to the national and international – affect outcomes and institutional effectiveness. While the examples above demonstrate the impact in the halls of international diplomacy, at the most macro level, the recent World Bank-UN report ‘Pathways to Peace’ quotes extensive quantitative research highlighting that governments of countries with more equitable gender relations – measured by levels of violence against women,

labor market participation, and income disparities – are significantly less likely to engage in conflict. Much of this research directly links numbers of women – in the labor force or public office – to societal level outcomes. In one piece of research, Caprioli finds that countries with ten percent of women in the labor force are nearly 30 times more likely to experience internal conflict compared with countries with 40 percent of women in the labor force. She also finds that a five percent increase in females in the labor force is associated with a five-fold decrease in the probability that a state will use military force to resolve international conflict.¹⁹

One of the best-known tenets of the women, peace and security agenda over the last two decades and feminist advocacy for at least a century is the connection between women’s leadership and peace, and particularly their participation in peace negotiations. Recent studies have confirmed what feminist advocates have said for decades: that when women are able to participate meaningfully, and influence peace talks these are likelier to be successful. In fact, recent studies have quantified the impact of women’s participation on the sustainability of peace.²⁰ This is not because women are inherently more peaceful, but because greater inclusion shifts dynamics of talks, enables new coalitions, and women are more likely to bring the issues that affect communities to the table – broadening the discussion from narrow ceasefires and power sharing to root causes. And yet, perhaps one of the most repeated statistics in this field comes from a study undertaken by UN Women in 2011, which sampled 31 major peace processes between 1992 and 2011, and revealed that only 4 percent of signatories, 2.4 percent of chief mediators, and nine percent of members of negotiating delegations in peace talks were women. These are strikingly low numbers.²¹

And despite the evidence on operational effectiveness and an almost two-decade agenda in the Security Council focused on increasing women’s participation in peace and security, these numbers have moved little. While data is difficult to verify for current processes, the absence of women from major peace negotiations in recent months is clear. From Afghanistan, to Yemen, to the Central African Republic, and Libya, the news photos of all or almost exclusively men discussing a country’s future shows how far we still are from meaningful progress on this score. And yet, in our experience, questions about ‘where are the women’ or insistence on mechanisms for their inclusion are typically met with empty rhetoric at best or irritation at worst by those involved in the organization of such processes, whether they be closed-door peace talks or large-scale national dialogues. In most cases, women’s participation is dismissed as an unnecessary complication, falsely placed in tension with the ending of conflict, or is

included as an afterthought. In the latter case, a few women may be added at the last minute under pressure by other external actors but are likely to be either observers or marginalized by the nature of their inclusion.

The numbers shown above in fact only scratch the surface and fail to adequately reflect the true extent of women's political marginalization in key processes, and by extension in the rebuilding of their homes and countries. As the Security Council now has an informal experts' group to review much more closely the situation for women in countries on its agenda, we are beginning to have more detailed numbers that illustrate the sidelining of women in decision-making about peace and security issues. What is needed are policies which ensure an even more thorough counting of women in these processes, with minimum targets of representation and the use of special measures to ensure it. Beyond the peace table, the UN and other actors should be dutifully tracking the gender composition of all the key committees and bodies set up to implement these peace agreements or govern a country's transition from conflict.

For example, in Mali in 2018, the committee monitoring implementation of the peace agreement had fourteen men representing the armed movements and no women, while the numbers on the government side vary. The armed movements were represented by 52 members in four different sub-commissions and only one of the listed members is a woman.²² In South Sudan, the Revitalized Agreement signed in September 2018 included a requirement of a minimum of 35 percent of women in the composition of key decision-making bodies, such as the committees set up in the pre-transition period. However, six months later, only one of them had complied with the requirement. In the other committees, dealing with the overall oversight of the transition, amendments to the Constitution, and various security arrangements, women's representation went from seventeen percent to zero percent in several committees.

