

Gendering Nuclear Disarmament

Identity and Disarmament in Sweden during the Cold War

Emma Rosengren



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Academic dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations at Stockholm University to be publicly defended on Friday 25 September 2020 at 13.00 in Hörsal 2, hus A, Universitetsvägen 10A.

Abstract

This dissertation provides new knowledge about gender, nuclear weapons and disarmament. Previous feminist research has shown that in contexts where positive associations are made between military strength, masculinity and nuclear weapon possession, it is hard to imagine nuclear renunciation and disarmament as anything other than potential emasculation or feminization. Meanwhile, empirically based feminist theorization about gender, nuclear renunciation and disarmament remains a blind spot. This dissertation uses Sweden as a case to analyze nuclear weapon renunciation and disarmament from a feminist angle. As one of the countries that had the opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons – and considered doing so for some time – before deciding to become engaged with international disarmament aims instead, Sweden is an interesting case to study. The empirical focus is on disarmament policymaking in relation to the Swedish nuclear weapon debate (1954–1968) and the submarine crisis (1981–1989). The study draws on a broad set of primary sources, ranging from government speeches and parliamentary records to media output including comics and personal correspondence and diaries. Approaching the nuclear weapon debate and the submarine crisis as arenas for debating disarmament policy, and understanding disarmament policymaking as historically situated and marked by gendered, nationalized and sexualized power structures in specific contexts, the dissertation contributes empirical and theoretical insights relevant to feminist IR theory, and to nuclear history and IR studies more broadly. Contrary to previous feminist theorizing about disarmament as associated with femininity and/or emasculation, my findings suggest that Swedish disarmament policy was co-constructed with certain forms of masculinity, and that alternative policy discourses and identity representations were feminized and sidelined to the margins. The dissertation suggests that rather than assuming preconceived linkages between nuclear weapons possession and masculinity on the one hand, and disarmament and femininity on the other, it is necessary to challenge such binary conceptualizations and investigate how masculinities and femininities, and nuclear weapon and disarmament policy, have been co-constructed in specific historical contexts. The opposite, to depart from preconceived conceptualizations about gender and policy not only contributes to the reconstruction of gender, but also rules out alternatives to nuclearized security strategies and nuclearized masculinity. The dissertation provides a methodological and theoretical framework for further research on the making of disarmament policy from a feminist perspective.

Keywords: *Feminist theory, nuclear disarmament, nuclear weapons, gender nation sexuality, identity and policy.*

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Emma Rosengren, Huddinge, August 2020.

Acronyms and abbreviations

AMSA	Action Network Against Swedish Nuclear Weapons (<i>Aktionsgruppen mot svensk atombomb</i>)
CCD	Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CND	Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
ENDC	Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee
FFP	Feminist Foreign Policy
FOA	Swedish Defense Research Agency, now FOI
FSS	Feminist Security Studies
ICAN	International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
IPPNW	International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
IR	International Relations
NNWFZ	Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
PTBT	Partial Test Ban Treaty
SAP	Social Democratic Party (<i>Socialdemokratiska arbetarepartiet</i>)
SSKF	Federation of Social Democratic Women (<i>Socialdemokratiska kvinnoförbundet</i>)
SSU	Social Democrat Youth Organization (<i>Socialdemokratiska ungdomsförbundet</i>)
TPNW	Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
WILPF	Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

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Part I

1. Introduction

On 12 July 2019, Sweden's Social Democratic Party (*Socialdemokratiska arbetarepartiet*, SAP) Foreign Minister Margot Wallström, perhaps best known as the instigator of Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP), announced that the government would not be signing the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).¹ The announcement came two years after Sweden participated in the negotiation of the treaty at the United Nations.² The decision not to sign the TPNW was criticized by the Green Party, a government coalition partner of the SAP.³ Sweden's potential signature had been a matter of tense debate both in the media and among politicians in Sweden since the TPNW was adopted at the UN General assembly in 2017.⁴ Conservative and liberal parliamentarians, as well as representatives of the Swedish Armed Forces saw the decision not to sign as a wise one.⁵ Representatives of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its work on the TPNW in 2017, condemned the decision of the Swedish government.⁶

¹ The announcement was made at a press conference. See Regeringskansliet. "Utrikesministern redogör för regeringens arbete för kärnvapennedrustning". 2019-07-12. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8tDaibocMuM> (available 2020-05-07).

² For information about the TPNW, see for example United Nations. "Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons". <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/tpnw/> (available 2020-05-07).

³ See for example Alm Ericson, Janine. "Vi i MP kämpar för en kärnvapenfri värld". *Aftonbladet*. 2019-07-12.

⁴ I have analyzed this debate through a feminist lens in a report published by Swedish Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and the Swedish section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. See Rosengren, Emma. "En feministisk reflektion om kärnvapennedrustning och förändring". In *I skuggan av makten. Skuggutredning till Utredning av konsekvenserna av ett svenskt tillträde till kärnvapenförbudskonventionen*. Svenska Läkare mot Kärnvapen och Internationella Kvinnoförbundet för Fred och Frihet, 2018. <https://slmk.org/wp-content/uploads/Skuggrapport-final-1.pdf> (available 2020-05-07).

⁵ See for example "Wallström: Sverige kommer inte att skriva under FN-förbud mot kärnvapen". *Sveriges television*. 2019-07-12. <https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/sa-anser-sverige-om-karnvapennedrustningen> (available 2020-05-07).

⁶ See for example ICAN. "A big step backwards: Why Sweden's decision not to sign TPNW damages its reputation as a leader on disarmament". https://www.icanw.org/a_big_step_backwards_why_sweden_s_decision_not_to_sign_tpnw_damages_its_reputation_as_a_leader_on_disarmament (available 2020-05-07).

While announcing that Sweden would not be signing the TPNW, Foreign Minister Wallström stressed that the Swedish government nonetheless had a sincere commitment to nuclear disarmament:

Sweden is a strong voice in the world for a nuclear weapon-free world and our country has a long tradition based on sincere political engagement, skilled diplomacy involving high-profile personalities who have worked on these issues throughout the years, as well as world-class technical expertise.⁷

This representation of the Swedish Self as a strong voice against nuclear weapons, combined with temporal references to a long tradition of engagement in work for nuclear disarmament as well as references to political, diplomatic and technical skill all contribute to the construction of international nuclear disarmament engagement as a particular responsibility of Sweden. The way in which Wallström spoke about disarmament as a foreign policy priority is an example of how representations of the national Self work as central features of foreign policy discourse. Such identity representations do not just reflect how decision makers want the Self to appear, they also associate the Self with certain responsibilities. Furthermore, both identity representations and policy reflect power relations in the broader societal context in which they are made. This dissertation studies the co-construction of identity and Swedish disarmament policy during the cold war, with a focus on its gendered, nationalized and sexualized underpinnings.

The point of departure for this dissertation is the assumption that foreign policy issues, such as the decision not to sign the TPNW, and identity representations, such as those made by Wallström, are co-constructed.⁸ Drawing on insights from feminist theory, it demonstrates that gender, nation and sexuality are three interrelated societal power orders that are central to the making of both identity and policy.⁹ Representing identity in particular ways, in this case as the identity of the national Self, makes it possible to advocate policies that are represented as compatible with the assumed identity of the Self. Hence, policy and identity are co-constructed and cannot be separated. Such representations also contribute to the (re)construction of various degrees of Other, since representations of the Self are relationally organized based on notions of

⁷ Regeringskansliet. "Utrikesministern redogör för regeringens arbete för kärnvapennedrustning". 2019-07-12. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8tDaibocMuM> (available 2020-05-07). All translations of quotes in Swedish used in this dissertation were made by the author.

⁸ Hansen, 2006: 6.

⁹ On gender as constructed and interrelated with other power orders, see for example Ahmed, 2004; Collins, 1998; McClintock, 1995. See also Chapter 2 of this dissertation.

difference.¹⁰ Relationally organized Self–Other dichotomies often have gendered, sexualized and racialized dimensions.¹¹ Inspired by feminist International Relations (IR) pioneer Carol Cohn, I argue that gender “interweaves with other discourses and shapes *them* – and therefore shapes other aspects of our world such as how nuclear weapons are thought about and deployed.”¹² Hence, I conceptualize gender as made and co-constructed with nation and sexuality, and as central to the analysis of policy discourses.

Previous feminist research on gender and nuclear weapons has investigated the linkages between nuclear weapon possession and certain forms of nuclearized military masculinity.¹³ Research along these lines has concluded that in contexts where positive linkages are made between military strength, masculinity and nuclear weapon possession, it is hard to imagine nuclear renunciation and disarmament as anything other than potential emasculation or feminization.¹⁴ Meanwhile, empirically based feminist theorization about the relationship between gender, nuclear renunciation and disarmament remains a blind spot.¹⁵ Against this backdrop, this dissertation analyses the making of Swedish disarmament policy during the cold war from a feminist perspective, positioning itself at the crossroads between international nuclear history and feminist IR studies.¹⁶ By focusing on periods of intense debate over disarmament policy in Sweden, the dissertation contributes with empirical knowledge about gender, nuclear renunciation and disarmament, and develops feminist theory about the gendering, nationalization and sexualization of disarmament policy-making.

Sweden’s self-proclaimed role as an advocate of disarmament and feminist foreign policy, and its past experiences in relation to nuclear weapons and disarmament, make the Swedish case especially well-suited for study. In fact, Sweden’s status as a nuclear weapon-free state has been a topic of intense debate and the decision to work for international nuclear disarmament was

¹⁰ Hansen, 2006.

¹¹ See for example Ahmed, 2004; Duncanson & Eschle, 2008.

¹² Cohn, 1993: 228.

¹³ See for example Cohn, 1987; Das, 2003, 2006, 2008; Duncanson & Eschle, 2008; Särnä, 2014.

¹⁴ See for example Cohn, 1987: 693.

¹⁵ In a study of arms control and disarmament efforts practiced by the United States and the United Kingdom during the cold war, IR scholar Susan Wright argues that somewhat paradoxically such work served to preserve status quo and relied on the same theoretical logic as strategies that strive for military advantage. Although focusing on nuclear weapon states, Wright contributes important insights about how disarmament policy can serve the interests of its advocates. See Wright, 2010.

¹⁶ While the term Feminist Security Studies (FSS) serves as an umbrella for research that addresses Security Studies from various feminist approaches (see for example Sjöberg, 2009), I position my study in the broader spectrum of feminist IR studies.

made before Sweden formally declared its nuclear weapon-free status.¹⁷ Shortly after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were devastated by US nuclear weapons, the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOA, now FOI) was tasked with investigating whether it would be possible for Sweden to produce its own nuclear arsenal. Technical preparations were immediately initiated but the nuclear weapon program, which was capable of the production of nuclear weapons by the mid-1950s, was kept secret.¹⁸ When news of Sweden's nuclear weapon ambitions reached the Swedish general public in 1954 it sparked one of the most intense foreign policy debates of the 20th century.¹⁹ Although Sweden had the technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons in the mid-1950s, the government chose not to do so. Instead, the Swedish government became engaged in international disarmament negotiations and since 1962 has been one of eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC).²⁰

Disarmament has remained a core feature of Swedish foreign policy. In the 1960s the Swedish government participated in the negotiation of a treaty that would make it impossible for Sweden to acquire nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future, the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT).²¹ In this process, Alva Myrdal, a well-known Social Democrat who had already held several prestigious positions, was appointed Minister for Disarmament. She was the first of three official disarmament representatives representing Sweden in international disarmament negotiations. The other two were also women – Inga Thorsson (1974–1982) and Maj-Britt Theorin (1982–1991).²² Instead of acquiring nuclear weapons, Sweden took a strong position on the international disarmament stage, calling for international nuclear disarmament. International disarmament engagement received strong support from various quarters in Sweden and became a cornerstone of Swedish security policy. Even though the Swedish nuclear weapon debate was highly contested between political parties, civil society organizations and within the ruling SAP, Sweden's international disarmament engagement received support from a broad spectrum of actors, including some who had been the strongest advocates for a Swedish nuclear weapon program.²³ Hence, disarmament came to neatly fit into the tradition of consensus and

¹⁷ For the most thorough analysis of the processes leading up to Sweden's decision not to acquire nuclear weapons and to work for international nuclear disarmament, see Jonter, 2016.

¹⁸ Jonter has analyzed Sweden's technical preparations to produce nuclear weapons from different angles. See Jonter 2001, 2002, 2010, 2012, and 2016.

¹⁹ See for example Molin, 1989.

²⁰ See for example Andersson, 2004; Jonter, 2016; Jonter & Rosengren, 2014. The ENDC was an early version of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (1969–1978), the Committee on Disarmament (1979–83), and the Conference on Disarmament (1983–present).

²¹ See for example Bergenäs & Sabatini, 2010; Jonter, 2010; Prawitz, 1994, 1995 and 2004.

²² Andersson, 2004; Prawitz, 2004.

²³ Jonter, 2016; Jonter & Rosengren, 2014.

agreement that has been said to characterize Swedish security policy.²⁴ Even though disarmament remained a core feature of Swedish security policy throughout the cold war, the topic is almost entirely absent from previous research.²⁵ Against this background, this dissertation analyzes the making of Swedish disarmament policy during the cold war through a feminist lens, thereby contributing new insights on the relationship between gender, nuclear weapons, and disarmament.

A Feminist Curiosity

The theme of this dissertation results from a feminist curiosity. According to the ground-breaking feminist IR scholar, Cynthia Enloe, a feminist curiosity “provokes serious questioning about the workings of masculinized and feminized meanings” and “is the sort of curiosity that prompts one to pay attention to things that conventionally are treated as if they were either ‘neutral’ or [...] imagined to be ‘trivial’ [...]”.²⁶ My feminist curiosity first awoke when I read feminist literature about nuclear weapons during my undergraduate studies, and intensified when I worked in national and international disarmament advocacy for civil society organizations in Sweden and in relation to the UN disarmament machinery.²⁷ This section elaborates on the feminist insights that have inspired my research project.

Nuclear weapons and their role in defense doctrines have long been the topic of detailed feminist scrutiny both in academia and among activists.²⁸ In

²⁴ Bjereld & Demker, 1995.

²⁵ See Chapter 4.

²⁶ Enloe, 2004: 220.

²⁷ After completing my Master degree, I worked professionally as a project manager on disarmament and non-proliferation first for Swedish Physicians against Nuclear Weapons (the Swedish Branch of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, IPPNW) in 2008–2010 and then for the Swedish section of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) in 2009–2012. Both organizations are members of ICAN and my work included regular advocacy in various international disarmament forums, such as the NPT Preparatory Committees and Review Conferences, among others.

²⁸ For early feminist work on nuclear weapons and gender see Caldicott, 1986; Russell, 1989. Writing on feminist peace work and anti-militarism, sociologist Cynthia Cockburn argues that the massacre of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were followed by increased activism within already established peace movements such as the WILPF, which was founded in 1915, and the launch of new movements such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in 1958. Cockburn, 2012: 33f. See also Confortini, 2012. Separatist women-only movements were also founded, of which the Greenham Common Women’s Camp from 1981 is the best known. See for example Liddington, 1989. Anthropologist Hugh Gusterson adds that the women-led anti-nuclear movement of the 1980s was particularly important since it challenged the clinical masculine world of nuclear scientists by bringing the domestic sphere into conversations. Gusterson, 1996: 209.

her pioneering article “Sex and death in the rational world of defense intellectuals,” Cohn focused on the gendered language of US military experts and defense intellectuals during the cold war. She showed how nuclear weapon experts used “technostrategic language” when talking about nuclear weapons, a language characterized by the use of abstract and technical terms that hide the devastating consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. Technostrategic language includes terms such as “collateral damage” and “clean bombs” that hide what happens when nuclear weapons are used.²⁹ Furthermore, this language relies on “images of competitive male sexuality” closely connected with domination, violence and power.³⁰ According to Cohn, such language made it possible to label ethical considerations irrelevant and contributed to the masculinization of nuclear weapons discourse. Reliant on gender axioms connected to rationality, protection and defense that influenced security thinking, technostrategic language reinforced assumptions about masculinized protection.³¹ Against this background, Cohn rhetorically asks: “If disarmament is emasculation, how could any real man even consider it?”³²

Cohn’s question about whether real men could ever consider disarmament awoke my feminist curiosity and a need to understand the gendering of disarmament policy. In feminist theorization about the linkages between military strength, masculinity and nuclear weapon possession, disarmament becomes a policy of the weak and is relationally associated with femininity. Assuming such preconceived linkages, however, contributes to reconstruct and sustain particular notions of femininity and masculinity, and to rule out change and variations within and between various contexts. Meanwhile, as discussed below empirical analysis of the gendering of disarmament policy among those who have abstained from nuclear weapon acquisition and who advocate disarmament is a blind spot in feminist theorizing. Hence, this dissertation uses Sweden as a case to analyze nuclear weapon renunciation and engagement in disarmament from a feminist angle. Since gender has a historical tradition of being co-constructed with nation and heterosexuality, this dissertation analyses the gendering, nationalization and sexualization of disarmament.³³ Such a study makes it possible to scrutinize, and by doing so also nuance, associations between nuclear weapons possession and masculinity on the one hand, and disarmament and femininity on the other.

²⁹ Cohn, 1987: 691.

³⁰ Cohn, 1987: 694.

³¹ Cohn, 1987: 693.

³² Cohn, 1987: 693.

³³ For example, nationalist ideas often rest on conservative and heterosexual stereotypes of gender difference, where women’s roles are located in the domestic and reproductive realm of the private, while men are assumed to fulfill productive and protective roles in public. See for example Collins, 1998; McClintock, 1995; Towns, Karlsson & Eyre, 2014; Yuval-Davis, 1997.

The theoretical ambition is closely linked to an empirical gap in the existing research. Even though the past decade has witnessed a tremendous expansion of the field of feminist scholarship in IR, the IR scholar Catherine Eschle rightly recognizes that “nuclear politics more generally has faded from the purview of gender and security studies in recent years.”³⁴ Although more than 30 years has passed since Cohn’s article was published, it remains defining of the field. IR scholars Claire Duncanson and Catherine Eschle build on Cohn’s work by exploring how even though the basic features remain the same, the identity of the British state has gone through some changes in recent years in relation to nuclear weapons policy. They argue that: “challenges to the nuclear-protector role are positioned as emasculating” because of the established “gendered binary between the masculine, strong protector and the feminized, vulnerable population.”³⁵ Furthermore, they reveal the making of a discourse around nuclear weapons that makes it possible to leave out “the emotional, the concrete, the particular, human bodies and their vulnerability, human lives and their subjectivity – all of which are marked [as] feminine.”³⁶ Research along these lines has founded a solid understanding of the masculine identity of the nuclear weapon state. However, the existing feminist literature on nuclear weapons as well as nuclear weapons research more generally suffer from a lack of research into nuclear renunciation and disarmament advocacy, in particular historical research that relies on primary sources.³⁷ This one-sided focus of existing research on those states that have acquired nuclear weapons or that perceive nuclear weapons as improving their security is problematic, not least since the vast majority of states have abstained from nuclear weapon acquisition.³⁸ This means that too much attention has been paid to the odd ones out – the nuclear weapon states. In addition, this empirical bias (re)creates linkages between security, nuclear weapon possession and an exceptional form of militarized masculinity. Simply put, when we talk about nuclear weapons and security, we talk about those who embrace these weapons. In so doing, we reinforce norms and perceptions that leave no room for alternatives to nuclearized security strategies and nuclearized masculinity.

Thus, there is a need to advance our theoretical and empirical knowledge about gender, nuclear weapons and disarmament by analyzing the historical processes of those states which have had the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons but have chosen not to do so. The value of this kind of historical investigation is not just that it explains past co-construction of identity and policy. It

³⁴ Eschle, 2013: 2.

³⁵ Duncanson & Eschle, 2008: 554f.

³⁶ Duncanson & Eschle, 2008: 550. See also Cohn, Hill & Ruddick, 2005.

³⁷ On the lack of research on those states which have abstained from nuclear weapons acquisition, see for example Levite, 2002–2003: 61; Pelopidas, 2015; Rublee 2009.

³⁸ See for example Levite, 2002–2003: 59; Rublee, 2009.

also has the potential to contribute to our understanding of the present. According to the political scientist Lene Hansen, who has inspired the methodological approach of this dissertation, historical research says a lot about the present as it provides “important knowledge on how constructions of identity have been argued in the past and thus a good indication of where ‘discursive fault lines’ might be located in the present.”³⁹ Hence, further knowledge about cold war nuclear renunciation and disarmament might help us better understand important topics in the present, such as the Swedish government’s decision not to sign the TPNW and the debates that preceded it.

Against this background, feminist research about nuclear weapons has awoken my feminist curiosity to analyze a case of nuclear renunciation and disarmament through a feminist lens, and I have chosen to focus on the Swedish case. In my study, as is argued above, theory was the initial inspiration for certain questions. First and foremost, following Cohn, if disarmament leads to emasculation: How could any “real man” consider nuclear restraint and advocate for disarmament?⁴⁰ In light of the lack of any feminist theorization of either nuclear renunciation and disarmament or Swedish disarmament policy, it has been necessary to undertake theoretical and empirical work. I have therefore chosen to take an abductive approach, which makes it possible to use insights from both theory and sources to produce a research design that enables the study at hand. The sociologist Jo Reichertz describes an abductive approach as “assembling or discovering, on the basis of an interpretation of collected data, such combinations of features for which there is no appropriate explanation or rule in the store of knowledge that already exists.”⁴¹ The lack of previous rules and explanations means that new insights must be generated through a mental process, in a cognitive logic of discovery. In describing abduction as “a state of preparedness for being taken unprepared”, Reichertz stresses the need both to take data seriously and to query previously developed knowledge, with the aim of developing new ways of ordering that fit with surprising facts.⁴² I argue that such an approach fits nicely both with a feminist curiosity and with a study that aims to visit unexplored empirical and theoretical terrains. The abductive research design of this dissertation is explained in more detail in Chapter 2.

Sweden is an interesting case to study because it is one of the countries that had the opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons – and considered doing so for some time – before deciding to become engaged with international disarmament aims instead.⁴³ The empirical focus is on situations where nuclear weapon- and disarmament-related issues have caused intense political debate

³⁹ Hansen, 2006: 53.

⁴⁰ Cohn, 1987: 693.

⁴¹ Reichertz, 2019: 264.

⁴² Reichertz, 2019: 266.

⁴³ Jonter, 2016.

both in parliament and among the general public. This is because a focus on competing approaches to disarmament that can be easily identified in times of intense debate makes it possible to explore both conflicting views about identity and policy, and the establishment of authoritative discourses over time. In order to identify such periods, I have studied all the annual parliamentary debates on foreign policy that took place during the cold war. This study revealed two periods characterized by especially intense debate about nuclear weapons and disarmament: (a) the disarmament debates of the 1960s, which were interrelated with the Swedish nuclear weapon debate; and (b) the disarmament debates about a Nordic Nuclear Weapon-free Zone (NNWFZ) in the 1980s that took place after a Soviet nuclear-armed submarine (the U137) violated Swedish territorial borders in 1981 – the so-called submarine crisis. Hence, my decision to focus on these periods was empirically driven. The different character of the two periods makes it possible to explore both a situation where the nuclear weapon option was abandoned and disarmament policy was formed, and how disarmament policy proceeded in times of perceived intensified nuclear danger. The selection of these two periods is further discussed in Chapter 2. These two periods are also discussed in detail in their respective empirical chapters of the dissertation, in Part II and Part III.

Aims, Key Assumptions and Research Questions

The overall aim of this dissertation is to contribute with new knowledge about the gendering of Swedish disarmament policy during the cold war through a study of the co-construction of gendered, nationalized and sexualized identity representations and disarmament policy. It demonstrates how identity and disarmament policy in Sweden have been (re)constructed, challenged and renegotiated over time, how authoritative discourses have been established, and how the processes up for scrutiny have contributed to the (re)construction of societal notions about gender, nation and sexuality. The empirical focus is on disarmament policymaking in relation to the nuclear weapon debate and the submarine crisis. Such an analysis makes it possible to nuance feminist theorizing about associations between masculinity and nuclear weapon possession, on the one hand, and femininity and disarmament, on the other. Hence, the dissertation contributes a methodological and theoretical framework for investigating the making of disarmament policy from a feminist perspective. By understanding disarmament policymaking as historically situated and marked by gendered, nationalized and sexualized power structures in specific contexts, the dissertation contributes new knowledge relevant not only to feminist IR studies, but also to research on nuclear history and IR more generally. This section introduces the key assumptions of the dissertation and the research

questions derived from those assumptions. The key assumptions are explored further in Chapter 2.

Key assumptions

This dissertation is based on three key assumptions: first, that gender, nation and sexuality is both interrelated with and central to the making of both identity and policy; second, that identity and policy are co-constructed; and, third, that representations of human bodies and emotions contribute to meaning-making about both identity and policy. This section introduces these assumptions, using examples from the empirical chapters of the dissertation as illustrations. These examples are crucial to demonstrating how the assumptions are interrelated, and how they have informed my empirical analysis. The examples used are not placed in their respective contexts and should be understood as simplified representations of complex processes. The empirical chapters of the dissertation further contextualize these examples and discuss ambivalences and ambiguities in more detail. Hence, the content of this section should be understood as simplified illustrations of how the methodological and theoretical framework has been used in the analysis, and of the interpretations that it is possible to make.

Gender, nation and sexuality

Taking feminist literature as its point of departure, the foundation of this dissertation is that gender, nation and sexuality are three interrelated societal power orders that are central to the making of both identity and policy.⁴⁴ As argued above, identity and policy are understood as intertwined, which means that they cannot be separated.⁴⁵ I understand gender as a central category of analysis, as “a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes.”⁴⁶ As a social category, gender is constantly in the making, reinventing itself through acts in historical processes. Since identities and societal positions are challengeable and changeable, they should be understood as under construction.⁴⁷ I argue that gender analysis makes it possible to investigate “the ways in which individual (and collective) identity is socially constructed around and through assumptions about male/female sexual difference, or the categories of masculinity and femininity.”⁴⁸ Hence, I conceptualize gender as made, and as relevant to the construction of both individual and collective identities.

⁴⁴ See Chapter 2 of this dissertation.

⁴⁵ Hansen, 2006.

⁴⁶ Scott, 1988: 42f.

⁴⁷ Ahmed, 2004; Butler, 2006.

⁴⁸ Duncanson & Eschle, 2008: 546.

Furthermore, I understand gender as “a system of symbolic meaning that creates social hierarchies based on perceived associations with masculine and feminine characteristics”, which means that gender is central to power relations.⁴⁹ I single out gender as a “primary way of signifying relationships of power” in historical processes, where that which is associated with masculinity has a historical tendency to be valued more highly than that which is associated with femininity.⁵⁰ This means that characteristics that have historically been associated with certain forms of masculinities, such as “strength, objectivity, rationality, aggression, domination, confrontation, public life, control, order, and leadership”, are privileged over that which has been associated with certain femininities, such as “weakness, subjectivity, emotion, passivity, submission, accommodation, privacy, uncertainty, chaos, and care.”⁵¹ Following IR scholar Saara Särmä, and in line with what has been argued above, individuals and collectivities of various kinds are marked as feminine/masculine, and hierarchically valued accordingly. Särmä suggests that “a person, state, or organization attributed with masculine characteristics are positioned as more powerful than those associated with feminine ones are.”⁵² Hence, power is central to the analysis of the gendering of both individuals and collectives. Moreover, gender serves as a symbolic system that shapes our understandings of phenomena beyond male and female, masculine and feminine. Thus, gender is embedded in political discourse and gives meaning to femininity, masculinity, sexuality and human bodies, *as well as* to nuclear weapons and disarmament policy.⁵³ Furthermore, and as argued above, gender intersects with other societal power relations. This dissertation focuses on its co-construction with nation and sexuality. Feminist scholars have shown how representations of nations often resemble descriptions of a conservative and heterosexual nuclear family ideal, involving active men as protectors of caring women in need of protection.⁵⁴ This traditional representation of collective national identity relies on the intersection of gender, nation and sexuality as manifest in the nuclear family ideal.⁵⁵ One implication of this is that it is necessary to address how gender is constructed in relation to – and through – assumptions about nation and sexuality.

In Sweden, the policies of armed neutrality and the welfare state, two central components of Swedish national identity throughout the cold war, have been made gendered, nationalized and sexualized concepts and practices. The idea that the policy of armed neutrality should protect the country relied on

⁴⁹ Sjöberg, 2009: 187.

⁵⁰ Scott, 1988: 42f. See also Peterson & Runyan, 2010.

⁵¹ Särmä, 2014: 47.

⁵² Särmä, 2014: 47.

⁵³ See for example Cohn, 1993: 228.

⁵⁴ McClintock, 1995; Towns, Karlsson & Eyre, 2014: 239; Young, 2003.

⁵⁵ Collins, 1998: 63.

the conviction that it is a masculine duty to bear arms. Furthermore, the Swedish welfare state and what is often referred to as “the Swedish model” have contributed to the nationalization and gendering of citizenship. Women have been associated with reproductive duties in the private sphere while men have been associated with productive duties in the public. While the policy of armed neutrality was thought to provide protection in external relations by keeping the country out of wars, the welfare state has been said to guarantee security at the domestic level for Swedish society.⁵⁶ This is explored further in the background chapter of this dissertation, Chapter 3.

As argued above, this dissertation focuses on the co-construction of gender, nation and sexuality, on the one hand, and policy on nuclear weapons and disarmament, on the other. In Part II on the Swedish nuclear weapon debate, for example, I show how some anti-nuclear weapon campaigners made reference to themselves as “women”, arguing that women as mothers had certain responsibilities for maintaining peace and the care of future generations. These representations made it possible for them to advocate against the acquisition of nuclear weapons and in favor of disarmament. When disarmament was connected with women’s reproductive capabilities it became possible to frame disarmament as a special concern of women. In this example, gendered notions about women’s care for future generations were (re)constructed in policy advocacy. Furthermore, sexualized representations of a heterosexual family ideal, where women were given certain duties in relation to both men and the nation, were also (re)constructed. Such representations were challenged by both men and women, as is further explored in Part II.

The co-constitution of identity and policy

The second assumption is inspired by Hansen’s take on discourse analysis presented in *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, where she argues that foreign policy and identity representations are so intertwined that they cannot be separated.⁵⁷ Since policy cannot be made without relying on certain identity representations, assumptions about appropriate identity representations must in turn guide policy: “Identities are thus articulated as the reason why policies should be enacted, but they are also (re)produced through these very policy discourses: they are simultaneously (discursive) foundation and product.”⁵⁸ There is therefore an interrelationship, where one cannot exist without the other: foreign policy cannot be communicated without making reference to identity and identity cannot be formulated outside of foreign policy. In effect, there is no causal direction between the two – they are constitutive of one another.⁵⁹ Hence, I see identity as both constructed and

⁵⁶ See Chapter 3 of this dissertation.

⁵⁷ Hansen, 2006: 1ff.

⁵⁸ Hansen, 2006: 21.

⁵⁹ Hansen, 2006: 16, 25ff.

unstable. Both individual subjects and national subjects are constantly under negotiation. An individual can speak on behalf of different subjectivities, as a “woman”, as a “social democrat”, as a “Swede”, as a “soldier” and as a “peace activist,” and so on. These different subjectivities can be understood as filters through which meaning and interpretation are organized. Hence, even if these positions are unstable, I argue that they organize interpretation and room for maneuver, which also gives them a restraining function.⁶⁰

Following Hansen, I approach identity as simultaneously discursive and political, and also as relational and social. Treating identity as discursive and political means that identity is understood as constructed through discursive representations, and that these representations set out boundaries for the policies that can be argued within a specific context. The relational approach to identity means that identity is represented in relation to its opposite Other, that is based on the difference between the Self and its more or less opposite Other. The social dimension is about identity as collective rather than individual, or something made in and through a collective landscape. In this way, policy is understood as a discursive practice.⁶¹ According to Hansen, policy discourses are related to action, while identity is part of a broader discursive and political practice. While identity representations are made through policy performances, they also legitimize policy at the same time.⁶² The methodological implication of this is that the empirical analysis addresses not only competing positions on disarmament and the establishment of authoritative disarmament policy discourses over time, but also how these positions co-constitute identity.⁶³

In sum, both identities and material objects gain their meaning through different forms of articulation, and language therefore has an essential role in the construction of both the material and the non-material. Hence, language can be understood as constitutive.⁶⁴ Furthermore, power relations are productive of how we value some identity representations and policies over others, and all discourses, including those on nuclear weapons and disarmament, “are infused with a series of conceptual dichotomies which flow from and underpin the primary signifiers of masculine/feminine, with the masculine side of the dichotomy favored over the feminine.”⁶⁵ Hence, discourse is infused with power.

This dissertation reveals identity through representations of space, time and responsibility, which Hansen identifies as three central dimensions of the constitution of political communities and interpretative frames for the making of

⁶⁰ Bergström & Boreus, 2012: 371.

⁶¹ Hansen, 2006: 6, 18, 25.

⁶² Hansen, 2006: 21.

⁶³ See Chapter 2 in this dissertation.

⁶⁴ On the theorization of language as constitutive in historical studies, see for example Caning, 1994.

⁶⁵ Duncanson & Eschle, 2008: 546.

foreign policy.⁶⁶ References to space, time and responsibility give rise to assumptions about the collective identity of the Self, and also about the proposed policy. One common example from the debates analyzed in this dissertation is spatial references to “Swedes” (space), temporal references to notions of a “peaceful past” (time) and representations of a certain Swedish responsibility to act in the interest of peace (responsibility) in light of the previous spatial and temporal references. This responsibility is connected with policy. In the Swedish nuclear weapon debate, the above identity representations featured in advocacy against Swedish nuclear weapons, and contributing to international nuclear disarmament was represented as a certain Swedish task. The opposite – the acquisition of nuclear weapons – was represented as incompatible with notions of Swedishness and Swedish responsible masculinity. Such identity representations made it possible to advocate for a specific policy action and impossible to do its opposite. Part II of this dissertation elaborates further on how such identity representations and policy advocacy have been co-constructed.

Bodies and emotion

Departing from the literature on bodily representations and emotions in IR, the third assumption made by this dissertation is that human bodies and emotions are central to meaning-making processes, and contribute to the manifestation of collective communities and thereby identities.⁶⁷ This assumption is both a result of my empirical analysis and a theoretical point of departure.⁶⁸ For example, my analysis of the source material showed that the fear of nuclear war was a core feature of the Swedish nuclear weapon debate, and that this made it possible to talk about nuclear weapon acquisition as a reasonable protection strategy. Furthermore, fear was attached to the body of the threatening Other, which in turn relied on and contributed to the (re)construction of notions of masculinized protection and female vulnerability. During the submarine crisis, shame was central to representations of the collective Self, as manifest in representations of a naked and vulnerable female body and impotent male bodies. Through gendered representations of the nation as a vulnerable female body, emotions were made collective and associated with a feminized and national community in need of protection. Such representations made it possible to argue that armed defense was necessary. The analysis in Part III of this dissertation shows that this is but one example of how gendered, nationalized and sexualized representations of human bodies and emotions

⁶⁶ Hansen, 2006: 46.

⁶⁷ See for example Särämä, 2014; Ahmed 2004, Costigliola, 1997. This is further explored in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.

⁶⁸ While working with the sources in Part III of this dissertation, I discovered how central bodies and emotion are to communicating meaning about both identity and policy. In line with my abductive approach, I decided to include theoretical literature about emotion and bodies in IR, and made insights from this literature part of my research design.

contributed to meaning making about both identity and policy. At the same time, other representations featured in the sources, and ambivalence and ambiguity are explored further in the empirical chapters.

Against this background, the focus of this dissertation is on the gendering, nationalization and sexualization of identity and disarmament policy, and how bodies and emotions have contributed to meaning-making about both identity and policy. The dissertation draws on post-structuralist insights about “identity and security as mutually constitutive and shifting”.⁶⁹ In line with political scientist Iris Marion Young, I use gender as interpretation rather than explanation, focusing on “how a certain logic of gendered meanings and images helps organize the way people interpret events and circumstances, along with the positions and possibilities for action within them”.⁷⁰ The point of departure is that policy on nuclear weapons and disarmament, on the one hand, and identity representations, on the other, are co-constituted. Furthermore, both policy and identity are co-constructed with gender, nation and sexuality. The research questions that spring from the methodological and theoretical assumptions presented above are outlined below.

Research questions

The aim of this dissertation is to contribute with new knowledge about the gendering of Swedish disarmament policy during the cold war. Given that previous feminist research has identified linkages between a certain form of masculinity and the possession of nuclear weapons, the dissertation seeks to contribute a deepened understanding of the gendering of nuclear weapon renunciation and disarmament. It does so through a study of the gendered, nationalized and sexualized co-construction of identity representations and disarmament policy, with an empirical focus on the Swedish case. This general aim, along with the basic assumptions elaborated above, inspire an overarching research question, which is followed by two sub-questions:

- How were societal assumptions about gender, nation and sexuality (re)constructed in the making of disarmament policy in Sweden during the cold war?

The processes of identity construction that this main question delves into are further explored through two methodologically and theoretically driven sub-questions:

- How do references to space, time and responsibility contribute to the making of relationally organized Selves and Others?

⁶⁹ Wibben, 2011: 593.

⁷⁰ Young, 2003: 2.

- How do human bodies and emotions contribute to the co-construction of identity and disarmament policy?

These questions should be understood as a delimitation of the scope of the dissertation, as well as a guide to a structured reading of the sources based on the basic assumptions introduced above and elaborated on further in the subsequent chapters. In sum, an analysis focused on these research questions makes it possible to theorize about disarmament from a feminist perspective, and thereby to achieve the general aims of the dissertation.

Dissertation Outline

This dissertation draws on a wide range of existing research, ranging from studies of the time periods and topics, to more general accounts of Swedish security policy during the cold war. I use the existing research to position my study in relation to it (Chapters 1 and 2), to elaborate a feminist understanding of Swedish cold war security policy (Chapter 3), and to introduce and facilitate an understanding of the cases studied (Parts II and III).

This first part of the dissertation, Part I, is an introductory part. This chapter briefly introduced existing feminist research on nuclear weapons, and the key assumptions, aims and scope of the dissertation. The following chapter elaborates further on the theoretical and methodological foundations of the dissertation, and provides a more hands-on account of the central choices made in the research design, as well as an overview of the sources consulted. Chapter 3 introduces a broader selection of existing research on Swedish security policy during the cold war, and provides a feminist reading of this research.

Part II is the first empirical part of the dissertation. It investigates how disarmament became an alternative to nuclear weapon acquisition in Sweden. Positioning the making of disarmament policy in the 1960s at its center, Part II explores disarmament in relation its context – the nuclear weapons debate. Part III – the second empirical part of the dissertation – explores the making of disarmament policy in the context of nuclear danger. It revisits the submarine crisis of 1981, when a Soviet nuclear-armed submarine violated Swedish territorial integrity, and the subsequent debates about the establishment of an NNWFZ. Both parts unfold the gendered, nationalized and sexualized making of disarmament policy in their respective historical settings. Part IV is a concluding chapter.

2. Theoretical and Methodological Tools

This chapter elaborates further on the theoretical and methodological foundations of the dissertation. Drawing on insights from poststructuralist, feminist and intersectional work from a broad range of disciplines, such as IR, cultural studies, sociology, and history, among others, I have developed a framework that draws on what others have written while adapting this to the specificities of my own research project. In light of the abductive approach introduced in Chapter 1, it is important to recognize that all the theory was not in place at the outset of the project. I have added theoretical literature to my reading list following findings in the primary sources and modified my theoretical framework according to insights from this literature. For example, while IR feminist literature was the core of my research project from the beginning, literature on bodies and emotions has been included along the way. The inclusion of literature about bodies and emotions was primarily the result of my work with Part III of the dissertation. Similarly, while the research project has approached language as constitutive from the outset, specific methodological tools have been developed over time. For example, while the co-construction of identity and policy has served as a key assumption throughout, I decided to use Hansen's conceptualization of time, space and responsibility as central to identity representations having already spent many months in the archives studying primary sources. Hence, my abductive approach means that both my theoretical and my methodological tools have been (re)created over time. To facilitate the reading of this chapter, however, and in the interests of intersubjectivity, this chapter presents my theoretical and methodological approach as a single package.

The chapter begins with an introduction to the theoretical and methodological foundations of the dissertation. It demonstrates how insights from feminist IR theory have informed the methodological tools used in the empirical analysis. There follows a more hands-on account of how the research process was set up, with a special focus on various stages of source selection. The chapter ends with general reflections on the sources included. In sum, the chapter provides a theoretical and methodological framework for analyzing Swedish disarmament policymaking through a feminist and poststructuralist lens.

Theoretical Background

This section introduces some of the foundational theoretical insights drawn from previous feminist research in IR. It especially focuses on gender, nation and sexuality in relation to security and protection, and how bodies and emotions contribute to meaning-making about both identity and disarmament policy.

Over many years, feminist IR scholars have shown how gender is embedded in discourses that are often assumed to be neutral. In line with what was said about a feminist curiosity in the previous chapter, that which is conventionally understood as “neutral” is in need of feminist analysis.⁷¹ In this dissertation, I conceptualize Swedish disarmament policy as in need of feminist scrutiny. In the past, feminist scholars have paid close attention to how narrow conceptualizations of security in traditional IR literature privilege military responses and militarized worldviews.⁷² For example, feminist work has shown that even when military responses strive to bring about security, the use of armed force is always accompanied by great suffering among civilians. High levels of gender violence, such as domestic violence, rape and trafficking, often mark contexts of war and militarized violence. Although men also fall victim to such violence, this has disproportionately negative effects on women’s security. Hence, the perception of military protection does not account for the security of individuals, and military violence has clear gender dimensions. Moreover, military spending also extracts resources from budgets that could be spent differently, for example on the elimination of direct threats to human life, such as poverty, ecological destruction and disease.⁷³

A central component of feminist work is linked to gendered perceptions of protection in conventional security thinking. In her study of the “logic of masculinist protection”, political scientist Iris Marion Young compares the role of men in the US military with the male breadwinner ideal in heterosexual family relations. She argues that: “the role of the masculine protector puts those protected, paradigmatically women and children, in a subordinate position of dependence and obedience.”⁷⁴ Drawing on a nation-family analogy, Young argues that both US family ideals and US military strategies rely on and reinforce active and heroic masculine stereotypes as opposed to passive and vulnerable feminine stereotypes. Young’s work is part of a broader feminist anti-

⁷¹ Enloe, 2004: 220.

⁷² Such traditional IR approaches include the neo-realist school, which attributes the military security-seeking behavior of states to power and an anarchic international system. See for example Mearsheimer, 1994–1995, 2001; Mearsheimer, Franklin & Davis (ed.), 1993; Paul, 2000; Thayer, 1995; Waltz, 1979.

⁷³ For an orientation on feminist takes on security, see for example Charlesworth & Chinkin, 2000; Cockburn, 2012; Enloe, 2000, 2004, 2007; Peterson & Runyan, 2010; Pettman, 1996; Tickner, 2001.

⁷⁴ Young, 2003: 2.

militarist agenda that challenges militarism in various forms and settings.⁷⁵ This dissertation is positioned in this anti-militarist feminist research tradition.

Furthermore, feminist work has also shown how military protection strategies are a central component of nation-making and how they rely on the gendering, nationalization and sexualization of bodies. Sociologist Nira Yuval-Davis argues that defending the nation – and thus being prepared to kill or die for the nation – can be seen as “an ultimate citizen’s duty”.⁷⁶ The practice of male conscription in Sweden is one example of how citizenship has been linked with male bodies and military service in historical processes.⁷⁷ Hence, male bodies have been tasked with protecting the nation, even though this involves being prepared to sacrifice their lives.⁷⁸ Young also emphasizes that gendered protection logics are relationally organized; men are not only obliged and willing to sacrifice their lives for the survival of the nation – which she conceptualizes as an imagined feminized and vulnerable population – but women accept this and encourage them to do so.⁷⁹ Since women’s reproductive capabilities are necessary for the continuance of the nation, there is an assumed need for an “honoured and elevated manly soldier who is prepared to die for the nation, to spill his blood to protect the national home and the nationalized white female body.”⁸⁰ Hence, the masculinized protection logic both strives to protect a feminized vulnerable population from foreign threats, and relates to the national territory as a female, and racialized, body.

In Sweden, Mother Svea has served as a historical symbol of the nation and, according to political scientist Maud Eduards, a marker of the national territory as a female body.⁸¹ Writing about bodily metaphors around migration, feminist and postcolonial scholar Sara Ahmed elaborates on “the soft national body [as] a feminized body, which is ‘penetrated’ or ‘invaded’ by others.”⁸² Hence, bodily representations such as Mother Svea and women represented as in need of protection are at the heart of the protection myth, represented as that which male bodies are in charge of protecting. Within the logic of masculinized protection, the “‘good’ man is one who keeps vigilant watch over the safety of his family and readily risks himself in the face of threats from the outside in order to protect the subordinate members of his household”, and in effect secures both his family and the national territory from threats.⁸³ Hence,

⁷⁵ See for example Blanchard, 2003; Cockburn, 2012; Duncanson & Eschle, 2008; Enloe, 2000, 2004, 2007; Särnä, 2014; Sjöberg, 2009.

⁷⁶ Yuval-Davis, 1997: 20f.

⁷⁷ See for example Ekerholm, 2014; Tornbjör, 2002: 195.

⁷⁸ For research about military sacrifice and death in Sweden from a gender perspective, see Åse & Wendt, 2019.

⁷⁹ Young, 2003.

⁸⁰ Åse & Wendt, 2019: 5.

⁸¹ Eduards, 2007: 13.

⁸² Ahmed, 2004: 2.

⁸³ Young, 2003: 4.

the protection myth privileges some bodies as protectors and others as in need of protection.

Furthermore, emotion is a necessary but often neglected component of the protection myth. In their introduction to emotions and world politics, IR scholars Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker argue that emotions have indeed played a role in IR scholarship for many decades, but are rarely explicitly mentioned. The positions of fear and anger, or of trust and glory in both realist and liberal theorizing have led to a “somewhat paradoxical situation where emotions have been implicitly recognized as central but, at the same time, remained largely neglected in scholarly analysis.”⁸⁴ Without representations of a threatening Other, there is no one to protect/be protected from. Without elements of fear attached to strangers who are positioned as threatening, without notions of a dangerous Other who threatens to invade and harm the national Self, the protection logic does not fulfill its purpose. Against this background, Ahmed argues that it is necessary to investigate how certain emotions are attached to specific bodies.⁸⁵

Although important insights have been gained about gender, security and militarization, most anti-militarist feminist work on security draws on experiences from heavily militarized contexts and offensive military strategies. Scrutinizing offensive and defensive military strategies through a gendered lens, political scientist Lauren Wilcox argues that the preference for offensive strategies in many defense doctrines can be traced back to “the association of offensive with activity, aggression, strength, and boldness [...] and the association of defensive with passivity, weakness, and victimhood”.⁸⁶ Following her argument, and in light of what has been argued above, offensive strategies have been associated with a masculine identity, whereas defensive strategies have been associated with a feminine identity. The Swedish case is an example of defensive security policy. As Chapter 3 shows, previous research on Swedish security and national identity during the cold war has demonstrated how the neutrality policy together with the welfare state served as two central components of Swedish national identity.⁸⁷ Following the argument of Wilcox, such defensive security strategies are potentially emasculating. This conclusion, however, follows a binary approach to gender that is similar to that which is argued in the introduction to this dissertation about feminist theorizing about nuclear weapon possession and masculinity, on the one hand, and disarmament and femininity, on the other. As the empirical chapters in Part II and Part III show, conceptualizations of the Swedish security policy at the national level has been far from feminized. Drawing on the feminist insights about security and protection presented above, this dissertation uses Sweden

⁸⁴ Hutchison & Bleiker, 2014: 494.

⁸⁵ Ahmed, 2004: 11.

⁸⁶ Wilcox, 2009: 228.

⁸⁷ See for example Lundin & Stenlås, 2010.

as a case for deepening and elaborating further on a more nuanced feminist understanding of disarmament policymaking in a defensive security setting. The next section explains my theoretical and methodological tools in more detail.

A Feminist Discourse Analysis

As argued in Chapter 1, this dissertation contributes new knowledge about the co-construction of gendered, nationalized and sexualized identity representations and disarmament policy in Sweden during the cold war, and the establishment of authoritative disarmament discourses in the historical processes I decided to focus on. This suggests a process-oriented study of how both identity and policy have been propounded and challenged, as well as of what has been marginalized and what has become authoritative over time. IR scholar Roxanne Doty argues that a post-positivist approach to foreign policy is especially suitable for exploring “*how* the subjects, objects, and interpretive dispositions were socially constructed such that certain practices were made possible.”⁸⁸ In this dissertation, I study how certain policy responses have been made possible, while others have been sidelined at the margins. My focus is on the processes that have led to the establishment of authoritative disarmament discourses, and how gender, nation and sexuality have been co-constructed in policy discourses.

The analysis in this dissertation is primarily focused on discourse, and on power in the processes that led to the co-construction of authoritative identity and policy representations. In order to understand power relations, it is necessary to investigate how certain identity representations and policy proposals have been legitimized, while others have been marginalized and ruled out. Writing about discourses as “regimes of truth”, where discourses decide both *who* is allowed to speak and *what* is allowed to be spoken about, political scientist Jennifer Milliken argues that discourses exclude and silence that which is not believed to fit. Hence, discourses both define and enable subjects, knowledge and action, and serve to silence and exclude.⁸⁹ Those representations that stick in official policy over time are what this dissertation interprets as authoritative. Since the dissertation singles out gender as a “primary way of signifying relationships of power” in historical processes, I pay special attention to the gendering of policy debates and outcomes.⁹⁰ Furthermore, gender is intersectionally co-constructed and interlinked with other power orders and, as argued in Chapter 1, this dissertation focuses on its co-construction

⁸⁸ Doty, 1993: 299.

⁸⁹ Milliken, 1999.

⁹⁰ Scott, 1988: 42f. See also Peterson & Runyan, 2010.

with nation and sexuality.⁹¹ Hansen's guide to discourse analysis has proved especially useful for the research design of this dissertation, as a result of its focus on foreign policy analysis.⁹² However, Hansen does not focus on the co-construction of identity and policy on the one hand, and gender, nation and sexuality on the other, in her approach. The following sections provide a more detailed overview of how my feminist theoretical positioning informs my discourse analytical approach, and of the tools that have been used in my analysis of the empirical sources.

The Gendered Making of Collective Identities

This dissertation positions the nation-family analogy as essential to understanding the gendered, nationalized and sexualized making of collectives, and thus to exploring identity representations in foreign policy. In his influential work on the origins and spread of nationalism, political scientist Benedict Anderson introduced the concept of the nation as an "imagined community". According to Anderson, it is imagined because although most members of a nation will never meet or hear about each other, they still relate to one another as members of a shared collective. In addition, the nation is necessarily imagined as *limited*, since boundaries create difference between those inside and those outside. These boundaries are upheld through the ideology of *sovereignty*, and regardless of the state of "actual inequality and exploitation" within the boundaries of the nation, the *imagination* of the community brings about "a deep, horizontal comradeship."⁹³ Anderson's thinking has influenced subsequent work on nations and nationalisms. However, although he has elaborated on how individuals make up the nation through the making of an imagined community, he falls short on grasping the power structures within communities, and how for example gendered positions within the community influence, and are influenced by, the idea of a united national whole.⁹⁴

The nation-family analogy is a key component of Young's work on the logic of masculinized protection, where she compares men's roles as military protectors in the international/public setting with their protective tasks in relation to their families in a domestic/personal setting. In this analogy, language about national unity and belonging resembles conservative notions of a heterosexual family ideal: the nation is seen as an extended, gendered and sexualized heterosexual family ideal, a conservative ideal "headed by a father and nurtured by a mother."⁹⁵ The division between the international/public and the domestic/private spheres in western nation-making, as well as the association

⁹¹ Apart from Chapter 1 in this dissertation, see for example Collins, 1998: 63.

⁹² Hansen, 2006.

⁹³ Anderson, 2006: 6f.

⁹⁴ See for example Eduards, 2007: 20.

⁹⁵ Towns, Karlsson & Eyre, 2014: 239.

between masculinity and the public and femininity and the private, correspond with traditional, heterosexual family ideals of a male breadwinner and a female housewife.⁹⁶ When state leaders talk about “family values” as characteristic of an imagined national community, they evoke emotions of national belonging and rely on metaphors that are only graspable in a societal context marked by gendered, sexualized and nationalized ideals. Sociologist Patricia Hill Collins argues that the power of “this traditional family ideal lies in its dual function as an ideological construction and as a fundamental principle of social organization,” constructed around intersections of societal power orders related to gender, nation and sexuality.⁹⁷

As discussed in Chapter 1, this dissertation focuses on the co-construction of gender, nation and sexuality and disarmament policy in Sweden during the cold war. Since foreign policy is directly related to nation-making, collective identity making in relation to the nation is central to the analysis. Yuval-Davis argues that “[c]ollectivities and ‘communities’ are ideological and material constructions, whose boundaries, structures and norms are a result of constant processes of struggles and negotiations, or more general social developments.”⁹⁸ This means that neither the meanings of a nation, nor the composition or interests of a national community are constant. Referring to the work of Anderson, linguist scholar and post-colonial thinker Anne McClintock argues that “nations are not simply phantasmagoria of the mind but are historical practices through which social difference is both invented and performed”, that is, simultaneously invented *and* performed by those whose collective actions constitute – and are constituted by – the nation. McClintock argues that although conceptualizations of nations often rely on notions of *unity* among citizens, historical performances of nations have relied on assumptions about gender *difference*. She therefore concludes that “[a]ll nations are dependent on powerful constructions of gender”.⁹⁹ McClintock elaborates, for example, on how men and women have been assumed to have “natural” positions in both the nation and the family.¹⁰⁰ Understanding collective identities as made and marked by societal notions about gender, nation and sexuality is central to the analysis of this dissertation.

Following what is argued above about the nation-family analogy, the making of collective identities related to nation-making is reliant on imaginary transformations of individuals and families into states and nations, and vice versa. Such transformations rely on gendered representations to make sense. IR scholar Saara Särämä argues that descriptions of states as bullies, wimps or

⁹⁶ See for example Pateman, 1992; Peterson & Runyan, 2010; Särämä, 2014; Steans, 2006: 110; Tickner, 2001.

⁹⁷ Collins, 1998: 63.

⁹⁸ Yuval-Davis, 1997: 8.

⁹⁹ McClintock, 1995: 353.

¹⁰⁰ McClintock, 1995: 353. See also Nagel, 1998.

mad men “are enabled by the fact that the arenas in which states and other actors engage each other are saturated with gendered meanings”.¹⁰¹ With no conceptual understanding of what a wimp is, or its relation to notions of hegemonic masculinities, such descriptions would make no sense. Writing about bodily images and references from the private sphere in international security settings, historian Frank Costigliola conceptualizes symbols and metaphors from the private and individual sphere as “shorthand” for communicating meaning about complex relationships.¹⁰² To have meaning in the eyes of their audiences, such metaphors rely on societal assumptions about gender and the stereotypes they bring about.

Moreover, Ahmed argues that emotions are central to collective identity making as they bind individuals together as groups and thereby serve as links between the individual and the collective. Emotion can be understood as the glue that makes the national subject whole. By attaching individual emotion to the nation, and by associating it with collective emotion, the nation becomes a subject that can feel, and at the same time an object that individuals can identify with. For example, when a nation is described as being violated and/or ashamed, it becomes a subject with the capacity to feel, and individuals can feel pity or shame for the nation.¹⁰³ That is the work emotions do to make the nation appear as a united community, and as a subject that can act as a united whole. In my analysis, I am especially interested in revealing how “individual emotions become collective and political” and how gendered, nationalized and sexualized identity representations of the nation as a human body have appeared in policy advocacy.¹⁰⁴ The following explains how I located identity representations in the sources, and how these representations are relationally organized.

Relational identity making

In its analysis of identity representations, this dissertation departs from a relational approach and searches for what is positioned as the Self and the Other. This means that if the national Self is represented as friendly, rational and developed, the Other is represented as its contrast – as unfriendly, irrational and underdeveloped. Thus, when the national Self is constructed in a certain manner, it is simultaneously differentiated from the characters of one or several (un)spoken Other(s). This is how meaning is organized relationally.¹⁰⁵ That said, a relational approach does not equate to simplicity and certainly has

¹⁰¹ Särnä, 2014: 50.

¹⁰² Costigliola, 1997: 164.

¹⁰³ Ahmed, 2004: 68, 98.

¹⁰⁴ Hutchison & Bleiker, 2014: 506.

¹⁰⁵ Hansen, 2006.

room for ambivalence and ambiguity. Hansen argues that “degrees of differences and Otherness” mark relational identity construction in foreign policy, and that ambivalence and complexity are necessary ingredients.¹⁰⁶ Historical analysis enables investigation of how ambiguous meanings have been created over time and the role of power struggles in meaning-making processes.

Relational meaning making is loaded with power as it tends to be marked by hierarchical notions of what is considered “good” or “important”. Furthermore, “self-other dichotomy frequently has gendered, as well as sexualized and racialized, dimensions”.¹⁰⁷ For example, and as argued below, men and masculinity have a historical tendency to be associated with rationality and development, whereas women and femininity have been associated with emotion and backwardness.¹⁰⁸ The Other can be represented as ruled by emotion rather than reason, as suffering from a lack of development or as a feminized Other underpinning a certain masculine response by the Self, as for example in colonial conquest. The Other can also be portrayed as an abnormal form of masculinity, as a brutalized Other “in contrast to the rationality and restraint of ‘ourselves’”.¹⁰⁹ Hence, the simultaneous making of identity and policy is not a neutral process and, following the key assumptions of this dissertation, gender is central to relationally organized meaning-making. Various feminized and masculinized identity representations that serve to differentiate the Self (or Selves) from the Other(s) can be mobilized in foreign policy. Consequently, my analysis of identity centers on representations of Self (Selves) and Other(s).

Space, time, and responsibility

In my analysis of collective identity representations, I focus on references to space, time and responsibility (ethics), following Hansen’s argument that “space, time, and responsibility are the big concepts through which political communities – their boundaries, internal constitution, and relationship with the outside world – are thought and argued.”¹¹⁰ This section argues that these dimensions are interlinked. Exploring how identity is spatially, temporally and ethically situated makes it possible to identify “differences between discourses and their changes over time.”¹¹¹ By analyzing which Self (Selves) and Other(s) are constituted in disarmament debates, how different they are and how difference is made with reference to time, space and responsibility, it is possible

¹⁰⁶ Hansen, 2006: 37.

¹⁰⁷ Duncanson & Eschle, 2008: 554.

¹⁰⁸ Ahmed, 2004.

¹⁰⁹ Duncanson & Eschle, 2008: 554.

¹¹⁰ Hansen, 2006: 46.

¹¹¹ Hansen, 2006: 38.

to identify whether change occurs in all dimensions of identity representations, and how policy has been differently argued and transformed over time.¹¹²

As is stated above, the nation state has historically been a major spatial referent in foreign policy discourses and is therefore of most immediate interest. While states are conventionally thought of as “genderless things”, feminist research has shown how gender is a central dimension in the analysis of spaces related to states and nations.¹¹³ For example, feminist research has shown that men have had disproportionate access to public political spaces in states, international institutions and militaries throughout the modern western state era, whereas women have been tasked with the main responsibility for private spaces such as the care of children and for the household.¹¹⁴ Hence, the gendered divide between the international/public and the domestic/private is one example of how states are gendered. Furthermore, symbolic representations of states and nations also rely on notions of gender difference. For example, male bodies are often used as symbols for active and political collectives, such as in the form of male politicians in cartoons describing the interactions between states.¹¹⁵ When female symbols are used to embody the nation, it is usually in situations where it is being represented as in need of masculine protection, when the private, domestic is described as threatened by an Other.¹¹⁶ Following McClintock’s reasoning, historical performances of nationhood relied on gendered identity constructions, and the gendering of spaces was one of these acts.¹¹⁷ While the international and the public tend to be marked as masculine/men’s spheres, the domestic and the private remain the spheres of femininity/women. Both bodily symbols and emotions such as fear of threatening Others contribute to the making of this dichotomy. However, spatiality can also be about “abstract political space, boundaries, and subjectivities”, such as “women”, “humanity” or “the people”.¹¹⁸ For example, disarmament can be described as of special interest to the Swedish state because of its geopolitical position between the main antagonists in the cold war, or for “women” because of their assumed concern for future generations. Hence, spaces are gendered, nationalized and sexualized at the personal, (inter)national, institutional and symbolic levels.¹¹⁹

The second feature of identity representations analyzed in this dissertation is linked to time. Temporal identity representations are made in relation to the

¹¹² Hansen, 2006: 44f.

¹¹³ Wadley, 2010: 38. See also Särämä, 2014: 50, 110.

¹¹⁴ See for example Peterson & Runyan, 2010; Särämä, 2014: 110; Steans, 2006; Tickner, 2001.

¹¹⁵ Särämä, 2014: 50, 110. See also Wadley, 2010: 38.

¹¹⁶ Särämä, 2014: 110. See also Ahmed, 2004: 2.

¹¹⁷ McClintock, 1993, 1995.

¹¹⁸ Hansen, 2006: 46.

¹¹⁹ See for example Scott, 1988.

past, the present and the future. Furthermore, they often rely on the difference between a present Self and its opposite Other. For example, notions of a “developed” Self also contribute to the construction of an “underdeveloped” Other. That said, temporal representations of the Self as developed do not need an external underdeveloped Other to be constituted – difference can be made with reference to the underdeveloped Self in the historical past as opposed to the developed Self of the present. Hence, references to time can serve to differentiate the Self from an opposite Other, or from a historical Self positioned as different (and thus Other) from the present Self. In these examples, difference is constructed around notions of progression, and progression relies on comparison over time. The positive and negative evaluation of identity representations related to temporal comparison is more obviously expressed with words such as “modern” and “backward”. In this example, “modern” is positively valued, whereas backward has a negative connotation. Gender analysis is crucial to an understanding of the evaluation of such temporal representations. Since women’s practices have historically been represented as backward-looking and outdated, and men’s practices as forward-looking and modern, modernity as such is a gendered concept associated with a masculine identity.¹²⁰ Furthermore, such representations also have racialized dimensions, since white bodies have often been associated with development and progression.¹²¹ Chapter 3 elaborates further on the centrality of modernity to the Swedish welfare state project, and how social reforms relied on representations of women as irrational and backward.¹²² Part II elaborates further on disarmament policy and the making of a masculinized, and white, modern Self.

Temporal references have other roles in relation to identity-making. Representations of a historical past can be used to justify the policy of the present. For example, by arguing that the presence of nuclear weapons during the cold war was the reason why tense relations between the United States and the Soviet Union never resulted in military confrontation on their territories, representations of historical policy can be used to advocate for the preservation of nuclear weapon capabilities in the present. Drawing on the gendered logic of masculinized protection, such representations serve both to advocate nuclearized security strategies, and to justify masculinized military logic. Hence, in this example, temporal identity representations are associated with notions of responsibility.

Furthermore, such representations are also temporally linked with the future. Talk about fear and the need to maintain an armed defense organization makes it possible to talk not only about the need to take certain measures, but also about responsibilities such as the rearmament of national forces to protect

¹²⁰ McClintock, 1993: 66.

¹²¹ See for example Ahmed, 2004; McClintock, 1993.

¹²² See Chapter 3 of this dissertation. See also for example Hirdman, 2010.

an apparently vulnerable population from invasion. Hence, the fear of a threatening Other makes it possible to talk about a vulnerable population, a national body in need of protection, and armament simultaneously emerges as a policy to ensure protection and in effect future survival. Consequently, the vulnerable national body in the present becomes a reality through references to threat and fear, a reality which must be defended so that the national body continues to prevail.¹²³ In sum, fear of a threatening Other and the attachment of danger to the body of the Other become the glue that makes the nation vulnerable in the present and guides policy for the future.

The third dimension, the ethical dimension, concerns the responsibilities of the Self, which in foreign policy often refers to the national Self.¹²⁴ For example, keeping the nation out of war through substantial investment in military defense is represented as a main responsibility of the security state, and serves to preserve the masculine protection ideal as in the previous example. As noted above, Young has argued that masculinized protection strategies are gendered, drawing on assumptions about armed men and unarmed women, and men with weapons who protect women (and children) in a somewhat heroic manner. This reproduces linkages between men, masculinity and weapons, and makes defense of the nation “an ultimate citizen’s duty”.¹²⁵ The association between men, masculinity and the military has a long historical tradition in western nation-making. Within Young’s “logic of masculine protection” framework, the duty of men to kill and die for the nation connects the spaces of “men” with military spaces, and with the responsibility to protect a vulnerable nation marked by a female body in order to ensure the continuance of the community in the future.

However, responsibilities are not necessarily attached to citizens in a preset temporal and spatial setting. For example, disarmament engagement can be represented as equated with being a wimp, as an unreasonable demand only advocated by naive and foolish peace activists, or as a reasonable security strategy that aims to reduce the risk of weapons being targeted at the national Self. It can also be described as the responsibility of a peaceful nation to contribute to world peace and disarmament in the interests of all of humankind. As shown in Chapter 4, if the space referred to is a collective of women, disarmament can be represented as a responsibility to care for future generations by guaranteeing that there will be a future at all. Here, time and notions of a threatened future arise. Hence, temporal, spatial and ethical dimensions are interrelated with one another in various ways; and since gender is a fundamental power order, it is everywhere in identity and policymaking. Organizing my empirical analysis around representations of identity in relation to space, time and responsibility makes it possible to reach a feminist understanding about

¹²³ See Ahmed, 2004: 85.

¹²⁴ Hansen, 2006: 46ff.

¹²⁵ Yuval-Davis, 1997: 20f.

the gendering, nationalization and sexualization of Swedish disarmament policymaking during the cold war.

In sum, this dissertation focuses on the gendering, nationalization and sexualization of representations of the Self (Selves) and relationally constituted Other(s) in debates about disarmament, through an identification of spatial, temporal and ethical dimensions of identity representations. Such an analysis not only reveals identity representations and policy proposals in debates, but also makes it possible to disclose which policies and identity representations have ended up as official policy. Inspired by political scientists Katarzyna Jezierska and Ann Town's take on nation branding, I aim to "denaturalize rather than necessarily to condemn, to show the contingent and partial nature of the narratives that serve to package and export coherent images and messages about a nation."¹²⁶ The following section elaborates further on the abductive research design of the dissertation and the sources included in the empirical chapters.

Sources and Methodological Reflections

This section elaborates on the most important choices made in relation to the research design and sources for this dissertation, and in so doing strives to make the research process as transparent as possible. The research design is abductive, meaning that I have adjusted my theoretical framework and my source selection according to insights gained from both theory and the sources. The utility of this kind of research process is that it makes it possible to start off with a theoretical curiosity, to approach the sources with an initial theory, and to reconstitute the theory and add new sources as questions arise during the research process. At a final stage, a smaller sample of sources was processed and analyzed systematically in order to understand and interpret the empirical findings. According to political scientists Maria Wendt and Cecilia Åse, the main advantage of this kind of abductive research approach is that it makes it possible to adapt the research design according to insights both from the material and from theory.¹²⁷ This section elaborates on the different steps in the research process, and provides a guide to the sources and some reflections on those sources.

Research process

This section presents the research process of the dissertation. The research process can be divided into three overall steps. The first step served to select the time periods analyzed in the dissertation. The second step was to identify

¹²⁶ Jezierska & Towns 2018: 57.

¹²⁷ Wendt & Åse, 2016: 364f.

the basic discourses through the study of a broad selection of sources, which are briefly introduced below and presented in Table 1. The third and final step was to analyze the making of gendered, nationalized and sexualized identity representations and disarmament policy, and the establishment of authoritative discourses over time, in a smaller sources selection. The latter study was based on the smaller selection of sources also presented in Table 1. As explained above, my analysis of texts was focused on identity representations related to space, time and responsibility, how human bodies and emotion featured in the sources, and how these representations contributed to the simultaneous gendering, nationalization and sexualization of both identity and policy.

Step 1

This dissertation is focused on the cold war – an era marked the rivalry between the USA and the Soviet Union, and the presence of nuclear weapons.¹²⁸ I chose to focus on this period because this was when nuclear weapons were being most intensely discussed, both in Sweden and internationally. This is a relatively long time period, however, and I therefore chose to study two shorter periods marked by intense societal debate on disarmament in Sweden. Since I am interested in investigating how official disarmament policy was challenged, and how it was remade in light of such challenges, it is reasonable to focus on times of intense debate. Such situations are also especially suitable for exploring how identities are challenged and renegotiated, since they “give rise to reformulated societal identities and collective self-images.”¹²⁹ Hence, a focus on intense debate facilitates an analysis of how societal power structures enable and exclude perspectives on disarmament, and how they have been challenged and transformed in these processes.

In order to identify relevant time periods to analyze – that is, periods marked by intense debate on disarmament – I chose to study the annual Foreign Policy Declarations delivered in the Swedish Parliament by the prime minister/foreign minister, and the foreign policy debates that followed these declarations in 1954–1989.¹³⁰ This material presents the official position of the government of the day, and shows how it was challenged by opposition parties in parliament. An initial study of these sources, with a focus on the Swedish equivalent words for “nuclear weapons” and “disarmament”, led to the selection of the two time periods analyzed: 1954–1968 in Part II and 1981–1989 in

¹²⁸ See for example Gaddis, 2007[2006].

¹²⁹ For a study on the reformulation of societal identities and collective self-images in times of intense media attention, see Åse, 2016: 113. See also Åse 2015; Hansen, 2006; Scott, 1988.

¹³⁰ The foreign policy declarations can be compared with US State of the Union addresses, but only address foreign policy matters. This material is discussed further below. The reason for starting with the foreign policy declaration of 1954 is that this was when the debate on Swedish nuclear weapons began. Before that, nuclear weapons were only talked about as something in the possession of the superpowers. The reason for stopping in 1989 is that this marked the end of the cold war.

Part III. Hence, the decision to focus on these two periods was empirically driven: they are the periods of most intense debate in the Swedish Parliament on nuclear weapons and disarmament throughout the cold war. The time periods are introduced in more detail in the empirical chapters of the dissertation.

Step 2

Having studied the foreign policy declarations and debates as part of step 1, I had an initial sense of the different policy positions in parliament. However, the debates engaged people other than elected politicians. As part of step 2, which aimed to identify basic discourses on identity and disarmament policy as described below, I therefore extended my source selection to incorporate a broader set of sources, from speeches delivered by government representatives in national and international forums, to media output, administrative records, and personal notes, correspondence and diaries. Since I sought to discover how policy was challenged and transformed over time, I included sources that were likely to express different opinions.

The two periods analyzed in this dissertation are very different from each other. Since this is an explorative study that aims to contribute theory about the topics studied, I found it valuable to scrutinize disarmament policymaking in different settings. While my theoretical and methodological approach remained the same, the ways in which I approached the two empirical investigations were marked by differences. My source selection criteria were adapted to the specificities of the two time periods. Even though I included different types of sources, both sets of criteria contained three levels, including various genres: (a) the official government level, such as official texts from government representatives; (b) the wider debate, such as parliamentary debates with opposition members, senior military officers', as well as media texts, NGO materials, campaign booklets and pamphlets; and (3) cultural representations, such as satirical cartoons and sketches, diaries, personal notes and correspondence.¹³¹ The first category formed a central plank of the analysis, as it represented the government policy level, but the wider debate is also highly relevant since my focus is on debates. The third and final level, cultural representations, was especially helpful for grasping nuances and understanding the wider societal context.

In conclusion, my decision to study the two time periods when nuclear weapons and disarmament were most intensely discussed in parliament presented me with two periods that were very different. My source selection reflected those differences and has had consequences for the interpretations it was possible to make. The first step in the analysis of the broad selection of

¹³¹ This categorization of levels including different genres is inspired by Hansen, 2006: 64. Unlike Hansen, however, I include material from civil society organizations in the wider debate category rather than in a separate category labeled marginal groups.

sources presented above was to identify “basic discourses”, which can be understood as ideal type constructions used as analytical tools. According to Hansen, basic discourses can be understood as “an analytical distinction of an ideal-type kind”, and their analytical value is that they provide “a lens through which a multitude of different representations and policies can be seen as systematically connected and that they identify the key points of structuring disagreement within a debate.”¹³² These basic discourses are not only characterized by competing policy positions, but also “construct different Others with different degrees of radical difference; articulate radically diverging forms of spatial, temporal, and ethical identity; and construct competing links between identity and policy.”¹³³ In this study, the basic discourses correspond with competing approaches to how and why disarmament ought to be achieved. This means that one basic discourse can include texts from various origins. If one discourse is found in parliamentary material and in media sources, I treat it as part of the same basic discourse, which means that I do not make genre-based distinctions.¹³⁴ I have identified the basic discourses by an initial reading of the broad material selection summarized in Table 1. Faced with new traits in the material, I re-consulted theory and included additional sources, which made it possible to adapt the basic categories according to new findings, and to devise new categories when necessary in line with my abductive approach. The following sections introduce the main source selections for the two time periods. The subsequent part of the chapter provides more detailed reflections on the source selection.

Period 1: 1954–1968

The first period involved a debate that has been described as one of the most intense foreign policy debates in Sweden of the past century: the nuclear weapon debate.¹³⁵ Disarmament policy came into this debate as what can fairly be described as a middle ground position that united both sides of the debate in a shared project.¹³⁶ Even though there was debate about exactly what disarmament policy should entail, no one really opposed the government doing what it could to contribute to international nuclear disarmament. This means that a period that began with intense debate about nuclear weapon acquisition from radically different policy positions ended with a more united approach to disarmament, where differences and nuances are more difficult to grasp. Hence, the debates were not so much focused on disarmament as on what the Swedish armed forces should be equipped with.

¹³² Hansen, 2006: 52.

¹³³ Hansen, 2006: 52.

¹³⁴ Hansen, 2006: 65.

¹³⁵ See for example Molin, 1989.

¹³⁶ See for example Jonter, 2016.

Since my initial interest concerned the making of Swedish nuclear disarmament policy, I began by studying sources from the 1960s, when Swedish disarmament policy was taking form. However, based on findings from the sources, I decided to include materials from the nuclear weapon debate of the 1950s. Parliamentary material and unofficial documents repeatedly made intertextual references to the nuclear weapon debate, indicating that disarmament policy and the nuclear weapon debate could not be separated.

The Swedish nuclear weapon debate was characterized by conflicting views about a single issue: whether Sweden should acquire nuclear weapons. Since the debate engaged and split the general public, parliament and the ruling Social Democratic Party, I have included a broad selection of sources from different strands of opinion, spanning SAP organizational material, including from its fringe organizations, government policy speeches, diplomatic correspondence, autobiographies, diaries and personal correspondence, in addition to the parliamentary material studied in Step 1. I have particularly focused on two radically different positions on both identity and policy: one advocated by the Federation of Social Democratic Women (the SSKF), and the other advocated by the Swedish Armed Forces. The Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces started the Swedish nuclear weapon debate by publicly calling for Sweden to acquire nuclear weapons in 1954. He remained a strong advocate of nuclear weapon acquisition.¹³⁷ The SSKF, on the other hand, was portrayed as the leader of anti-nuclear weapon advocacy when the debate was at its peak and was close to state power through its relationship with the SAP.¹³⁸

Furthermore, in light of the biased focus on men in conventional IR scholarship, and the argument of political scientist Annick Wibben that “we still know too little about women in global politics – and miss much about how power in global politics works by not looking for them,” my decision to focus on the SSKF is a conscious act aimed at including some women’s voices in my study.¹³⁹ There is a risk that this will contribute to the representation of anti-nuclear weapon activism as a women’s issue. Like Eschle, however, I find it “possible to maintain a deconstructive analytical approach toward gender while simultaneously pursuing an empirical focus on women”.¹⁴⁰ This dissertation therefore uses the SSKF as an empirical lens for anti-nuclear advocacy, while also maintaining a deconstructivist approach by addressing how they themselves contributed to the making of both gender, and nuclear weapon and disarmament policy. Although the SSKF was a fringe organization of the SAP, I treat it as part of the wider debate, mainly because it challenged the party leadership.

¹³⁷ See for example Jonter, 2016.

¹³⁸ Ahlmark, 1965: 35; Nilsson Hoadley, 1989.

¹³⁹ Wibben, 2016: 3.

¹⁴⁰ Eschle, 2013: 1.

I have also included personal writings in the form of diaries, correspondence and personal notes by and between individuals who were involved in the SAP internal debate, and who were leading advocates of disarmament engagement.¹⁴¹ Table 1 summarizes the sources, and the subsequent section provides a more detailed account of the sources. Study of this broad selection of sources made it possible to identify basic discourses related to identity and disarmament policy.

Period 2: 1981–1989

In Part III of the dissertation I focus on the making of disarmament policy in relation to a specific event: the 1981 submarine crisis. While the event itself only lasted for a short period of time, it continued to feature in Swedish parliamentary foreign policy debates for many years after its conclusion. This period can be described as the reverse of the first period. When the Soviet submarine U137 stranded in Karlskrona, there was broad agreement that this was a violation of Swedish territorial sovereignty. Even those with the strongest attachments to the Soviet regime condemned its behavior.¹⁴² However, no one drew the conclusion that the incident should lead Sweden to reconsider its non-nuclear status. At the conclusion of the crisis, the incident was positioned at the center of disarmament debates, and it became increasingly clear that there were opposing views on how disarmament efforts should proceed in light of the stranded submarine, especially with regard to the Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NNWFZ). Hence, disarmament was a matter of intense debate throughout this period.

My source selection for this part of the dissertation is different from the previous part. While both parts use parliamentary sources to reveal competing identity representations and policy proposals among political parties, and official government statements to study official policy and identities, the analysis in this part is particularly focused on media representations. Both the submarine crisis and the NNWFZ received a lot of media attention. In the 1980s, the media was the main channel for societal debate between politicians, academics, military representatives, representatives of various civil society organization, and individuals. Given my interest in debate, it is therefore reasonable to focus on media sources. Furthermore, parliamentary debates about the submarine crisis and the NNWFZ frequently made reference to media debates, and there are thus several intertextual linkages. Moreover, unlike the records of parliamentary debates, the media reached a broad audience. The density and reach of media sources make them interesting material to study. I have chosen to include the two largest “national” newspapers in Sweden in the study: the socially liberal *Dagens Nyheter* and the conservative *Svenska Dagbladet*. The reasons for doing so are discussed below.

¹⁴¹ The specifics of the materials are presented below.

¹⁴² See Part III of this dissertation.

Part III of the dissertation also includes cartoons, satirical sketches and caricatures published in national and local newspapers. Analyzing this material, however, is slightly different from analyzing texts. In my search for identity representations in the images I especially focused on how references to space, time and responsibility have been made relationally, and how human bodies and emotions have featured in the images. In this specific genre, human bodies often appear as representations of collectives. For example, Mother Svea frequently represents Sweden, whereas the then Soviet President, Leonid Brezhnev, represents the Soviet Union.¹⁴³ Through such representations, spatial references were geographically organized as Sweden, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other. This meant that I had to scrutinize how human bodies appeared and what they represented in order to reveal references to *space*. Other bodily identity representations also featured in the images. For example, Swedish male politicians and soldiers were a common feature, serving as spatial references to the collective of men. In some images, such representations were associated with notions of shame, representing the submarine intrusion as an example of male political and military failure. Hence, failure was associated with men. Such representations contributed to the (re)construction of protection as a main *responsibility* of Swedish male politicians and the military. *Temporal* references were made through representations of neutrality as a key component of an assumed shared national past, and through representations of a civilized Self as opposed to an uncivilized Other. Both emotion, and human bodies, contributed to meaning making about both policy and identity. Bodies in particular were a central feature of the images. This is a consequence both of the genre – that human bodies are key features of satirical sketches and caricatures – and of their serving as representations of space, geographically organized as nations, and collectively organized as, for example, men. As argued above, references to time and responsibilities are simultaneously attached to the bodies featured in the images. By focusing on the different identity representations in the images, I made a thematic categorization and discuss a smaller sample of images as illustrations of these themes in Chapter 9.

Step 3

While my study of the broad selection of sources made it possible to identify the basic discourses that served as ideal types for my overall analysis, I eventually had to select a smaller sample of sources in order to make a more systematic, and rigorous, analysis. The sources are listed in Table 1. All the

¹⁴³ As argued in the Chapter 3, Mother Svea is a historical representation of the Swedish nation as a female body. She figures as a statue outside the parliamentary building and makes frequent appearances in various historical sources. Hence, Svea was not invented by the satirical sketches but has a long tradition of serving as a symbol of the Swedish nation. See Eduards, 2007: 13; and Chapter 3 of this dissertation.

sources selected for the broad reading are included in the table. Those sources selected for the systematic analysis in step 3 are shown in bold.

Table 1. Source selection

Level of analysis	The official level	Wider debate	Cultural representations
Period 1.	Foreign policy declarations Government speeches published in <i>Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy</i>	Parliamentary records from debates on foreign policy declarations and on nuclear weapon acquisition Organizational material of SSKF, including speeches by chairperson and monthly magazine <i>Morgonbris</i> Reports of the Supreme Commander <i>SAP organizational material</i> <i>Campaign books</i> <i>Media</i>	Notes and diaries Correspondence <i>Autobiographies</i>
Period 2.	Foreign policy declarations Government speeches published in <i>Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy</i>	Parliamentary records from debates on foreign policy declarations Media: argumentative texts <i>Motions to parliament concerning the NNWFZ</i>	Cartoons (satirical sketches and caricatures)

Having made the final source selection, I departed from the basic discourses identified in Step 2 and made a structured analysis guided by my research questions and the theoretical and methodological framework. This analysis made it possible to identify the making of gendered, nationalized, and sexualized identity representations and disarmament policy during the periods under scrutiny.

Guide to the sources and source reflections

As the above sections have shown, this dissertation draws on various kinds of primary sources from two different historical settings. This allows an exploration of how seemingly related issues can be studied from different angles. Both empirical parts draw on primary sources selected based on each respective historical context, and to provide answers to the research questions asked. The following reflects on the sources under the headings the official level, the wider debate, and cultural representations.

The Official Level

This dissertation draws on a wide range of official state documents since its main ambition is to analyze the processes that led to the establishment of authoritative discourses on both identity and disarmament policy. Authoritative discourse here is understood as the policy enacted by the government and the identity representations that became dominant in official discourse. Hence, even though these are interrelated with processes beyond the government apparatus, the focus is on state processes.

A major source of information that serves as the backbone of the empirical analysis is the annual foreign policy declarations delivered to the Swedish Parliament. These present the official position of the Swedish government on various issues related to foreign policy, including disarmament. The foreign policy declarations are available in the parliamentary records (*riksdagens protokoll*).¹⁴⁴ I have chosen to depart from these declarations since they are likely to make clear references to both identity and policy and have formal authority to define political positions. Furthermore, since foreign policy declarations receive relatively more media attention than other parliamentary declarations, and thereby reach out to broader audiences, I consider them especially suitable to study. In addition to the foreign policy declarations, I have included official policy speeches on the topics at hand delivered by government representatives in international forums and to wider Swedish audiences. Such speeches are collected in the annual series *Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy* (*Utrikesfrågor. Offentliga dokument m.m. rörande viktigare svenska utrikesfrågor*) which is put together and published by the Swedish Foreign Ministry (*Utrikesdepartementet*).¹⁴⁵ Like the foreign policy declarations, these documents have formal authority to define political positions and sometimes reach a wide audience – one indicator being that there are press releases in many cases. These resemble the foreign policy declarations and serve as complementary material as the declarations are only delivered once a year. The texts

¹⁴⁴ English translations of the foreign policy declarations are available in Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. *Documents on Swedish foreign policy*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1957–1991.

¹⁴⁵ Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. *Documents on Swedish foreign policy*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1957–1991.

included in these volumes are likely to articulate the intended voice of the government, and to make clear references to identity and policy. Hence, I used both the foreign policy declarations and official speeches by government representatives to analyze the official policy position of the Swedish government. It is important to note, however, that this kind of material only reveals what the government said, not what it actually did. While talking about the need for international nuclear disarmament in the foreign policy debate, a prime minister could at the same time be asking a government agency to proceed with Swedish nuclear weapon research. Hence, analyzing official declarations and speeches only makes it possible to investigate how the government spoke about various matters, not why it did so or how it behaved. I do not use any of the material to make claims about *why* this or that happened. Instead, I explore *how* the processes studied evolved, and the simultaneous making of identity and policy in these processes.¹⁴⁶ Hence, my focus is on how official speeches contributed to the making of both policy and identity.

The Wider Debate

As discussed above, this dissertation focuses on times of intense societal debate on disarmament. A second category of sources were selected to reflect different positions in the wider debates studied.