Parity in numbers, or at least efforts towards parity, should be central to our broader push for gender equality. This does not mean that every woman will represent the interests of women in general or can be relied on or expected to advance gender equality goals. It does not mean that men in positions of power cannot be important allies, or that gender parity is enough by itself to deliver the sweeping changes to our society that feminists seek. What we argue is that it is a necessary first step, and a much more direct route towards those changes, than trying to influence male gatekeepers.

WOMEN IN PEACEKEEPING

One of the better-known images of the UN is the blue helmet worn by its peacekeepers, deployed in more than a dozen countries throughout the world. Since 2000, the United Nations Security Council has adopted nine resolutions on the protection and empowerment of women in conflict situations. Increasing the representation of women in peacekeeping, and particularly among uniformed personnel, is repeatedly urged in every single one of these resolutions, from encouraging Member States to deploy "a higher percentage" or "greater numbers" of female military and police personnel, to calling upon the Secretary-General to take measures to achieve this goal and, more explicitly in resolution 2242 (2015), "to initiate a revised strategy, in collaboration with Member States, to double the numbers of women in military and police contingents in peace operations in five years."²³

However, in 25 years, the representation of women in these peacekeeping operations has only inched up three points, from one to four percent. This lack of progress by the United Nations has coincided with an era of significant advances in the integration of women in national armed forces, and it is made worse by the fact that the nature and mandates of modern UN peacekeeping operations, and the normative framework of the organization in general, lead to a reasonable expectation that, on the matter of gender balance, the UN should out-perform other actors involved in military operations, rather than lag behind.²⁴

There is growing recognition that a greater gender balance is a critical factor contributing to the operational effectiveness and credibility of these missions.²⁵ Peacekeeping operations have much more contact with the population than traditional military operations, engage much less in direct combat, and collaborate with civilian partners in multiple tasks, from facilitating humanitarian aid to helping with disarmament and demobilization of armed groups and the reform of the security sector in the host country. UN guidelines for the military and police indicate that women are needed to effectively implement these tasks, from staffing, setting up, or monitoring checkpoints and cantonment sites to guarding correction facilities or participating in investigations, joint protection teams, and cordon-and-search operations.²⁶ Women broaden the range of skills and capacities among all categories of personnel and improve the mission's image, accessibility, and credibility vis-à-vis the local population. Women and girls in particular may prefer to communicate with female officers, especially if they are survivors of gender-based violence or in settings where it is a cultural taboo to communicate with a man in the same function. Targeted outreach to women in host communities is needed for more comprehensive sources of intelligence and early warning. Finally, it is often

noted that a better gender balance has a positive impact and role-modelling effect in the host societies, both as a source of inspiration for local women and girls and as a challenge to more traditional or rigid gender norms.

Without women, missions cannot fulfill their goals of improving their protection of women and girls in their daily operations. For example, to respond to atrocities against civilians, and particularly against women and girls in Eastern DRC, the UN mission developed an intricate system full of innovations and protection and monitoring tools. However, without the involvement of women in these tasks, they could not be effective. In 2013, only ten percent of community liaison advisors, who performed the crucial task of interacting with the community, were women. Less than a third of the hundreds of joint protection teams – meant to have a mixture of military, police and civilians with different skills and functions – deployed since 2009 included at least a woman, typically one woman as part of a large team. And even though the mission was supposed to monitor for early warning signs of conflict-related sexual violence, there were only sixteen female military observers in a country as big as Western Europe that year.²⁷