In order to gain a deeper understanding of potential conflict and disagreement, I researched the annual foreign policy debates that followed the foreign policy declarations in the Swedish Parliament. Like the foreign policy declarations, they are available in the parliamentary records (*riksdagens protokoll*).¹⁴⁷ While the foreign policy declarations represent the formal position of the Swedish government, the debates include the voices of all the political parties represented in parliament and are likely to reveal different perspectives and opinions. Hence, the debates are used to identify competing positions on the topics studied and make it possible to investigate how official policy was challenged. I have also studied parliamentary bills for the same reason. This kind of material shows how political parties acted in opposition to and support of the government and says less about how the issues discussed were prioritized in the respective party organization. As with the government speeches discussed above, I am merely interested in exploring how policy and identity were challenged, not why different actors advocated a particular position or the prioritization of disarmament in various political groups. For example, in debates about the NNWFZ in the 1980s, it was often argued that the Swedish Communist Party had a strong relationship with the Soviet Union, and that its policy proposals merely served to advance the security interests of the Soviet

¹⁴⁶ For further elaboration on the differences between why and how questions, see for example Doty, 1993: 299.

¹⁴⁷ Riksdagens protokoll. 1953–1991. Available at Riksdagsbiblioteket (the Riksdag Library), Stockholm.

Union.¹⁴⁸ Although interesting things can be revealed about the intentions of various actors, this falls beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Since the parliamentary disarmament debates often referred to defense issues, I have also included the reports of the Supreme Commander (*Överbefälhavaren*, ÖB) of the Swedish Armed Forces. This made it possible to analyze how nuclear weapons and disarmament policy was conceptualized by the defense establishment. As discussed above, I chose to focus specifically on the ÖB as an advocate for Swedish nuclear weapons in my study of the first time period. As the ÖB was head of the Swedish Armed Forces, he acted as representative of a powerful Swedish government administrative agency. He was thereby both constrained by government decisions and in a position to advocate for increased resources to his own organization. Close to state power as the head of a powerful administrative authority, and well-known among the general public, his points of views are likely to have reached both those in power, and a broader audience.

The material identified above made possible an analysis of the state's position, and an exploration of how the government's position was supported and/or challenged by other political parties and state agencies. However, government policy is not made only in parliament, but in a broader national context where for example political parties not represented in parliament, the media and individuals are involved in the debate. Since I am interested in exploring how the topics studied were discussed outside parliament, I included sources from political parties and their side organizations. The organizations, which are listed below, either had a direct relation with the topics discussed or are referred to in the parliamentary debates. The sources used include member magazines, the agendas and minutes of congresses and board meetings, newspaper op-eds and public speeches. Several sources presented in this section serve clear political purposes, for example as part of national election campaigns or as lobbying material written to advance the position of a particular group. Other kinds of material, such as the minutes of meetings, can be used both to track developments and to identify competing positions within organizations about which policy ought to be advanced. Even though I sometimes used organizational material to track developments and to identify the position of the groups studied, my main interest was to explore how policy was argued and identity perceptions formed.

Social Democratic Party

The nuclear weapon debate did not just split the general public in Sweden, it also split the ruling Social Democratic Party. SAP organizational material is stored in the Swedish Labor Movement's Archives and Library (*Ar-*

¹⁴⁸ Similar claims were made about the peace movement and other radical groups, and this became the subject of a state investigation. See Hjort, 2002.

betarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB) in Huddinge, and is frequently referenced in research on the nuclear weapon debate. For this dissertation, I re-consulted some of this material, especially the minutes and agendas of board meetings and congresses, in order to follow-up intertextual linkages with the material produced by the SSKF presented below. My analysis centers around how the anti-nuclear weapon advocacy of the SSKF was received within the SAP. In addition to meeting minutes, I also included party-specific material on disarmament, primarily the final report of the party committee tasked with investigating the nuclear weapon debate in the late 1950s, *Neutralitet, försvar, atomvapen: rapport till Socialdemokratiska partistyrelsen*. This report has been identified in previous research as having played an especially important role in disarmament and the postponement decision.¹⁴⁹ Unfortunately, no separate records of the committee have been stored at the archive. Although it might be possible to find fragments in for example the archive of Foreign Minister Tage Erlander, I judged it too time-consuming a task to search for such fragments. However, the report does give a good indication of how disarmament was perceived by a broad group of social democrats, and especially its relation to the nuclear weapon option.

Federation of Social Democratic Women

As argued above, I use the SSKF as an empirical lens to study the opposition to nuclear weapons during the first time period. The advantages and disadvantages of this choice are discussed above. I studied the documentation from the triennial congresses, the minutes of board and executive committee meetings, and public statements on the nuclear weapons issue. All this material is stored at the ARAB. I studied the minutes to track developments within the organization and to find statements on the topics studied. I also skimmed all the issues of *Morgonbris*, the monthly members' magazine published at that time, and researched all the articles related to nuclear weapons and disarmament. Furthermore, I included public statements and op-eds from the archive of Inga Thorsson, the chairperson of the SSKF for most of the time period, which is also stored at the ARAB. Several speeches are kept in her personal archive rather than in the organizational archive of the SSKF. Her archive is organized according to topic, and I studied all the public statements/speeches on nuclear weapons and disarmament. Most of this material, especially the SSKF material from 1954–1960, has been researched before. However, the period post-1960 has not been systematically covered, and disarmament advocacy remains a missing element from the existing literature. On a source critical note, it is worth noting that the SSKF was not the only voice opposing nuclear weapon acquisition. On the contrary, parliamentarians, peace organizations and other groups were involved in the work against nuclear weapons.

¹⁴⁹ See for example Jonter, 2016; Jonter & Rosengren, 2014.

I used the SSKF as an empirical lens to understand nuclear weapon opposition, but the inclusion of other sources might have led to other interpretations.


Media

In addition to the sources mentioned above, this dissertation also studies media sources, and the analysis of media sources is the backbone in Part III. At an early stage of the research process I also studied media material from the first time period. However, given the density of other sources, and that nothing substantially new appeared in the media sources studied, I decided to leave this material out of the final source selection. The decision to focus on the media in Part III is that the media was a major arena for debate about the submarine crisis and for following debates about the NNWFZ. Parliamentary debates frequently made reference to media debates and there are thus several intertextual linkages.

In my analysis, I chose to focus on the socially liberal *Dagens Nyheter* and the conservative *Svenska Dagbladet*, the two largest national newspapers. Because they represent two different political orientations, the newspapers are likely to have had contrasting approaches to the topics studied. They were also the most widely read morning newspapers during the time period. Furthermore, *Dagens Nyheter* and *Svenska Dagbladet* are national newspapers and since my focus is on the national level, I chose to focus on sources that reach a national audience. At an early stage in the research process I considered including *Blekinge Läns Tidning* (BLT), a local newspaper published in the region where U137 stranded. I soon noticed, however, that media representations in the *BLT* resembled those in *Dagens Nyheter* and *Svenska Dagbladet*. Given this finding, and the fact that my focus is on the national level, I chose to exclude the *BLT* from my investigation. Moreover, my analysis of the parliamentary debate showed that *Dagens Nyheter* and *Svenska Dagbladet* were the most frequently referenced newspapers in these debates. Both newspapers are digitalized at the Royal Library (*Kungliga Biblioteket*) in Stockholm. I used the keywords “nuclear weapon-free zone (kärnvapenfri zon)” both alone and in combination with “submarine (ubåt)” for the time period January 1, 1981 to December 31, 1989.¹⁵⁰ I chose these keywords since my focus is on debates about the NNWFZ, and how this debate proceeded in light of the submarine crisis. These searches resulted in a large set of texts, primarily from the early 1980s.

¹⁵⁰ I also tried other search words such as “disarmament (nedrustning)”, but the search results were too broad.

Figure 1. Media coverage of the Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, 1981–1989, *Dagens Nyheter* and *Svenska Dagbladet*



Source: Kungliga Biblioteket (National Library of Sweden). <https://tidningar.kb.se/>, search words: “nuclear weapon-free zone (kärnvapenfri zon)”, 2020-05-23.

Figure 2 presents an overview of the number of articles in *Dagens Nyheter* and *Svenska Dagbladet* that mention the NNWFZ during the time period. It shows that the number of articles was fairly similar in the two newspapers, and that media coverage was much more intense at the beginning of the 1980s, especially in 1981, the year of the submarine crisis. After skimming through all the search results, I decided to include in my analysis all the argumentative texts that expressed clear opinions, such as op-eds, reportage, signed and unsigned editorials and chronicles. Since my initial study of parliamentary sources showed that the submarine crisis and NNWFZ debates in the 1980s brought with them intense debate about the state of what was referred to as “the peace movement”, I looked specifically for texts written by peace advocates.

In addition to the sources mentioned above, I also included a richer selection of media sources published during and shortly after the submarine crisis, as I was especially interested in exploring gendered, nationalized and sexualized identity representations in media coverage of this specific event. The Military Archive (*Krigsarkivet*) in Stockholm has a comprehensive press collection about U137 collected from both national and local media.¹⁵¹ I decided to include in my analysis of the submarine crisis all the articles in this collection from *Dagens Nyheter* and *Svenska Dagbladet*. Even though I have not been able to find the selection criteria for this material, it appears to be a comprehensive collection of both local and national media. It is possible that I would

¹⁵¹ The collection is in 4 volumes. “Pressklipp, U137”. Vol. 10–14, Serie Ö1, informationsavdelningen, Chefen för marinen, Krigsarkivet, Stockholm.

have found additional representations had I included additional newspapers for my study. For example, it is possible that local newspapers from the northern region showed less interest in the submarine crisis than the ones from the south, close to where the submarine stranded. Given my main interests discussed above, however, I decided to stick with the same selection criteria as for debates about the NNWFZ.

Cultural representations

A third category of sources is labeled cultural representations, including personal writing such as diaries, letters and notes, and comics, satirical sketches, and caricatures published in the media. I have included this kind of material since I am interested to explore how identities were represented and challenged in sources that are not primarily policy oriented. Even though diaries and satirical sketches are different genres, my use of these sources is similar, which is further discussed below.

Diaries, personal notes, and correspondence

This dissertation uses diaries, correspondence and personal notes in the study of the first period. Such material is often absent from IR research but appears in related fields such as diplomatic history. Including this kind of material is part of my feminist curiosity. As Enloe puts it, “[o]ne of the starting points of feminism is taking women’s lives seriously. ‘Seriously’ implies listening carefully, digging deep, developing a long attention span, being ready to be surprised.”¹⁵² This kind of source material certainly makes it possible to listen carefully and to dig deep, and in retrospect it is the material that surprised me more than any other. Furthermore, since the nuclear weapon issue was a sensitive and conflict-ridden one, this kind of material has revealed aspects not necessarily included in the official material. The fact that it was a conflict-ridden topic also made it seem more likely to me that the individuals involved would write about it in their personal notes. As part of step 2, I studied this material produced by central figures in the SAP: Foreign Minister Östen Undén, Disarmament Minister Alva Myrdal and disarmament advocate Inga Thorsson. Since Undén was Foreign Minister when Swedish disarmament policy took form, and founder of Sweden’s first disarmament initiative, the Undén plan, he is a highly relevant person to include, even though he resigned in 1962 when Torsten Nilsson took over. As the main figure in the international disarmament negotiations, Myrdal is likely to have had important insights about the policies formed in the initial years of disarmament policy-making. Thorsson, who advocated disarmament in the nuclear weapon debate, had ties with both. These people are likely to have approached the making of Swedish disarmament policy from different angles, thereby covering competing approaches to disarmament within the SAP. Meanwhile, if I had included

¹⁵² Enloe, 2004: 3.

additional people, not least from other parties and groups than the SAP, I might have reached other conclusions. Since my main focus is on the government level, however, it seems reasonable to focus on people close to the government.

The diaries of both Thorsson and Undén are available for research, but with an important difference. While Undén's diaries have been published, Thorsson's diaries are kept at the ARAB, which provides restricted access. I was given access for the purposes of this dissertation.¹⁵³ Myrdal kept no personal diary and therefore other material was consulted. Myrdal made ambitious notes on draft speeches, for example, and filed correspondence on disarmament issues according to theme. These are stored in her personal archive at the ARAB and I have studied notes related to disarmament stored in volumes covering peace and disarmament. Myrdal, Thorsson and Undén were all public figures and it is therefore important to acknowledge that they might have been careful about what they included in their notes and diaries. As representatives of the largest political party in Sweden, all had high-profile positions, making it likely that they knew that their archives would be of interest for future research. Self-censorship is therefore an aspect to consider, in that what is kept in the archives is probably what these people wanted to preserve. Since I am not striving to reveal their "true intentions", but rather to understand how disarmament was conceptualized differently, this is less of a problem for this dissertation.

In addition to diaries and personal notes, the correspondence between government officials and the individuals mentioned in this section, which is stored in the foreign ministry archive at the National Archives (*Utrikesdepartementets arkiv, Riksarkivet*), has also been included. Such correspondence makes it possible to study how government officials communicated about disarmament on a more personal level. Since I do not focus on actors and the reasons for various positions on disarmament, several of these sources were only included in my broad source selection (step 2), and consequently excluded from the smaller source selection (step 3) featured in the empirical chapters. That said, step 2 should be understood as foundational for the structured analysis and has therefore had an influence on the interpretations made.

Comics, satirical sketches, and caricatures

Part III also makes use of a special type of media source which is rare in conventional studies of IR: comics, satirical sketches and caricatures. Going through the press collection at the Military Archive, I discovered a rich and overt focus on bodies and emotions, which was especially salient in the large

¹⁵³ Following the procedures of the Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek (ARAB), permission was given by one of Inga Thorsson's sons, Leif Thorsson.

number of emotionally charged satirical sketches published in local and national media.¹⁵⁴ Satirical sketches, cartoons and caricatures formed part of a popular genre during the time period. Furthermore, this genre used human bodies almost exclusively to communicate meaning, constructing and reconstructing meaning around both male and female bodies, and about identity and policy. In addition, the humorous and provocative character of this genre is likely to provoke emotions, not least to make people laugh.¹⁵⁵ As discussed above, this made me curious to learn more about bodies and emotion in IR.

The complete press collection of U137 at the Military Archive (*Krigsarkivet*) contains 56 images published in newspapers and magazines with conservative, liberal, socially liberal and left-wing agendas. I researched all these images. I also included images from an additional source, a left-wing magazine targeted at a culturally interested audience, *Folket i Bild/Kulturfront*. My reason for including this magazine was that when I found one satirical sketch from this magazine in my work with the above-mentioned book chapter, this made me curious to explore whether there were any similar sketches in this magazine. *Folket i Bild/Kulturfront* was especially popular in the early 1980s, known for critical reportage of political elites not only in Sweden, but especially in the Soviet Union, and for its provocative character. All issues of *Folket i Bild/Kulturfront* are stored at the ARAB. I looked through all the issues published during and shortly after the submarine crisis and found three images for inclusion from this source.¹⁵⁶

As a genre, satirical sketches and caricatures draw on simplified notions of what they are addressing. By turning complex and often serious topics into something laughable, this genre also exposes power relations in various forms. The context in which such sources are published is crucial to their interpretation. If the audience does not understand or relate to what is depicted in the image, it becomes rather pointless. This kind of material is therefore likely to draw on well-known stereotypes in order to make sense. Such stereotypes in turn reflect widespread societal assumptions about gender, nation and sexuality, among other things, in the context in which they were published. Such stereotypes, however, can take different forms. According to historian Joan B. Landes, “images can just as often make trouble, disrupt as well as secure desired identifications.”¹⁵⁷ Following her reasoning, I investigate not only how the images reflect societal assumptions about gender, nation and sexuality, but

¹⁵⁴ My interest in this category of source material was awoken during work on a book chapter about the submarine crisis co-authored with the cultural scientist, Anna Lundberg. A limited number of these images are analyzed in the book chapter. See Lundberg & Rosengren, 2014.

¹⁵⁵ For discussions on the position of laughter in the study of IR, see for example Särnä, 2014.

¹⁵⁶ Most images analyzed are included in Part III. However, since I have not been able to get in contact with all copyright owners, Appendix 3 includes those full pages where the images were published (the respective newspaper own the copyrights of these pages).

¹⁵⁷ Landes, 2001: 1.

also how these assumptions are challenged and constructed or reconstructed in the images. Moreover, since they are critical of those in power, this particular category of images is likely to exaggerate representations in a humorous manner. Hence, the images are likely to draw on and thereby reproduce well-known stereotypes in order to make sense to their audiences, while also probably going slightly to the extreme.

In order to illustrate how my theoretical and methodological approach was used in my analysis of this genre, the image below serves as an example. The image was published in the above-mentioned magazine *Folket i Bild/Kulturfront* in late 1981, soon after the Soviet submarine left Swedish territory.

Figure 2. “Alltid redo!”



Source: Leif Zetterling, *Folket i Bild/Kulturfront*, nr. 21, 19/11–3/12 1981

Without my theoretical lens, and if not positioned in the context of the submarine crisis, the image could be said to portray a man standing on the shoreline, having a rest and a snack with his eyes closed. In the background, a foreign ship quietly approaches land, and a seabird makes its way into calm waters. Given what is known about the historical context in which the image was published, however, another interpretation is possible. Standing on the shoreline of a nation that has not been at war for more than 100 years, a Swedish soldier

dreams about a belligerent past when Sweden was a dominant power in Europe.¹⁵⁸ Dressed in a uniform resembling the style of the war king, Karl XII, who reigned during the great power era and was defeated by the Russians in Poltava in 1709, the soldier is trying to accommodate his great power identity of the past with the situation of the present.¹⁵⁹ Adding my theoretical lens to the analysis of this specific image, a third interpretation is also possible. Leaning on his iron sword and negligent of the threatened danger lurking offshore, the body of a male Swedish soldier is dressed for a masquerade in a cross-gender costume. Wearing a face covered with make-up and holding his exposed genitals in his hand, the soldier performs a queer act in line with the story of the Emperor's New Clothes.¹⁶⁰ Representing the Swedish Armed Forces, tasked with backing up the policy of neutrality and protecting the Swedish nation in a cold war setting characterized by mistrust and tension, the soldier clearly stands naked and vulnerable in the eyes of those who dare tell the truth. The image thereby portrays the soldier as a emasculated servant more concerned with his appearance and his genitals (the banana) than the protection of Swedish territory. Serving as an exhibit of the "wimp" factor of armed neutrality, the image can be interpreted as a timely critique of the protective abilities of the Swedish Armed Forces, and in the long run of neutrality in all its gendered complexity.¹⁶¹ All these alternatives are possible interpretations of this specific image. The meanings given are in the eyes of the beholder. My departure is that the images say a lot about the spatial and temporal context in which they were circulated, and how political bodies were conceptualized and positioned relative to each other.¹⁶²

My interpretation is simultaneously limited and made possible by what my methodological and theoretical approach informs me to search for, and by my knowledge of the historical context in which the image was published. This context is related not only to the submarine crisis, but to a longer historical past that is present in the images. Hence, contextual knowledge and being what Åse and Wendt call a "national insider" are key to an understanding of the complexities of references to various forms of national symbol, rhetoric, and practice.¹⁶³ At the same time, Åse and Wendt also stress the difficulties

¹⁵⁸ For a discussion about the relationship between notions of a peaceful past and Swedish neutrality, see for example Lundin & Stenlås, 2010: 7f. See also Johansson & Norman, 1992: 356; and Stråth, 2004: 154.

¹⁵⁹ In her book on Swedish neutrality, IR scholar Christine Agius explains how Swedish neutrality during the cold war was constructed in relation to memories of a belligerent past. See Agius, 2006: 63f.

¹⁶⁰ *The Emperor's New Clothes* by Danish author Hans Christian Andersen was first published in 1837, and still serves as classic literature in Swedish schools.

¹⁶¹ Referring to someone as a wimp in a defense and security setting is one way of emasculating and/or feminizing and serves to silence and humiliate. See for example Cohn, 1993: 234f.

¹⁶² See also Särnå, 2014: 71.

¹⁶³ Åse & Wendt, 2019: 21.

national insiders have in stepping outside “the national imaginary and its truths”.¹⁶⁴ In order to deal with this methodological challenge I presented early drafts of my analysis to national and international audiences from different academic fields, using the feedback to clarify, refine and adjust my interpretations.¹⁶⁵ Discussing my work with scholars in Sweden from different academic fields, in particular gender scholars, economic historians and cultural scholars, has both challenged and deepened my initial interpretations, making them more nuanced and complex.¹⁶⁶ Feedback from international scholars proved especially helpful for identifying national particularities and references that I took for granted.¹⁶⁷ This research process was especially valuable when working with historical sources – both images and texts – heavily marked by their national context.

In sum, I approach the images as one way to conceptualize dominant societal assumptions about gender, nation and sexuality in the context in which they were published, while also acknowledging that other representations were present in other sources, and that such images might exaggerate representations in order to make their audiences laugh. Nonetheless, I argue that it is possible to learn a lot about the broader context by scrutinizing that which is expected to make an audience laugh.

Reflections on archival work

The work with this dissertation involved many hours in the archives. The Labor Movement’s Archive and Library (ARAB) in particular was a frequently visited venue. The ARAB keeps documents from the SAP, including diaries and personal correspondence and notes of central figures in the party, along with other sources related to the labor movement. In light of my source selection discussed above, both personal and organizational records from the ARAB have been central to my study. Furthermore, my study uses public records both from the parliament and from government agencies. The research was done in a national context with a tradition of open records although dif-

¹⁶⁴ Åse & Wendt, 2019: 21.

¹⁶⁵ An early version of my analysis of the images was co-authored with cultural scientist Anna Lundberg, see Lundberg & Rosengren, 2014. An early draft of the analysis published in this dissertation was presented at the annual Convention of the International Studies Association in San Francisco in 2018.

¹⁶⁶ Input from cultural scientist Anna Lundberg, Linköping University, political scientist and gender scholar Cecilia Åse, Stockholm University, and economic historian Yvonne Svanström, Stockholm University has been especially helpful.

¹⁶⁷ For example, Valerie Hudson, Texas A&M University, the Bush School of Government and Public Service provided valuable feedback as discussant at the ISA annual convention in San Francisco, 2018. Furthermore, I also received insightful feedback from participants in the *4th Annual Conference on International Studies in the 21st century*, a joint PhD Workshop organized by Cornell University and Stockholm University on the 11–12th June 2018.

ferent degrees of secrecy applies to for example issues related to national security. Even though restrictions apply to some of this material, a lot is open for study. Hence, I have been able to research both public records and personal sources. Moreover, the freedom of the presses legislation in Sweden has made it possible for different policy perspectives to feature in media, both in opposition to, and in support of, government policy. Hence, I could study competing policy perspectives that reached broad audiences through media channels. In addition, the media published comics that were both critical towards government policy, and that had strong sexualized undertones. Such material is not always approved in other national contexts. All in all, government legislation regarding public records and freedom of the presses, together with the work of the ARAB in keeping the history of the SAP accessible, has made the work with this dissertation possible.

Archival work also poses challenges. On a general level, archival research always depends on how others have decided what material to preserve. Such selection processes reflect and reinforce societal power structures.¹⁶⁸ For example, while archives often store a great number of sources from the public sphere and high-level politicians, sources from marginal groups and those considered of little importance are not as likely to be preserved. Since women have been more or less excluded from the public sphere, and since their work has been regarded less important than the work of men, archival records suffer from a gender bias. Furthermore, other power structures such as class and ethnicity are also reflected in records and interrelate with gender in several ways.¹⁶⁹ Hence, archival studies are always constrained by power structures in the past, potentially reinforcing them in the present.

A final reflection on archival work is more specifically related to this study. Even though the use of different genres has its advantages, it also involves difficulties. For example, I have studied sources ranging from diaries and comics to policy speeches and public records. While several policy speeches can communicate similar messages about policy, fragments in diaries and letters from key actors has had a stronger impact on my own thinking than many of the policy speeches I have read. Balancing insights from different kinds of sources has not been a simple task. In order to overcome this challenge, I have strived to make my abductive research design as transparent as possible, and I have included those personal notes that have had a strong influence on my own intellectual process in footnotes.

¹⁶⁸ For example, philosopher Jacques Derrida argues that what all archival sources have in common is that they have been selected. See Derrida, 1996. Cultural scientist Jacques Le Goff elaborates on how archival sources reflect previous and present power orders in the broader society. See Le Goff, 1992.

¹⁶⁹ For example, historian Gerda Lerner has described systematic exclusion of women from archives. See Lerner, 1993. Historian Carolyn Steedman elaborates further on archives, gender and class, and historians Achilles Mbembe and Ann Laura Stoler discuss archives and ethnicity in relation to colonial rule. See Steedman, 2001; Mbembe, 2002; and Stoler, 2009.

Contributions

This dissertation makes several contributions of relevance to those interested in feminist IR theory, nuclear history and history in IR more broadly. Rather than treating gender as a variable, the dissertation focuses on its co-construction with policy about nuclear weapons and disarmament. The empirical investigations made it possible to discuss three more principal contributions to the existing literature. These are briefly introduced below and further discussed in Part IV.

First and foremost, the dissertation makes a contribution to feminist IR theory by advancing our knowledge of gender, nuclear weapons and disarmament. Through a study of the co-constitution of identity and Swedish disarmament policy during the cold war from a feminist angle, the dissertation contributes feminist theorizing about the gendered, nationalized and sexualized making of disarmament policy. This is important since it challenges static conceptualizations of gender and shows how security policies which are reliant on positive associations between a certain form of military masculinity and nuclear weapons possession are changeable.

Second, the dissertation feeds into nuclear history by showing how a relational approach to gender makes it possible to investigate how gender has been made in historical processes in Sweden and thereby to challenge conventional associations between women and peace on the one hand, and men and war on the other. As discussed above, this matters for how we conceptualize both gender and policy.

Third, the dissertation highlights the value of historical analysis for understanding IR and will hopefully encourage the inclusion of historical perspectives and primary sources in the field. All too often, scholarship in IR uses theory to predict or explain security behavior without solid engagement with primary sources, without addressing processes of continuity and change, and without investigating how power structures have been (re)constructed in historical processes. My argument is that exploring gender in historical foreign policy processes makes it possible to gain a better understanding of how societal power orders have been simultaneously made in and constrained policy processes. This exploration also makes it possible to better understand – and address – existing challenges. This means that the dissertation is guided by a transformative ambition. Inspired by feminist scholars who have led the way, I want to visualize, and in so doing also to disrupt, how we think and talk about gender, nuclear weapons and disarmament in the present.

3. The History of Swedish Security Policy

This background chapter uses the theoretical framework of the dissertation to develop a feminist understanding of two central and mutually reinforcing components of Swedish cold war security policy *and* national identity: the policy of neutrality and the welfare state. Writing a historical study means having to deal with time. Illustrations of linear developments can be used to put a story together, to identify what came first in order to follow up on what happened thereafter. Timelines are particularly useful for sketching overviews of chains of events, political representation or budgetary changes and continuities over time, among other things. Since my theoretical and methodological approach positions references to time in identity representations as central to the analysis, a contextual understanding of the past is crucial to the analysis.¹⁷⁰ This chapter introduces the policy of neutrality and welfare, which previous research has represented as two central components of Swedish national identity during the cold war.¹⁷¹ While previous research has contributed important insights on the making of Swedish cold war neutrality policy and national identity, gender analysis and feminist theory are missing elements. There is thus a need to scrutinize neutrality and welfare from a feminist perspective. Grounded in previous research, this chapter develops a feminist understanding of the interrelation between neutrality policy and welfare. Section 1 provides an introduction to non-alliance and neutrality. Section 2 examines the interrelation between the policy of neutrality and the welfare state, and how the two can be understood as two sides of the same coin. Section 3 elaborates on militarization and Swedish security policy during the cold war. The chapter ends with a summary with a special focus on how insights from this chapter have influenced the subsequent analysis in Parts II and III. In sum, this background chapter establishes some central premises of the dissertation based on my theory-induced reading of previous research.

¹⁷⁰ See Hansen, 2006. For studies on historical references in the making of the historical present in Sweden, see for example Linderborg, 2004, and Stråth, 2000.

¹⁷¹ See for example Lundin & Stenlås, 2010.

The Rise of an Armed Neutrality

This section introduces non-alignment and the policy of neutrality, the foundation of Swedish security policy during the cold war. The years immediately after the Second World War saw an escalation of international tension and the formation of the two power blocs that are generally viewed as the main rivals of the cold war: the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact, on the one hand, and the US and its NATO allies, on the other.¹⁷² Meanwhile, this was also a period of bridge-building politics and the build-up of the UN system.¹⁷³ During the early postwar years of international division, the Swedish government took the initiative to try to establish a Scandinavian defense union with Norway and Denmark. However, the conversations were short-lived. A precondition for Sweden was that three states should remain neutral towards the two blocs that had formed on the international scene, but Norway supported alignment with the western bloc. When both Norway and Denmark signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, and became members of NATO established in 1950, Sweden formally declared its neutrality policy and non-aligned status as its foreign policy doctrine.¹⁷⁴ From the mid-1950s and throughout the cold war, foreign policy declarations repeatedly communicated a commitment to “non-participation in alliances in times of peace, aiming at neutrality in the event of war”, although the exact formulation varied slightly.¹⁷⁵

Although Sweden’s neutrality policy can be traced far back in history, most attention in previous research has been paid to its modern representations during the 20th century.¹⁷⁶ Unlike the other neutral states in Europe, such as Switzerland and Austria, Sweden’s neutrality policy has never explicitly been part of national or international law. Writing from an international legal perspective, Per Cramér argues that after the Second World War, Swedish decision makers made it clear that neutrality was an optional political doctrine. For example, when in 1956 the Communist Party suggested to parliament that the government should seek formal recognition of, and guarantees for, Swedish neutrality from other states, their non-government bill (motion) was rejected on the grounds that it reduced Sweden’s future freedom of action. However, the continuous character of neutrality policy was also emphasized, and Cramér

¹⁷² For an overview of the relationship between the US and the Soviet Union during the cold war, see for example Gaddis, 2007[2006].

¹⁷³ On Sweden’s neutrality policy and the relationship with the UN (and the League of Nations), see for example Bring, 2008.

¹⁷⁴ Petersson, 2003; Johansson & Norman, 1992: 361ff.

¹⁷⁵ Different versions of this sentence were included in Foreign Policy Declarations throughout the cold war and it is generally referred to as Sweden’s official security policy during this time. See for example Goldman, 1991.

¹⁷⁶ For historical accounts of Swedish neutrality, see for example af Malmberg, 2001; Cramér, 1998; Huldt, 1990; Karsh, 1988. For information about pre-modern neutrality, see Müller, 2019.

concludes that unless the government declared otherwise, Sweden was portrayed as a *de facto* permanent neutral state in accordance with international law.¹⁷⁷

Rather than being contingent on a formal legal status, political scientist Kjell Goldman argues that the credibility of Swedish neutrality policy has been reliant on three factors: “national defense, popular support, and general foreign policy orientation.”¹⁷⁸ Building on Goldman’s argument, IR scholar Christine Agius emphasizes popular support in particular, and argues that Östen Undén, Sweden’s Foreign Minister in 1945–1962 and often referred to as the founder of Swedish cold war neutrality, deliberately connected neutrality with the values and traditions of the Social Democrat Party (SAP). These values and traditions included support for international cooperation, reformism, and international law.¹⁷⁹ Such values are often connected with what is referred to as an active foreign policy. In fact, a common interpretation of Swedish foreign policy after the Second World War has been that a turning point can be identified, when it transformed from a cautious and traditional small state security strategy into a more active international profile. This change is often located some time during the 1960s, although interpretations differ regarding the substance and extent of its transformational potential.¹⁸⁰

Numerous authors have directed their attention to the discrepancies between Sweden’s officially declared neutrality policy during the cold war, on the one hand, and its close ties with particular countries in NATO and the western bloc, on the other.¹⁸¹ Historian Mikael af Malmborg, however, states that even though it has been convincingly argued that “simple dichotomies of ‘neutral–non-neutral’, or ‘aligned–non-aligned’” fail to account for policy and practice in Sweden during the cold war, the literature that frames neutrality as a mere chimera falls short in grasping the nuances.¹⁸² In addition, such approaches do not adequately address the fact that neutrality was performed and framed differently in various policy spheres, and that the interpretation of what neutrality actually meant differed among a broad spectrum of actors.¹⁸³

While there have been interesting accounts of the content, extent and credibility of Swedish neutrality policy, it is not the intention of this chapter to

¹⁷⁷ Cramér, 1998: 277ff.

¹⁷⁸ Goldman, 1991: 123.

¹⁷⁹ Agius, 2006: 105. See also Ferreira-Pereira, 2005.

¹⁸⁰ The first period of Sweden’s more active foreign policy has been referred to as “the Undén line”, and the second as “the Palme line”. See Kronvall & Petersson, 2005. For previous research on the launch of an activist foreign policy, see Löden, 2001. See also Bjereld, Johansson, & Molin, 2008.

¹⁸¹ In 2011, for example, the Swedish journalist Mikael Holmström initiated a heated debate about Sweden’s secret alliance with the western bloc. See Holmström, 2011. See also Agrell, 1991.

¹⁸² af Malmborg, 2001: 148f.

¹⁸³ See for example Bring, 2008; Kronvall & Petersson, 2005; Petersson, 2003.

address *whether* or *why* Sweden was really neutral. Instead, this chapter takes as its point of departure the literature that approaches the policy of neutrality as a matter of Swedish national identity. A common interpretation in this field of research is that Swedish national identity after the Second World War rested on neutrality and non-alignment, on the one hand, and the welfare state and modernity, on the other.¹⁸⁴ Although part of foreign policy for years, historians Per Lundin and Niklas Stenlås argue that in the early years of the cold war, Swedish neutrality policy became embedded in historical narratives that emphasized that Sweden had not taken an active part in war for more than 100 years.¹⁸⁵ The historical point of departure for this line of reasoning can be traced back to 1814, when Sweden entered a union with Norway that lasted until 1905. Before 1905, the policy of neutrality was merely thought of as a tactical device that sought to enhance Sweden's trade and economic interests.¹⁸⁶ Today, 1814 is known as the starting point for what has recently been celebrated as Sweden's 200 years of peace. Although the policy of neutrality was increasingly linked with notions of a peaceful past during the early cold war period, it has not always been associated with peace. During the 19th century it was generally assumed that neutrality was only a wartime policy that served no purpose in the absence of war.¹⁸⁷

While security strategies varied during the 200 years that followed the peace settlement of 1814, that year constituted a turning point for Swedish national identity.¹⁸⁸ According to Agius, having served as a dominant power in Europe, especially during the 17th and 18th centuries, the Swedish great power identity of the past struggled to accommodate itself to an era of relative decline in both military and economic terms.¹⁸⁹ According to af Malmberg, at the beginning of the 20th century, the military establishment and leading politicians perceived an internationally guaranteed neutrality "as unmanly and pacifism as something for the weak and despicable. Neutrality ideas seemed to be nursed by 'Jews, socialists and hysterical women', in the words of the Russian foreign minister."¹⁹⁰ Although not explicitly stated in af Malmberg's study, one aspect of the denigration of neutrality around the end of the 19th century was its association with women and femininity, as well as with others who were also represented as "apart". Based on this historical foundation, when memories of a belligerent past were merging with assumptions about a peaceful present, the basis for modern neutrality was laid. This chapter departs from insights from previous research by arguing that: the policy of neutrality

¹⁸⁴ See for example Cronqvist, 2012; Johansson, 1995; Lundin & Stenlås, 2010: 6ff; Westberg, 2003; Westberg, 2015: 11.

¹⁸⁵ Lundin & Stenlås, 2010: 7f. See also Johansson & Norman, 1992: 356; Stråth, 2004: 154.

¹⁸⁶ af Malmberg, 2001; Karsh, 1988: 16.

¹⁸⁷ Mårald, 1974.

¹⁸⁸ See for example Agius, 2006; Westberg, 2015.

¹⁸⁹ Agius, 2006: 63f.

¹⁹⁰ af Malmberg, 2001: 106.

was a central element of Swedish cold war mentality; and, that neutrality cannot be understood as an isolated policy, but must be situated in relation to modernization and the build-up of the Swedish welfare state in a state capitalist setting. The latter point is the topic of the following section.

Neutrality and Welfare: Two Sides of the Same Coin

During the cold war, the Swedish government repeatedly declared that Swedish security policy was reliant on the policy of armed neutrality to keep the country out of war.¹⁹¹ At the same time, however, neutrality policy alone cannot explain the security politics of Sweden during this period. Instead, historian Marie Cronqvist writes about a dual security strategy pursued by the state: security in external relations guaranteed by neutrality in combination with comparatively large armed forces; and security in internal relations guaranteed by a strong welfare state.¹⁹² Moreover, there are interlinkages between the two components of Swedish security policy. For example, the policy of neutrality was dependent on the welfare state, not least for ensuring the availability of personnel and equipment for the armed forces. Furthermore, the welfare state was reliant on armed neutrality for the protection of the domestic state project. Hence, while the policy of neutrality was dependent on the welfare state to ensure resources for the military, the welfare state relied on armed neutrality to ensure its protection.

According to Lundin and Stenlås, the policy of neutrality is strongly associated with modernity, and modernity and neutrality have “shaped and justified collective action” since the end of the Second World War.¹⁹³ Modernity in turn is strongly related to the welfare state. The build-up of the Swedish welfare state has received close attention in the existing literature, not least in the field of economic history. Emerging from the Second World War relatively unscathed, Swedish industry flourished as the devastation in other parts of the world created high demand for engineering products and raw materials. This fueled Swedish industry, and Swedish economic growth reached new heights in the 1950s and 1960s. Sweden’s relatively rapid development from a poor agrarian society to a prosperous industrialized state has received a great deal of academic attention.¹⁹⁴ Economic, social and technical changes were part of a larger modernization process, and new organizations and social movements strived for democratization and emancipation.¹⁹⁵ In addition, historian Alf W. Johansson argues that Per Albin Hansson’s *folkhem* vision of

¹⁹¹ See for example Goldman, 1991.

¹⁹² Cronqvist, 2012.

¹⁹³ Lundin & Stenlås, 2010: 6.

¹⁹⁴ See for example Magnusson, 2004; Schön, 2007.

¹⁹⁵ Florin, 2006: 47, 284.

the 1930s, a vision where all citizens were described as united in a family-like constellation, was used as an important historical reference point for the modernistic ideals of the postwar years.¹⁹⁶ However, the late 1960s saw increasing criticism of key elements of the Swedish model, and often overlapping protests against capitalism and war.¹⁹⁷

The Swedish welfare state took shape in a national post-Second World War context marked by a strong belief in what science and technology could do for the good society. During the 1950s, the “modern breakthrough” in relation to the welfare state was traced back to two events in the 1930s: the Horse Trade (*Kohandeln*) between the Social Democrats and the Farmers’ Party in 1933 and the Saltsjöbaden Agreement between the Swedish Trade Union Confederation and the Swedish Employers Confederation in 1938. These events were described as important class compromises that underscored the prospects for peaceful settlement in the labor market, based on reason, science and expertise.¹⁹⁸ The welfare state project is strongly connected with the social democratic hegemony of major parts of the 20th century. After the SAP formed a government in 1932, it remained in power, albeit in different constellations, until 1976. After a short period of center/liberal/conservative coalition rule, the SAP regained its governing position in 1982 and stayed in power until 1991.¹⁹⁹ This long period of SAP rule has become associated with what is still referred to as “the Swedish model”.²⁰⁰

While the Swedish model is frequently associated with positive labor relations, a large public sector and social politics, the role of the defense industries in the build-up of the Swedish welfare state has been neglected in previous research. Historian Ann-Katrin Hatje argues that the public social investments characteristic of the Swedish welfare state were reliant on the defense industry to ensure economic growth. For example, the defense industry and various military-related government agencies created employment opportunities and thus generated tax income and boosted consumption, while stagnating civilian production such as in the textile industry could redirect its manufacturing into military uses.²⁰¹ In addition, companies such as Volvo, LM Ericsson and Saab

¹⁹⁶ A direct translation of *Folkhem* would be People’s Home, a term first used by Social Democrat Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson to describe his vision of a united Swedish community for all citizens. See Johansson, 2004: 180.

¹⁹⁷ For example, in his analysis of activism and social movements in the 1960s, historian Kim Salomon describes how the Swedish FNL movement not only protested against what was framed as US imperialism and an unrighteous war against innocent civilians in Vietnam, but also challenged SAP politics from a Marxist-Leninist viewpoint. Salomon, 1996: 31, 332f. In addition, at the turn of the decade the stability that had characterized relations in the labor market since the Saltsjöbaden Agreement had been destabilized, and several strikes followed the big miners’ strike in Kiruna in 1969–1970. Lundin & Stenlås, 2010: 26f.

¹⁹⁸ Lundin & Stenlås, 2010: 6f. See also Stråth, 2000.

¹⁹⁹ Appendix 1 presents an overview of governments constellations during the cold war.

²⁰⁰ See for example Thullberg & Östberg, 1994.

²⁰¹ Hatje, 2009: 27ff.

were involved in both civilian and military production where one sector fed into the other. Furthermore, Lundin and Stenlås argue that the relationship between military orders, employment in defense industries and economic growth was an important aspect of the broad consensus among politicians and the main actors in the labor market around support for the maintenance of a strong military.²⁰² Hence, both armed neutrality and the Swedish welfare state were reliant on a strong defense industry.

A considerable body of research has also shown that the build-up of the Swedish welfare state was not a gender-neutral project. Nonetheless, gender equality remains a central pillar of what Jezierska and Towns call the “Progressive Sweden” brand, a representation of Sweden as “a liberal dreamscape that slides between utopian ideals and problematic generalizations about ‘Sweden’ as a coherent actor whose population shares behaviors and goals.”²⁰³ Even though many reforms in Sweden have contributed to increased equality between men and women, the problem with generalizations like the “Progressive Sweden” brand is that they represent the imagined community as united and equal, and make historical experiences of inequality invisible. While gender equality is a central feature of the “Progressive Sweden” brand, historical research has showed a different story. For example, historians Urban Lundberg and Klas Åmark have identified a “male breadwinner model” in Swedish social policy between 1890 and the 1950s. Although the 1920s saw an increased demand for women’s labor in the cities, and a relative increase in women’s salaries compared to the salaries of men, the bourgeois family ideal of a male breadwinner and a female housewife remained intact.²⁰⁴

Interestingly, although the Second World War is often assumed to have brought about changes in the gendered division of labor in other countries, as men were recruited as soldiers and women served as reserve workers, no such large-scale transformation took place in Sweden. While some women did enter the paid labor force during these years, historian Johanna Overud concludes that overall the gender division of labor and the male breadwinner ideal prevailed.²⁰⁵ In her analysis of women and socioeconomic change in Sweden during the 20th century, economic historian Maria Stanfors locates changes in women’s education and production roles in distinct periods of economic structural change during the 1920s, the late 1940s, and the 1960s and 1970s.²⁰⁶ The largest change took place in the 1960s and 1970s, especially for married women.²⁰⁷ Even though more men than women have engaged in paid labor in Sweden over time, women have worked throughout history. The problem is

²⁰² Lundin & Stenlås, 2010: 13ff.

²⁰³ Jezierska & Towns, 2018: 56.

²⁰⁴ Lundberg & Åmark, 2010: 159. See also Schön, 2007.

²⁰⁵ Overud, 2005.

²⁰⁶ Stanfors, 2003.

²⁰⁷ Åmark, 2002: 251.

that this work has often been unpaid and made invisible.²⁰⁸ For example, economist Anita Nyberg argues that if married women's work in agriculture had been classified as paid work and thus included in historical accounts of women's work, the picture would look very different.²⁰⁹ Furthermore, state policies such as joint taxation helped to limit women's paid work until 1971, and men have predominated in industrial life, party politics, academia and interest groups in Sweden.²¹⁰ Hence, the ideal of a male breadwinner and women's domesticity was the norm in the Swedish labor market for a considerable part of the 20th century, even though women's paid work increased over those years.

While the major part of the 20th century was characterized by the male breadwinner ideal and assumptions about women's domesticity, the 1970s is often described as a decade characterized by re-evaluation and historical change, not least when it comes to gender equality. Tax reforms, investment in public sector childcare and a reform of the parental leave system facilitated women's paid labor.²¹¹ However, women's labor in Sweden has been conditioned on state support. Women's historical main responsibility for child rearing means that engagement in paid labor and economic independence have been reliant on publicly provided childcare and paid parental leave.²¹² A large public sector, including child care, developed in the 1970s, bringing with it a change in economic relations.²¹³ The welfare state therefore had an important role in relation to women's economic citizenship. However, this change also relied on assumptions about gender difference. When women entered the paid labor market on a larger scale, care-providing tasks in the public sector were a major area of employment. Thus, these changes also reflected a gendered division of labor that was reliant on women's domesticity. Hence, the Swedish model relied on gender as an organizing structure of power.

While the welfare state, or the *folkhem* as Prime Minister Per-Albin Hansson had called it in the 1930s, served as a collective commonality for the Swedish *folk* or people, men and women were given – and performed – different duties within this enterprise. For example, historian Yvonne Hirdman argues that one new dimension that the welfare state brought with it was the idea that the private sphere should be reformed and modernized in order to improve the lives of citizens. A driving force behind this reform was what has been called “social engineering”, meaning that science, rationality and technology should guide economists, architects and politicians in their search for progressive political reform. In the domestic sphere, new technology should rationalize the

²⁰⁸ See for example Nyberg, 2001: 11.

²⁰⁹ Nyberg, 1989.

²¹⁰ See for example Eduards, 2007.

²¹¹ These developments have been analyzed in several books, such as Florin & Nilsson, 2000; Isaksson, 2007; Östberg, 2002.

²¹² See for example Wikander, 2006.

²¹³ See for example Florin & Nilsson, 2000.

unpaid and reproductive work of women, which would in turn make it easier for women to take part in productive labor.²¹⁴ This was part of a broader reform of women's social and political rights that included women's paid work, which began in the inter-war years, continued during the period of the Second World War, and intensified in the 1960s and 1970s.²¹⁵ In this reform, Hirdman argues that the tasks that women had performed in the past were equated with irrationality and backwardness.²¹⁶ Following McClintock's argument on the connection between nationalism, gender and modernity, where women's practices are represented as backward-looking and outdated, and men's practices as forward-looking and modern, modernity can be understood as a gendered concept and practice.²¹⁷ In addition, the creation of the norm of a united and modern Swedish community also involved the creation of an opposite Other composed of those who did not fit the collective "we" of the *folkhem*. Such Others were not only located outside the boundaries of Swedish territory, but also found within. Forced sterilization policies of those who were considered apart from the national community were one way to control and punish those who were seen as not belonging.²¹⁸ Hence, conceptualizations of the egalitarian *folkhem* contributed to the making of an imagined national community that was reliant on the differences between those inside and those outside, and between insiders who belong and those who are unwanted.

Militarization and the Swedish Model

The linkages between welfare and warfare are crucial to our understanding of gender and cold war security policy. Support for a heavily armed version of neutrality policy did not suddenly evolve during the cold war. The end of the First World War had brought with it an increase in support for a strong national defense and a marginalization of pacifist strands, especially within the SAP. In fact, the SAP embraced armed defense and mandatory male conscription, and af Malmborg argues that these were successfully incorporated into the "ideology of national solidarity".²¹⁹ After the Second World War, several leading Social Democrats left behind the anti-militarist attitudes that had flourished during the inter-war years and joined the military establishment in their call for relatively sizeable armed forces. This led to a split within the

²¹⁴ Hirdman, 2010: 92ff.

²¹⁵ Overud, 2005.

²¹⁶ Hirdman, 2010.

²¹⁷ McClintock, 1993: 66.


²¹⁸ Hirdman, 2010. According to historian Maija Runcis, sterilization policies were part of a patriarchal system, especially punishing the weakest in the society. See Runcis, 1998.

²¹⁹ af Malmborg, 2001: 116ff.

SAP, with pro-militarists on one side and anti-militarists on the other.²²⁰ However, the broad support for armed neutrality did not mean that neutrality was seen as belligerent or offensive. Rather, Cronqvist argues, “neutrality increasingly became [...] a state of mind that invested the Swedish national identity with rationality, peacefulness, and modernity.”²²¹ Furthermore, she argues that neutrality served to single Sweden out from the European Others after the horrors of the Second World War, and was linked with notions of a peaceful and modern Self.²²²

Even though previous research has shown how representations of neutrality have been linked with peace, cold war Sweden was by no mean pacifist. Sweden maintained a relatively large military capacity, and Swedish military expenditure was among the highest per capita in Europe, considerably larger than in most NATO member states.²²³ Figures 3 and 4 show military spending in the European neutral states, first as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) and then in constant US dollars (2017) between 1960 and 1988. Figure 3 shows that even though Swedish military spending decreased as a share of GDP, it remained the highest among the European neutrals. Figure 4 shows that in constant US dollars, Swedish and Swiss military expenditure were fairly similar throughout the period.

Figure 3. Military spending in neutral European states, 1960–1989, as a percentage of GDP



Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). *Military Expenditure Database*. <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex> (available 2019-08-05).


²²⁰ Stenlås, 2010: 83.

²²¹ Cronqvist, 2012: 198.

²²² Cronqvist, 2012.

²²³ See for example Agrell, 2010.

Figure 4. Military spending in neutral European states, 1960–1989
(Constant (2017) US dollars)



Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). *Military Expenditure Database*. <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex> (available 2019-08-05).

The relatively large conventional Swedish armed forces established during the first part of the cold war was set up without much resistance. Reliant on a strong military capability, Swedish neutrality policy corresponds with what historian Efraim Karsh defines as a negative component of neutrality: that a neutral state must strive to deter an attack through a defensive military strategy.²²⁴ This supports the common interpretation that the policy of neutrality backed up by a strong conventional defense was thought to guarantee the protection of Swedish citizens, and political scientist Bengt Sundelius concludes that Swedish security policy therefore relied on armed force in a classical sense.²²⁵

According to Lundin and Stenlås, a more comprehensive critique of investment in the military and the defense industry did not take place until the early 1970s.²²⁶ Stenlås argues that the absence of such a critique in the early years of the cold war can be traced back to neutrality being a central component of national identity: “The Cold War provided the Swedes with an identity as neutrals and ‘non belligerents’ and the defense costs were simply the price paid for that identity.”²²⁷ Even though the size of the armed forces and of budget allocations would later become matters of controversy, which could be described as “a clear left-right issue in Swedish politics” with the Communist and the Green parties as the main advocates of reducing military spending in

²²⁴ Karsh, 1988.

²²⁵ Sundelius, 1990.

²²⁶ Lundin & Stenlås, 2010: 26.

²²⁷ Stenlås, 2010: 63.

the later period of the cold war, Goldman argues that the mainstream position was that a credible neutrality policy required a strong defense.²²⁸

The policy of armed neutrality has important gender dimensions. When the parliamentary building was equipped with a statue of Mother Svea (*Moder Svea*) in 1905, a symbol of the mother of the nation and, according to political scientist Maud Eduards, a marker of the national territory as a female body, the state was an almost exclusively male sphere. Women were virtually excluded from the public sphere at the end of the 19th century – including for example from political life, state institutions and academia – and men were obliged to protect the nation through compulsory military service.²²⁹ Facing exclusion from political parties and public political life at a time of transformation, women began to organize separately in party political women's organizations in both left wing and right wing parties.²³⁰ It is in this context that men and women, albeit separately, both advocated for universal suffrage.

In Sweden, the duty to bear arms was assigned to men through mandatory military service (*allmän värnplikt*) since 1901. A more accurate description would be mandatory male conscription. In fact, the conscription policy was used as an argument in favor of giving all men the right to vote in the early 20th century. The argument was that if it was a man's duty to kill or die for the nation, all men should have a say on how that nation was run. United around the slogan "one man, one rifle, one vote (*en man, ett gevär, en röst*)", a growing number of men sought the right to participate in national elections. In effect, the struggle for Swedish men's suffrage linked defense with masculinity and democracy.²³¹

While men organized around a militarized aspect of citizenship to gain their right to vote, women drew on understandings of women as mothers with a particular responsibility for peace in their advocacy of women's suffrage. Historian Josefin Rönnbäck argues that when the National Association for Women's Franchise (*Landsföreningen för kvinnans politiska rösträtt*, LKPR) advocated women's voting rights in the first decades of the 20th century, it was to some extent using such assumptions to portray women as "empathetic, peaceful and inclined to 'take care' and create agreement."²³² In her study of women's anti-war activities in Sweden in 1914–1940, historian Irene Andersson shows that these activities were also based on the assumption that women had a different relationship to war and peace than men.²³³ Historian Christina Florin argues that such maternalistic reasoning was typical around the turn of the 19th century, and that it provided a complementary argument for why

²²⁸ Goldman, 1991: 124.

²²⁹ Eduards, 2007: 13.

²³⁰ For studies on the Federation of Social Democratic Women, see Carlsson Wetterberg, 1986; Karlsson, 1996. Regarding the right winged party, see Nicklasson, 1992.

²³¹ See for example Ekerholm, 2014; Tornbjör, 2002: 195.

²³² Rönnbäck, 2004: 227.

²³³ Andersson, 2001: 28ff, 113f, 305.

women should participate in decisions from which they were excluded. Although men and women were treated as inherently *different* through such representations, difference was not accepted as a rationale for unequal status. Instead, the complementary arguments rested on the claim that men and women contributed different perspectives, and that both perspectives were important for the nation as a whole.²³⁴ According to historian Charlotte Tørnbjerg, motherhood thus became a uniting link between a national discourse and the discourse of the home and the family.²³⁵ Rönnbäck argues that this complementary approach served as both a political force that aimed to change society and a critique of men's societal rule. Although this line of reasoning provided women with opportunities for political maneuver, Rönnbäck concludes that its reliance on gender difference limited the change potential and preserved gender identities. In addition, it contributed to the gendering of certain political issues, such as childcare and education, as feminine and the simultaneous masculinization of other issues, such as economics, defense policy and foreign policy.²³⁶

Since women first practiced their right to vote in national elections in 1921, their political participation and representation have been far from equal to those of men.²³⁷ It was not until 1989 that the Swedish Armed Forces were formally opened up to allow women to voluntarily apply for National Service, although women had performed different – often unpaid and low-valued – duties in the military before then. Addressing military service as a crucial component of the economic dimension of Swedish citizenship, economic historian Fia Sundevall argues that ideas about gender and military work, and the specific and changing duties that women were thought able to perform, were transformed through interactions with, and the presence and work of, voluntary women's defense organizations in the armed forces.²³⁸ Although women were never included in the scope of mandatory military service, they were not locked out of the organization altogether.

The main arguments for male conscription can be traced back to assumptions about men's obligation to protect the country, given its vulnerable geopolitical position in a threatening world order. Political scientists Erika Svedberg and Annika Kronsell argue that in order to maintain such a sizeable army, men had to be convinced that it was their masculine duty to protect the nation, and the linkages between masculinity, defense and the military were reinforced by military service.²³⁹ In addition to the practice of conscription, Kronsell argues that voluntary defense organizations contributed to the making of

²³⁴ Florin, 2006: 47, 237.

²³⁵ Tørnbjerg, 2002.

²³⁶ Rönnbäck, 2002: 102f, 114.

²³⁷ Östberg, 1997: 70, 96.

²³⁸ In her dissertation, Fia Sundevall explores the opening up of what she calls "the last male bastion in the labour market" in Sweden, the Swedish Armed Forces. See Sundevall, 2011.

²³⁹ Svedberg & Kronsell, 2002: 18ff.

defense into a common national enterprise. Together with male conscription, voluntary defense organizations spread militarism to wider society, making defense of the nation “every man’s and every woman’s concern.”²⁴⁰ Drawing on insights from political philosopher Jean Bethke Elshtain, Kronsell connects the conscripted neutral soldier with a “just warrior” ideal, “willing to protect civilians and dedicate his life for the good of the nation.”²⁴¹ As the logic of masculine protection introduced in Chapter 2 relies not only on those bearing arms in the armed forces, but also on broad support for this mission, the uniting force of “total defense” was an important aspect of Swedish cold war security policy. Cronqvist argues that civil defense – a policy that could activate the militarization of everyday life – was ultimately legitimized as a strategy for ensuring the “survival of the Swedish *folkhem*, a home in which all Swedes would be cared for as members of a family and where values such as equality, cooperation, order, and security would prevail.”²⁴² What Cronqvist does not account for, however, is the gendered aspects of the interrelationship between the folk, welfare and warfare.

While some women voluntarily participated in military work, close to all men between 18- and 48-years old were involved in different aspects of Sweden’s relatively large military organization throughout the cold war, in components such as the regular Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Home Guard. The extent of the armed forces and a large national arms industry led social scientists Robert Egnell, Petter Hojem and Hannes Bertes to argue that Sweden was “highly militarized” during the cold war, and that male conscription and the duty to serve were “socialized within every Swedish male citizen.”²⁴³ The association between men, masculinity and defense has preserved the position of men as protectors of the national territory. As women have been seen as those in need of protection, political scientist and gender scholar Cecilia Åse argues that “women and femininity are boundary markers and embody national territory.”²⁴⁴ Hence, armed neutrality relied on assumptions about masculinized protection of an imagined feminized national territory and the women therein. Meanwhile, although the ideal of the neutral soldier united both conscripted and voluntary organizations in the defense of the nation, Åse identifies what she calls “a gender dilemma” in Swedish neutrality policy concerning military masculinity. The 1981 submarine crisis, in which the Soviet submarine U137 was stranded in the archipelago off Karlskrona in southern Sweden, is one example of the activation of the gender dilemma. Åse concludes that the U137 incident was “potentially emasculating” since the armed

²⁴⁰ Kronsell, 2012: 42.

²⁴¹ Kronsell, 2012: 24. See also Elshtain, 1995.

²⁴² Cronqvist, 2012: 206.

²⁴³ Egnell, Hojem & Berts, 2014: 45.

²⁴⁴ Åse, 2016: 115. See also Eduards, 2007.

forces were unable to prevent the submarine from entering Swedish territory.²⁴⁵ Hence, the gender dilemma of Swedish neutrality policy is related to the ambition to deter attack by making the costs to the attacker too high, on the one hand, and situations where the armed forces fail to live up to their commitments, on the other. This is explored further in Part III of this dissertation.

Summary

This chapter has contributed important insights about the gendering of Swedish security policy during the cold war through a theory-induced reading of previous research. The chapter informs the empirical analysis in the parts of the dissertation that follow in a number of ways.

First and foremost, based on previous research about Swedish cold war security policy and national identity, I position the policy of neutrality and welfare as two central components of Swedish cold war national identity. Furthermore, this chapter has shown how the interrelation between neutrality and welfare is central to understanding identity formation and security policy during the time period studied. While armed neutrality was thought to provide protection in external relations by keeping the country out of war, the welfare state was said to guarantee security for Swedish society at the domestic level. There is therefore a dual security strategy that mobilizes the armed neutral soldier in defense of a welfare nation in need of protection. Hence, both neutrality policy and welfare were important components of protection politics in relation to *spatial* representations of a united Swedish Self. Furthermore, this chapter has also shown how notions of a peaceful past served as a central *temporal* identity representation in Sweden. Even though the policy of neutrality was associated with temporal references to a peaceful past, its cold war shape was by no means pacifist. Both neutrality and the welfare state relied on a strong national defense industry, and state investments were central to both military and civil industry. My analysis therefore pays special attention to identity representations related to neutrality and welfare. In addition, I elaborate on how temporal references to a peaceful past featured in disarmament policymaking.

Second, this chapter has shown how the policy of neutrality and welfare have been gendered concepts and practices. While mandatory male conscription provided the armed forces with men, voluntary defense organizations contributed to the spread of broad support for armed neutrality in society. Because of the connection between men, masculinity and defense, Swedish neutrality was backed up and made credible through a defensive version of the “logic of masculinist protection”. Hence, neutrality relied on armed force in a

²⁴⁵ Åse, 2016.

classical, albeit defensive, sense. Furthermore, this chapter has argued that the Swedish welfare state and what is generally known as “the Swedish model” have contributed to the nationalization and gendering of citizenship. Women have been associated with reproductive duties in the private sphere of what in the 1930s Per-Albin Hansson called the *folkhem*, while men have been associated with productive duties in the public sphere. However, the welfare state also provided services that have opened up opportunities for women’s engagement in paid labor, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. Even though the welfare state has been an important arena for achieving gender equality through state reforms related to women’s work, it has also contributed to a reconstruction of women’s domesticity, thereby reinforcing notions of gender difference. Furthermore, the welfare state has been strongly associated with notions of modernity, which McClintock conceptualizes as a gendered concept and practice. Against this background, my analysis investigates how disarmament is positioned in relation to the welfare state and notions of modernity.

Third, this chapter has shown how bodies and emotion are central to an understanding of Swedish cold war security policy. For example, the female body of Mother Svea has served as a symbol of the Swedish nation. Following the feminist theorizing presented in Chapter 2, bodily symbols of a feminized national territory rely on and reinforce notions of active men and passive women, as well as men as protectors and women in need of protection. While male bodies have been active in the state apparatus and tasked with protecting the nation from threatening Others, women’s bodies have been associated with the private sphere and treated as in need of protection. Such representations rely on notions of fear and the presence of threatening international Others. Hence, the bodies of Others have been associated with fear, which helps to legitimize militarized protection. Against this background, my empirical analysis pays special attention to which bodies appear in the sources, and how they are gendered, nationalized and sexualized. Furthermore, I elaborate on how emotions and human bodies have contributed to meaning making about both the Self and various degrees of Other(s).

In sum, this chapter establishes some premises for the subsequent study of the gendering, nationalization and sexualization of both identity and disarmament policy. Parts II and III of this dissertation move on to empirically investigate how disarmament policy took form during the two time periods studied, and how this informs our theoretical understanding of the relationship between gender, nuclear weapons and disarmament.

Part II

4. Period 1: 1954–1968

Part I, the overall introductory part to the dissertation, outlined its focus on the gendering of disarmament policy in Sweden during the cold war. This first empirical part of the dissertation focuses on disarmament policymaking in 1954–1968, in a national context marked by an intense debate about whether Sweden should acquire nuclear weapons. As discussed in Part I, it focuses on the gendering, nationalization and sexualization of the processes studied, and on how emotions and bodies were central to meaning-making processes about both identity and disarmament policy. By revealing how identity representations and policy were simultaneously argued, challenged and (re)negotiated, the chapters in part II of the dissertation elaborate on the gendering, nationalization and sexualization of Swedish disarmament policy in the initial years of its making. In order to facilitate an understanding of the analysis, the following section presents a brief introduction to the Swedish nuclear weapon debate and disarmament, and the international context in which it took place, based on previous research. It also elaborates on key findings in the existing literature that are relevant to this study.

Background and Previous Research

This section draws on previous research about the Swedish nuclear weapon debate and disarmament to introduce topics central to the empirical analysis, and describes the political context of the period. Although presented as “facts”, this introduction should be understood as highlights of what I position as especially important to the subsequent empirical analysis.

The Nuclear Weapon Debate

Shortly after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were devastated by US nuclear weapons in 1945, the Swedish Defense Research Agency (*Försvarets forskningsanstalt*, FOA) was tasked with investigating whether it would be possible for Sweden to produce its own nuclear weapon arsenal. Technical preparations and basic research were initiated on the establishment of a nuclear infrastructure, but the nuclear weapon program, which by the mid-1950s was sufficiently advanced to enable the production of nuclear weapons, was kept secret

at that time.²⁴⁶ Although the Swedish nuclear weapon program was kept secret in its initial years, Nils Swedlund, Supreme Commander (*Överbefälhavare*, ÖB) of the Swedish Armed Forces, publicly proposed that Sweden should acquire tactical nuclear weapons to uphold its neutral and non-aligned policy in a defense inquiry in 1954. This began an intense debate.²⁴⁷ In parliament, the Conservative Party together with public figures, such as representatives of the media elite, backed the call of the ÖB.²⁴⁸ The ruling Social Democratic Party (*Socialdemokratiska arbetarepartiet*, SAP) was split on the issue. Prime Minister Tage Erlander initially supported the nuclear weapons option, for example, while Foreign Minister Östen Undén was an outspoken opponent.²⁴⁹ Throughout the second half of the 1950s, the nuclear weapon program was challenged on several grounds and a strong nuclear weapon opposition movement took form. Various labor unions, churches, temperance organizations and peace groups publicly opposed Swedish nuclear weapons and provided a broad range of arguments against the bomb. In 1958, a group of 21 renowned authors, academics and church leaders signed a program that would become the foundation document of the Action Network Against Swedish Nuclear Weapons (*Aktionsgruppen mot svensk atombomb*, AMSA), an organization with the sole task of opposing Sweden's acquisition of nuclear weapons.²⁵⁰ The women's branch of the SAP, the Federation of Social Democratic Women (*Socialdemokratiska kvinnoförbundet*, SSKF), represented by its chair, Inga Thorsson, is often described as the leading light of anti-nuclear activities throughout the Swedish nuclear weapons debate.²⁵¹

The Swedish nuclear weapon debate took place in an international context often referred to as the Atomic/Nuclear Age, the period after the US bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This period was marked by tense relations between the main antagonists in the cold war – the United States and the Soviet Union – and fear of nuclear war was a significant characteristic of international relations. In the early years of the cold war, only a limited number of states possessed nuclear weapons (see Table 2) but there was a widespread fear of nuclear weapon proliferation to additional states. Despite this fear, only a limited number of states had the capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons,

²⁴⁶ Thomas Jonter has analyzed Sweden's technical nuclear weapons preparations from various angles. See Jonter 2001, 2002, 2010, 2012, and 2016.

²⁴⁷ Agrell, 1985; Jonter, 2010, 2016; Molin, 1989.

²⁴⁸ I use the term Conservative Party for what was called the Right Wing Party 1952–1969, thereafter the Moderate Party (*Moderata Samlingspartiet*, or *Moderaterna*). This party was usually referred to as the Conservative Party outside of Sweden in the 50s and 60s, and I chose to call it the Conservative Party throughout the dissertation to avoid a change of name in the empirical parts of the dissertation.

²⁴⁹ For an overview of the Swedish nuclear weapons debate, see Jonter 2016.

²⁵⁰ Ahlmark, 1965: 35f. See also Jonter, 2016.

²⁵¹ See for example Ahlmark, 1965; Östberg, 2008: 177.

and even fewer decided to do so.²⁵² It is in this international context of fear of nuclear holocaust and cold war rivalry, however, that the Swedish nuclear weapon program took shape.

The Postponement

In an international context characterized by fear of nuclear holocaust and excessive nuclear weapon proliferation, opponents of nuclear weapon acquisition combined anti-nuclear weapon activities at the national level with an emphasis on international détente and disarmament. This support for international disarmament gradually spread to various branches of the SAP. For example, a serious controversy between factions for and against nuclear weapon acquisition took place at the congress of the SAP youth section in 1958. After intense debate and difficulties achieving unity, Olof Palme, who would later become Prime Minister of Sweden, proposed that instead of making a decision either to support or oppose the nuclear weapon option, a compromise approach should prevail that made it possible to postpone the decision. Palme's compromise was based on the international situation and the possibility of Sweden contributing to progress in the international disarmament field.²⁵³ At the same congress, Prime Minister Erlander announced that a SAP study committee composed of party representatives from both sides of the debate would evaluate the nuclear weapon option. In its final report, the committee concluded that a decision on Swedish nuclear weapon acquisition should remain open until the mid-1960s when greater knowledge about international developments and domestic technical requirements was expected to be in place.²⁵⁴ Meanwhile, research would continue on how Sweden could best protect itself in case of nuclear attack, and this research was expected to eventually feed into Swedish nuclear weapon research.²⁵⁵ From the late 1950s, the Swedish SAP government followed this "postponement strategy" with the support of a majority in

²⁵² In their study of South Korea's and Taiwan's nuclear histories, social scientists Rebecca H.C. Hersman and Robert Peters identify 18 states that have ever "experienced a voluntary, sustained reduction in either intent or capability to develop or maintain a nuclear weapons capability", or what the authors call "nuclear rollback". Hersman & Peters, 2006: 545. Levite recognizes that close to 20 states have gone through what he calls nuclear reversal, meaning that states sustain some kind of nuclear weapon capability while not "going nuclear". Levite, 2003: 62. IR scholars Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way argue that it is problematic to approach "nuclear weapons status as a dichotomous variable", and call for a classification based on "degrees of nuclearity". They have developed a scale that includes "acquisition of weapon capability, substantial efforts to develop weapons, exploration of the possibility of developing/acquiring weapons, and no interest or effort whatsoever". According to their classification, 25 states (including the nuclear weapon states) have explored, pursued or acquired nuclear weapons. Singh & Way, 2004: 866.

²⁵³ Andersson, 2004: 55f; Jonter & Rosengren, 2014.

²⁵⁴ Jonter & Rosengren, 2014; Jonter, 2016.

²⁵⁵ Jonter, 2010.

parliament, meaning that “technical progress in the direction of making domestic production of nuclear weapons feasible was to be weighed against international developments in the nuclear disarmament field.”²⁵⁶ The international developments referred to were linked to efforts at the international level that were expected to limit the risk of nuclear war through legally binding disarmament obligations. Historian and IR scholar Thomas Jonter argues that the postponement policy was especially important since it made it possible to reach a political compromise between the SAP and centrist/liberal parties on the nuclear weapon issue.²⁵⁷

International Disarmament Negotiations

Ever since the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, international disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control negotiations have sought to reduce the number of nuclear warheads in the global arsenal. Article 26 of the UN Charter gives the Security Council the task of promoting arms regulation, and the first resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1946 called for the elimination of nuclear weapons from the world’s military arsenals.²⁵⁸ The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was founded in 1957 to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy while at the same time ensuring that states that did not yet possess nuclear weapons would not use nuclear technology for military purposes.²⁵⁹ Even though the Swedish government had been following disarmament talks since the foundation of the United Nations, it was not until 1957 that Sweden took its first initiative in the sphere of nuclear disarmament. This first step was made by submitting a joint resolution with India to the United Nations Security Council calling for a moratorium on nuclear weapon tests.²⁶⁰ At the time, the Swedish government was focused on the science behind disarmament and technical matters, and the need to prevent future developments in the nuclear field through a test ban.²⁶¹

While the nuclear weapon issue remained officially unresolved at the national level in the early 1960s, through the postponement policy discussed above, the Swedish government became increasingly engaged in international

²⁵⁶ Jonter & Rosengren, 2014: 51.

²⁵⁷ Jonter, 2016.

²⁵⁸ Charter of the United Nations. 1945. www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ (available 2012-05-11); United Nations General Assembly. *Establishment of a commission to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy*. 1946-01-26. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/671200> (available 2020-08-16).

²⁵⁹ Goldblat, 2002: 103.

²⁶⁰ Andersson, 2004: 14f.

²⁶¹ Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. “Statement to the Riksdag on the international situation made by the Prime Minister in the First Chamber and by the Foreign Minister in the Second Chamber; 20th March”. *Documents on Swedish foreign policy*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1957.

disarmament negotiations after 1962 as a member of the UN-sponsored Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in Geneva. These negotiations led to the conclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963 and eventually to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968. By signing these treaties, Sweden made an international commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future.²⁶² For this process, Alva Myrdal, a well-known Social Democrat politician who had previously served as Sweden's Ambassador to India, had been appointed to lead the Swedish disarmament delegation in 1961. She was the first of three official Swedish disarmament representatives in international disarmament negotiations, and the only one to hold such a position as secretary of state. As events unfolded, the other two were also women: Inga Thorsson (1974–1982) and Maj-Britt Theorin (1982–1991).²⁶³ In an international context where an overwhelming majority of those acting as state representatives on disarmament were men, the appointment of women to these posts certainly stood out.²⁶⁴ While there is interesting work that remains to be done on gender and disarmament diplomacy, however, it is not the focus of this dissertation.²⁶⁵

Even though the Swedish government had not officially made a decision on whether to acquire nuclear weapons, it took part in the negotiations that led up to the NPT as a member of the ENDC.²⁶⁶ By signing the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state on the August 19, 1968, Sweden made a public international commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons. Grounded in the 1960s, multilateral disarmament became an integral part of Sweden's security policy, and has remained so ever since. Sweden has regularly initiated, and contributed to, proposals aimed at strengthening the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.²⁶⁷

As argued above, the Swedish nuclear weapon debate took place in an international context characterized by fear of accelerated nuclear weapon proliferation and of nuclear holocaust. When the NPT was first signed in 1968, between 15 and 20 states were thought to have nuclear aspirations and the ability to acquire nuclear weapons. Sweden was one of those countries.²⁶⁸ Only

²⁶² See for example Bergenäs & Sabatini, 2010; Jonter, 2010; Prawitz, 1994, 1995 and 2004. Jonter argues that Swedish disarmament engagement in the early 1960s was part of Foreign Minister Undén's strategy to create a compromise solution between those in favor of Swedish nuclear weapon acquisition and those against. See Jonter, 2016.

²⁶³ Andersson, 2004; Prawitz, 2004.

²⁶⁴ See Appendix 2.

²⁶⁵ In recent years, gender and diplomacy has received increased scholarly attention. See for example Aggestam & Towns, 2019.

²⁶⁶ Norlin, 1998; Reiss, 1988.

²⁶⁷ Swedish disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives have been put forward for example in relation to NPT Review Conferences, in negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), in discussions about Nuclear Weapon-free Zones (NWFZ) and in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). See for example Bergenäs & Sabatini, 2010; Prawitz 1995, and 2004.

²⁶⁸ See footnote 252 in this chapter.

five states however – the US, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom (UK), France and China – had already developed nuclear weapons (see Table 2). These states are the only ones recognized as nuclear weapon states in the treaty: only these five states are allowed to possess nuclear weapons. All other states are designated non-nuclear weapon states. The treaty obliges the nuclear weapon states to dismantle their nuclear arsenals in good faith and gives all states parties the inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Hence, the NPT is based on the three pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The NPT is still considered the cornerstone of what is described as the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. There are currently 190 states parties to the treaty. South Africa is the only state to have first developed and then decided to dismantle a nuclear weapon program, joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1991. Only four states – India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan – have since developed nuclear weapons and now stand outside of the treaty.²⁶⁹

Table 2. Nuclear weapon states under the NPT and nuclear-armed states

	Year of first nuclear weapon test	Year became party to the NPT
United States of America	1945	1970
Soviet Union	1949	1970
United Kingdom	1952	1968
France	1960	1992
People's Republic of China	1964	1992
India	1974	N/A
Pakistan	1998	N/A
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	2006	N/A*
Israel	Not confirmed	N/A

* North Korea joined the NPT in 1985 but withdrew from the treaty in 2003. Even though the country has conducted nuclear test explosions, there is no verification that the country possesses operational nuclear weapons.

Sources: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *Nuclear forces development*. www.sipri.org/research/armaments/nbc/nuclear (last visited 2012-05-16); Goldblat, Jozef. *Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements*. 2nd ed. London: Sage, 2002.

Hence, Sweden was one of the few countries with the political ambition and the technical capability to acquire nuclear weapons in an era without international regulation.

Several authors have analyzed the Swedish nuclear weapon debate, especially in the later part of the 1950s, but the paucity of primary sources has

²⁶⁹ Dhanapala, 2005; Goldblat, 2002. A small number of states have abandoned their nuclear weapon programs and joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.

constituted a barrier to exploring the highly classified sphere of nuclear technology and national security in Sweden. Some studies have addressed why Sweden ended up not going nuclear, but these efforts have generally been hampered by a heavy dependence on secondary sources.²⁷⁰ The recent declassification of documents in Sweden has made more in-depth studies of Swedish nuclear history possible. Jonter has used such material to argue that the decision to integrate nuclear weapons into the civilian nuclear energy program was a key factor in why Sweden abstained from nuclear weapon acquisition. According to Jonter, this time-consuming process allowed time for a critical mass against nuclear weapons to develop in the country and created a dependency on US technology, putting the US in a powerful position to steer Sweden away from the nuclear weapon option. Jonter also recognizes that international disarmament efforts and the creation of an international non-proliferation regime eventually institutionalized in the NPT strengthened the skeptics and was important to reaching a political compromise on the issue.²⁷¹ Political scientist Maria Rost Rublee explores the role of identities and argues that Sweden was able to abandon the nuclear weapon option because anti-nuclear weapon groups framed the possession of nuclear weapons as incompatible with Swedish identity. Like Jonter, she also recognizes the importance of international disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations.²⁷² In an article co-authored with Jonter, I argue that a combination of factors, such as dependency on US technology, a strong opposition movement and increased Swedish engagement in disarmament negotiations, all influenced the Swedish decision not to acquire nuclear weapons in interrelated ways that cannot be separated, and that this brought with it a new security political strategy in which disarmament played a central role.²⁷³ These studies have provided important insights about developments and events, especially with regard to the detail of technical and political developments. Furthermore, Jonter and Rublee in particular have established a basic understanding of how support for disarmament grew stronger in a national context marked by conflict.

While a great deal of research has analyzed the Swedish nuclear weapon debate from various angles, only limited attention has been paid to gender relations. However, a few pieces stand out. In her empirically rich account of the role of the SSKF, historian Anna-Greta Nilsson Hoadley argues that the SSKF's room for maneuver was limited and they faced strong internal resistance. Despite their efforts, Nilsson Hoadley argues that the SSKF was not successful in influencing the SAP's position.²⁷⁴ Historian Gunnel Karlsson adds that this was the first time that the SSKF had become engaged in defense

²⁷⁰ See for example Cole, 1996; Garris, 1972, 1973; Reiss, 1988.

²⁷¹ Jonter, 2010. See also Jonter, 2002, 2016.

²⁷² Rublee, 2009: 179ff.

²⁷³ This argument is further developed in Jonter & Rosengren, 2014.

²⁷⁴ Nilsson Hoadley, 1989.

policy, which had previously been regarded as the domain of men. The fact that it did so led several men to react, and the SSKF was repeatedly described as emotional rather than rational, and irrelevant rather than relevant.²⁷⁵ Moreover, in her linguistic study of the media debate, linguist scholar Görel Bergman-Claeson shows how gendered assumptions about the appropriate behavior of men and women were used more generally to degrade women who opposed the nuclear weapon option.²⁷⁶ Consequently, this constituted a process in which the SSKF challenged gender boundaries and was dismissed and downgraded for doing so. Taken together, these studies provide a thorough overview of the activities of the SSKF in the “first phase” of the Swedish nuclear weapon debate, in the late 1950s. However, they fail to account for the opposition to nuclear weapons from 1960 onwards, or the interconnectedness of gender, nuclear weapons and disarmament.

Even though disarmament was a core feature of Swedish security policy throughout the cold war, it is almost entirely absent from the existing literature, apart from overviews of Swedish security policy,²⁷⁷ a brief study of Sweden’s first disarmament initiative, the Undén plan,²⁷⁸ and a study of Swedish negotiating tactics in the ENDC.²⁷⁹ Historian Stellan Andersson has written the most detailed account in his empirically rich review of disarmament and the SAP in 1961–1963.²⁸⁰ In particular, Andersson’s work serves as a detailed guide to the rich archives. However, the studies mentioned above are empirically driven, and little theory has been produced in relation to Swedish disarmament policy. Various theoretical pieces stand out. In his brief account of Swedish disarmament policy from the 1920s to the 1980s, historian Bo Huldt positions disarmament within a realist framework and argues that for a small state, international disarmament efforts can be interpreted as a rational security strategy aimed at achieving balance at the international level, and thereby advancing security ambitions.²⁸¹ Huldt concludes that Swedish disarmament policy during the cold war was motivated by such considerations, and that it merely reflects the self-interest of the state in minimizing risk in military terms. However, Huldt also recognizes that his study is far from all-encompassing, and that a “detailed and well documented account of the history of Swedish disarmament policy is yet to be written.”²⁸² The literature on nuclear weapon proliferation and non-proliferation has been dominated by the neo-

²⁷⁵ Karlsson, 1996.

²⁷⁶ Bergman-Claeson, 1994.

²⁷⁷ See for example Bjereld, Johansson & Molin, 2008.

²⁷⁸ Andersson, 2004: 86ff; Norlin, 1998.

²⁷⁹ Stenelo, 1972.

²⁸⁰ Andersson, 2004.

²⁸¹ Huldt, 1986.

²⁸² Huldt, 1986: 185.

realist school for many years. It attributes the military security-seeking behavior of states to power balances and an anarchic international system.²⁸³ Hence, Huldt's conclusions are far from innovative but follow an international tendency to rationalize disarmament policy within a military framework. Furthermore, and as argued above, Jonter and Rublee have discussed Swedish disarmament policy in relation to the decision not to acquire nuclear weapons, arguing that international disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations were important to the Swedish decision not to acquire such weapons.²⁸⁴ None of the works mentioned above, however, include gender or feminist theory in their analytical frameworks. Against this background, this part of the dissertation contributes new empirical findings about the making of Swedish nuclear disarmament policy and its relation to the nuclear weapon debate to the research on the Swedish nuclear weapon debate, as well as a theoretical analysis of the making of Swedish disarmament policy from a feminist perspective.

Disposition

The chapters in part II of this dissertation are organized both thematically and chronologically. Chapter 5 discusses the Swedish nuclear weapon debate, especially the first phase of the debate which began in 1954 and peaked around 1958. Drawing on insights from feminist theory, I argue that the nuclear weapon debate caused what I conceptualize as a crisis for national unity and in effect the heterosexual family ideal.

Chapter 6 analyzes how disarmament rose to become a common ground position that unified those who favored and those opposed to nuclear weapon acquisition, and how competing identity representations were made in debates about disarmament. The chapter focuses on disarmament debates. While the chapter includes material from the early years of the nuclear weapon debate, its primary concern is what happened in the late 1950s and the 1960s.

Chapter 7 examines the official disarmament policy position of the Swedish government, with a focus on how it reflected the identity and policy representations identified in Chapters 5 and 6. My analysis shows how certain identity representations were silenced over time, while others became core features of government policy. The chapter primarily draws on sources from the 1960s.

²⁸³ See for example Mearsheimer, 1994–1995, 2001; Mearsheimer, Franklin & Davis, 1993; Paul, 2000; Thayer, 1995; Waltz, 1979.

²⁸⁴ Jonter, 2016; Rublee, 2009.

5. Gendering the Swedish Nuclear Weapon Debate

This chapter analyses identity representations and policy advocacy in the Swedish nuclear weapon debate. The chapter takes two radically different policy positions towards nuclear weapon acquisition as its starting point by scrutinizing identity representations among advocates of nuclear weapon acquisition, on the one hand, and opponents of nuclear weapon acquisition, on the other. Using the theoretical and methodological approach of the dissertation, it develops a feminist understanding of the gendering, nationalization and sexualization of the Swedish nuclear weapon debate. Furthermore, and in line with the theoretical and methodological approach, it elaborates on how human bodies and emotions contributed to meaning making about both identity and policy in the debate. The chapter is organized thematically, whereby each section makes arguments for and against nuclear weapon acquisition according to specific themes. The themes addressed are: (a) fear as a precondition for both sides of the debate; (b) the gendered making of emotional bodies; and (c) notions of Swedish exceptionalism among both advocates and opponents of nuclear weapon acquisition. These themes are the result of my theory induced reading of the empirical sources. In sum, the chapter shows how the nuclear weapon debate caused what my analysis conceptualizes as a gendered, nationalized and sexualized split, and a threat to national unity. Feminist theorizing about the nation-family analogy is crucial to this conceptualization.

Dealing with Fear in the Nuclear Age

The two main sides of the Swedish nuclear weapon debate are easy to identify: there were those who wanted the Swedish government to acquire nuclear weapons, and those who wanted the government to abstain from nuclear weapon acquisition. Although proposing radically different policies, this section argues that notions of fear were a unifying element for both sides. While those who advocated Swedish nuclear weapon acquisition relied on fear as a prerequisite for their notion of a threatening world order to be valid, opponents of nuclear weapon acquisition attached fear to the existence of nuclear weapons as a result of the humanitarian consequences of their use. Rather than an

explicitly addressed emotion, however, fear was an implicit precondition for both sides.

In favor of nuclear weapon acquisition

Advocacy of nuclear weapon acquisition represented the possession of Swedish nuclear weapons as necessary to make the policy of armed neutrality credible. The line of argumentation was that Swedish non-alignment was only credible if it was backed up by strong armed forces. The only way to maintain strong armed forces in the nuclear age was argued to be through the possession of nuclear weapons. Since Sweden was not protected by nuclear weapons through its membership of a military alliance, it was necessary to possess its own nuclear weapons. This approach to nuclear weapon acquisition was advocated, for example, by the head of the Armed Forces, the Swedish Supreme Commander (*Överbefälhavare*, ÖB). In his defense inquiry of 1954, the ÖB stated that Sweden's geopolitical position as a non-aligned state between east and west made it likely that Sweden might get dragged into a future war. It was not thought that Sweden would be a primary target in such a war, but that Sweden's location was of strategic importance to both superpowers. Facing such an assumed risk, the ÖB argued that it was necessary to maintain a defense organization that was as strong as possible. With a strong national force, he argued, the national territory could be secured in case of attack while awaiting the assistance of others. According to the ÖB, equipping the armed forces with tactical nuclear weapons would facilitate this task.²⁸⁵ Consequently, the ÖB argued that the Swedish government should investigate whether it was possible to equip the Swedish Armed Forces with tactical nuclear weapons.²⁸⁶ My conclusion is that his argumentation was based on the perception that nuclear weapons could *protect* Sweden from an attack in what was described as a threatening international setting. Spatial references were made to Sweden as non-aligned. My interpretation is that *fear* of threatening Others and the conviction that nuclear weapons were necessary for protection were prerequisites of the argumentation of the ÖB.