The presence of women has been correlated with fewer allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers. Measuring this correlation with quantitative comparisons is difficult under the current conditions for two main reasons: there are simply too few women in peacekeeping operations and the data on sexual exploitation and abuse, like most data on gender-based violence, is not reliable enough. Practitioners understand that they represent an extreme undercount of real incidences, and very little is known about the factors or conditions that would explain variations in reporting from mission to mission or year to year. And yet, the few studies that have attempted to measure this have come up with significant findings in support of the need for greater representation of women. One of the few studies on this in the 1990's found a correlation between the presence of women – uniformed or civilian staff – and a lower incidence of rape and prostitution.²⁸ A more recent analysis on mission-level information collected from 2009 to 2013, noted that a five percent increase in female representation in the military could reduce incidences of sexual exploitation and abuse by half.²⁹ A qualitative study from Liberia attributed a reduction in sex trafficking and prostitution in certain areas with the presence of all-female police units.³⁰ And finally, in surveying women in all-female units and men and women in mixed units results, Julia Bleckner's study showed important revelations: 90% of respondents from the all-female units, and 55% of women and 35% of men in the mixed units, noted that the local women were more comfortable working with women peacekeepers. Only

30% of men thought that sexual exploitation was a problem in their area of operation, compared with 40% of women in the mixed units and 100% of respondents in the all-female units.³¹ These results are in line with multiple studies that have signaled that, even if lower incidences cannot be proven, there is undeniable – and logical – evidence that a greater presence of women is accompanied by higher levels of reporting and increased levels of comfort and satisfaction by the local population. This is a finding that was already recorded in the 1990's when observed in missions in Rwanda, South Africa, and Namibia.³² Moreover, data from 40 countries shows a clear correlation between policewomen and higher reporting of violence against women.³³ If you ask field practitioners, a majority would expect that a very different gender composition of these operations would make a significant difference in curbing sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers, and the public statements by military leaders themselves and UN senior officials in charge of peacekeeping over the last few years show a significant degree of consensus.

But beyond the academic debate, there is a very simple practical implication. In UN peacekeeping operations, 96% of blue helmets, 90% of police, 80% of the leadership, and 70% of all civilian staff, are men. If a perpetrator is identified and repatriated, his supervisors are likely to be men, as are the people involved in a hypothetical military court back home, if it gets that far. Worryingly, the people investigating these abuses, who are interrogating traumatized women and children, are also likely to be men.³⁴

The potential benefits are so large, and the reputational and operational risks to the UN brought about by these scandals are so damaging, that changing the composition of these operations should be viewed as essential and urgent. However, even among policymakers who understand the logic, share the principle, and believe the evidence, there tends to be a resigned acceptance that the skewed gender balance cannot be altered in the short or medium term, and perhaps not even in the long term. Fortunately, there are signs that this may be changing. In 2018, the Canadian government launched the first-ever initiative that devotes significant resources and financial incentives to increasing the number of women among the uniformed personnel of peacekeeping missions. Announcing the new Elsie Initiative, Prime Minister Trudeau noticed the modest goal set by the UN Security Council in 2015 and that, at the current rate, “it would take us another 37 years to reach the goal we wanted to reach in five.”³⁵ And the implementation of the gender parity strategy in the UN has already been felt in certain categories of personnel, like military observers, where the percentage of women tripled in two years after barely budging for decades prior.

CONCLUSION

When the Security Council adopted its landmark resolution 1325 on women, peace and security at the turn of the century, women's participation in peace and security decision-making and their role as agents for peace were this resolution's driving force, its main pillar, and its key innovation. Ten years later, the slogan used in the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) for the tenth anniversary of this agenda was "Women Count For Peace," a wordplay on women being perennially being pushed aside and counted out in spite of their peacemaking potential, and the belief that the UN and other actors needed to start quantifying the extent of this exclusion and generate stronger data on women, peace and security issues. Over the following decade, academics grew an ever-growing body of evidence linking greater gender balance and more women to better outcomes across all the key areas of the UN's work on peace and security.³⁶ An emphasis on quantifying the gender balance in each decision-making body or process, at every turn and in every corner, is part and parcel of this pursuit to unlock the benefits of women's participation and leadership.