The Conservative Party in parliament and representatives of the Liberal Party and the Center Party backed the ÖB's call for Swedish nuclear weapons.²⁸⁷ Using different phrasing, each described nuclear weapons as necessary

²⁸⁵ Centralförbundet Folk och Försvar. *Alltjämt ett starkt försvar: riktlinjer och kostnader: referat av överbefälhavarens förslag*. Stockholm, 1954: 277.

²⁸⁶ Centralförbundet Folk och Försvar. *Alltjämt ett starkt försvar: riktlinjer och kostnader: referat av överbefälhavarens förslag*, Stockholm, 1954: 288.

²⁸⁷ As mentioned above, I use the term Conservative Party for what was called the Right Wing Party 1952–1969, thereafter the Moderate Party (*Moderata Samlingspartiet* or *Moderaterna*). What is today known as the Liberals (*Liberalerna*) was called the People's Party (*Folkpartiet*) 1934–1990. In 1990 it was renamed the Liberal People's Party (*Folkpartiet Liberalerna*). I

military tools. Without nuclear weapons, the Swedish Armed Forces were described as incapable of meeting what were represented as their protection obligations. For example, in 1957 a Conservative Party parliamentarian argued:

It is impossible to separate foreign policy and defense policy. They complement and are prerequisites for one another. [...] In order to reach necessary efficiency at a reasonable cost, the Swedish defense has to be equipped with tactical atomic weapons as soon as possible.²⁸⁸

He argued that it was necessary to equip the armed forces with nuclear weapons for armed neutrality to be effective. Taking the dual security strategy of armed defense policy and a neutral foreign policy as a starting point, advocates of nuclear weapon acquisition in parliament argued that defense policy would suffer if not equipped with nuclear weapons. The relationally organized opposite, to live without nuclear weapons, was described as missing out on something crucial. Similar reasoning was reflected by another Conservative Party parliamentarian:

It is not possible to maintain efficient resistance if we do not have tactical atomic weapons. We cannot defend our whole country if we do not have these weapons. We cannot afford defense sufficient against an adversary for whom atomic weapons are commonplace with conventional weapons. We take on a huge responsibility if we decide that Swedish youth have to enter a war where the adversary possesses atomic weapons and we lack them.²⁸⁹

Hence, in order to ensure national protection in the atomic age it was described as essential to possess nuclear weapons. Referring to nuclear weapons as “a defense weapon that our defense simply needs,” Conservative Party politicians labelled tactical nuclear weapons necessary military tools.²⁹⁰ Hence, the

have chosen to call them the Liberal Party throughout the dissertation. The Center Party (*Centerpartiet*) was called the Farmers' League (*Bondeförbundet*) until 1957, when it took its present name. I call it the Center Party throughout the dissertation.

²⁸⁸ Riksdagens protokoll. 1956/57: 9. ”Meddelande av utrikesministern; tillika svar på fråga ang. förstärkning av de svenska insatserna för teknisk hjälp till mindre utvecklade områden i världen”, herr Hjalmarsson (h), andra kammaren.

²⁸⁹ Riksdagens protokoll. 1956/57: 24. ”Meddelande om regeringens politiska program m.m.”, Hjalmarsson (h), andra kammaren. See also Riksdagens protokoll. 1955/56: 2. ”Vid remiss av statsverkspropositionen m.m.”, Hjalmarsson (h), andra kammaren; Riksdagens protokoll. 1955/56: 8. ”Utrikesdebatt”, Osvald (fp), första kammaren; Riksdagens protokoll. 1958/59: 16. ”Ang. ökad forskningsverksamhet inom atomområdet, m.m.”, Svärd (h), första kammaren; Riksdagens protokoll. 1958/59: 17. ”Atomvapenfrågan”, Hjalmarsson (h), andra kammaren.

²⁹⁰ Riksdagens protokoll. 1957/58: B7. ”Försvarets utformning på längre sikt”, Hjalmarsson (h), andra kammaren. See also for example Riksdagens protokoll. 1956/57: 9. ”Ang. Sveriges utrikespolitik”, Ewerlöf (h), första kammaren; Riksdagens protokoll. 1956/57: 9. ”Ang. Sveriges utrikespolitik”, Hjalmarsson (h), andra kammaren; Riksdagens protokoll. 1957/58: 9.

advocacy of nuclear weapons was not represented as based on opinion, but rather as based on facts, and as the only reasonable way to proceed. To do the opposite was associated with a state of weakness, as missing out on a central protection tool and leaving the armed forces ill-equipped to meet the threats of the modern age. Without strong armed forces, it was argued that hostile intruders could easily invade Swedish territory. With strong armed forces in place, however, intruders would hesitate to invade the nation.²⁹¹ Hence, equipping the armed forces with nuclear weapons was represented as serving defensive purposes and as a necessity. According to my theoretical and methodological approach, meaning is constructed relationally. By describing the possession of nuclear weapons as necessary for ensuring protection, advocacy of the acquisition of Swedish nuclear weapons is made possible and nuclear weapons abstention is relationally ruled out as an option.

Furthermore, those in favor of nuclear weapon acquisition also held that the *lack* of nuclear weapons might *attract* foreign intruders. For example, the ÖB argued that: "If a small state does not have nuclear weapons, and is not part of an alliance that disposes such weapons, this can in some situations serve as an attraction for an intruder."²⁹² Hence, the lack of nuclear weapons was represented as increasing the risk of invasion. Similarly, a Center Party parliamentarian noted: "Sweden has not presented itself as an open country for potential invaders. Rather, anyone thinking about invasion has had to count on a strong resistance and efficient weapons."²⁹³ In order to guarantee the protection of the nation, he found it necessary to equip the armed forces with nuclear weapons. In his statement, he equated the lack of nuclear weapons with being open to foreign invaders.

In the advocacy presented above, the spaces referred to were geographically organized with Sweden as the main spatial referent and bodily organized through indirect references to men as protectors of the national territory. Hence, a distinction was made between a national Self and threatening Others, and between those tasked with protecting and those in need of protection. This corresponds with what Hansen calls a "classical concept of security", in which a sharp distinction is made between the national Self and the international Other, and where the national Self is described as vulnerable in light of the threatening behavior of Others.²⁹⁴ The theory section of this dissertation has

"Meddelande av utrikesministern; tillika svar på fråga ang. förstärkning av de svenska insatserna för teknisk hjälp till mindre utvecklade områden i världen", Hjalmarsson (h), andra kammaren.

²⁹¹ See for example Riksdagens protokoll. 1961/62: 11. "Ang Sveriges utrikespolitik". Herr Bengtsson (cp), första kammaren.

²⁹² Centralförbundet Folk och Försvar. *Alltjämt ett starkt försvar: riktlinjer och kostnader: referat av överbefälhavarens förslag*. Stockholm, 1954: 281.

²⁹³ Riksdagens protokoll. 1961/62: 11. "Ang Sveriges utrikespolitik". Herr Bengtsson (cp), första kammaren.

²⁹⁴ Hansen, 2006: 34.

shown how the nation has been compared with the heterosexual family ideal. This ideal positions men as protectors and women as responsible for nurturing tasks both in the nation and within the family.²⁹⁵ The argumentation above resembles such representations through its reliance on military protection.

As noted above, the policy of armed neutrality was a core component of Swedish national identity during the cold war, and relied on broad societal support to unite a wide spectrum of actors. Swedish military expenditure was substantially higher than in other states in similar positions, and the Swedish Air Force, which was primarily developed in the 1950s and 1960s, was among the most advanced in the world.²⁹⁶ The extent of the armed forces and the national arms industry meant that Sweden was “highly militarized” during the cold war, and a duty to serve was assigned to all men through the policy of male conscription.²⁹⁷ Hence, the association between masculinity, defense and the protection of the nation has relied on – and preserved – the position of men as protectors of Sweden’s national territory. Women have been positioned as in need of protection, while women’s bodies – and femininity – have served to embody the national territory.²⁹⁸ The idea that armed neutrality should protect the country relied on a conviction – and practice – that it was a masculine duty to bear arms as part of mandatory military service.²⁹⁹ Against this backdrop, my interpretation of the arguments in favor of nuclear weapon acquisition is that by positioning the state apparatus, including the armed forces as the active spatial referent, with a masculinized protection mandate over passive spatial referents, the vulnerable population and the national territory were relationally organized as feminized. Furthermore, representations of the nuclear weapon-free Self as an attraction for invaders can be conceptualized as gendered and sexualized representations of the nation as a vulnerable female body in need of masculine protection from a threatening Other. Such representations are a common feature of international security thinking.³⁰⁰ The arguments made by advocates of nuclear weapon acquisition correspond well with such symbolic representations.

Against nuclear weapons

While the ÖB along with conservatives in parliament favored nuclear weapon acquisition, the ruling SAP was divided and Foreign Minister Undén was an outspoken opponent of the nuclear weapon option. In a memo from 1955, he

²⁹⁵ McClintock, 1995: 353, 1993: 61ff. See also Åse, 2016; Nagel, 1998; Towns, Karlsson & Eyre, 2014: 239; Yuval-Davis, 1997: 20f.

²⁹⁶ See for example Bjereld, Johansson & Molin, 2008; and Chapter 3 in this dissertation.

²⁹⁷ Egnell, Hojem, & Berts, 2014: 45.

²⁹⁸ Åse, 2016: 115. See also Eduards, 2007.

²⁹⁹ See Chapter 3 of this dissertation, and for example Egnell, Hojem, & Berts, 2014; Kronsell, 2012; Sundevall, 2011.

³⁰⁰ Åse, 2016: 114f. See also Yuval-Davis, 1997: 20.

elaborated on how he thought nuclear weapon acquisition might make Sweden a target, drawing the conclusion that nuclear weapon acquisition would decrease rather than increase Swedish security.³⁰¹ As the debate widened throughout Swedish society, it also created a serious split in the SAP. As argued in Chapter 4, the Federation of Social Democratic Women (SSKF) was described as the leader of anti-nuclear weapon advocacy in Sweden when the debate was at its peak. In addition to debates in the Swedish Parliament, this chapter uses SSKF advocacy as an empirical lens on anti-nuclear weapon campaigning in Sweden. The image below features Inga Thorsson, chair of the SSKF, delivering one of her many speeches.

Figure 5. Inga Thorsson



Source: Holst, Bo. "Inga Thorsson, borgarråd". Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB.

³⁰¹ See for example Andersson, 2004; Nilsson Hoadley, 1989.

The SSKF launched its first official statement against Swedish nuclear weapons at its congress in 1956, resulting from a motion that argued that evaluations of the nuclear weapon option must include political, military and moral considerations.³⁰² The congress statement ended:

This Congress of the Federation of Social Democratic Women declares that these weapons constitute such a principally new and horrible threat to humanity that our responsibility for the coming generations, for life itself, leads us to reject the thought of including them in the Swedish defense.³⁰³

The paragraph includes two especially interesting components: first, that the SSKF was represented as having a responsibility to oppose the nuclear weapon option for the sake of future generations; and, second, that nuclear weapons were represented as inherently different from conventional weapons and posed a serious threat to humanity. In addition, fear of the use of nuclear weapons was a precondition for these representations to make sense. The first point relied on spatial references to the SSKF as an organization of women. In its advocacy, the SSKF frequently represented itself as a collective of women and mothers. Spatial representations were associated with a responsibility to ensure the survival of those as yet unborn. Hence, temporal references to future survival were part of such representations. For example, when the SSKF gathered more than 40 women's organizations in a protest against US and Soviet nuclear weapon tests in 1955, a joint statement read as follows:

[Because of the consequences of nuclear weapon use, w]omen, as bearers of coming generations, cannot remain silent while facing such a challenge. We protest, with all our power, against the possibility that these incredible technological achievements can be used to destroy human beings.³⁰⁴

Such identity representations associated women with reproductive capabilities and with a certain responsibility to speak out against nuclear weapons. At an

³⁰² "Motion nr 9, ang. atomvapen i svenska försvaret". *Protokoll, Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Kvinnoförbunds 9:e kongress, 6–9 maj 1956*. Stockholm: Barnängens Tryckerier AB, 1956. See also Hoadley Nilsson, 1989.

³⁰³ "Uttalande angående atomvapen i svenska försvaret". *Protokoll, Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Kvinnoförbunds 9:e kongress, 6–9 maj 1956*. Stockholm: Barnängens Tryckerier AB, 1956.

³⁰⁴ "Till F.N.:s Generalförsamling". Bilaga 9, Protokoll, årsmöte styrelsen för Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Kvinnoförbund, 7 maj 1955. Vol. 18, Serie A3 Verkställande utskottets protokoll, Protokoll. Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Kvinnoförbund, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB; "Protokoll VU 7 juni 1955". Vol. 18, Serie A3 Verkställande utskottets protokoll, Protokoll. Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Kvinnoförbund, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB. Similar statements were made by Inga Thorsson, chair of the SSKF. See for example Thorsson, Inga. "Londonkonferensen – för fred och samförstånd". *Morgonbris*. No. 7–8, 1955.

international meeting of women in 1959, the chair of the SSKF, Inga Thorsson, noted: "It may be that women naturally, quickly and based on instinct turn away from a weapon that allows the wrongdoing of fathers to affect children in a third, fourth and even later generation."³⁰⁵ In this and similar statements, the SSKF associated women with motherhood and reproductive tasks. According to its arguments, women had a certain responsibility to ensure the survival of future generations. Following a relational approach, such statements made it possible to represent belligerent men as potentially responsible for the destruction caused by nuclear weapons. Words such as "naturally" and "instinct" contributed to represent women's reproductive tasks as something biological, and associated policy advocacy with nature. The SSKF argued *both* that women as mothers had a responsibility to act against nuclear weapons, *and* that they had a different perspective to that of men. Hence, such representations relied on notions of gender *difference*.

In the above advocacy, women were represented as biological reproducers of coming generations, and thereby associated with a responsibility for the welfare and survival of the as yet unborn.³⁰⁶ Linking women and femininity with motherhood, reproduction and care for future generations thus served both to differentiate women from men, and to portray women's perspectives as supplementary to those of the privileged others: men/fathers. Both gender and heterosexuality are central to such representations. This kind of argumentation has to be understood in its historical context of advocacy for women's political rights and women's peace advocacy. When women advocated for political rights in Sweden in the early 20th century, they used complementary arguments on why women should gain access to the political and public spheres from which they had been excluded. For example, women were portrayed as peaceful, empathetic and care-givers, qualities they argued would contribute positively to the political sphere.³⁰⁷ Such arguments rested on the claim that men and women contributed different perspectives, and that both perspectives were important for the national whole.³⁰⁸ Similar reasoning has been identified among women peace campaigners. In her study of women's anti-war activities in Sweden in 1914–1940, historian Irene Andersson reveals how these activities were also based on the assumption that women had a different relationship with war and peace than men.³⁰⁹ Such representations

³⁰⁵ "Tal vid internationellt kvinnomöte i Hamburg den 10 juli 1959". Vol. 9, Serie 4 Handlingar rörande verksamhet, 2 Försvarsfrågan, i.s. atomvapendebatten. Inga Thorssons arkiv, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB. See also for example "Acceptera svenska atomvapen?". Vol. 9, Serie 4 Handlingar rörande verksamhet, 2 Försvarsfrågan, i.s. atomvapendebatten. Inga Thorssons arkiv, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB.

³⁰⁶ For feminist theorizing about the biological reproduction of nations, see Yuval-Davis, 1996.

³⁰⁷ Rönnbäck, 2004: 227.

³⁰⁸ Florin, 2006: 47, 237.

³⁰⁹ Andersson, 2001: 28ff, 113f, 305.

(re)constructed the ideas that men and women had “natural” positions in the nation and that nurturing was a female task. Similar representations were made in the nuclear weapon debate. By making reference to motherhood and responsibility for future generations, the SSKF reinstated the linkage between the nurturing and peaceful mother (women) and the belligerent father (men), which served as a justification for having a say on the nuclear weapon issue. Through such representations, identity and gendered policy advocacy were simultaneously constructed.

The SSKF was not alone in the SAP in speaking out about such responsibilities. A group of male SAP parliamentarians was also actively arguing against nuclear weapon acquisition, emphasizing the consequences of nuclear weapons for future generations. One noted:

Personally, I am convinced that nuclear weapons are no worse than conventional weapons when it comes to inhumanity and killing human beings. However, the terrifying heritage it leaves for the youth, for future generations to come, is of such a character that each and every reasonable human being must consider: Can it be reasonable that we ourselves build up a nuclear weapon capability?³¹⁰

Even though he did not think that nuclear weapons were worse than conventional weapons in terms of inhumanity or killing capacity, their long-term consequences for future generations made him question how reasonable it was to acquire them. Along with spatial references to “reasonable” people, he made temporal references to the devastating heritage nuclear weapons would leave for future generations as a main reason for questioning the nuclear weapon option. This statement, and those made by the SSKF, focused on the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, while temporal references to future survival were associated with a responsibility to ensure that nuclear weapons would not be used again. Communist Party parliamentarians made similar claims.³¹¹

The debate about the devastating humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons should be understood in its broader international context. Less than a month after nuclear weapons were first tested in Alamogordo, New Mexico, the United States dropped nuclear bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing between 110 000 and 140 000 people immediately and causing radiation-related injuries that would haunt generations to come.³¹² Both Swedish and international advocacy against nuclear weapons connected their use with the humanitarian devastation witnessed in Hiroshima

³¹⁰ Riksdagens protokoll. 1957/58: B6. ”Försvarets utformning på längre sikt”, Lundberg (s), andra kammaren.

³¹¹ Riksdagens protokoll. 1956/57: 24. ”Meddelande om regeringens politiska program m.m.”, Hagberg (k), andra kammaren.

³¹² See for example Sherwin, 2003.

and Nagasaki, and nuclear weapons became a symbol of the level of destructive power modern science could provide.³¹³ Fear of the consequences of nuclear weapon use was a core feature of Swedish anti-nuclear weapon advocacy. In an op-ed published in 1956, Thorsson wrote about the fear that followed the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and how the humanitarian consequences would turn out to be worse than was initially expected:

We remember our feelings that day in August 1945, when the news reached us about the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. We remember the fear we felt when we learned more about the consequences of the new weapon of terror. We have closely followed what the scientists have told us about the even worse aftermaths of this weapon.³¹⁴

In talking explicitly about *fear* of nuclear weapons and describing nuclear weapons as weapons of mass destruction that cause unspeakable humanitarian suffering, this category of weapons was labeled immoral by those who opposed nuclear weapon acquisition. While advocates of nuclear weapon acquisition attached fear to threatening nuclear-armed Others in an international setting arguably characterized by tensions, the opponents of nuclear weapon acquisition attached fear to nuclear weapons as such, with reference to the devastating consequences of their use. Meanwhile, emotion appeared in more direct ways in the nuclear weapon debate. The next section elaborates further on how my analysis reveals how emotions were associated with female human bodies and at the same time distanced from male bodies.

The Gendered Making of Emotional Bodies

As noted above, notions of fear were present on both sides of the Swedish nuclear weapon debate. While nuclear weapon proponents relied on notions of a threatening international environment (and thereby fear) for their argumentation to make sense, anti-nuclear weapon advocates associated all nuclear weapons with fear. Fear was merely assumed in an international setting characterized by mistrust and tension, or in relation to the bomb itself. However, a central feature of the continued gendering, nationalization and sexualization of the debate is how emotions seemed to stick to certain bodies more than others. For example, my study of SAP organizational material as part of step 2 in the research process, in combination with insights from previous research, show how women in the SAP who opposed nuclear weapons were relationally

³¹³ For research about the Swedish anti-nuclear movement, see for example Jonter, 2016; Rublee, 2009. For research about the international movement against nuclear weapons, see for example Cockburn, 2012; Gusterson, 1996; Wittner, 2009.

³¹⁴ Thorsson, Inga. "Acceptera svenska atomvapen?". *Morgonbris*. No. 2, 1956.

labeled emotional as opposed to what were represented as rational men.³¹⁵ How emotions were attached to some bodies but distanced from others is the theme of this section.

The making of rational male bodies

Section 1 has shown how opponents of nuclear weapons made the humanitarian dimension of the use of nuclear weapons a core element of their advocacy. Those who favored nuclear weapon acquisition labelled this an invalid argument. Labeling such advocacy as guided by morals relationally differentiated it from that which was associated with rationality. For example, addressing Thorsson in parliament, a fellow SAP parliamentarian said:

I do not think that in the end it will be possible to really consider the humanitarian dimension that all of us recognize. Even if Mrs Thorsson might describe them as worse than they really are, it is certain that we face a problem that deeply affects us and where we want to make a decision based on humanitarian concerns. In the end, however, it is the government and parliament that is responsible for the lives and freedom of the Swedish people and that has to focus on the essential things, the things that decide whether there is a risk that we will end up in a war or continue to live in peace. [...] The rest of us, who do not have a single-minded focus on the humanitarian dimension like Mrs Thorsson,

³¹⁵ For example, when SSKF chair Inga Thorsson informed the SAP board that her organization was against Swedish nuclear weapons acquisition on February 21, 1956, former minister of defense Per Edvin Sköld, who would write a campaign book in favor of nuclear weapon acquisition a couple of years later, said: "The SSKF leadership does this based on moral reasons. [...] What advantages can be reached for the people of the world if Sweden abstains from protecting itself? This is more of an emotional argument than a rational one." Prime Minister Erlander said that an internal split in the party would be destructive, and emphasized: "I sincerely hope that the statement of the SSKF's chair is not her last word, that it will be possible to reach an agreement on the [postponement] position announced by the minister of defense". Ragnar Lassinantti, a SAP representative in northern Sweden, was troubled but also convinced that the women's organization would "do the right thing": "I do not think that the position of the women's organization is that threatening. I believe that this time, as in so many other critical situations, the women will end up following the men. There is no reason for us to have two different positions." Minister of defense Torsten Nilsson emphasized that emotions were best left outside the room: "I do not want to judge her opinion, but I would appreciate and positively value it if we could discuss this matter as unemotionally as possible." What these reactions show is that Thorsson was thought to be more emotional than rational, that she was the odd one out and therefore should change her position, and that the women should "follow the men", thereby keeping the male norm intact. See "Protokoll, Socialdemokratiska Partistyrelsens sammanträde 21 februari 1956". Vol. 17, Serie A Protokoll, 2 Partistyrelsens protokoll och bilagor, A Partistyrelsens protokoll. Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB. See also Nilsson Hoadley, 1989; Andersson, 2004; Jonter, 2016.

[...] would like to base our final decision on knowledge not only about the military political and foreign political dimensions, but also about technical matters.³¹⁶

By making a distinction between humanitarian considerations, no matter how noble, and “the essential things”, he represented humanitarian concerns as subordinate to what he represented as primary considerations for “the lives and freedom of the Swedish people” – military and foreign policy dimensions, as well as technical matters. Through such distinctions, humanitarian concerns and morals were relationally labeled as less politically relevant when it came to the survival of Swedes. In a parliamentary debate in 1959, a Conservative Party parliamentarian advocated Swedish nuclear weapon acquisition and spoke at length about what he called “emotional thinking”, a term used by those who dismissed advocacy against nuclear weapons as emotional and in effect irrelevant:

If one tries to rationalize their reasoning to identify what the [arguments against atomic weapons] are, one faces great challenges because to a great extent it concerns a general emotional thinking and a general wishful thinking. Emotional thinking is most prominent at the heart of the argumentation of what can be called radical pacifists – those who argue that we do not have the right to meet violence with violence or the threat of violence. [...] We firmly declare that we think that the Swedish armed forces should be equipped with tactical atomic weapons, and that this should happen as soon as the technical prerequisites are in place. This represents realism on the defense issue, a realism that becomes increasingly urgent as each day passes.³¹⁷

He emphasized that the acquisition of nuclear weapons represented realism, and made a distinction between anti-nuclear weapon activism, emotions and idealism, on the one hand, and support for nuclear weapons, rationality and realism, on the other. A fellow Conservative Party parliamentarian argued that “[the need to acquire nuclear weapons] is a military necessity that emotions and emotional thinking cannot change.”³¹⁸ Arguing that emotion had no place in the debate, he also represented nuclear weapon acquisition as rational and necessary.

Labeling certain arguments emotional and therefore irrelevant made it possible to reject and/or silence those arguments. For example, a Liberal Party parliamentarian argued that it would be “highly desirable for [the debate about

³¹⁶ Riksdagens protokoll. 1957/58: B12. ”Svar på frågor ang. ifrågasatt utvidgning av forskningsverksamheten på atomområdet”, Sköld (s), andra kammaren.

³¹⁷ Riksdagens protokoll. 1958/59: 16. ”Ang. ökad forskningsverksamhet inom atomområdet, m.m.”, Svärd (h), första kammaren.

³¹⁸ Riksdagens protokoll. 1956/57: 9. ”Meddelande av utrikesministern; tillika svar på fråga ang. förstärkning av de svenska insatserna för teknisk hjälp till mindre utvecklade områden i världen”, herr Hjalmarsson (h), andra kammaren.

Swedish atomic weapons to be] as objective and free from passion as possible.”³¹⁹ Calling for language free from emotion, he described some arguments as objective and free from passion, and others as the relationally organized opposite, subjective and passionate. Recognizing that the new situation brought about by nuclear weapons meant the human race faced new challenges, a SAP parliamentarian represented it as “natural” that an emotional character had come to surround the topics discussed. This was nothing more than a necessary phase, however, and he expressed his desire that a more “objective” debate without emotion would prevail:

It might not be so strange that this emotional character has been present. Human beings are facing a completely new situation. Of course, it takes time to choose one’s road and to decide on the means to cope with the problems one is facing. I therefore see it as fairly natural that we have had a fairly strong pacifist, defense nihilist tendency in the discussion in recent years. This is not unhealthy – as some have argued – but a natural and necessary consequence of the great matters humans are facing. It is to be hoped, however, that the discussion will eventually become more sober, that an objective debate will grow strong and that this will [replace] emotionally based views.³²⁰

Through such representations, that which was described as outside of the objective sphere was labeled as of limited relevance. This hierarchy of what was considered important was also reflected among those who were against nuclear weapon acquisition. For example, a SAP parliamentarian who was an outspoken opponent of nuclear weapon acquisition noted: “Little has been said about the effects of atomic bombings today. I will not delve into this topic, because it could be interpreted as talking about things outside of the so-called objective debate.”³²¹ By this statement, he was recognizing that the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons had been labeled as outside of what was classified as the objective debate. In sum, a difference was created between what was considered rational and objective reasoning by those who favored nuclear weapon acquisition, and what they labeled as emotional and subjective reasoning by those opposed to such weapons.

In the above examples, those who advocated nuclear weapon acquisition represented themselves as relevant while the opponents of nuclear weapon acquisition were relationally represented as emotionally guided and therefore irrelevant. Such representations have important gender dimensions. The human bodies that were dismissed as irrelevant were the victimized bodies of a

³¹⁹ Riksdagens protokoll. 1958/59: 16. ”Ang. ökad forskningsverksamhet inom atomområdet, m.m.”, Boheman (fp), första kammaren.

³²⁰ Riksdagens protokoll. 1958/59: 16. ”Ang. ökad forskningsverksamhet inom atomområdet, m.m.”, Siegbahn (s).

³²¹ Riksdagens protokoll. 1958/59: 16. ”Ang. ökad forskningsverksamhet inom atomområdet, m.m.”, Branting (s), första kammaren.

nuclear blast and the feminized bodies that opposed nuclear weapon acquisition. Following a relational approach, male bodies in favor of nuclear weapons were represented as rational and relevant. As noted above, feminist research on nuclear weapon discourses in the US and the UK has shown how nuclear weapons are expected to be discussed in a “rational” manner. This rational logic has been associated with a masculine identity, while the opposite – expressing emotion – has been associated with a feminine identity. Where there is a masculine right of interpretation and where the qualities associated with women and femininity are belittled, any argument that deviates from rational logic can be dismissed or ignored.³²² In this light, representations of anti-nuclear weapon advocacy as emotional, and of the victims of the use of nuclear weapons as irrelevant made it possible to argue that nuclear weapon acquisition was the rational way forward.

Emotional military thinking

Even though advocates of nuclear weapon acquisition held that emotion and morals were irrelevant in debates about nuclear weapons, opponents of nuclear weapon acquisition made emotion part of their advocacy and called it a necessary ingredient. In a speech on International Women’s Day in 1958, Thorsson recognized: “In the lively debate on these issues, it has been said that we are guided by muddy and casual emotional thinking.” However, she continued:

It is natural that discussions on nuclear weapons, the disarmament problem, the peace question, partly have been characterized by emotional thinking. It would be scary if such a debate could take place where the participants were not engaged with their emotions. [...] Accurate and ‘rational’ considerations are not enough: emotion, fantasy and vision have to be included if we want to understand correctly what it is all about.³²³

Thorsson argued that emotions were a necessary component of the evaluation of the nuclear weapon option, no matter what her adversaries claimed. She also confronted the terminology used by the supporters of nuclear weapons by accusing them of “vague wording about the new weapon’s horrible character,” and accused the military establishment and conservative advocates of being

³²² See for example Cohn, 1987; Cohn, Hill & Ruddick, 2005.

³²³ ”Tal av Inga Thorsson”. Internationella kvinnodagen mars 1958. Vol. 9, Serie 4 Handlingar rörande verksamhet, 2 Försvarsfrågan, i.s. atomvapendebatten. Inga Thorssons arkiv, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB. See also ”Protokoll från SSU-kongressen 1958, Tal av gäster, Inga Thorsson”. Vol. 9, Serie 4 Handlingar rörande verksamhet, 2 Försvarsfrågan, i.s. atomvapendebatten. Inga Thorssons arkiv, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB.

emotionally guided.³²⁴ Arguing that the military was stuck in dated experiences that were not relevant to the present situation, Thorsson claimed:

The military uses all available propaganda resources to strongly push for atomic weapon acquisition. Naturally, the military arguments for this must be scrutinized. After our evaluation we have come to the conclusion that the arguments are not convincing. The military leadership does not seem to have the power or the vision needed to visualize the new world order and Sweden's new position in the world. It starts from its experiences of the past, a time that we cannot base any evaluations on, neither militarily nor politically. They rely – as much as we do – on emotional thinking when they demand that 'our boys should not have to be sent to defend this country equipped with poor weapons compared to those of the enemy'.³²⁵

According to Thorsson, representatives of the Swedish Armed Forces used all available means to discredit opponents of nuclear weapon acquisition. Thorsson argued that this was mere propaganda, and claimed that it relied on nostalgia and romantic fantasies of past experiences with no relevance to the present. By associating military arguments with nostalgia and wishful thinking, Thorsson represented their advocacy as far from rational. The atomic weapons that the military was asking for could do nothing to help them in the event of a nuclear war, and Thorsson therefore argued that the military was irrational and emotional in its evaluation of the situation. Rearticulating the same message in a subsequent speech, Thorsson called this "emotional military thinking."³²⁶ The background story to this line of argumentation was that advocates of nuclear weapon acquisition held that it would be immoral to equip Swedish youth facing a nuclear weapon-equipped adversary with conventional weapons.³²⁷ Arguing that emotions were everywhere, Thorsson claimed:

Among other things it is clear that the argumentation of those who favor acquisition of atomic weapons is also to a great extent an expression of emotion, but

³²⁴ "Protokoll från SSU-kongressen 1958, Tal av gäster, Inga Thorsson". Vol. 9, Serie 4 Handlingar rörande verksamhet, 2 Försvarsfrågan, i.s. atomvapendebatten. Inga Thorssons arkiv, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB.

³²⁵ "Protokoll från SSU-kongressen 1958, Tal av gäster, Inga Thorsson". Vol. 9, Serie 4 Handlingar rörande verksamhet, 2 Försvarsfrågan, i.s. atomvapendebatten. Inga Thorssons arkiv, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB.

³²⁶ "Sverige i atomvapnets skugga. En lekmands syn på atomvapnen". Konferens i Umeå den 23–24/11 1957, Stadsbiblioteket. Vol. 9, Serie 4 Handlingar rörande verksamhet, 2 Försvarsfrågan, i.s. atomvapendebatten. Inga Thorssons arkiv, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB.

³²⁷ See for example Riksdagens protokoll. 1958/59: 17. "Atomvapenfrågan", Hjalmarson (h), andra kammaren.

from another perspective. This does not rule out, however, that realist and objective judgments have been made on both sides, and I think that we could admit that on both sides.³²⁸

According to Thorsson, both sides of the nuclear weapon debate were guided by emotion. She also stressed that reason was part of anti-nuclear weapon advocacy. This kind of language is interesting not only because it challenged the dichotomy between the emotional woman and the rational man, but also because it challenged nuclear weapon discourses more generally. Social scientists Carol Cohn, Felicity Hill and Sarah Ruddick argue that nuclear weapons tend to be discussed within a “strategic expert discourse” that is deeply connected with a masculine identity because of its reliance on strength, protection and rationality. They argue that the opposite – to talk about nuclear weapons in phrasings that are classified as “impulsive, uncontrolled, emotional, concrete, upset and attentive to fragile human bodies” – is associated with a feminine identity.³²⁹ Cohn argues that to talk about human suffering is to turn away from the masculinized, rational discourse that limits the conversation to discussion of clinical and abstract terms.³³⁰ By bringing the humanitarian dimension of nuclear weapons to the fore, Thorsson challenged both a rationalist discourse around nuclear weapons, and gendered assumptions about rational men and emotional women.

Swedish Exceptionalism

This section focuses on representations of Swedish exceptionalism in the Swedish nuclear weapon debate. While drawing different conclusions about whether the Swedish government should acquire nuclear weapons, both sides of the debate portrayed Sweden and Swedishness as exceptional, to varying degrees. The different ways in which notions of Swedish exceptionalism were represented is the topic of this section.

As argued above, opponents of nuclear weapon acquisition associated nuclear weapons with fear, as a consequence of the devastating humanitarian impacts of their use. Hence, nuclear weapons were relationally differentiated from other categories of weapon, such as the conventional weapons of the Swedish armed forces. This differentiation has to be understood in a national context where the policy of armed neutrality received broad societal support and, as argued in Chapter 3, was a central component of Swedish national identity. Even though it was against equipping the armed forces with nuclear

³²⁸ Riksdagens protokoll. 1957/58: B7. ”Försvarets utformning på längre sikt (Forts.)”, Thorsson (s), andra kammaren.

³²⁹ Cohn, Hill & Ruddick, 2005: 5.

³³⁰ Cohn, 1987.

weapons, the SSKF was in favor of a conventionally armed defense force. It repeatedly clarified that it supported the idea of a strong conventional defense for upholding the policy of neutrality, while at the same time opposing the inclusion of nuclear weapons in such a defense.³³¹ This meant that the SSKF could remain loyal to the policy of armed neutrality.

While the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and the differentiation between nuclear and conventional weapons were central to anti-nuclear weapon advocacy, such arguments were rejected by those who favored nuclear weapon acquisition. It was argued that the strategic nuclear weapons and hydrogen bombs of the US and the Soviet Union were the real weapons of mass destruction. Swedish nuclear weapons were represented as inherently *different* from the nuclear weapons of the superpowers. For example, early on in the nuclear weapon debate, a Conservative Party parliamentarian argued:

Both robot weapons and tactical atomic weapons [...] are distinctively defensive weapons. The idea is that they will be part of the Swedish defense organization only as a military tool against hostile attack, with purely tactical tasks, when the time makes them available to us.³³²

Given that Swedish nuclear weapons would only be used for tactical purposes, he did not see them as any different from the conventional weapons already held by the Swedish Armed Forces. Hence, advocates of nuclear weapon acquisition relied on notions of difference between Swedish atomic weapons, on the one hand, and what had been used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, on the other. Using this distinction, it was possible to disregard the humanitarian consequences of the potential use of nuclear weapons. Another Conservative Party parliamentarian held that:

It is important that the Swedish discussion about atomic weapons stays on topic instead of turning into general nightmare scenarios. What we are discussing [...] is an atomic weapon to be used against hostile intruders, designed for this purpose only. It is not at all about for example Hiroshima bombs. Even if we could, no one in our country wants to possess weapons of mass destruction targeted at cities. The tactical atomic weapon – as it is possible to define it – gives the defender a larger advantage than the attacker. This is a reason to discuss it as part of our defense in a cool and realistic way.³³³

³³¹ See for example Wigforss, Ernst (ed). *Nej! till svenska atomvapen*. Stockholm: Tiden. 1959: 10f; "Protokoll, VU-sammanträde torsdagen den 15 januari 1959". Vol. 22, Serie A Protokoll, 3 Verkställande utskottets protokoll. Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Kvinnoförbund, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB.

³³² Riksdagens protokoll. 1953/54: 22. "Motioner om utredning rörande begränsning av försvarskostnaderna.", Svärd (h), andra kammaren.

³³³ Riksdagens protokoll. 1954/55: 8. "Utrikesdebatt", herr Hjalmarson (h), andra kammaren.

Opponents of nuclear weapon acquisition were described to turning the discussion into a “nightmare scenario”, which he regarded as going off topic. Calling for a “cool and realistic” conversation, he emphasized that Swedish tactical nuclear weapons would only be used for defensive purposes. As in the previous section, he made a distinction between what was represented as realistic nuclear weapon advocacy and emotionally guided and unrealistic anti-nuclear weapon advocacy, where the latter was represented as making unrealistic nightmare scenarios part of their argumentation.

Through these kinds of representations, Swedish nuclear weapons were described as just like any military equipment, and easily integrated into the conventional weapon-based Swedish Armed Forces. The defensive character of Swedish defense policy was central to such representations. The purposes for which a state acquired or used nuclear weapons were described as the heart of the matter, rather than the characteristics of the weapons themselves. For example, a Conservative Party parliamentarian held that if nuclear weapons were for use in defending national independence and human survival, this would meet moral criteria and therefore be classified as moral:

I have always held – and I still do – that what decides the moral quality is the purpose for which the weapon is used. If it is used to defend the right to national independence and human survival, it meets necessary moral criteria. If it is used for aggression, to back up a threat or to occupy, then it is immoral.³³⁴

The distinction between the defensive security policy of the spatially organized national Self and the offensive policies of the Others therefore contributed to the representation of Swedish nuclear weapons as different from those of the superpowers. This made it possible to label Swedish nuclear weapons defensive weapons and thus “morally justified”, with reference to the defensive character of Swedish defense policy. The opposite – to use nuclear weapons as an act of aggression – was represented as immoral.

The above argumentation made the geographic setting of Sweden its main spatial reference, by arguing that the defense of Sweden was the main responsibility of the Self. Furthermore, it described Sweden’s defensive security strategy as moral and reasonable, as opposed to the offensive security strategies of threatening Others. Temporal references were made to armed neutrality, which was described as a defensive security strategy distanced from aggression. It is my interpretation that this assumed difference between what was represented as a morally superior and defensive Swedish Self equipped with morally defensible Swedish nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and those weapons which were represented as immoral in possession of threatening Oth-

³³⁴ Riksdagens protokoll. 1958/59: 16. ”Ang. ökad forskningsverksamhet inom atomområdet, m.m.”, Svärd (h), första kammaren.

ers, on the other, relied on notions that Sweden was different from other countries, that is, of Swedish exceptionalism. Furthermore, such representations made it possible to distance Swedish nuclear weapons from future victimized bodies following a nuclear blast, as Swedish nuclear weapons were described as only serving defensive purposes. Through these kinds of representations, Swedish defense policy – and the nuclear weapons that it wanted to be integrated into the armed forces – were labelled morally superior to those of the adversaries.

In light of what is argued in the theory section about masculine protection, this can be understood as central to the making of what can be interpreted as a morally superior defense policy of the Self – a defensive security policy with no hostile intentions. Its opposite Other – the offensive security policies of the superpowers and their possession of strategic nuclear weapon arsenals – was thus represented as immoral, aggressive and hostile. Such representations contributed to the making of a moral military masculinity ideal, represented as inherently different from the immoral, aggressive and inhumane military masculinity ideal of other nuclear weapon states. In light of this separation, the proposed policy of acquiring nuclear weapons was represented as responsible and morally defensible. Thus, identity and policy were simultaneously inter-linked and made.

In their advocacy, opponents of nuclear weapon acquisition challenged the distinction between Swedish nuclear weapons and those of the superpowers, and emphasized that regardless of the terminology, any use of nuclear weapons would bring about such severe humanitarian consequences that their possession could never be acceptable. For example, recognizing that the capacity of a Swedish nuclear weapon would be comparable to the bomb that had been used on Hiroshima, a Communist Party parliamentarian refused to accept the distinction made primarily by Conservative Party advocates:

According to [this] description, it is only ‘tactical’ atomic weapons with a clear defensive character that cannot be compared with the hydrogen bombs, which are weapons of mass destruction. 6 000 of the 250 000 citizens of Hiroshima were spared after the first ‘tactical’ atomic bomb, which really says it all about that kind of definition.³³⁵

Similarly, SSKF chair Thorsson emphasized that “there is no practical way to distinguish between so-called tactical and so-called strategic atomic weapons”.³³⁶ Talking about nuclear weapons as weapons that cause indiscriminate

³³⁵ Riksdagens protokoll. 1958/59: 7. ”Meddelande ang. Sveriges utrikespolitik”, herr Hagberg (k), andra kammaren.

³³⁶ ”Inga Thorsson om Motion nr 9, ang. atomvapen i svenska försvaret”. *Protokoll, Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Kvinnoförbunds 9:e kongress, 6–9 maj 1956*. Stockholm: Barnängens Tryckerier AB, 1956.

harm to civilian populations, opponents of nuclear weapon acquisition rejected the assumed separation between Swedish tactical nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapons of the superpowers. The same message was repeated over and over again. In a speech on International Women's Day in 1958, Thorsson stated that "all atomic weapons are weapons of terror", and that they had come to constitute a new threat to all of humankind.³³⁷ She said that regardless of whether nuclear weapons were defined as tactical or strategic, the consequences of their use would be so severe that they could not be legitimized. She, as well as other opponents of nuclear weapon acquisition, thereby challenged the distinction between the tactical nuclear weapons that the Supreme Commander and Conservative Party parliamentarians were asking for and the strategic arsenals of the nuclear weapon states. By challenging this distinction, opponents of nuclear weapon acquisition linked all nuclear weapons with severe humanitarian consequences and differentiated them from that which concerned the future survival of all of humankind.

Even though opponents of nuclear weapon acquisition challenged the distinction between Swedish nuclear weapons and those of the superpowers, they, like the advocates of nuclear weapon acquisition, also drew on notions of Swedish exceptionalism in their argumentation. This was especially apparent in temporal references to notions of a national peaceful past and, in turn, in representations of a peaceful Self in the present. Furthermore, such representations were also associated with spatial references to the Self as part of a world opinion that favored peace – a Self that extended the geographical boundaries of national Swedish territory. Using spatial references to the Swedish "people", opponents of nuclear weapon acquisition argued that Swedes favored a traditional position on peace and neutrality, and that this position was incompatible with nuclear weapon acquisition. Through such representations, opponents of nuclear weapon acquisition represented "Swedishness" as connected with a world opinion that worked against nuclear weapon tests and for nuclear disarmament in the interests of all of humankind. For example, a Communist Party parliamentarian argued:

The world opinion that demands an end to nuclear weapon experiments and a ban on the use of nuclear weapons in case of war grows stronger each day. In this situation, to advocate for the acquisition of nuclear weapons in our small country is a cynical demonstration against everything related to détente and peace. Swedish nuclear weapons activism is contrary to the traditional peace and neutrality position of our people.³³⁸

³³⁷ "Tal av Inga Thorsson". Internationella kvinnodagen mars 1958. Vol. 9, Serie 4 Handlingar rörande verksamhet, 2 Försvarsfrågan, i.s. atomvapendebatten. Inga Thorssons arkiv, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB.

³³⁸ Riksdagens protokoll. 1957/58: B6. "Försvarets utformning på längre sikt", Persson (k), första kammaren. Similar reasoning was raised earlier, for example by SSKF member and social democrat parliamentarian Nancy Eriksson, Riksdagens protokoll. 1954/55: 31. "Svar på

Drawing on temporal references to a peaceful past and spatial references to a “traditional peace and neutrality position of our people”, the identity of the Swedish Self was represented as associated with peace. Furthermore, nuclear weapon acquisition was represented as incompatible with the peaceful identity of the Self. The SSKF made similar references to notions of a peaceful past, and linked anti-nuclear weapon advocacy in Sweden with global world opinion that demanded peace:

World opinion demands peace, world opinion demands an end to the production of atomic weapons. Do we Swedes feel that we are part of this world opinion? Are we aware that the spectators’ bench from which we have observed the world for 150 years is no more than a memory in the atomic age? Have we realized that we could not escape the destiny of the rest of the world, if the unthinkable and terrifying large-scale war were to take place? Are we prepared to use all the positive forces that we have to participate in world opinion’s demand for peace?³³⁹

Arguing that Sweden had been on the sidelines of world events for 150 years, Thorsson spoke about the unthinkable consequences a nuclear war would bring about and called on all Swedes to join the global campaign against nuclear weapons. Arguing that it was possible to take an active role in world affairs, she represented the opposite as taking a passive position. Hence, Thorsson associated anti-nuclear weapon campaigning with activity. Using similar phrasing, the SSKF continually represented their advocacy as active, and aligned their voice with a growing world opinion, calling on all Swedes to do the same.

In the late 1950s, it was emphasized that if Sweden were to acquire nuclear weapons, this would set a bad example for others to follow. For example, Foreign Minister Undén argued that “the suspicion that Sweden is striving to join the atomic club could inspire other states to do the same, no matter if they have their own production or purchase from abroad.”³⁴⁰ In its advocacy, the SSKF linked the Swedish decision with the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries. In an op-ed in 1958, for example, Thorsson stated:

By deciding to produce atomic weapons, Sweden could be the very country that is responsible for the spread of this production to all the countries that have, or

interpellation ang. åtgärder för att påskynda atomkraftens fredliga utnyttjande som energikälla för industri m.m.”, Eriksson (s), andra kammaren.

³³⁹ ”Tal av Inga Thorsson”. Internationella kvinnodagen mars 1958. Vol. 9, Serie 4 Handlingar rörande verksamhet, 2 Försvarsfrågan, i.s. atomvapendebatten. Inga Thorssons arkiv, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB. See also for example Thorsson, Inga. ”Tiden är knapp”. *Morgonbris*. No. 1, 1957.

³⁴⁰ Riksdagens protokoll. 1957/58: B12. ”Svar på frågor ang. ifrågasatt utvidgning av forskningsverksamheten på atomområdet”, FM Undén (s), andra kammaren.

soon will have, the raw material and the technical resources to produce such weapons. [...] What we do on the atomic question will positively or negatively influence our ability to reach an international solution to the greatest and most serious task facing humankind.³⁴¹

According to Thorsson, Swedish nuclear weapon acquisition could inspire other states to follow Sweden's lead, in effect turning Sweden into a rogue state that contributed to an acceleration of the nuclear arms race. Such representations have to be placed in the broader international context. The Swedish nuclear weapon debate took place in an international context in which the fear of an escalating proliferation of nuclear weapons to a large number of states was a common feature of international relations. The danger of this situation was already being recognized by a SAP parliamentarian in 1955:

If things continue as they are now, we will [...] come to a situation where there are no countries and no human beings to defend, and we can get there just by experiment, without war. Under such circumstances it would be criminal for a small country to produce weapons of mass destruction just because it is able to do so. We have to find other solutions and Sweden – with its historically long period of peace, its reputation in the world and its goodwill among other nations – should be brave enough to serve as an example, to walk the road that humanity has chosen to secure its survival.³⁴²

Arguing that Sweden should be brave and serve as an example for other states to follow by abstaining from the acquisition of nuclear weapons, he made temporal reference to assumptions about Sweden's peaceful past and argued that it would be criminal for a state such as Sweden to contribute to the nuclear arms race. Representations of a peaceful past that made it possible to describe the present Self as peaceful associated spatial references to the "Swedish people" with a global call for peace and disarmament.

Instead of acquiring nuclear weapons, the SSKF and other anti-nuclear advocates communicated a responsibility of the Swedish Self to become an international role model by abstaining from nuclear weapon acquisition. In an interview with East German television in 1958, Thorsson emphasized that Sweden should show that "even a small and neutral state" refused to join the nuclear arms race.³⁴³ Nuclear abstention was thus represented as something to be proud of, since it was expected to contribute to halting the arms race at the

³⁴¹ Thorsson, Inga. "Sveriges uppgifter i det internationella nedrustningsarbetet". *Morgonbris*. No. 7–8, 1958.

³⁴² Riksdagens protokoll. 1954/55: 10. "Överbefälhavarens utredning rörande krigsmaktens utveckling", Spångberg (s), första kammaren.

³⁴³ "Uttalande för östtysk radio den 28/3 1958 i riksdagshuset". Vol. 9, Serie 4 Handlingar rörande verksamhet, 2 Försvarsfrågan, i.s. atomvapendebatten. Inga Thorssons arkiv, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB.

international level.³⁴⁴ The opposite was relationally represented as a state of humiliation and shame. Through such representations, opponents of nuclear weapon acquisition associated nuclear weapon acquisition with the proliferation of nuclear weapons, a bad international reputation and emotions related to shame. In 1963, Thorsson again recognized that the best way to contribute to international détente was for Sweden to voluntarily give up the nuclear weapons option:

We are convinced that a majority of the Swedish people would welcome a Swedish no-decision, meaning among other things that the Nordic states could form a nuclear weapon-free zone in times of peace. For us, in our part of the world, this would be the best support we could give to détente efforts. By using the freedom of action for such an initiative, the SAP would make itself worthy of its position as the governing party in a privileged country like Sweden.³⁴⁵

Such policy advocacy drew on temporal references to a shared national past characterized by peace and neutrality. Hence, spatial references were made to the Swedish national Self. The responsibility of the Self was linked to a role model ideal, in which Sweden was said to have a responsibility to act as a positive model for others to follow. By doing the opposite, by acquiring nuclear weapons, it was expected that Sweden would set a bad example and thereby contribute to nuclear weapon proliferation. Such representations made it possible to represent nuclear weapon acquisition as incompatible with Sweden's peaceful identity and disarmament as the right way forward. Notions of shame contributed to make meaning about the nuclear weapons option. How debates about disarmament proceeded in this context is the topic of the following chapter.

³⁴⁴ "Uttalande för östtysk radio den 28/3 1958 i riksdagshuset". Vol. 9, Serie 4 Handlingar rörande verksamhet, 2 Försvarsfrågan, i.s. atomvapendebatten. Inga Thorssons arkiv, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB. See also "Tal av Inga Thorsson". Internationella kvinnodagen mars 1958. Vol. 9, Serie 4 Handlingar rörande verksamhet, 2 Försvarsfrågan, i.s. atomvapendebatten. Inga Thorssons arkiv, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB.

³⁴⁵ Thorsson, Inga. "Det första steget". *Morgonbris*. No. 9, 1963.

Summary

This chapter has explored the co-construction of policy and identity in the Swedish nuclear weapon debate, which has been described as one of the most intense Swedish foreign policy debates of modern times. Using sources from both sides of the argument, the analysis in this chapter has contributed insights relevant to the analysis in subsequent chapters.

First and foremost, those who favored nuclear weapon acquisition represented it as essential to equip the Swedish Armed Forces with nuclear weapons. Representations of armed defense as a necessity, particularly in light of mandatory male military service and the association between the armed forces, masculinity and national protection, meant that men were represented as protectors of the nation. Hence, spatial references primarily concerned Sweden, but also indirectly male bodies. Nuclear weapon advocacy thus contributed to the making of gendered representations of active men and passive women, embodied in military men tasked with protecting vulnerable female bodies in need of protection. Such representations rely on and reinforce gendered and sexualized notions of a conservative heterosexual family ideal. In this way, gendered, nationalized and sexualized identity representations, and nuclear weapon advocacy were simultaneously constructed.

Furthermore, nuclear weapon advocacy also made temporal references to a peaceful Swedish past, representing Swedish armed neutrality as a key component of ensuring its peaceful status. By emphasizing the defensive character of Swedish security policy, offensive security strategies were at the same time represented as aggressive. Similarly, Swedish nuclear weapons were differentiated from what were represented as the weapons of mass destruction of aggressive Others, and disconnected from the human suffering caused by the use of nuclear weapons in the past. Such representations made it possible to argue that Swedish nuclear weapons were morally justifiable as part of a defensive security strategy. My conclusion is that this contributed to the construction of a moral and reasonable military masculinity ideal mandated to protect the nation.

Although not addressed as related to emotion, such representations also relied on the presence of fear. In order for the international to be threatening, and national territory to be vulnerable to foreign intrusion, fear was attached to the bodies of threatening Others. Fear thus served as a link between descriptions of vulnerable national territory and the aggressive threatening Other, and the proposed policy of acquiring nuclear weapons. Furthermore, this advocacy represented nuclear weapon acquisition as rational and objective, as opposed to what was relationally organized as emotional and subjective – advocacy against nuclear weapons. Even though nuclear weapon advocacy relied on the presence of fear to justify its argument, emotions were stuck on female bodies, on the bodies of those who were positioned as opponents of nuclear weapons, or those in need of protection.

The opponents of nuclear weapon acquisition analyzed in this chapter made spatial references to different collectives, such as “women”, “Swedes”, “peaceful people” and “Social Democrats”. Along with references to responsibility, they made the survival of future generations their main concern, and in so doing they also made temporal references to the future. SSKF members in particular referred to themselves as representatives of women, arguing that women as mothers had a certain responsibility to care about the welfare of future generations. Through such representations, men were relationally represented as potentially belligerent. Hence, such representations relied on and reconstructed a similar heterosexual family ideal as nuclear weapon advocacy, based on assumptions about gender difference. However, such ideals – especially representations of nuclear weapon advocacy as rational and anti-nuclear weapon advocacy as emotional – were also challenged. For example, opponents of nuclear weapon acquisition argued that military advocacy in favor of nuclear weapons relied on nostalgic and wishful thinking based on experiences from the past. Through such representations, anti-nuclear weapon advocacy labeled all advocacy as emotionally based. Hence, the gendered and sexualized nuclear family ideal was both reinforced and challenged.

Furthermore, temporal references were continually made to notions of a peaceful Swedish past, and this past was associated with the responsibility to promote peace in the present. The acquisition of nuclear weapons was represented as incompatible with such a peaceful Self. Hence, like nuclear weapon advocacy, such temporal representations of the Self relied on notions of Swedish exceptionalism. Furthermore, as in the advocacy in favor of nuclear weapon acquisition, fear was a central component of anti-nuclear weapon advocacy. However, instead of being attached to the bodies of threatening Others, fear was associated with nuclear weapons themselves. Victimized human bodies in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the future potential victims of a nuclear war featured as representations of nuclear danger. Thus, victimized bodies were a central feature of the argumentation of those who opposed nuclear weapon acquisition. Such representations made it possible to advocate abandonment of a Swedish nuclear weapon program and the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

My conclusion from the analysis in this chapter is that the Swedish nuclear weapon debate caused a gendered, nationalized and sexualized split in Sweden not only in parliament and among the general public, but also in the national whole. Chapter 6 explores how disarmament policy evolved as a unifying common ground in a context marked by conflict, and how differences regarding both identity and policy on the nuclear weapon debate resurfaced in debates about disarmament.

6. Disarmament Debates

Chapter 5 shows how the Swedish nuclear weapon debate created a gendered, nationalized and sexualized split between those in favor of and those against Sweden acquiring nuclear weapons. This chapter focuses on how disarmament rose to become a unifying component of Swedish foreign policy, uniting both sides of the nuclear weapon debate. Although there was broad unity around the need for international regulation of nuclear weapons, conflicting views appeared in debates about what disarmament policy should entail, what it should strive to achieve, and its fundamental relation to the national nuclear weapon program. The focus of the chapter is on the simultaneous construction of disarmament advocacy and identity representations.

In Pursuit of National Unity

When the Swedish nuclear weapon debate was at its peak in the late 1950s, the Swedish government decided to postpone a decision on nuclear weapons. The official position was that Sweden should “refrain from any decisions that can be interpreted as a step on the road towards Swedish atomic acquisition” while awaiting progress on international disarmament negotiations.³⁴⁶ Hence, the postponement policy made the Swedish decision contingent on developments in the sphere of international nuclear disarmament. In particular, the need for unity around the two components of Swedish security policy – foreign and defense policy – was repeatedly represented as a reason not to get into a conflict on the nuclear weapon issue, especially in the late 1950s. In 1958, the Defense Minister said:

Our non-aligned foreign policy would not have been respected abroad if it was not supported by our strong defense. Both foreign policy and defense policy in

³⁴⁶ Riksdagens protokoll. 1958/59: 16. ”Ang. ökad forskningsverksamhet inom atomområdet, m.m.”, DM Andersson (s), första kammaren. See also Riksdagens protokoll. 1957/58: B12. ”Svar på frågor ang. ifrågasatt utvidgning av forskningsverksamheten på atomområdet”, DM Andersson (s), andra kammaren.

our country serve to keep us out of war, to protect our peace and our independence. [...] By keeping the issue open we have avoided a defense conflict that would tear us apart, in both parliament and the nation.³⁴⁷

In recognizing that the nuclear weapon debate risked tearing “us” apart, referring to both parliament and the nation, he emphasized that the policy of armed neutrality was what kept Sweden out of war. Arguing that a conflict on the nuclear weapon issue was best avoided, the defense minister called for reliance on armed neutrality to be maintained, arguing that the postponement strategy made unity possible. This attitude was shared by other political parties in parliament. For example, a Liberal Party parliamentarian stressed: “For a fairly long time, the democratic parties have agreed that it would not benefit defense – or anything else – to fuel a conflict about atomic weapons by demanding a decision now or in the near future.”³⁴⁸ The postponement policy made it possible to avoid increased conflict on the nuclear weapon issue. Similar statements were made on the left. A Social Democrat Party (SAP) parliamentarian noted: “I do not think that it is possible to make a unanimous decision in Sweden to equip the Swedish defense forces with nuclear weapons. I think that it will split the nation.”³⁴⁹ By representing the nuclear weapon debate as something that could “split the nation”, this statement also represented the nation as an entity capable of acting in a united way.

As elaborated in Chapter 2, Anderson conceptualizes the nation as an “imagined community” dependent on boundaries between those inside and those outside. Regardless of the level of “actual inequality and exploitation” within the boundaries of the nation, the *imagination* of community brings about “a deep, horizontal comradeship.”³⁵⁰ Furthermore, the image of national unity can also be understood in terms of a nation-family analogy. Comparing the nation with a heterosexual family ideal, McClintock elaborates on how men and women are assumed to have “natural” positions in both the nation and the family.³⁵¹ Following this reasoning, the nation is conceptualized as an extended, gendered and sexualized heterosexual family ideal, a conservative ideal “headed by a father and nurtured by a mother.”³⁵² As Chapter 5 has shown, the nuclear weapon debate caused what can fairly be described as a gendered, nationalized and sexualized split of the national Self. My conclusion is that avoiding conflict on the nuclear weapon issue was equivalent to

³⁴⁷ Riksdagens protokoll. 1957/58: B6. ”Försvarets utformning på längre sikt”, DM Andersson (s), andra kammaren.

³⁴⁸ Riksdagens protokoll. 1958/59: 17. ”Atomvapenfrågan”, Ohlin (fp), andra kammaren. See also for example Riksdagens protokoll. 1958/59: 17. ”Atomvapenfrågan”, Hedlund (cp), andra kammaren.

³⁴⁹ Riksdagens protokoll. 1958/59: 17. ”Atomvapenfrågan”, Åkerström (s), andra kammaren.

³⁵⁰ Anderson, 2006: 6f.

³⁵¹ McClintock, 1995: 353. See also Nagel, 1998.

³⁵² Towns, Karlsson & Eyre, 2014: 239.

avoiding a conflict that would split the national home – and the heterosexual nuclear family ideal on which it relied.

The role model approach

The international dimension of the Swedish nuclear weapon debate had been a core element from the beginning. For example, the first motion on the nuclear weapon issue passed by the SSKF stated that Sweden's decision on the bomb was related to international efforts "to reach an agreement to ban the production and use of atomic weapons."³⁵³ Furthermore, and as argued in Chapter 5, anti-nuclear advocates made temporal references and argued that nuclear weapon acquisition would be incompatible with neutrality and peace, and therefore with what they represented as Swedish "tradition". Speaking about this peace tradition, a Communist Party parliamentarian argued:

As the Prime Minister said, Sweden has peace traditions to build on. To honor these traditions in this serious situation, to build on them by contributing to a ban on atomic weapons and the enforcement of strong international control of this ban is the great task of the Swedish representation at the United Nations. [...] This is what the peace-loving mass of people in our country wants, and for years this is what we have said is the most important contribution our country can make in international politics.³⁵⁴

In this statement, representations of Sweden's peace tradition were associated with a responsibility to advocate in the UN for a ban on nuclear weapons, something that "the peace-loving mass of people" in Sweden was represented as standing behind. Communist Party representatives also argued that additional disarmament initiatives in Geneva would be compatible not only with the peace tradition, but also with Sweden's "position as a non-aligned state."³⁵⁵ In such representations, temporal references to a peaceful past contributed to the legitimization of disarmament advocacy in the present.

Furthermore, links were also made between the Swedish national welfare project and disarmament engagement. For example, the SSKF argued that while "building our own People's home (*folkhem*)", it was necessary to "be

³⁵³ "Motion nr 9, ang. atomvapen i svenska försvaret". *Protokoll, Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Kvinnoförbunds 9:e kongress, 6–9 maj 1956*. Stockholm: Barnängens Tryckerier AB, 1956.

³⁵⁴ Riksdagens protokoll. 1953/54: 21. "Ang. åtgärder i anledning av försöken med vätebomber m.m." herr Persson (k), första kammaren. See also Riksdagens protokoll. 1954/55: 9.

"Ang. Sveriges utrikespolitik", herr Öhman (k), första kammaren.

³⁵⁵ Riksdagens protokoll. 1964/65: 13. "Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt". Herr Hermansson (k), andra kammaren.

engaged in world affairs and to recognize our responsibility for world affairs.”³⁵⁶ By associating international affairs with spatial references to the welfare state project at the national level, associations were constructed between a responsibility to work for solidarity “at home” and a responsibility to do the same abroad. The image below shows the SAP May 1 rally in Stockholm 1957, where participants marched under a banner stating: “Ban atomic weapons (*Förbjud atomvapnen*)”.

Figure 6. “*Förbjud atomvapnen*”



Source: ”Första maj 1957 Stockholm.” Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB.

In addition, if Sweden were to take on the role model approach elaborated on in Chapter 5, this would not only contribute positively to Sweden’s reputation, but was also be expected to break the deadlock in international disarmament negotiations.³⁵⁷ In an op-ed published in 1960, Thorsson recognized that Sweden could contribute positively to international disarmament: “We argue that Sweden can, in the crucial years of the 1960s, make a small but necessary contribution to the only thing that can give a desperate humanity hope for

³⁵⁶ ”Protokoll, Socialdemokratiska Partistyrelsens sammanträde 21 februari 1956”. Vol. 17, Serie A Protokoll, 2 Partistyrelsens protokoll och bilagor, A Partistyrelsens protokoll. Sveriges Socialdemokratiska arbetareparti, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB.

³⁵⁷ ”Uttalande för östtysk radio den 28/3 1958 i riksdagshuset”. Vol. 9, Serie 4 Handlingar rörande verksamhet, 2 Försvarsfrågan, i.s. atomvapendebatten. Inga Thorssons arkiv, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB.

peace: successive international disarmament.”³⁵⁸ As noted above, the SSKF linked nuclear weapon acquisition with the identity of being an international pariah that hinders disarmament and accelerates the nuclear arms race, and the opposite – renouncing the nuclear weapon option and contributing to détente and disarmament – to the identity of a role model. Similar reasoning was heard in the parliament. For example, the Communist Party argued that the best contribution to disarmament Sweden could make was to set a good example by declaring itself non-nuclear.³⁵⁹ In the Foreign Policy debate in 1964, a Communist Party parliamentarian said:

If the government is against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it must be a minimum demand to support the nuclear weapon-free club and to try to prevent the nuclear weapon states from selling nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states or storing nuclear weapons on their territories. With regard to this, it would have helped if the government had used this occasion to assure the world that Sweden will not acquire nuclear weapons. [...] The reply of the foreign minister in response to previous questions about whether Swedish nuclear weapons could be used to put pressure on the superpowers only serves to increase worries among those who understand what a catastrophe it would be if additional states, among them Sweden, hiding behind the beautiful words of the Undén Plan, maintain the possibility or the right to acquire nuclear weapons.³⁶⁰

Following this reasoning, Sweden should give up its nuclear weapon capability regardless of the behavior of other states. By not doing so, it would be behaving irresponsibly and setting a bad example that others might follow.

Nuclear weapon capability as leverage

The postponement policy was at least tolerated by the Conservative Party, even though it strongly held that a lack of progress in international disarmament negotiations would necessarily lead to Sweden acquiring nuclear weapons. The Swedish Armed Forces were represented as weak without nuclear weapons: “If nothing happens at the international level, I am convinced that we have to conclude that we cannot maintain a strong defense unless we acquire tactical atomic weapons.”³⁶¹ As argued in Chapter 5, the Conservative Party believed that Swedish neutrality and non-alignment had to be backed up by a strong national defense organization, preferably equipped with nuclear

³⁵⁸ Thorsson, Inga. ”Kvinnorådslag i framtidstro”. *Morgonbris*. No. 7–8, 1960.

³⁵⁹ Riksdagens protokoll. 1963/64: 15. ”Ang. Sveriges utrikes- och handelspolitik”. Herr Lager (k), första kammaren.

³⁶⁰ Riksdagens protokoll. 1963/64: 15. ”Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt”. Herr Hagberg (k), andra kammaren.

³⁶¹ Riksdagens protokoll. 1958/59: 7. ”Ang. Sveriges utrikespolitik”, herr Ewerlöf (h), första kammaren. See also for example Riksdagens protokoll. 1961/62: 11. ”Sveriges utrikespolitik”. Herr Heckscher (h), andra kammaren.

weapons. The only factor that might change this situation was if progress was made at the international disarmament.³⁶² Only if other states were prevented from acquiring and/or possessing nuclear weapons was it considered reasonable for Sweden to do the same.

Those who advocated nuclear weapon acquisition did not buy into the argument that Sweden had a certain responsibility to abstain from acquiring nuclear weapons, or that acquisition would set a bad example for other states to follow. On the contrary, Conservative Party politicians argued that Swedish nuclear weapon acquisition – or at least the knowledge that Sweden could acquire nuclear weapons as a last resort if no progress was made in international disarmament negotiations – would contribute positively to international developments by putting pressure on the superpowers to reach agreement. For example, a Conservative Party parliamentarian argued:

I am convinced that if it is discovered in the world that a small country like ours with our technical resources is capable of producing atomic weapons, and is prepared to do so, this situation is likely to advance the efforts of the great powers to reach an agreement.³⁶³

In arguing that the knowledge of Sweden's potential nuclear weapon capability would intensify efforts to reach an international agreement, Conservative Party politicians maintained that it was necessary to keep the nuclear weapon option open even if no decision to acquire nuclear weapons was made.³⁶⁴ It was frequently recognized that Sweden was one of a few states that had the technical ability to produce nuclear weapons on its own. For example, a Liberal Party parliamentarian argued:

If we want to have any influence, we should announce that if [international efforts to negotiate a test ban] are not successful, we will have to look after ourselves and acquire a modernized defense. No states outside of the military alliances have achieved such industrial development that they have this possibility, except for Sweden and Switzerland.³⁶⁵

Being a nuclear weapon-capable state was thought to give Sweden influence at the international level, and threatening to acquire nuclear weapons if no

³⁶² See for example Riksdagens protokoll. 1966/67: 12. "Utrikesdebatt". Herr Bohman (h), andra kammaren.

³⁶³ Riksdagens protokoll. 1957/58: B12. "Svar på frågor ang. ifrågasatt utvidgning av forskningsverksamheten på atomområdet", Hjalmarsson (h), andra kammaren.

³⁶⁴ Riksdagens protokoll. 1957/58: B12. "Svar på frågor ang. ifrågasatt utvidgning av forskningsverksamheten på atomområdet", Hjalmarsson (h), andra kammaren.

³⁶⁵ Riksdagens protokoll. 1958/59: 2. "Statsverkspropositionen m.m.", Boheman (fp), första kammaren.

agreement was reached was considered a reasonable maneuver. Speaking specifically about the room for maneuver for a small state, a Conservative Party parliamentarian argued:

We should, within the limited room for maneuver that a small state has, work to reach a nuclear test ban as a step on the road to successive and controlled disarmament. Meanwhile we should stipulate that if this does not lead to a ban on the use of atomic weapons within a reasonable time, we will not consider ourselves bound by it.³⁶⁶

According to this statement, nuclear weapon capability was said to serve international disarmament well by showing the great powers that proliferation could be an unintended consequence of their inability to reach agreement. Thus, nuclear weapon capability was associated with influence.

The possibility of gaining increased influence in disarmament negotiations was repeatedly mentioned in the parliamentary debate, not least on a test-ban treaty. In 1963, the Conservative Party recognized that “the willingness of a small nation to abstain from the production, acquisition or storage of nuclear weapons is dependent on the nuclear weapon states also agreeing to responsibilities, now at hand in the form of a controlled test ban.”³⁶⁷ He argued that if non-nuclear weapon states were to agree to restrictions, then the nuclear weapon states would have to match their sacrifices. The Conservative Party saw this as an important reason for preserving the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons, and argued that it would be dangerous if states such as Sweden decided not to acquire nuclear weapons without getting anything in return. They also stressed that Sweden would lose its best negotiation tool with the nuclear weapon states if they did so, and that they would give up any possibility of talking with authority:

If we are to be able to talk with any authority in discussions on disarmament, not least regarding nuclear weapons, those in the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France must be convinced that if these great powers do not reach a reasonable conclusion when it comes to nuclear weapons and disarmament, it is likely that nuclear weapons will proliferate to countries like Sweden and Switzerland.³⁶⁸

According to the Conservative Party, the appropriate price for the nuclear weapon states to pay would be not simply to commit to non-proliferation, but to agree to a complete ban on nuclear weapons. It also argued that “[i]f we can

³⁶⁶ Riksdagens protokoll. 1958/59: 27. ”Svar på interpellation ang. regeringens syn på de frågor, som förekommit i höstens utrikespolitiska debatt”, Hjalmarson (h), andra kammaren.

³⁶⁷ Riksdagens protokoll. 1961/62: 11. ”Ang Sveriges utrikespolitik”. Herr Virgin (h), första kammaren.

³⁶⁸ Riksdagens protokoll. 1963/64: 15. ”Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt”. Herr Heckscher (h), andra kammaren.

reach this goal [of getting rid of nuclear weapons completely] by making clear to the nuclear weapon states that if they do not do anything, nuclear weapons will spread, then it might be worth using that tool.”³⁶⁹ Through such representations, the ability to acquire nuclear weapons was associated with having a strong position to influence the nuclear weapon states. The relationally organized opposite, giving up the nuclear weapons capability, was represented as equal to letting go of all advantages in, and opportunities to influence, disarmament negotiations.

Like the opponents of nuclear weapon acquisition, those in favor of acquiring nuclear weapons made temporal references to a shared national peaceful past. However, they came to a completely different policy conclusion. For example, making explicit reference to notions of Sweden’s peaceful past, a Conservative Party parliamentarian argued:

Some might say: ‘If Sweden were to acquire nuclear weapons, this would have unfortunate consequences for efforts to reach international agreements.’ It would be very interesting to further develop the grounds for this claim. What is the reason to suspect that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by one of the countries in the world most recognized for its work for peace, which has been at peace since 1814 and distances itself from all agreements that could lead to war, would make others feel threatened and that they would therefore acquire atomic weapons? Who would feel threatened by Swedish atomic weapons?³⁷⁰

In this statement, temporal references to Sweden’s peaceful history, and hence a peaceful national Self in the present, made it possible to argue that other states would not interpret Sweden’s acquisition of nuclear weapons as a hostile act. Assuming that no one would “feel threatened by Swedish atomic weapons”, the acquisition of nuclear weapons was represented as compatible with notions of Swedishness. Again, those who favored nuclear weapon acquisition drew on notions of difference between Sweden and other potential nuclear weapon states, arguing that the peaceful character of the national Self made others feel safe with Swedish nuclear weapons.

³⁶⁹ Riksdagens protokoll. 1963/64: 15. ”Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt”. Herr Heckscher (h), andra kammaren.

³⁷⁰ Riksdagens protokoll. 1958/59: 17. ”Atomvapenfrågan”, Heckscher (h), andra kammaren. See also for example Riksdagens protokoll. 1961/62: 11. ”Ang Sveriges utrikespolitik”. Herr Bengtsson (cp), första kammaren.

Summary

This chapter has outlined how engagement with international nuclear disarmament arose as a shared priority of both sides of the nuclear weapon debate. Differences occurred, however, with regard to the position of the Swedish nuclear weapon program in relation to disarmament. The identity representations featured in this chapter resemble those in Chapter 5. Those who opposed nuclear weapon acquisition made different spatial references, speaking as women, representatives of humanity as a whole, and so on. In their disarmament advocacy, however, it was especially common to make temporal references to a peaceful Swedish history, arguing that a peaceful past made it necessary to contribute to international disarmament and peace, and to act as a good example for others to follow by abandoning any nuclear weapon plans. However, notions of a peaceful past led conservatives to a different conclusion. They used it as an argument for why Sweden could be trusted with nuclear weapons. For conservatives, spatial references continued to be geographically organized around Sweden, and the protection of national territory was represented as the main responsibility. Drawing on notions of Swedish exceptionalism, it was argued that Sweden's peaceful tradition could remain intact even if the defense organization was equipped with nuclear weapons, since no one would be threatened by Sweden. In fact, a Swedish nuclear weapon capability was described as a positive contribution to international disarmament talks because it could put pressure on the nuclear weapon states to work harder. Although conservatives and anti-nuclear advocates shared the conviction that Sweden was an especially peaceful nation, this led to different solutions to the nuclear weapon and disarmament problems. Chapter 7 analyzes how official disarmament policy evolved at the governmental level.

7. The Making of a Technical Expert

Chapters 5 and 6 showed how the nuclear weapon debate caused a gendered, nationalized and sexualized split between those in favor of and those opposed to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and how disarmament emerged to become a unifying ground between both sides of the debate. This chapter turns to the disarmament policy of the Swedish government and examines how authoritative discourses on both identity and disarmament policy were established over time, and manifest themselves in official policy. The chapter primarily draws on government sources. This category of sources predominantly refers to spatial references related to the geographical setting of Sweden, as in “Sweden” and “the Swedish government”. As a result of the origin of the materials included, spatial referents are primarily geographically organized and thus differ from those in other chapters. In this light, this chapter pays special attention to how different temporal and responsibility identity representations were co-constructed with the Swedish government’s disarmament policy, and how they were gendered, nationalized and sexualized.

The (Re)unification of the Nation

As is argued in the introduction to Part II, the Swedish government was divided on the nuclear weapon issue and unable to decide whether to equip the Swedish Armed Forces with nuclear weapons. The official government position in the late 1950s held that Sweden should await the outcome of international disarmament negotiations and postpone the nuclear weapon decision. Although unable to reach agreement on whether to equip the armed forces with nuclear weapons, there was general agreement on both the policy of armed neutrality and the need for international regulation of nuclear weapons. In the mid-1950s, the Swedish government saw disarmament merely as a sign of decreased tension at the international level, and any progress in the disarmament field was considered a consequence, rather than a cause, of reduced tension between the superpowers.³⁷¹ Nonetheless, nuclear weapons were also described as preserving stability at the international level:

³⁷¹ Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. “Statement to the Riksdag on the international situation, made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Second Chamber and summarized by the

A fairly general belief that a certain balance of power between the two blocs now exists has obviously contributed to the prevailing calm. This applies especially to a balance in the possession of modern means of destruction. The knowledge of the destructive effects of these weapons constitutes in itself a strong restraining factor against any possible tendencies to start an attack or a preventive war. This knowledge acts as a deterrent on both sides and at the same time compels them to make attempts to reach a political détente.³⁷²

While this nuclearized balance of power was seen as a stabilizing force, the importance of the regulation of nuclear weapons was also recognized, not least due to the destructive consequences of the potential use of such weapons.³⁷³ Although the great powers were identified as having the main responsibility for resolving the problems related to disarmament, the Swedish Prime Minister stated that a small state like Sweden had a responsibility to contribute, not least because of its “long peace tradition”:

Of course, we first hope for the possibility to reach agreement on general disarmament, a ban on the use of atomic weapons and control of nuclear energy in the UN. [...] Of course this is a question that must primarily be resolved by the great powers [...] But also small nations, with war powers not comparable to those of the great powers and that not are involved in the production of atomic weapons, have every reason to express their concern about developments, and have a clear responsibility to contribute to the disarmament issue according to their capabilities. Our country would treat its long peace tradition poorly if we were not prepared to actively contribute to efforts to achieve general disarmament and a realistic and effective control of atomic energy.³⁷⁴

As Chapter 6 demonstrated, references to the Swedish peace tradition were a shared feature of those who favored and those who opposed Swedish nuclear weapons. Even though this temporal reference was used to advocate different policy proposals in the nuclear weapon debate, notions of a shared historical past can be understood as a unifying element for both sides of the debate. While arguing that Sweden had a certain position to protect at the international level, based on “its role in the United Nations, its traditional peace policy and

Prime Minister in the First Chamber; 9th March”. *Documents on Swedish foreign policy*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1955.

³⁷² Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. “Government statement on the international situation made by the Prime Minister in the First Chamber of the Riksdag and by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Second Chamber; 7th March”. *Documents on Swedish foreign policy*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1956: 15.

³⁷³ Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. “Government statement on the international situation made by the Prime Minister in the First Chamber of the Riksdag and by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Second Chamber; 7th March”. *Documents on Swedish foreign policy*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1956.

³⁷⁴ Riksdagens protokoll. 1953/54: 21. ”Ang. åtgärder i anledning av försöken med vätebomber m.m.” PM Erlander (s), första kammaren.

its cooperation with other nations”, the defense minister also stressed that Sweden had a certain responsibility to contribute to international disarmament.³⁷⁵ As time passed, Swedish engagement in international disarmament affairs increased to become a unifying component of Swedish foreign policy that both sides of the nuclear weapon debate could sign up to. In a national context where the nuclear weapon debate had caused intense conflict, the need for disarmament and international regulation of nuclear weapons united both sides of the debate. In the early 1960s, the Swedish government gained increased access to international disarmament forums after the decision on nuclear weapons acquisition had been postponed in the late 1950s, awaiting what would happen in the international arena.³⁷⁶ Temporal references to a peaceful past that both advocates and opponents of nuclear weapon acquisition stood behind made it possible to act as a united nation and to make engagement in international nuclear disarmament efforts a responsibility of the national Self.

The Nuclear Weapon-capable Self

Chapter 6 examined how the postponement policy made the Swedish decision on nuclear weapon acquisition contingent on developments in the international disarmament field. The possibility of Sweden participating in international disarmament talks was increased when it became one of eight non-aligned states to join an extended disarmament conference formed in 1962 – the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC). A Swedish disarmament delegation led by Alva Myrdal was appointed to prepare for the ENDC negotiations.³⁷⁷ Myrdal’s first task as Sweden’s disarmament representative was to work on a Swedish initiative on a voluntary non-atomic club at the UN. This later became known as the Undén Plan. This initiative was presented to the UN General Assembly in 1961.³⁷⁸ Facing years of deadlock in the international disarmament arena, and the failure of the cold war rivals to negotiate a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests, Undén proposed that “the initiative to bring about a ban against nuclear tests should be left to [the non-nuclear weapon] countries” through the establishment on a voluntary basis of a “Non-

³⁷⁵ Riksdagens protokoll. 1958/59: 17. ”Atomvapenfrågan”, DM Andersson (s), andra kam-maren.

³⁷⁶ See for example Jonter, 2016.

³⁷⁷ ”Pressmeddelande måndagen den 5 mars 1962, ang. medlemmar i den sv. del. i nedrust-ningskommissionen”. Vol. 445, Mål V 1962, HP48 Förenta nationerna, Politiska avdelning-ens ärenden, 1920 års dossiersystem, Utrikesdepartementets arkiv, Riksarkivet.

³⁷⁸ ”Statement by the minister for foreign affairs, Mr. Östen Undén in the First Committee”. Vol. 443, Mål V 1961, HP48 Förenta nationerna, Politiska avdelningens ärenden, 1920 års dossiersystem, Utrikesdepartementets arkiv, Riksarkivet. This initiative has been further ex-plored by Norlin, 1998; and Andersson, 2004: 86f.

atomic club”.³⁷⁹ In its capacity as member of the ENDC, Sweden also advocated a ban on nuclear weapon tests and signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963 – even though it was not the comprehensive ban that it envisaged.³⁸⁰ At the same time, in addresses to international audiences, the Swedish government emphasized that its decision on nuclear weapon acquisition was dependent on developments in the international nuclear disarmament sphere, and that additional agreements would have to be reached in order for Sweden to declare itself non-nuclear:

It is the hope of the Government that the test-ban agreement now signed in Moscow will lead to further concrete results in the work for disarmament and pave the way for settlements which impose real limitations on both nuclear and conventional weapons. If these hopes are fulfilled, this first important step which the Moscow Treaty constitutes may have a decisive importance for our position regarding Swedish nuclear weapons.³⁸¹

In this statement, the Swedish government argued that Sweden’s decision on its own nuclear weapon program was contingent on developments in the international disarmament field. The PTBT was described as a step in the right direction, but it was stressed that additional steps would have to be taken in order to influence the Swedish decision on nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Sweden would remain a potential nuclear weapon state. Hence, the Swedish government kept the nuclear weapon option open while awaiting progress in the international disarmament sphere. Unlike those opponents of nuclear weapon acquisition who wanted Sweden to serve as a role model by abandoning the nuclear weapon option, the government decided to continue to pursue the postponement strategy for the time being.³⁸²

Science, technology and expertise

The Swedish nuclear weapon debate and the disarmament engagement that eventually constituted unifying common ground in a split nation took place in a national context marked by technological optimism, where science and tech-

³⁷⁹ ”Pressmeddelande måndagen den 5 mars 1962, ang. medlemmar i den sv. del. i nedrustningskommissionen”. Vol. 445, Mål: V 1962, HP48 Förenta nationerna, Politiska avdelningens ärenden, 1920 års dossiersystem, Utrikesdepartementets arkiv, Riksarkivet; ”Statement by the minister for foreign affairs, Mr. Östen Undén in the First Committee”. Vol. 443, Mål V 1961, HP48 Förenta nationerna, Politiska avdelningens ärenden, 1920 års dossiersystem, Utrikesdepartementets arkiv, Riksarkivet.

³⁸⁰ See for example Goldblat, 2002.

³⁸¹ Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. ”Press release; 6th August”, *Documents on Swedish foreign policy*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1963: 59.

³⁸² Previous research has argued that Prime Minister Erlander had already changed his mind about the nuclear weapons decision in the early 1960s. See for example Jonter, 2016.

nological progress were seen as solutions to various Swedish societal problems such as energy supply and poverty. In the setting up of the Swedish welfare state, Alva Myrdal was a strong supporter of so-called social engineering, that is, that diverse problems in society could be dealt with by investment in infrastructure, education and social reform. Together with her spouse, Gunnar Myrdal, a renowned economist who had previously served as Minister of Trade, she was often labeled the architect of the Swedish welfare state. This was an era of strong belief in what modern technology and science could do for the public good.³⁸³ It was in this context of technological optimism that the Swedish nuclear program was born not only potentially to produce nuclear weapons, but also to provide energy. At that time, the visions of scientists and engineers who pictured a future of an unlimited supply of cheap energy and continued progress in the field of nuclear technology were widely shared throughout Swedish society.³⁸⁴ As it turned out, Sweden's technological competences derived from the nuclear weapon program became a core feature of Swedish disarmament policy. In fact, what prevailed over time, and became dominant in international negotiations, was Sweden's technological approach to disarmament. As the political scientist George H. Quester noted, "the Swedish delegation at Geneva saw itself as an independent source of expertise."³⁸⁵ This image of the modern national Self was shared with leading politicians in the SAP and the opposition.

Early on, the Swedish government connected disarmament with technological competence and skill. When the PTBT was discussed in 1962, the government proposed that scientific knowledge should be used to resolve the controversies over control and inspections that were causing disagreements between the US and the Soviet Union. In a speech to the ENDC in 1962, the Swedish disarmament delegation proposed that a solution to the test-ban issue might be found outside of the political and/or military sphere, on a purely scientific basis. The idea was that existing observation sites could be used and findings compiled at an international center, where senior scientists would evaluate whether nuclear tests had taken place.³⁸⁶ A joint memorandum of the

³⁸³ In 1934, the Myrdals published their book *Kris i befolkningsfrågan* (Crisis in the Population Question), addressing several issues related to the welfare state project and social engineering. See Myrdal, 1934. See also Andersson, 2004; Etzemüller, 2014. As Chapter 3 argues, the Swedish welfare state project relied on notions of gendered difference, where women were associated with reproductive tasks and men with productive tasks. See Hirdman, 2010.

³⁸⁴ Anshelm, 2006: 17ff.

³⁸⁵ Quester, 1970: 56.