As the outcomes in the area of peace and security demonstrate, gender parity is a profoundly transformative and basic building block of equality. The mere inclusion of women in meaningful ways and in decision-making roles leads to institutional change – structurally and culturally – and is directly related to better outcomes in all areas. It is for this reason that numbers and representation are used as key indicators in global frameworks such as the Sustainable Development Goals and indicative research on equality, peace and justice such as the Women Peace and Security Index. While insufficient in and of itself, transformation of institutions and the global policy agenda, and success in tackling the current day global challenges, will only be possible with a greater drive and focus on the numbers alongside broader changes.

And yet, despite the clear path from parity to greater equality and effectiveness, the facts on women's leadership remain grim. Only seven percent of the world's Heads of States are women, as are 18 percent of Cabinet Ministers and 24 percent of Members of Parliaments. These numbers mask even more extreme political marginalization of women across peace and security spaces, as shown above. Figures in business, academia, media and leading roles in the labor market in general show similar numbers or even lower, as is the case with the world's 500 largest companies, where only five percent of CEOs are women. It is in this context, and an overall push back on women's rights, that the rapid changes in institutional leadership at the United Nations is a positive and significant

example of progress. It must be matched by concurrent commitments from all relevant actors and translate into equal representation of women in all spaces – from peace talks to courts to parliaments – if we are to truly reap the benefits of parity and the capacities of half of our population.

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NOTES

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- 3 See, for example, Corinne Post and Kris Byron: "Women on Boards and Firm Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis," *Academy of Management Journal*, Vol. 58, 5 Thematic Issue on Gender in Management Research (2015); Patsy Doer, "The business case for gender parity," *Thomson Reuters Foundation*, 8 March 2018, <https://blogs.thomsonreuters.com/answerson/business-case-gender-parity/>.
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- 7 Caroline Criado Perez, *Invisible Women, Data Bias in a World Designed for Men*, (Penguin) 2019.
- 8 UN General Assembly Resolution 3416 (XXX) 1975.
- 9 See the Secretary-General's remarks at the opening of the Commission on the Status of Women (11 March 2019) at <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2019-03-11/csw-remarks-opening-of-63rd-session>.
- 10 See: Thalif Deen, "When Gender Parity Knocks at the UN Door, Does Merit Fly Out of the Window?" *InterPress Service*, October 11, 2018; For an overview of the resistance faced inside the UN, see Anne Marie Goetz and Paige Arthur, "The UN's Gen-

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12 Secretary-General’s remarks at the opening of the 63rd Session of the Commission on the Status of Women (11 March 2019); Anne Marie Goetz and Paige Arthur, “One Year into the Secretary-General’s Gender Parity Effort at the UN: Bright Spots and Clouds on the Horizon”, September 17, 2018.

13 The official transcript of this May 31st 2005 meeting can be accessed at <https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.5191>.

14 See picture of the current serving Permanent Representatives to the UN Security Council at https://www.un.org/en/media/accreditation/pdf/SC_Membership.pdf.

15 The percentage of women briefers invited to speak to the Security Council under rule 39 was 17 percent in 2016, 24 percent in 2017, and 30 percent in 2018, a record, partly due to the appointments of women to UN leadership positions that are frequently called to brief the Security Council and the new practice of inviting women from civil society to brief during country-specific meetings, as called for in resolution 2242 (2015). See the latest UN’s Annual Highlights of Security Council Practice at <https://unite.un.org/sites/unite.un.org/files/app-schighlights-2018/index.html#>.

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18 See remarks to the Security Council by Akila Radhakrishnan, President of the Global Justice Center, at <http://globaljusticecenter.net/blog/28-publications/videos/1029-accountability-for-conflict-related-sexual-violence-as-a-central-pillar-for-prevention-arria-formula-meeting-of-the-un-security-council>.

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20 Radhika Coomaraswamy, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325*, United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), 2015.

21 These figures would in fact be even lower if the sample did not include a major outlier with the 2011 peace agreement for the Philippines, where women were a third of the signatories and delegations.

22 See UN Security Council, S/2018/688 at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2018/688.

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