³⁸⁶ "Referat av anförande av ambassadör Rolf Edberg den 2 april 1962 vid nedrustningskonferensen i Genève". Vol. 447, Mål V 1962, HP48 Förenta nationerna, Politiska avdelningens ärenden, 1920 års dossiersystem, Utrikesdepartementets arkiv, Riksarkivet; "ENDC/PV.13, speech by Mr Edberg". Vol. 108, Serie 4 Handlingar från Alva och Gunnar Myrdals verksamhet, 1 Handlingar från Alva Myrdals verksamhet, 16 Handlingar från Alva Myrdals verksamhet: Fred och nedrustning. Alva och Gunnar Myrdals arkiv, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB.

eight non-aligned states in the ENDC a few weeks later proposed that improvements to existing networks and scientific endeavors, as well as the appointment to an international commission of “highly qualified scientists, possibly from non-aligned countries” could help resolve the control issue.³⁸⁷ Swedish nuclear physicists and members of the disarmament committee also traveled to the US to study seismological progress.³⁸⁸ Throughout the 1960s, the Swedish government frequently launched scientific initiatives particularly aimed at developing tools that could detect and identify underground explosions. In May 1966, for example, Sweden hosted a conference on test detection in which a limited number of experts from non-nuclear weapon states participated.³⁸⁹ This conference was an important part of the work to establish a “detection club”, which was one of Sweden’s technical priorities in the mid-1960s.³⁹⁰

One important aspect of this technological focus was the conviction that science could help to bridge the gaps between the superpowers, in effect giving small states like Sweden an important role. In a memo from 1962, Myrdal noted that technological progress in the detection field could contribute significantly to disarmament.³⁹¹ Furthermore, Myrdal argued that Sweden could contribute technical solutions that would make agreement between the US and the Soviet Union more likely. The foreign policy declaration of 1962 communicated a similar message:

Usually it is not easy for the small nations to advance suggestions intended to bridge the differences in this question, but it should perhaps not be impossible for them in Geneva at least to attempt to bring about a more tempered discussion of the various forms of control which may be appropriate and necessary before one or the other disarmament measure is made acceptable to the Powers concerned.³⁹²

³⁸⁷ Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. “Memorandum on the question of a ban on nuclear weapon tests”. *Documents on Swedish foreign policy*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1962.

³⁸⁸ “Angående nedrustningsförhandlingarna”. Letter from Ericsson to Wachtmeister and Myrdal, 30.10.62. Vol. 460, Mål V 1962, HP48 Förenta nationerna, Politiska avdelningens ärenden, 1920 års dossiersystem, Utrikesdepartementets arkiv, Riksarkivet; Interview with Prawitz, Jan, 2012-09-19.

³⁸⁹ Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. “Press release 17th May 1966”. *Documents on Swedish foreign policy*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1966.

³⁹⁰ “P.M. detektionsklubben”. Bil. t. Nedrustningsdelegations skriv. nr 5 den 31.1.1966. Vol. 477, Mål V 1966, HP48 Förenta nationerna, Politiska avdelningens ärenden, 1920 års dossier-system, Utrikesdepartementets arkiv, Riksarkivet.

³⁹¹ “Memorandum”. Geneva, 1 June, 1962. Vol. 106, Serie 4 Handlingar från Alva och Gunnar Myrdals verksamhet, 1 Handlingar från Alva Myrdals verksamhet, 16 Handlingar från Alva Myrdals verksamhet: Fred och nedrustning. Alva och Gunnar Myrdals arkiv, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB.

³⁹² Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. “Government statement in the foreign affairs debate in the Riksdag; 14th March”. *Documents on Swedish foreign policy*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1962: 14f.

According to this statement, countries like Sweden could play an important role in finding solutions to control issues, at that time linked to a test ban. It was well known that the US was calling for detailed control mechanisms while the Soviet Union was refusing to allow inspections on its soil, preventing any progress in negotiations. Hence, it was argued that Swedish technological skill could serve as an entry point to influence over disarmament outcomes. Through its emphasis on the technological skill it derived from its nuclear weapon program, the national Self was represented as technologically advanced and developed, as opposed to relationally organized representations of less developed Others. Hence, temporal references related to development and progress were represented through the technological approach to disarmament. In a letter to Sweden's UN representative, Myrdal wrote:

Since most of the non-nuclear delegations have hardly any knowledge of these topics, the Swedish delegation felt it necessary to (...) take greater responsibility to be oriented in these topics, a duty mostly born by our experts.³⁹³

According to Myrdal, in light of the limited skills of the other non-aligned states, Sweden – as a technologically advanced and developed country – had to take the lead. Other non-aligned states were relationally organized as less developed, and as without influence. It was therefore made a responsibility of the national Self to contribute technical solutions to disarmament problems. However, technological contributions were not only represented as a way to give Sweden influence at the international level. They were also represented as different from politics – as an objective approach free from political opinion. By proposing technical solutions, the Swedish government spoke in terms of “depoliticizing” the issue. For example, the foreign policy declaration of 1962 argued, “[i]t is perhaps likely that technical inquiries might to some extent remove certain issues from the realm of politics.”³⁹⁴ By depicting science as pure and apolitical, Sweden made its voice appear objective and values-free, unlike other non-aligned states and the superpower rivals in the cold war. Hence, the technological approach to disarmament constructed a perceived difference between Swedish skill and competence, on the one hand, and the assumed limited contributions of other non-aligned states, on the other. Furthermore, such representations also made it possible to distance disarmament

³⁹³ ”Kärnvapenmakter och kärnvapenfria inför provstoppsfrågan”. Telegram from Myrdal to Åström, Genève 27 March 1962. Vol. 108, Serie 4 Handlingar från Alva och Gunnar Myrdals verksamhet, 1 Handlingar från Alva Myrdals verksamhet, 16 Handlingar från Alva Myrdals verksamhet: Fred och nedrustning. Alva och Gunnar Myrdals arkiv, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB.

³⁹⁴ Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. “Government statement in the foreign affairs debate in the Riksdag; 14 March”. *Documents on Swedish foreign policy*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., Stockholm, 1962: 15.

from emotion and opinion. In a national context where those who opposed the nuclear weapons option were feminized and dismissed because of their association with emotions, disarmament was positioned as far away from feminized, emotional bodies.³⁹⁵

The technological approach to disarmament received what appears to have been unanimous support in Sweden. Already in the foreign policy debate of 1961, a Conservative Party parliamentarian was noting that: "I believe that the government's recommendation regarding the technical approach to the solution of the disarmament question has been realistic, and I regret that it has not yet led to practical results."³⁹⁶ In 1962, a Liberal Party parliamentarian recognized that Sweden had been put in a rather difficult position between the East and the West, and that relations with other non-aligned states could cause problems: "In all circumstances our interests do not in all regards correspond with theirs and they often have a somewhat – dare I say – more naïve opinion about this problem than we have gained through long experience."³⁹⁷ In representing other non-aligned states as naïve, he was at the same time representing the Self as its relationally organized opposite – as rational and reasonable. In effect, he made a distinction between Sweden and the other non-aligned states. In 1963, a different Liberal Party politician elaborated further on the issue:

³⁹⁵ Although excluded from the final source selection, my reading of personal correspondence as part of the broad source selection in step 2 contributed greatly to my understanding of this argument. For example, having worked in the ENDC for half a decade, Myrdal wrote a letter that was never sent to Inga Thorsson. She wrote: "For me, especially when I have extended the framework of social and family politics, it seems like should it not only for me but for our society at large be close to humiliating that each thing that a female person does apart from social and family politics, as now, in my case, defense (...) and disarmament policy (...) becomes a 'female' sphere. As you are well aware, if it is so classified, it gets downgraded to the unimportance that 'female peace values' have always had." According to Myrdal, she did not want disarmament to become associated with assumptions about femininity, as this would increase the risk that it would be downgraded. She continued: "In the disarmament negotiations it would kill Sweden [...] if it could be degraded as 'women's politics'. I am therefore actually fairly eager – when I eventually leave – that a male – and an important politician – takes over these problems." Reading Myrdal's letter, and bearing in mind the gendering of nuclear weapon opposition and the dismissal of women's arguments in the Swedish nuclear weapon debate demonstrated in Chapter 5, it seems reasonable to conclude that Myrdal thought that disarmament had to be distanced from that which was associated with femininity in order not to be downgraded. In order to be taken seriously, she found it necessary to be able to talk to nuclear strategists in a language that was acceptable to them. Although this dissertation is not focused on actors' intentions, the reading of such correspondence has influenced my interpretations, which is why I choose to include it here. See "Ej sänt, 1967: Inga Th.". Vol. 108, Serie 4 Handlingar från Alva och Gunnar Myrdals verksamhet, 1 Handlingar från Alva Myrdals verksamhet, 16 Handlingar från Alva Myrdals verksamhet: Fred och nedrustning. Alva och Gunnar Myrdals arkiv, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB.

³⁹⁶ Riksdagens protokoll. 1960/61: 14. "Sveriges utrikespolitik". Herr Hjalmarson (h), andra kammaren.

³⁹⁷ Riksdagens protokoll. 1961/62: 11. "Ang Sveriges utrikespolitik". Herr Boheman (fp), första kammaren.

In the neutral – or more correctly non-aligned – group, Sweden is the only country that is conventionally counted as a technically developed country, while the other seven are counted as developing countries. [...] There is no doubt that within this group Sweden has come to have some sort of special position. We have had specialist military, technological and scientific expertise available in Geneva, and not least the work of this expertise has given us and thereby the whole non-aligned eight-party group strength and decisiveness in relation to both the western and the eastern group, given that one has trusted the facts that our experts have presented and these must be the basis for all suggestions proposed to this by no means simple conference.³⁹⁸

By emphasizing that Sweden was the only developed country in the non-aligned group, Sweden was represented as having a special position of expertise. Through such representations, Sweden was (re)constructed as a developed and technologically advanced country, and as a trustworthy nation, as opposed to what was relationally represented as the Other – the other non-aligned states in the ENDC and the nuclear weapon states. Such representations drew in particular on notions of difference with the non-aligned states. Furthermore, while other non-aligned states were disregarded as naive, Sweden was represented as realistic and rational. Chapters 5 and 6 have shown how nuclear weapon supporters represented their advocacy as rational, reasonable and objective, as opposed to the feminized anti-nuclear weapon advocacy that was represented as driven by emotion. When talking about the technologically developed national Self, difference was constructed between Sweden and the other non-aligned states. Just before the conclusion of the NPT in 1968, a Conservative Party parliamentarian who had been an active advocate of nuclear weapon acquisition argued that “Swedes” were especially well qualified to contribute to work for détente and disarmament:

Us Swedes are especially well qualified to participate in this work. Our non-aligned policy makes us independent from foreign influence, and we have so far succeeded in remaining outside of bellicose developments. We have also shown that we are free from aggressive intentions, so that we are striving for peace cannot be questioned. We also have highly developed scientific resources and a will to contribute to the work for détente and the easing of tensions in the world that is deeply anchored in the nation as a whole.³⁹⁹

In representing the Swedish Self as immune to foreign influence due to its non-aligned policy, he also represented the Self as having reached a higher level of scientific development. Furthermore, he represented the Self as peaceful and non-aggressive. This was described as “deeply anchored in the nation as a whole” and was said to make Sweden especially well qualified to live up

³⁹⁸ Riksdagens protokoll. 1962/63: 17. ”Utrikesdebatt”. Herr Ståhl (fp), andra kammaren.

³⁹⁹ Riksdagens protokoll. 1967/68: 13. ”Ang. Sveriges utrikes- och handelspolitik”. Herr Virgin (h), första kammaren.

to the task of working for disarmament. As argued in Chapter 2, women's practices have historically been associated with tradition and backwardness, and men's practices as forward-looking and modern.⁴⁰⁰ Furthermore, white bodies have often been associated with development and progression.⁴⁰¹ Hence, representations of the Self were associated with whiteness and masculine characteristics such as development and influence. Furthermore, representations of the Self as peaceful made it possible to talk about a united national Self with a shared historical past. Moreover, the representation of the Self as non-aggressive relied on representations of relationally organized aggressive Others, and contributed to the construction of a responsible defensive security and a militarized masculine ideal of the Self. Hence, when supporting disarmament at the international level, the Swedish nation was represented as acting as a national "whole".

This techno-scientific approach to disarmament took place in an international context in which world-famous scientists such as Nobel Peace Prize winner Linus Pauling were calling for nuclear disarmament. According to IR scholar Paul Robinson: "Scientists in the United States played a large role in the nuclear disarmament movement from the first days of the nuclear age."⁴⁰² Myrdal herself frequently corresponded with research institutes, primarily in the US.⁴⁰³ Nonetheless, the technological approach to disarmament has also been criticized. For example, historian and IR scholar Benoît Pelopidas argues that US nuclear scientists during the PTBT negotiations chose to "sacrifice their larger ethical concerns and limit their discourse to technicalities", thereby "pursuing an uncontested scientific authority and direct influence over government policy".⁴⁰⁴ Following his argument, their single-minded focus on technology distracted attention from other issues, such as ethical and moral considerations.⁴⁰⁵ The empirical findings in this chapter reveal that it was not only the nuclear weapon states that had a technological approach to disarmament. Sweden, the self-proclaimed disarmament advocate, made technological contributions one of its main responsibilities and represented the national Self as modern both in Sweden and internationally. Sweden's technological focus can be interpreted as a way to separate "rational disarmament scientists" from irrational, emotional anti-nuclear activists. By focusing on technology and science, other aspects such as ethical considerations could be left out of the conversation. Given the historical association between technology and

⁴⁰⁰ McClintock, 1993; 1995.

⁴⁰¹ See for example Ahmed, 2004; McClintock, 1993.

⁴⁰² Robinson, 2011.

⁴⁰³ See various documents in Vol. 067 and 068, Serie 4 Handlingar från Alva och Gunnar Myrdals verksamhet, 1 Handlingar från Alva Myrdals verksamhet, 16 Handlingar från Alva Myrdals verksamhet: Fred och nedrustning. Alva och Gunnar Myrdals arkiv, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB.

⁴⁰⁴ Pelopidas, 2014.

⁴⁰⁵ See Cohn, Hill & Ruddick, 2005: 5.

masculinity, this could very well be interpreted as distancing disarmament from notions of femininity.⁴⁰⁶ We can therefore trace a technostrategic disarmament approach that privileges reason over emotion and technology over morality. Furthermore, representations of the Self as modern and technologically advanced can be interpreted as important to establishing coherence between the nuclear weapon debate and the disarmament engagement that took place.

The militarization of disarmament policy

Chapter 6 argued that while those in Sweden who opposed nuclear weapon acquisition wanted Sweden to give up the nuclear weapon option and to serve as a good example on the international stage, those who favored nuclear weapon acquisition thought it reasonable for Sweden to use its nuclear weapon capability to put pressure on the nuclear weapon states. If they were unable to reach agreement on international nuclear disarmament, Sweden represented itself as obliged to acquire nuclear weapons. As non-proliferation talks progressed throughout the mid-1960s, Swedish officials argued that the NPT should not only prevent proliferation by making it illegal for non-nuclear weapon states to acquire nuclear weapons, but also contain commitments by the nuclear weapon states. At the beginning of 1965, for example, Foreign Minister Nilsson delivered a speech to the UN General Assembly, which argued that a non-proliferation treaty should be accompanied by a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a halt on the production of fissile material for military purposes, which would have had major consequences for the nuclear weapon states.⁴⁰⁷ Myrdal followed up on the foreign minister's proposal, arguing that this "should make the sacrifices incurred more equitably distributed".⁴⁰⁸ Nilsson and Myrdal were calling for commitments not only by the non-nuclear weapon states, but also by the nuclear weapon states. If Sweden was to agree to have restrictions imposed on itself, they argued that "also the Great Powers

⁴⁰⁶ The relationship between technology and gender has been further explored in research fields such as science and technology studies (STS). See for example Fox, Johnson & Rosser, 2006; Wajcman, 2004.

⁴⁰⁷ "Speech given by the Swedish Foreign Minister, Mr Torsten Nilsson, at the United Nations". Vol. 108, Serie 4 Handlingar från Alva och Gunnar Myrdals verksamhet, 1 Handlingar från Alva Myrdals verksamhet, 16 Handlingar från Alva Myrdals verksamhet: Fred och nedrustning. Alva och Gunnar Myrdals arkiv, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB.

⁴⁰⁸ "Statement by Ambassador Alva Myrdal at the United Nations Disarmament Commission on 10 May 1965". Vol. 108, Serie 4 Handlingar från Alva och Gunnar Myrdals verksamhet, 1 Handlingar från Alva Myrdals verksamhet, 16 Handlingar från Alva Myrdals verksamhet: Fred och nedrustning. Alva och Gunnar Myrdals arkiv, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB.

must obviously put a limit to their nuclear armaments”.⁴⁰⁹ In a speech delivered to the ENDC in 1966, Myrdal stated:

I believe that we must be much clearer as to what the arguments really are why a non-proliferation treaty should endeavor to cancel the nuclear option just for states *which at present are non – nuclear*. If there is to be something of an eleventh commandment: Thou shalt not carry nuclear weapons – why should it only be valid for some?⁴¹⁰

Questioning the reasonableness of some states being allowed to possess nuclear weapons while others were not, Myrdal called for equal treatment in the treaty currently under negotiation. The foreign policy declarations of the mid-1960s reflected similar messages.⁴¹¹ In sum, the message of the government at both the national and the international level was that if Sweden was to give up its nuclear weapon capability, then the nuclear weapon states would have to give something in return.

As chapter 6 has shown, the Conservative Party in parliament argued that Sweden should keep the nuclear weapon option open, and that this could be used as a negotiation tool to put pressure on the nuclear weapon states to reach agreement on disarmament. If they were unwilling to do so, Sweden would have no other option but to acquire nuclear weapons. Official government statements were less clear on whether the Swedish nuclear weapon program should serve as a bargaining tool. According to Foreign Minister Nilsson, the United States and the Soviet Union wanted to prevent states like Sweden and Switzerland from acquiring nuclear weapons, as they feared that this would serve as a bad example for other states to follow:

It is this circumstance that makes it possible for us to put pressure on the super-powers to move forward and continue on the road they have already entered and in firsthand agree to a comprehensive test ban. [...] What makes it possible for the smaller states to put pressure on the United States and the Soviet Union

⁴⁰⁹ Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. “Government statement in the foreign affairs debate; 23rd March”. *Documents on Swedish foreign policy*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1966: 20. See also Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. “Speech by Mrs. Myrdal at the Disarmament Conference at Geneva; 10th August”. *Documents on Swedish foreign policy*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1965: 104ff.

⁴¹⁰ “Speech by ambassador Mrs. Alva Myrdal, Swedish Delegation, 24 February 1966”. Vol. 447, Mål V 1966, HP48 Förenta nationerna, Politiska avdelningens ärenden, 1920 års dossier-system, Utrikesdepartementets arkiv, Riksarkivet.

⁴¹¹ See for example Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. “Government statement in the Riksdag debate on foreign affairs; 8th April”. *Documents on Swedish foreign policy*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1964. See also Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. “Government statement in the Riksdag foreign affairs debate; 24th March”. *Documents on Swedish foreign policy*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1965.

is the awareness that we will maintain our freedom of action until they make genuine and serious efforts to start on the road to disarmament.⁴¹²

Although not arguing in favor of nuclear weapon acquisition, the foreign minister did talk about the freedom of action policy as a way to put pressure on the nuclear weapon states simply because it was in their interests to get Sweden on board. The 1966 foreign policy declaration stressed that for a non-proliferation treaty to be successful, it was essential that all the threshold states signed up to it, and this was unlikely to happen unless the nuclear weapon states gave something in return:

If the general security of the world is to be the guide for efforts to gain control over the possession of nuclear weapons, also the Great Powers must also obviously put a limit to their nuclear armaments. A non-proliferation agreement not paying reasonable regard to this demand can be difficult to accept for several of the countries which are of considerable importance in this connection, namely those which now are more or less close to the point where they are able to start their own productions of nuclear weapons. Without the co-operation of these countries, a non-proliferation agreement cannot be efficient.⁴¹³

As one of the states that at this point had not yet publicly given up the nuclear weapon option, the Swedish government hinted that it might not sign up to a treaty that did not take its considerations seriously. In a speech delivered to the first committee of the UN General Assembly in 1965, however, Myrdal argued that Sweden's call for balance did not mean that Sweden was bargaining or threatening to acquire nuclear weapons:

The position of my country on this point is clear. Our delegation continues, as always, to be in favor of and to work for halting and reducing armaments, and particularly nuclear armaments through international agreements. [...] It has been announced already in Tokyo, but I judge it highly appropriate that it should also be explicitly stated in this central organ of the international community and in direct connection with disarmament discussions, that the Swedish Government has recently taken the decision to seek the application of IAEA safeguards and thus of international control to its hitherto bilateral agreements in this field. Our nuclear program is being directed to peaceful purposes only.⁴¹⁴

⁴¹² Riksdagens protokoll. 1963/64: 15. "Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt". FM Nilsson (s), andra kammaren.

⁴¹³ Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. "Government statement in the foreign affairs debate; 23 March". *Documents on Swedish foreign policy*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1966: 20.

⁴¹⁴ Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. "Statement by Mrs Myrdal in the First (Political) Committee of the UN General Assembly; 27th October". *Documents on Swedish foreign policy*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1965: 117ff.

In claiming that the Swedish nuclear weapon program was being redirected towards peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Myrdal also emphasized that she represented a world opinion calling for further steps to be taken by the nuclear weapon states, and that Sweden had no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons. Like the advocacy of opponents of nuclear weapon acquisition, Myrdal spoke about a world opinion that favored peace and disarmament, and connected Sweden with this world opinion. That said, she did not declare Sweden's intention to sign the treaty under negotiation. In the final stages of negotiations, Myrdal specified three goals that the Swedish government wanted the NPT to ensure: disarmament obligations on behalf of the nuclear weapon states, control measures, and the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy for all states parties.⁴¹⁵ Even though the NPT did not supply the package envisaged by the Swedish government, in 1968 the Swedish Foreign Minister argued that a balance had been reached.⁴¹⁶ The inclusion of Article VI, which made it the responsibility of all states parties to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" was one component that was seen as bringing balance to the treaty.⁴¹⁷

In sum, the government's position on disarmament held that for a nuclear capable country such as Sweden to make international commitments, the nuclear weapon states would have to give something in return. Regardless of whether Sweden threatened to acquire nuclear weapons or refused to sign treaties it did not find sufficient, Swedish disarmament policy was dependent on, or at least backed up with, nuclear weapon capability. While the spatial references mentioned above mainly referred to the Swedish geographic setting, temporal references were primarily made to Sweden as a nuclear weapon-capable state, one of the developed countries that was able to acquire nuclear weapons. Through such references, Sweden was represented as exceptional among the non-aligned states – it was the only state that had the technical capacity to acquire nuclear weapons. References to responsibility were linked to responsibilities to the Swedish Self: if there was nothing in a treaty for Sweden, why would it want to sign? Hence, its identity representations and disarmament policy resembled those of the nuclear weapon proponents rather than the more radical opponents of nuclear weapon acquisition in for example the Communist Party and the SSKF. It advanced what can be understood as a militarized approach to disarmament where nuclear weapon capability was positioned at the center of advocacy.

⁴¹⁵ Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. "Press release, 30 May 1966". *Documents on Swedish foreign policy*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1966.

⁴¹⁶ Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. "Government statement in the Riksdag foreign affairs debate; 21st March 1968". *Documents on Swedish foreign policy*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1968: 24.

⁴¹⁷ Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml> (available 2019-09-10).

Summary

In sum, the Swedish government's disarmament policy primarily drew on identity representations related to nuclear weapon capabilities, either as a source of expertise or as a bargaining tool. Through its focus on Swedish nuclear weapon capability, and in statements about Swedish technological skill, the government was communicating a message about a technologically advanced and developed country. Difference was constructed in particular between Sweden and the other non-aligned states in the ENDC, where the developed national Self was described as objective and rational as a result of its nuclear weapon capability. Instead of acting as a role model, as advocated by those who opposed Sweden acquiring nuclear weapons, the Swedish government positioned Swedish nuclear weapon capability at the center of its advocacy. It did this either by proclaiming itself a technical expert because of its nuclear weapon capability, or by demonstrating its reluctance to sign treaties that did not address Sweden's concerns. The focus on nuclear weapon capabilities, technology and science was genuinely supported by conservatives in parliament, and they described the opposite Other – that is, the other non-aligned states, as naive and less skilled. Hence, disarmament was strongly associated with temporal references related to development, science and rationality. As the theory section of this dissertation discussed, post-colonial thinker Anne McClintock presents a general critique of the relationship between nationalism, gender and modernity. According to McClintock, modernity can be understood as a gendered concept and practice, where femininity becomes associated with backwardness and passivity, and masculinity becomes associated with the forward-looking and active.⁴¹⁸ Following McClintock's reasoning, the association between Swedishness, technology and science brought with it the formulation of a modern national Self, relationally organized as different from those represented as less technologically advanced and un-modern Others among the non-aligned states. Because of the linkages between modernity and masculinity, identity representations in Swedish disarmament advocacy became associated with masculine ideals, and the Swedish disarmament delegation was able to serve as the main actor – the leader – of the non-aligned states. Hence, such representations relied on the difference constructed between the developed and capable masculinized national Self, and what was relationally represented as an underdeveloped, incapable, and feminized, Other – the non-aligned states.

⁴¹⁸ McClintock, 1993: 66.

Part III

8. Period 2: 1981–1989

The focus of Part III of this dissertation is on how identity and disarmament policy were co-constructed during and after the 1981 submarine crisis when a Soviet nuclear-armed submarine – the U137 – stranded in the Swedish archipelago in the middle of the cold war. The empirical focus is on disarmament policy related to the Nordic Nuclear Weapon-free Zone (NNWFZ). The analysis contributes new knowledge about the gendering, nationalization and sexualization of disarmament policymaking in Sweden during the 1980s. To facilitate reading of the subsequent empirical chapters, Chapter 8 introduces previous research of relevance to the study. The chapter ends with an overview of the disposition of the chapters in Part III.

Background and Previous Research

This section provides a brief overview of the historical context of efforts to establish an NNWFZ in the 1980s, and of the submarine crisis of 1981, based on previous research. Although presented as “facts”, this timeline should be understood as highlights of what I position as especially important both for background and for the subsequent empirical analysis.

Disarmament and the Nordic Nuclear Weapon-free Zone

Part II showed how instead of acquiring nuclear weapons, the Swedish government engaged in nuclear disarmament negotiations at the international level.⁴¹⁹ Sweden’s first disarmament initiative, the Undén Plan, envisaged that non-nuclear weapon states should form a non-atomic club on a voluntary basis.⁴²⁰ Even though the Undén plan was never realized, disarmament advocates in Sweden made continual efforts to establish an NNWFZ. President of Finland Urho Kekkonen initially launched the call for such a zone in 1963, but the Swedish government showed little interest at the time. When Kekkonen relaunched the initiative in the mid-1970s, however, the Swedish debate on the establishment of such a zone intensified.⁴²¹

⁴¹⁹ This argument was made in Jonter & Rosengren 2014, and developed further by Jonter, 2016. See also Part II of this dissertation.

⁴²⁰ Andersson, 2004: 86ff; Norlin, 1998.

⁴²¹ See for example Prawitz, 1994.

Meanwhile, foreign policy remained a core feature of Swedish security policy, and disarmament engagement was one of its components. In the 1980s, disarmament debates especially concerned efforts to create an NNWFZ. At the time of the discovery of the U137, the Swedish government had recently begun to look into the possibility of creating an NNWFZ. Before 1981, it had not been labeled possible to establish such a zone. In its response to various parliamentary motions on the creation of an NNWFZ in 1976–77, the Swedish foreign affairs committee (*utrikesutskottet*) emphasized that Sweden had “a positive attitude to the general idea of nuclear weapon-free zones”. Nonetheless, the committee went on to set preconditions for the establishment of the zone. Apart from being dependent on the support of all the Nordic states, the foreign affairs committee stated that the nuclear weapon states would have to commit to certain arrangements before the Swedish government could consider joining an NNWFZ. In addition, it raised concerns about the optimum boundaries of the zone and how nuclear weapons in the surrounding areas beyond the zone should be dealt with.⁴²² The status of the Baltic Sea within any zone arrangement was represented as central to the issue. Since the first condition of the foreign affairs committee was not met in the late 1970s, the committee did not consider the zone proposal to be something that could be achieved in the near future. Similar responses were given in the foreign affairs committee reports of 1977–78 and 1979–80.⁴²³ In June 1981, a few months before the U137 stranded in Karlskrona, the Swedish Parliament unanimously passed a bill calling on the government to further investigate the possibility of creating an NNWFZ. At the time, the Swedish government emphasized that such a zone would require certain responses from the superpowers, especially the Soviet Union.⁴²⁴ The Soviet Union had been supporting the establishment of an NNWFZ for some time, and had declared a willingness to make the Baltic Sea a “Sea of Peace” back in the late 1950s.⁴²⁵ As Part III of the dissertation reveals, the intrusion by the U137 into Karlskrona in 1981 seriously muddled the waters of such assurances.

Even though the Swedish government continued to be engaged in international disarmament negotiations throughout the cold war, it maintained a strong defense organization. Chapter 3 demonstrated that the mainstream position of most political parties was that a credible neutrality policy required a strong defense. Sweden also maintained a relatively large military capacity

⁴²² Utrikesutskottets betänkande UU 1976/77: 3 y. *Utrikesutskottets yttrande med anledning av prop. 1976/77:74 i vad avser inriktningen av säkerhetspolitiken m.m. jämte motioner.*

⁴²³ Utrikesutskottets betänkande UU 1976/77: 3 y. *Utrikesutskottets yttrande med anledning av prop. 1976/77:74 i vad avser inriktningen av säkerhetspolitiken m.m. jämte motioner*; Utrikesutskottets betänkande UU 1977/78: 12. *Utrikesutskottets betänkande med anledning av motioner om nedrustning m.m.*; Utrikesutskottets betänkande UU 1979/80: 4. *Utrikesutskottets betänkande med anledning av motioner om nedrustning m.m.*

⁴²⁴ Huldt, 1986: 206ff.

⁴²⁵ Huldt, 1986.

throughout the cold war.⁴²⁶ However, the size of the armed forces and of budget allocations increasingly became a topic for debate in the 1980s, in what Goldman describes as a left-right division in Swedish politics.⁴²⁷ The Conservative Party argued that there was a discrepancy between an “active peace-and disarmament policy”, on the one hand, and a strong national defense organization, on the other. In the mid-1980s, the Conservative Party received support from the military and from security policy experts in its view that the armed forces should be prioritized over other security strategies.⁴²⁸ After the 1981 submarine crisis, trespassing by submarines was represented as an important reason why it was a necessity to back neutrality with strong armed forces.⁴²⁹

The 1981 submarine crisis

On October 28, 1981, a local fisherman reported the presence of a stranded submarine in a restricted military naval area in the Karlskrona archipelago in southern Sweden. The national marine base was established in the Karlskrona archipelago in 1680 so when the U137 stranded, Karlskrona had been serving as the main marine base in Sweden for about 300 years.⁴³⁰

Having inspected the situation, the military confirmed that the submarine was of Soviet origin. Stuck fast on a rock and unable to navigate in any direction, the submarine was stranded in Swedish territorial waters. The Soviet crew argued that it had reached this position due to navigational error and broken equipment, and consequently wanted to return to international waters with Soviet assistance. The Swedish authorities, however, held that it was the task of the Swedish Navy to remove the submarine from its territory. As the analysis in Chapter 9 reveals, the incident became the subject of cartoons and satirical sketches. The Soviet ambassador to Sweden was called to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the media reported every move in the days that followed. After the Swedish authorities had confirmed that the submarine was of Soviet origin, they sought permission to question the crew. It was not until November 2, however, that the Soviet authorities agreed to this demand. Meanwhile, Swedish technical inspections were made of the outside of the submarine and, on November 5, Prime Minister Thorbjörn Fälldin pub-

⁴²⁶ See for example Agrell, 2010.

⁴²⁷ Goldman, 1991: 124.

⁴²⁸ Hult, 1986: 201ff.

⁴²⁹ See for example Riksdagens protokoll. 1981/82: 99. ”Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt”.

⁴³⁰ See for example “Världsarvsstaden Karlskrona”. *Visit Karlskrona*. <http://www.visitkarlskrona.se/sv/upplev/varldsarvsstaden-karlskrona> (available 2020-06-18).

licly declared that the submarine was probably equipped with nuclear weapons.⁴³¹ Announcing the discovery, Fälldin spoke of “the most remarkable offence against Sweden since the Second World War”.⁴³² The Soviet Union did not confirm the validity of the Swedish claim. On the contrary, it was reported that the Soviet authorities had claimed that the radioactivity detected by the tests originated from a watch worn by a crew member on board the submarine. On November 6, the submarine left Swedish territorial waters in the company of a Swedish vessel and the immediate crisis came to an end. Soviet warships and salvage vessels circled the area just beyond Swedish territorial waters until the submarine had been escorted back to international waters.⁴³³

The 1981 submarine crisis played out in an international context of renewed tension between the US and the Soviet Union following the relative calm of the 1970s. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and US President Ronald Reagan’s rearmament policy and Strategic Defense Initiative, often referred to as Star Wars, are well-known features of the tense relations at the international level.⁴³⁴ Furthermore, it took place in a national context in which Sweden had declared itself free from nuclear weapons by signing the NPT in 1968.⁴³⁵ Throughout the 1980s, a number of incidents were reported relating to possible underwater activities and these were investigated by the Swedish military. However, in 2001, a Swedish government commission concluded that most of the reported intrusions could not be verified.⁴³⁶ In his study of submarine intrusions, political scientist Fredrik Bynander argues that most of the reported trespass had been assumed to be Soviet- and Warsaw Pact-originated.⁴³⁷ However, some have argued that NATO submarines were also involved in secret underwater activities in the Baltic during the cold war.⁴³⁸ While scholars and others interested in submarine activities continue to disagree about origins and intentions, the U137 is one of the verified Soviet intrusions, and Bynander argues that this crisis “transformed intruding submarines into a first-class media event that seemed to invoke widespread feelings of national victimization and exposure to hostility from the historical enemy across the Baltic.”⁴³⁹ Following Bynander’s argument, this thesis singles out the 1981 U137 intrusion as a particularly significant event, not only because

⁴³¹ The series of events have been documented in for example SOU 2001:85: 64ff.

⁴³² ”Rapport: Ubåt U137 på grund 1981”. *Sveriges Television*. 1981-11-05. <https://www.op-petarkiv.se/video/1952556/> (available 2020-08-05).

⁴³³ SOU 2001:85: 64ff.

⁴³⁴ For an overview of the relationship between the US and the USSR during the cold war, see for example Gaddis, 2007[2006].

⁴³⁵ See part II of this dissertation.

⁴³⁶ SOU 2001:85.

⁴³⁷ Bynander, 2003.

⁴³⁸ Holmström, 2011. See also Agrell, 2000; Tunander, 2001.

⁴³⁹ Bynander, 2003: 1, 4ff.

it was confirmed that a Soviet submarine had violated Swedish territorial sovereignty, but also because it was described as a national crisis and received intense media coverage. Furthermore, as the following chapters reveal, it had important policy implications.

Although most studies on submarine intrusions depart from a rationalist approach, a few studies have been published in recent years that apply feminist theory. For example, political scientist and gender scholar Cecilia Åse argues that the U137 incident was “potentially emasculating” since the armed forces were proved incapable of preventing the submarine from entering Swedish waters. Referring to this as the “gender dilemma” of Swedish neutrality, she links this to the ambition to deter attack by making the costs to the attacker too high, on the one hand, and situations when the armed forces fail to live up to their commitments, on the other. Following Wilcox, as defensive strategies are “potentially unmanly or even feminine”, the defensive soldier was confronted with “gender ambivalence” when the Soviet submarine entered Swedish waters. In order to reinstate confidence in the ideal of the defensive soldier, Åse argues that the Soviet intruders were disgraced through gendered representations, and that images were created of national military heroes compatible with Swedish national identity.⁴⁴⁰ In line with Åse’s findings, I argue in a book chapter co-authored with cultural scientist Anna Lundberg that the incapacity of the armed forces to prevent the submarine from entering Swedish waters, in combination with what was described as weak political leadership, called the logic of masculinized protection into question.⁴⁴¹ Accordingly, previous feminist research has described the submarine crisis as a crisis for Swedish defensive military masculinity. This part of the dissertation builds on this research to elaborate on how Swedish disarmament policy proceeded after the submarine crisis. Inspired by Åse, I use media material to expose how broader societal assumptions about both policy and identity were represented and thus reconstructed during the submarine crisis. The analysis in this dissertation differs from Åse’s however, in that it includes a broader set of primary sources, covers a longer time period and, most importantly, focuses on how disarmament policy evolved in the context of the submarine crisis.

Disposition

The disposition of Part III of the dissertation is primarily chronological and follows a similar structure to Part II. However, it differs slightly since it focuses on policy advocacy in relation to a single event – the submarine crisis. Chapter 9 focuses on gendered, nationalized and sexualized identity representations in media coverage of the submarine crisis. Chapter 10 examines the

⁴⁴⁰ Åse, 2016: 116. See also Åse, 2014; Wilcox, 2009.

⁴⁴¹ Lundberg & Rosengren, 2014.

gendering, nationalization and sexualization of identity and disarmament policy in debates about the NNWFZ following the submarine crisis (1981–1989). Through an initial reading of the sources, I discovered that while interrogating the consequences of the submarine crisis for the content of Swedish security policy, the relationship between foreign policy ambitions, including disarmament, on the one hand, and defense ambitions, including the state of the armed forces, on the other, was at the heart of the debates. Therefore, chapter 10 also focuses on how debates about disarmament were interrelated with debates about defense policy. Chapter 11 elaborates on how official disarmament policy evolved in the 1980s in light of the submarine crisis and debates about an NNWFZ (1981–1989). It uses the findings of the two previous chapters to reveal the gendering, nationalization and sexualization of disarmament policymaking, and how human bodies and emotions contributed to meaning making in the processes studied.

9. The Submarine Crisis Revisited

This chapter focuses on gendered, nationalized and sexualized identity representations in the media coverage of the 1981 submarine crisis, and how human bodies and emotions featured in meaning-making processes. Section 1 reveals how the submarine crisis can be understood as a crisis for the policy of armed neutrality, and in effect for the Swedish defensive military masculinity ideal. Section 2 argues that media coverage of the submarine crisis also reconstructed representations of Soviet humiliation, of a slightly stupid and unreliable Other, and a relationally reliable and proud Self. In sum, the chapter contributes crucial insights about the gendering, nationalization and sexualization of media representations of the submarine crisis, and the position of human bodies and emotion. These insights feed into the subsequent analyses of disarmament debates in Chapter 10 and the making of government disarmament policy in Chapter 11.

Armed Neutrality in Dire Straits

The Soviet submarine U137 stranded in a Swedish national context where armed neutrality and non-alliance had served as Sweden's declared foreign policy orientation throughout the cold war rivalry between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.⁴⁴² Chapter 3 explained that Swedish neutrality had come to be described as reliant on a relatively large conventional defense organization.⁴⁴³ Gender analysis is crucial to our understanding of Swedish cold war neutrality and its reliance on a defensive military organization. The idea that the armed forces should protect the country relied on the conviction and practice that it was a masculine duty to bear arms.⁴⁴⁴ Svedberg and Kronsell argue that in order to maintain a sizeable army, men had to be convinced that it was a masculine duty to protect the nation, and the linkages between masculinity, defense and the military were reinforced by compulsory military service.⁴⁴⁵

While male conscription provided the armed forces with men, voluntary defense organizations contributed to the spread of broad support for armed

⁴⁴² See for example Gaddis, 2007[2006].

⁴⁴³ See for example Karsh, 1988; Sundelius, 1990.

⁴⁴⁴ See Sundevall, 2011.

⁴⁴⁵ Svedberg & Kronsell, 2002: 18ff.

neutrality in society.⁴⁴⁶ Hence, Swedish neutrality relied on the involvement of close to all men in the armed forces through mandatory military service, engaging them in a practice enabled by, and contributing to the reconstruction of, the conviction that it was a masculine duty to protect the nation through a defensive security strategy. Wilcox argues, however, that defensive security strategies are potentially emasculating.⁴⁴⁷ Insights from previous research show how the U137 intrusion challenged Swedish military masculinity since the armed forces were proved incapable of preventing the submarine from entering Swedish waters.⁴⁴⁸ Hence, Åse argues that the U137 submarine crisis created a gender dilemma for Swedish neutrality. Initial media reports of the submarine intrusion put the Swedish military and leading politicians in a shameful position, as unable to prevent the submarine from reaching the Swedish shoreline. Over time, however, the Swedish political and military elite was described as capable and in charge.⁴⁴⁹ Drawing on these insights, this section focuses on how identity representations in the media coverage of the submarine crisis related to Swedish neutrality and the defensive soldier ideal, and how human bodies and emotion featured in such representations. Although not the center of my analysis, the bodily representations of Sweden only portray white bodies. The whiteness of Swedish bodies is further established through the relationally different bodily characteristics of the Soviet Other, such as bushy eyebrows and dark hair. Racialized associations are thus repeatedly made between Swedishness and whiteness.

Humiliated Swedish men

In a national context where the armed forces were mandated to provide back-up for Swedish neutrality and prevent foreign intrusion, the discovery of the U137 in Swedish territorial waters triggered an intense critique of both politicians and the military. My analysis of the images shows how politicians were described as passive, stupid and ignorant, and the military as incompetent. Shame and national embarrassment were central to these representations. One example is the image in Figure 7, which portrays Prime Minister Fälldin relaxing in his boat on a “calm” fishing trip.

⁴⁴⁶ Cronqvist, 2012: 198.

⁴⁴⁷ Wilcox, 2009: 228.

⁴⁴⁸ Åse, 2016: 116, 2014.

⁴⁴⁹ Åse, 2016.

Figure 7. Prime Minister Thorbjörn Fälldin on a fishing trip



Source: Karlsson, Ewert. *Aftonbladet*. 1981-11-06.

As the leader of what used to be called the “Farmers’ League” (*Bondeförbundet*) until 1957, thereafter the Center Party, and a practicing farmer himself, the portrayal of Fälldin resembles a national stereotype of a phlegmatic farmer.⁴⁵⁰ Looking at the sky and smoking his characteristic pipe, the prime minister fails to notice the myriad of nuclear warheads and submarine telescopes surrounding him in the water. In the image, the prime minister makes no recognition of the danger surrounding him, and continues his fishing trip seemingly unaware of what is going on around him. In this setting, the prime minister is represented as unreasonably calm, and as negligent of the danger surrounding him. The military was represented in similar ways. One example is Figure A1, “Staffans stollar”, published on November 3, 1981 (see Appendix 3). The image sketches a soldier standing on the shoreline looking at the periscope of a submarine without understanding what he is seeing, calling to

⁴⁵⁰ For example, in a comparison between Olof Palme and Thorbjörn Fälldin, Kjell Östberg describes how Fälldin’s personality was generally described as slow in the media. See for example Östberg, 2010: 46.

his captain: "Captain, some weirdo has put a pipe between the islands." The soldier is portrayed as stupid. This image and the image above portray Swedish men as a politician and a soldier, respectively, who do not appear to be up to the task. Hence, spatial references are made to male politicians and military men. In the images, the male bodies do not just fail to prevent foreign submarines from entering Swedish waters, they do not even understand what is going on. By portraying male politicians and the military as stupid and ignorant of an obvious danger, it becomes apparent that their assumed responsibility is to protect the nation from intrusion. Furthermore, they are positioned in a shameful position since they fail to perceive the threats surrounding them. Through such representations, my interpretation is that the images illustrate notions of failed male leadership and shame.

The fact that a fisherman and not the navy discovered the submarine, even though it became stranded near a restricted military naval base, was a common theme in media reports.⁴⁵¹ An unsigned editorial sarcastically stated that the situation was "a measure of the efficiency of the navy", describing the situation as embarrassing.⁴⁵² Having failed to spot the submarine, the military faced heavy criticism for being unable to keep the border intact. Similar messages were communicated in editorials and articles. However, the inability to keep the national border intact was not just described as the fault of military personnel – it was said to be the result of political priorities. For example, a journalist at *Svenska Dagbladet* wrote that the Swedish Armed Forces had lost its protective ability and was unable to guard its own naval base due to budget cuts.⁴⁵³ Hence, politicians were represented as responsible for the military failure. An unsigned editorial published in *Svenska Dagbladet* the day after the U137 left Swedish territory argued that:

An embarrassing question that has to be posed, because it is embarrassing, is whether the Swedish armed forces would have detected the most recent intrusion if it had not been for the embarrassing stranding of the Russian submarine. Previous experience shows that it is possible for foreign submarines to stay in Swedish waters for days, maybe weeks, without being discovered or removed by our defense forces. This is a conclusion that has to be drawn not as a critique of the competence of the navy, but against the inadequacy of the resources we have given them.⁴⁵⁴

According to the author, it was inadequate resources, not the navy, that was responsible for what had happened. Regardless of whether it was considered the fault of the military or of political priorities, however, both the armed forces and politicians were described as unable to meet their obligations.

⁴⁵¹ See for example Bergman, Klas. "Ubåten väckte Sverige". *Dagens Nyheter*. 1981-12-31.

⁴⁵² "Ubåt 137". *Svenska Dagbladet*. 1981-10-29.

⁴⁵³ "Försvaret angår oss alla". *Svenska Dagbladet*. 1981-10-30.

⁴⁵⁴ "Lärdom av flottbesök". *Svenska Dagbladet*. 1981-11-07.

Facing criticism for not having spotted the submarine or been able to keep national territory safe, the Swedish military intensified its presence in the area. Circling the submarine with patrol and torpedo boats, watching it from military aircraft and patrolling the shoreline with men wearing camouflage, the military presence was broadcast on national television. Some even described it as show for journalists and photographers.⁴⁵⁵ Nonetheless, the armed forces were repeatedly described as incapable of living up to what was highlighted as its most important task – keeping the border intact. Hence, both politicians and military personnel were portrayed as slightly stupid and unable to keep Swedish territory safe from intrusion.

While Sweden's politicians and military were described as incapable of keeping national territory secure, the Swedish security policy faced similar criticisms. Figure A2 "Yes vår beredskap är good!" in Appendix 3 criticized both the military and the policy of neutrality in a humorous way. Remaining firmly onshore, looking inwards towards the nation instead of over the sea, a Swedish commander stands side by side with his US counterpart. The Swedish commander states: "Yes, our state of alert is good (*Yes, vår beredskap är good*)", in a satirical aping of broken English. Had the commanders looked the other way, away from the nation and towards the border, they would have spotted the danger in the form of a submarine poking around and approaching the shore. With its temporal reference to former Prime Minister Per-Albin Hansson, founder of the Social Democrat *folkhem* vision, who had made the same statement at the outbreak of World War II, the image makes temporal references to a former SAP leader, and to neutrality and the welfare state.⁴⁵⁶ Hansson's statement on Sweden's military preparedness in 1939 has been a source of both criticism and laughter. Many have argued that Sweden was in no position to meet a foreign threat, and that his statement was far from reality.⁴⁵⁷ In this light, the reference to Hansson's statement can be interpreted as a sarcastic critique of the state of Swedish defense capabilities. Hence, the temporal reference to Hansson's statement was used to criticize those in power, and simultaneously represented neutrality and the welfare state as something particularly Swedish. At the same time, however, the state of Swedish neutrality was also questioned.

Furthermore, the image (Figure A2, Appendix 3) positions the Swedish and US flags in a setting that could be interpreted as a state of close cooperation between the two nations. In the image, the men stand side by side looking to the west, towards the US and NATO, rather than to the east where the submarine is located. While non-alliance was said to rule Swedish foreign relations, the image suggests that military cooperation with the western bloc is taking

⁴⁵⁵ "...som en krigsfilm". *Svenska Dagbladet*. 1981-10-30.

⁴⁵⁶ Neutrality and the welfare state are discussed in Chapter 3 as two central components of Swedish identity during the cold war.

⁴⁵⁷ See for example Johansson, 1985.

place. Questioning the real state of Swedish non-alignment could be interpreted as a timely comment on a dispute between the ruling coalition government and the opposition in parliament. Prior to the intrusion, Defense Minister Torsten Gustafsson stated that while Sweden was neutral, it was no secret where “Sweden belonged”, and that culturally it aligned itself with the western bloc.⁴⁵⁸ In media coverage, several commentators called for reassurances that Swedish foreign policy had not changed. For example, Social Democrat opposition leader Olof Palme argued that the submarine incident “emphasized the importance of complete clarity regarding the content of Swedish neutrality.”⁴⁵⁹ In an op-ed published in *Dagens Nyheter*, the chairperson of one of the local branches of the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society (*Svenska Freds- och Skiljedomsföreningen*, *Svenska Freds*) mentioned the affair and argued that “[Nato member states] do not have to spy, they get all the information they need anyway.”⁴⁶⁰ Hence, it was hinted that while the Soviet Union had to sneak around in Swedish territorial waters to get information about Swedish security policy, the US and its NATO allies got all the information they needed from the Swedish government. An opinion piece published in *Dagens Nyheter* in 1983 argued that:

Neutrality policy has been founded on the assumption that both power blocs benefit from Swedish neutrality, and that they, in the case of a conflict, have a genuine interest in respecting Swedish neutrality. Through its actions during the submarine crisis, the Soviet Union has shown both that it does not consider Sweden’s territorial integrity that important, and that it considers the Swedish defense system to be hostile and under the influence of its main antagonist.⁴⁶¹

According to the author, the submarine intrusions showed that Swedish neutrality policy, a policy that was thought to have served Sweden well in the past, was increasingly being put into question due to suspicions that Sweden had close ties with the US and NATO. Hence, it was not only the defense capability of the Swedish armed forces that was up for scrutiny, but also the credibility of neutrality as a whole.

As argued above, the spatial references in these images were made to men, and illustrated with the bodies of male politicians and soldiers. Temporal references were made to both neutrality and the welfare state, and criticism was directed at the suspicion that Sweden had increasingly strong ties with the US

⁴⁵⁸ Gustafsson was repeatedly criticized for this statement. See for example ”Palme om försvarsministern. Fälldin har lämnat honom i sticket”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1981-11-04; Bergom-Larsson, Maria. ”Maria Bergom-Larsson svarar Wilhelm Agrell. Vår neutralitet måste vara aktiv”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1983-05-27.

⁴⁵⁹ ”Palme om försvarsministern. Fälldin har lämnat honom i sticket”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1981-11-04.

⁴⁶⁰ Milld, Jan. ”Bort med krigsfartygen från hela Östersjön!”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1981-11-06.


⁴⁶¹ Agrell, Wilhelm. ”Willhelm Agrell om ubåtskränkningarna: Neutraliteten är i gunning”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1983-09-17.

and NATO, making neutrality appear just a memory of the past. All these references contributed to the reconstruction of protection as a main responsibility for military men and male politicians. By not including women in these representations, the possibility that women could be responsible for protection was ruled out.

Brezhnev and Mother Svea

While the above analysis has identified the making of a humiliated national Self embodied in male politicians and military personnel unable to keep Swedish territory safe from intrusion, a considerable number of images portray the relational Other in the body of Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev. In such images, the Other is represented as threatening, attacking the body of Mother Svea, a frequently used symbol of the Swedish nation (see Figure 8).⁴⁶²

Figure 8. "På bar gärning"



Source: Andersö, Anders (Tecknar-Anders). *Svenska Dagbladet*. 1981-10-30.


The image illustrates Mother Svea, rising from her bath, covering her naked body from Brezhnev's intrusive eye. With binoculars around his neck, Brezhnev seems to be about to peek at things that it was not intended for him to see. The image can be interpreted as illustrating well-known gender stereotypes: a sexually interested, active man and a naked, indignant woman. As discussed in Chapter 2, gendered and sexualized representation of the nation as a female body, and as vulnerable and in need of protection from a threatening Other, is

⁴⁶² Eduards, 2007: 13.

a common feature of international security thinking.⁴⁶³ From this perspective, the image can be understood as representing a naked Mother Svea, a symbol of the Swedish nation, in a domestic setting in her own bathroom, vulnerable to the Soviet intruder. The active intruder takes the form of a man, the intruder in the form of a woman. Spatial references are made to a feminized Swedish nation, illustrated by the female body of Svea, and a masculinized threatening Other in the male body of Brezhnev. However, other interpretations can also be made. Resembling the painting techniques of Torsten Bjarre and his (in Sweden) iconic images of “Lilla Fridolf and Selma,” a married couple depicted as an angry and demanding wife, and her weak and henpecked husband, the image can be interpreted as representing a different, yet gendered, relationship. With these lenses, the image describes Mother Svea in the act of lecturing Brezhnev about his bad behavior, sneaking around in her bathtub without permission. Placed in such a context, the Soviet intruder is the one who finds himself in a disgraceful and emasculated position – exposed in a place where he was not supposed to be and being lectured to by a woman. The expression on Brezhnev’s face supports such an interpretation. For this representation to be humorous, my interpretation is that a relationship where the woman as opposed to the man is dominant and strong was considered humiliating. The relational approach to gender is crucial to both interpretations.

⁴⁶³ See Chapter 2 of this dissertation, and for example Åse, 2016: 114f.

Figure 9. "Huka er gubbar, snart laddar han om"



Source: Zetterling, Leif. "Huka er gubbar, snart laddar han om". *Folket i Bild/Kulturfront*. No. 8, 1982.

In Figure 9, Brezhnev stands behind a brick wall, puncturing the wall with a canon positioned where his sex organ would be seen if it were not hidden behind the wall. The caption reads: "Take cover boys, he is about to reload (*Huka er gubbar, snart laddar han om*)", a paraphrase of a joke told by former Prime Minister and Social Democrat Tage Erlander (1946–1969) on national television in 1962.⁴⁶⁴ It was under Erlander's leadership that the Swedish welfare state took shape and neutrality was established as Sweden's foreign policy doctrine. Erlander's political legacy has been described as foundational for Sweden, and he was known as considerate and firm.⁴⁶⁵ Furthermore, Erlander was prime minister during the Swedish nuclear weapons debate and Sweden's initial disarmament engagement analyzed in Part II of this dissertation.⁴⁶⁶

⁴⁶⁴ "Hylands hörna". *Sveriges Television*. 1962-12-19. <https://www.oppetarkiv.se/video/16667374/hylands-horna> (available 2020-04-25).

⁴⁶⁵ See for example Ruin, 1990.

⁴⁶⁶ See Part II of this dissertation.

Placed in this context, the caption made temporal reference to the political leadership of the past. Social Democrat leader Palme accompanied by a scantily dressed woman holding the white flag of capitulation slide down the canon in a playful manner. Prime Minister Fälldin and Foreign Minister Ullsten stare into the canon with confused and somewhat blank expressions on their faces. The woman is the only character in the picture who is not a politician, or even a real person. According to the painter, she represents a young Mother Svea, a female national symbol carrying the white flag of peace.⁴⁶⁷ Using the cannon as a helter-skelter, the Swedes are portrayed as negligent and naive, as children in the act of playing, resembling the passive and incompetent representations above. Unlike Erlander paraphrased in the caption, the politicians in the image are portrayed as childish. Brezhnev serves as a spatial representation of the Soviet Union, represented as sexually abusive, dominant and literally about to blow something up. Again, Brezhnev is painted as the intimidating but laughable Other. The men in the image are thereby portrayed as either threatening (Brezhnev) or childish and naive (the Swedish politicians). Both representations in this setting are laughable, which means that the image can be understood as a general critique of those in leadership positions. Through spatial references to Swedish men who fail to protect the nation, their responsibility to protect is simultaneously (re)constructed. In this setting, and on a symbolic level, the canon can be interpreted as representing both the submarine and a penis. The wall can be understood as a symbol of the Swedish border. The picture can therefore be argued as drawing on a rape metaphor, with the Soviet cannon – or the U137 – penetrating a wall – or the Swedish nation. Hence, the image can be interpreted as a gendered and sexualized representation of Soviet violation of Swedish national territory, reconstructing a male threatening Other and an incapable, emasculated Self.


However, the political context in which the submarine crisis took place also included a gendered, nationalized and sexualized political scandal with implications for how the image might be interpreted. In the late 1970s, leading Swedish politicians, including Prime Minister Fälldin, were accused of having visited prostitutes at a brothel with connections to the Soviet intelligence services. What is now known as “the Geijer affair (*Geijer-affären*)” became a national political scandal that involved espionage, sexual exploitation and male privilege, as well as criminal behavior and political cover-ups at the highest level. Although Palme, who was prime minister at the time the scandal broke, denied all the accusations, the scandal was described as a threat to national security.⁴⁶⁸ In light of the Geijer affair, and since all those in the image were involved in the affair to some extent, the image can be interpreted as a timely critique of those in power. While the men tasked with protecting the nation were being seduced by foreign intelligence services with the help of

⁴⁶⁷ Interview with Zetterling, Leif. 2019-06-13.

⁴⁶⁸ See for example Olsson, 2006; Rauscher & Mattsson, 2004.

women's bodies, the Swedish nation was becoming an easy target for the foreign intruder.

Figure 10. "Epilog på u-båtsdrama"



Source: "Epilog på u-båtsdramat". *Sydsvenskan* (SDS). 1981-11-04.

Figure 10 features Brezhnev in the act of flirting with Mother Svea while hiding a paralyzed Swedish general behind his back. The general is clearly losing consciousness, hanging limp from the grip of the enemy. At the symbolic level, the female body of Mother Svea again represents the Swedish nation, a spatial reference to a feminized nation. The general represents the incapable Swedish military in a male body, the male protector who has failed in his mission. Brezhnev represents the threatening Other, the Soviet Union in a male body, a representation of a sneaky Other with bad intentions. However, a closer look at Mother Svea allows an alternative interpretation. Wearing glasses and with hair in the same style as those of Foreign Minister Ola Ullsten, Mother Svea resembles the foreign minister in a feminized outfit. My interpretation is that this represents the foreign minister in a queer and shameful position, dressed as a woman and courted by an abnormal masculinized Other.

One thing that stands out in the above media representations is that they almost exclusively make spatial references to men through the presence of male bodies. Numerous images painted Swedish politicians and military personnel in male bodies, which means that men served as the main spatial referent. Being described as incompetent, slow and passive, the Swedish men featured in the media representations were represented as acting as what IR scholar Carol Cohn calls "wimps". Swedish men were depicted with attributes connected with femininity, such as passivity, negligence and naivety. According to Cohn, to be described as acting like a wimp "is an *interpretation* of a person's acts (or, in national security discourse, a country's acts [] and] is a

selection of one among many possible different ways to understand something.” In addition, “once the selection is made, the other possibilities recede into invisibility.”⁴⁶⁹ My interpretation is that gendered, nationalized and sexualized representations both served as a critique of those in power, and contributed to the construction/reconstruction of societal power orders. Through portrayals of Swedish politicians and the military as wimps, the option of making them appear strong and powerful was ruled out. At the same time, however, the assumption that it is a masculine duty to protect the nation was preserved.

Other spatial referents concerned the national Self and the opposite Other, represented in Mother Svea and Brezhnev. In contrast to the incapable Swedish man, the Soviet intruder was described as a dangerous but capable threatening Other, an overly potent enemy who had violated the body of Mother Svea, and in effect the Swedish nation. Representations like these drew on gendered and sexualized notions of monstrous Soviet male domination, Swedish male incompetence and Swedish female victimization, as well as of Soviet male activity and Swedish inactivity. Through representations of male incompetence and female victimization, media representations made the protection of the nation the main responsibility of Swedish men. In the images, however, Swedish men had failed in their mission. Temporal references to neutrality along with the presence of political leaders from the past were central to the critique of Swedish politicians and the military in the present.

By portraying politicians and military personnel as passive and incapable, media representations can be understood as a gendered critique of the actual state of the defensively neutral soldier ideal. The relational approach to gender is crucial to this analysis. Since the national military force was considered essential to ensuring neutrality, the reliability of neutrality was also called into question. Media portrayals thereby contributed to the emasculation of both Swedish men and neutrality. Meanwhile, the association between masculinity and defense, and the position of men as protectors of a national territory marked by a female body was reconstructed in the media representations, even though their abilities were seriously questioned. However, the underlying assumptions in representations related to responsibility were that it was a man’s duty to protect the nation, and a woman’s duty to cherish this protection. Through such representations, the possibility that women could serve as protectors was ruled out. At the same time, however, representations of Svea were ambivalent. Sometimes she was represented as victimized, sometimes as capable and in charge. Since Svea is a historic symbol of the Swedish nation, such ambivalent representations are interesting. One possible interpretation is that the main criticism was directed at current protective abilities, rather than the policy of armed neutrality as such.

⁴⁶⁹ Cohn, 1993: 234.

The Restoration of National Pride

In the above analysis I have argued that media representations of the submarine crisis can be understood as representations of national shame, apparent in representations of a humiliated, emasculated Self unable to keep national territory safe from the threatening Soviet Other. However, media representations also contained a contradictory message about an unreliable, oversized and dishonored Other. Following a relational logic, such representations contributed to the making of a reliable, moderate and honorable Self. For example, several images represented Brezhnev and the Soviet Union in a shameful position, as a liar and a pariah that could not be trusted. Communicating a message of Soviet failure, Figure 11 portrays a man asking an artist: “Which politician is the easiest to paint?” The artist replies: “Brezhnev, since he has lost his face.”

Figure 11. “Ströyers dagbok”, November 18, 1981




Source: Ströyer, Poul. ”Ströyers dagbok”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1981-11-18

In this case, Brezhnev serves as a spatial reference to the Soviet Union and is positioned as the one who should be ashamed in light of the submarine crisis. Figure A3 in Appendix 3 portrays a huge and ashamed Brezhnev standing in the corner being lectured by Mother Svea. The caption reads: “Little Mother Svea puts the big Brezhnev in the naughty corner. The Russian leader mopes about. On his back he has the hammer and the sickle.” At the symbolic level, Mother Svea serves as a symbol of the Swedish nation, small but confident, lecturing the Soviet aggressor. Furthermore, the aggressor accepts being lectured by Svea. In positioning Brezhnev as a huge child in the naughty corner, and Svea as a small but adult parent, the image draws on gender, heterosexual family ideals and size to humiliate the Other. The image of being put in the naughty corner by a woman reconstructs stereotypical assumptions of women being responsible for childcare. By positioning the woman as the one in charge and representing Brezhnev as a child, the image makes the situation embarrassing for the Soviet Other. This permits the emasculation of the Soviet

Other. The fact that Svea is so small, but still able to control the huge body of the Other makes the situation even more embarrassing.

Figure 12. "Sårad oskuld"



Source: "Sårad oskuld". *Svenska Dagbladet*. 1981-11-12.


In Figure 12, Brezhnev is replaced by the Russian bear, a well-known metaphor for the Soviet Union. Standing on a stool to be able to peak through a keyhole, the Soviet Other is also escaping from a hedgehog with the three crowns of Sweden printed on its body. The hedgehog is a historical metaphor for Swedish defense policy from the Second World War, pointing its spikes outwards in its defensive position.⁴⁷⁰ Again, the Soviet Other is put in a position of being controlled by someone much smaller. The hedgehog is certainly small compared to its Soviet counterpart, but it still manages to scare the huge bear. In addition, the bear resembles a circus animal trained to balance on a stool and to follow the instructions of its owner. In a humorous way, these images portray the big Russian bear as a frightened and/or humiliated child in a grown-up body. They portray the masculinity of the Other as equipped with big bodies but having small brains, the brain of a child or an animal. Following a relational approach, images like these (re)construct the Swedish Self as the opposite: small but confident with brains and authority. Although Brezhnev is represented in these images as bigger – or, at the symbolic level, more heavily armed – than Mother Svea, she and the Swedish nation she represents triumph over the enemy from the east. Again, the Swedish Self is represented as small but capable, and size is an important feature of how the Other is degraded.

⁴⁷⁰ See for example Molin, Bjereld & Johansson, 2008.

Such representations rely on heteronormative assumptions about strong, active men and weak, passive women, and use such gendered and sexualized assumptions to portray the Other as in an embarrassing position being controlled by a woman. At the same time, since Svea is a historical symbol of the Swedish nation, such representations can also be understood as illustrations of a small nation confronting one of the most powerful nations of the cold war. Either way, the Soviet Other was positioned in a shameful way in the images. Following a relational logic, such representations at the same time contribute to the making of an honorable Self. Representations of this honorable Self also feature in some of the images.

Figure 13 portrays the Swedish Prime Minister together with the Swedish Foreign Minister, Defense Minister and Supreme Commander carrying the head of a humiliated and beheaded Brezhnev, who slouches away across the Baltic Sea, dragging his broken submarine behind him. Holding the submarine on a lead, Brezhnev resembles a child with a toy. Instead of a head, Brezhnev has a flag reading “Sea of Peace”.⁴⁷¹

Figure 13. Brezhnev beheaded



Source: Zetterling, Leif. *Aftonbladet*. 1981-11-06.

⁴⁷¹ Use of the phrase “Sea of Peace” serves as a satirical reference to Soviet assurances that the Baltic Sea would become a sea of peace (see Chapter 10).

One possible interpretation of the image is that it portrays Swedish politicians holding Brezhnev's head as a trophy. The image can therefore be interpreted as representing the Soviet intruder both as a child with a toy submarine, and as a beheaded enemy. While stereotypical representations of children tend to make them appear innocent, this image represents the Soviet Union both as a child, and as a defeated, unreliable adversary. Furthermore, the image portrays Swedish politicians as small but capable, and as showing off. Posing in front of a photographer, carrying Brezhnev's head as a trophy, the image can be interpreted as a critique of trophy seeking masculinity or masculine ambitions. Hence, it is possible to make ambivalent interpretations of identity representations.

In the above images, spatial references are made to collectives of male politicians – represented either as humiliated boys being lectured by Svea, or as proud and capable Swedes on top of developments. The written media made similar representations. In an interview with *Dagens Nyheter*, the Swedish Foreign Minister emphasized that the Soviet Union had agreed to all Swedish demands, and described the Swedish course of action as resolute and successful.⁴⁷² Labeling them “a clear achievement for decisive Swedish diplomacy”, *Dagens Nyheter* described Swedish actions as “a clear message to the rest of the world that smaller states can stand up for their rights against a super-power.”⁴⁷³ In light of the submarine intrusion, it was described as important that the Soviet Union agree to Swedish demands not only for domestic opinion, but also for what the rest of the world would think of Sweden. This was portrayed as especially important given international media interest in the situation.⁴⁷⁴ *Svenska Dagbladet* argued that US reaction showed appreciation that “small neutral Sweden did not give in to Soviet pressure.”⁴⁷⁵ Praising the Swedish government, *Svenska Dagbladet* recognized that “the handling has been characterized by robustness and restraint.”⁴⁷⁶ It was particularly emphasized that it was Sweden and not the Soviet Union that escorted the submarine out of Swedish territorial waters. Describing the Soviet Union as excessively armed without the slightest respect for a small non-aligned nation, it was not without pride that a journalist recognized that on the day the submarine was towed out of Swedish waters, it had “had to leave Swedish waters with its tail between its legs.”⁴⁷⁷ Expressing his support for how the government had handled the situation, opposition leader Palme stressed: “When a Soviet submarine strands in the Swedish archipelago it is troublesome for the Soviet Union,

⁴⁷² ”Inspektion i natt efter utfrågning”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1981-11-03.

⁴⁷³ ”Ubåten flott”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1981-11-03.

⁴⁷⁴ ”Ubåten flott”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1981-11-03.

⁴⁷⁵ ”Bevis på hot från öst”. *Svenska Dagbladet*. 1981-11-05. See also ”Ursäkt utan ånger”. *Svenska Dagbladet*. 1981-11-04.

⁴⁷⁶ ”Ursäkt utan ånger”. *Svenska Dagbladet*. 1981-11-04.

⁴⁷⁷ ”Den röda spionbåten”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1981-11-06.

not for Sweden.”⁴⁷⁸ Hence, at a time of national crisis, the opposition leader backed the government. While Sweden was described as behaving in a reasonable manner, the Soviet Union was portrayed as having done the opposite, performing a “nonchalant exhibition [maktspråk] of Soviet power.”⁴⁷⁹ The Soviet Union was repeatedly described as excessively armed and prone to violence. Recognizing this in the parliamentary debate on foreign policy in 1982, a Center Party parliamentarian claimed that it was “a well-deserved fate when the Russian warship was dragged like a barge away from Swedish territorial waters.”⁴⁸⁰ An unsigned editorial published in *Svenska Dagbladet* stated that “Sweden has no reason to deviate from its chosen path of action. It should make sure that our rights are respected in a calm and methodical manner, without excessive deference.”⁴⁸¹ Describing Swedish behavior as simultaneously confident, robust, calm, methodical and reasonable, an alternative narrative was created to the incapable one identified above. Now the national Self was described as righteous and on top of developments. In sum, although media representations shifted from portraying Sweden as in a shameful position to a position of being in charge, spatial references were repeatedly made to men as protectors of the national territory. Spatial representations of the territory as a female body contributed to the reconstruction of the narrative of men as protectors and women in need of protection. At the same time, representations of Svea as small but capable complicate such an interpretation.

The Making of an Unreliable Other

The submarine crisis did indeed give rise to gendered, nationalized and sexualized representations of both shame and pride in the Swedish media. However, another feature of media representations was how they relied on personal references, frequently representing international politics as intimate. An unsigned editorial published in *Dagens Nyheter* on the November 18, 1981, after the submarine had left Swedish waters, illustrates this point. Reflecting on the submarine’s intrusion, the editorial described it in a way that made it resemble a personal trauma:

The spontaneous way to react to infringement is shame. It is less the ‘wounded innocence’ that stays in the one who has been subjected to infringement than the moment of enforced acquaintance with someone who is out to cause harm.

⁴⁷⁸ ”Regeringen får stöd av Palme”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1981-11-05.

⁴⁷⁹ ”Båtgästen från Sovjet”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1981-10-29.

⁴⁸⁰ Riksdagens protokoll. 1981/82: 99. ”Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt”, Bengtson, Torsten (cp).

⁴⁸¹ ”Förargelsens båt”. *Svenska Dagbladet*. 1981-11-01.

What follows is rage, astonishment, the need for revenge etc., depending on the power balance between the violating party and the one who has been violated.⁴⁸²

Describing the intrusion as a situation of “wounded innocence (*sårad oskuld*)”, the writer elaborated on emotional reactions in what resembles an intimate relationship, one person who has been violated by another. Positioning *shame* as the immediate response to infringement (*kränkning*), the writer moved on to describe rage, astonishment and revenge as ways to overcome the assault one has been exposed to. In this representation, the intrusion was described as something that had happened to a person, or a group of people in a body-like constellation able to feel collectively as a person. Similar representations could be found elsewhere. For example, writing about the room for maneuver for a small nation in an international setting where its security is dependent on the behavior of the great powers, an unsigned editorial published in *Svenska Dagbladet* stated: “A picture is painted of a country that gradually learns to live with violations.”⁴⁸³ In this description, Sweden was represented as a united whole, resembling descriptions of a person who learned to live with violations. The perpetrator was the Soviet Union.

Such representations also featured in criticisms of the Swedish government. One conservative commentator wrote a chronicle in *Svenska Dagbladet* asking: “why in heavens name has Sweden acted as if it, and why does it continue with a security policy that runs the errands of the perpetrator (*gärningsmannen*)?”⁴⁸⁴ In describing Sweden as someone who runs errands for the perpetrator, in this case the Soviet Union, this can be understood as a symbolic representation of an intimate relationship between two people where the victim is not only unable to leave the perpetrator, but also does what is best for the violating other. Drawing on language that resembles descriptions of a domestic relationship, the nation-family analogy is central to making sense of such representations. As argued in Chapter 2, emotion and human bodies are central to IR theorizing, and Costigliola has shown how symbols and metaphors from the private sphere, often loaded with sexual references, can be seen as “shorthand” for communicating meaning about complex relationships in security discourses.⁴⁸⁵ It can fairly be argued that analogies about the international and the family served as shorthand for making sense of the submarine crisis, not least with reference to the intrusion as a case of heterosexual domestic violence. Through such representations, the Swedish nation was described as a feminized person violated by a masculinized aggressor, resembling narratives on domestic violence in heterosexual relationships, of a violent man and a victimized woman.

⁴⁸² ”Vem vill ha ett vykort på USAs kränkningar?”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1981-11-18.

⁴⁸³ ”Den lilla nationen”. *Svenska Dagbladet*. 1987-12-19.

⁴⁸⁴ Braconier, Fredrik. ”Sveriges märklige ubåtspolitik”. *Svenska Dagbladet*. 1987-12-19.

⁴⁸⁵ Costigliola, 1997: 164.

The above analysis of media representations has shown how the gendered, nationalized and sexualized making of what appears to be a victimized national Self also (re)constructed notions of an unreliable Other who was revealed for who he really was. This representation made it possible for the Self to break free from the Other and to appear reasonable and reliable. As Chapter 10 shows, such representations were also present in subsequent disarmament debates. An unsigned editorial published in *Svenska Dagbladet* described the submarine crisis as “unquestionably a bit embarrassing.” Nonetheless, setting “spontaneous rage” aside, it was argued that the situation showed what the Soviet Union was really up to:

From a Swedish perspective, the situation is unquestionably a bit embarrassing. We have perceived a measure of the efficiency of the coastal guard. The submarine had to get struck aground for a whole day before the Swedish defense force discovered that a foreign war vessel had reached not only Swedish territory, but military positions near a restricted naval base. We have to draw conclusions from this. Of course, other nations do. In the middle of the spontaneous rage one feels at the actions of the Soviet Union, one still has to be satisfied that we now know more about the maneuvers of the superpower on the border of and within Swedish territory. Perhaps the event will encourage those who more or less disregard the Soviet Union in order to get their security political equation to add up to reconsider the situation.⁴⁸⁶

Represented as a symbol of Soviet unreliability, the submarine was argued to have proved that the Soviet Union could not be trusted. By representing the Other as unreliable and with bad intentions, the Self could either act rationally with its eyes wide open, or continue to disregard the threat that the Soviet Other was said to pose. Such representations relied on geographically organized spatial referents to the Soviet Other and the Swedish Self. However, the Swedish Self was not represented as united. Instead, a division was made between those who were said to “disregard the Soviet Union in order to get their security political equation to add up”, and those who saw things clearly. Chapter 10 elaborates further on how this split featured in the disarmament debates.


In various representations, media coverage highlighted the discrepancy between Soviet rhetoric and action. It also represented the intrusion as embarrassing for the Soviet Union, not least because of its engagement with Nordic governments on the creation of an NNWFZ. The Soviet Union had repeatedly stated that it posed no threat to the Nordic region but the submarine crisis was represented as proof that Soviet assurances could not be trusted.⁴⁸⁷ Representations of Soviet unreliability were a common element in the images. Figure

⁴⁸⁶ “Ubåt 137”. *Svenska Dagbladet*. 1981-10-29.

⁴⁸⁷ “Magasinet”. *Sveriges Television*. Episode 21, 1981-10-28. <https://www.oppetarkiv.se/video/11414666/magasinet-avsnitt-21-av-43> (available 2020-08-05).

A4 in Appendix 3 portrays an innocent looking Soviet soldier saying: “Invaded Afghanistan, what? We had problems with our compass.” Referring to the official Soviet explanation that the submarine ended up in Sweden due to technical errors, and the recent and heavily criticized military invasion of Afghanistan, the image can be interpreted as a sarcastic critique of Soviet unreliability.⁴⁸⁸ It suggests that while Soviet generals acted innocent, their excuses were total fabrications. Through such representations, the Soviet Other was described as a bad liar, and a fool that was not to be trusted. From a relational approach, such representations (re)constructed a linkage between a reasonable national Self and the recognition that the Soviet Union was an unreliable threat.

Figure 14. “Ströyers dagbok”, November 11, 1981



Source: Ströyer, Poul. "Ströyers dagbok". *Dagens Nyheter*. 1981-11-11.

Figure 14 communicates a similar message, but this time with reference to Soviet claims that Swedish measurements proving nuclear warheads were onboard the submarine were inaccurate. Instead, it was said that these readings came from a watch.⁴⁸⁹ Portraying a Soviet commander pointing to a wristwatch strapped to a nuclear missile, the image can be interpreted as a critique of both Soviet lies, and their expectations that Swedes would be so easily fooled. Again, the image questions the reasonability and reliability of Soviet explanations. Similar representations appeared in editorials on and reportage of the submarine crisis. In such representations, emphasis was placed on what Brezhnev said about making the Baltic a Sea of Peace, and what he did by showing up with a nuclear-armed submarine in Swedish territorial waters.⁴⁹⁰ Hence, the

⁴⁸⁸ SOU 2001:85.

⁴⁸⁹ The image includes a sentence saying: “The radiation from the submarine came from a watch, said a Soviet colonel.” See also SOU 2001:85.

⁴⁹⁰ See for example “Jakoviev själv utvisad som spion”. *Svenska Dagbladet*. 1981-11-08.

inconsistency was pointed out between Soviet talk about peace, on the one hand, and its behavior in the Baltic Sea, on the other. This perceived inconsistency was also a repeated element in the cartoons, caricatures and satirical sketches, and is the theme of Figure 15 and Figure 16.

Figure 15. "På grund i 'Fredens hav'"



Source: "På grund i fredens hav". *Sydsvenskan (SDS)*. 1981-10-30.

Figure 16. "Rorsmannen"



Source: Nordlinder, Folke. "Rorsmannen". *Svenska Dagbladet*. 1981-11-10.

The above depictions can be interpreted as portraying the assumed discrepancy between Soviet rhetoric and practice. While talking about making the Baltic a “Sea of Peace”, as symbolized by the peace dove in Figure 15 and the sign “Sea of Peace (*Fredens Hav*)” in Figure 16, the Soviet Union did not hesitate to sneak around the area with nuclear-armed submarines. In these images, the submarine can be understood as a symbol of the assumed unreliability and dangerous behavior of the Soviet Union.

Summary

In sum, the media representations analyzed in this chapter drew on geographically organized spaces where human bodies featured as representations of Sweden, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other. They told a story about the Swedish Self as both violated and ashamed, and robust and reasonable, as opposed to the relationally constructed brutal and unreasonable Other, the Soviet Union. In addition, an image of a winning Self and its opposite, a humiliated Other, was also formed in the material. This can be interpreted as the restoration of pride in Sweden in general and defensive military masculinity in particular. Such an interpretation is in line with Åse’s argument that “[w]inning the reputation game was essential to reinstating confidence in Swedish foreign policy.”⁴⁹¹ In order to reinstate confidence in the ideal of the defensive soldier, Åse argues that the Soviet intruders were disgraced through gendered representations – and that images of national military heroes were created compatible with Swedish national identity.⁴⁹²

While Swedish male bodies were associated with righteousness and robustness, Soviet male bodies gave the impression of having a lot of muscle but not much brain. Furthermore, the national territory marked by a female body was not just represented as victimized. Instead, Mother Svea emerged as tough, lecturing the Soviet intruder on his bad behavior. In this setting, the Soviet Union was described as the one that should be ashamed. In addition, the Soviet Union was being lectured by a woman – a gendered portrayal of power relations where the lecturing of a woman is likely to have been interpreted as even more embarrassing for the threatening Other. Hence, when Swedish male bodies were represented as resolute, trustworthy and smart, this dictated the rule that an untrustworthy, stupid superpower must follow. Mother Svea was shown as small but strong. I read this as simultaneously a story about the small, non-aligned nation, the resolute men who were tasked with ensuring its protection, and the female body that was no longer victimized. No longer the victim of monstrous Soviet masculinity, a Swedish masculinity ideal associ-

⁴⁹¹ Åse, 2016: 127.

⁴⁹² Åse, 2016. In my study, I have not searched for such heroic representations of individuals.

ated with responsibility, robustness and protection was (re)created. An additional representation was linked to Soviet unreliability and claims that the submarine crisis revealed what the Soviet Union was really up to. Representing the Other as unreliable made it possible to talk about a reliable national Self – a Self that was potentially too smart to fall for fancy words. Through this relationally organized representation of the Self and the Other, the Self was simultaneously potentially split. Chapter 10 shows that this national split was a core feature of subsequent disarmament debates.

10. Debates about the NNWFZ

This chapter explores the simultaneous making of identity and disarmament policy in the national context of fear and perceived nuclear danger triggered by the submarine crisis. This perception of fear was communicated both in the media and among politicians, and was especially linked to the discovery of nuclear weapons on board the U137. The day after the news that nuclear weapons were on board the submarine was first broadcast by the national media, for example, an unsigned editorial in *Dagens Nyheter* read: “The threat of nuclear weapons has never been as apparent to the Swedish population as it is now.”⁴⁹³ In bringing nuclear weapons on to Swedish territory, it was argued, the U137 had brought the Swedish population face to face with a frightening and threatening situation. Similar representations were made by politicians. In an interview published in *Svenska Dagbladet* in 1982, Foreign Minister Ola Ullsten spoke about his feelings on the discovery of nuclear weapons on board the U137:

It became more personal those four or five days when I, together with only a few others, knew that there was a Hiroshima bomb floating around in a submarine. I was not afraid that it would detonate and that Karlskrona would be blown up. But I was afraid because it all became so close to my life.⁴⁹⁴

According to Ullsten, the presence of nuclear weapons on the submarine made things more “personal”. In contrast to more common references in foreign policy speeches to the Self as a collective of people, such as Swedes or men, Ullsten spoke about himself, his life, and the intimate and personal. With a temporal reference to Hiroshima, Ullsten associated the U137 with the devastating consequences of the use of nuclear weapons witnessed at the end of the Second World War. Even though he stated that he was not afraid that nuclear weapons would be used against Sweden there and then, he recognized that the U137 brought the threat of nuclear weapons closer to his life. In an international setting of increasingly frosty cold war relations, my interpretation is that the submarine came to embody nuclear danger, thereby serving as a spatial

⁴⁹³ ”Fyndet i Gåsefjärden”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1981-11-07.

⁴⁹⁴ Lindmarker, Ingmar. ”Styrandes förnuft är inget att lita på”. *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1982-04-11.

representation of geographically organized tense neighborhood relations. Furthermore, the submarine was also associated with fear. As discussed in Chapter 2, Ahmed describes emotions as the glue that makes the national subject whole, and argues that this makes emotions central to collective identity making.⁴⁹⁵ Through the attachment of fear to the submarine and the threatening Other, the Swedish nation was made whole. This chapter reveals that opinions differed about how Sweden should proceed with the making of nuclear disarmament policy in light of the stranded submarine.

Disarmament Advocacy

The U137 stranded in a national context in which leading politicians had agreed to investigate the possibility of establishing a Nordic Nuclear Weapon-free Zone (NNWFZ). Chapter 9 showed how media representations and spatial references to an unreliable Soviet Other at the same time served to position the national Self as both capable and reliable. After the discovery of nuclear weapons on board the U137, the submarine intrusion was repeatedly represented as an example of Soviet unreliability, and expected to have consequences for ongoing efforts to establish an NNWFZ. In the reporting published in *Dagens Nyheter*, it was argued that the submarine crisis would become a turning point, and that “the security political debate about Sweden and its defense, a nuclear weapon-free zone, the ‘Sea of Peace’, and so on, will never be the same.”⁴⁹⁶ According to this argument, the submarine intrusion would have consequences for subsequent security debates, not least about the NNWFZ. A similar message was repeated in an editorial in *Dagens Nyheter* published on New Year’s Eve in 1981. It argued that the U137 had made the threat of nuclear weapons a reality for the Swedish people, and that this would have consequences for the NNWFZ:

The discovery of nuclear weapons on board the U137 has had consequences for the whole nuclear weapons debate and the efforts – supported by the Soviet Union – to create a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Nordic. [...] The nuclear threat became a reality to each Swede. The disarmament debate gained a new dimension. The discussion about a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Nordic has been shown in a new light.⁴⁹⁷

According to the editorial, the submarine crisis made the nuclear threat real to all Swedes, and discussions about the NNWFZ were said to have been “shown in a new light”. Another editorial in *Dagens Nyheter* argued that this discovery

⁴⁹⁵ Ahmed, 2004.

⁴⁹⁶ “Bomb i Fredens hav”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1981-11-06. See also “Palmes misstag”. *Svenska Dagbladet*. 1981-11-07.

⁴⁹⁷ Bergman, Klas. “Ubåten väckte Sverige”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1981-12-31.

made the intrusion seem “more serious” than had previously been thought, bringing a new dimension to what was described as the “international strategic debate, as well as the growing peace debate”:

The behavior of the Soviet Union in the so-called Sea of Peace, the Baltic Sea, with its position in the balance of power, has been disturbing. The picture becomes even darker now. This means that the submarine affair is not yet closed. As a ship of shame, the Soviet submarine is expected to soon be on its way. [...] What remains is a Swedish state and military leadership that has behaved well in a situation that everyone wanted to avoid. However, this sad story, not least for the neighborhood relationship between Sweden and the Soviet Union, has taken a serious turn.⁴⁹⁸

After describing the submarine as “a ship of shame”, the editorial represented the Swedish state and military leadership as capable, and argued that the incident made Swedish-Soviet relations more tense. The spatial representations of Sweden, the state and the military leadership – that is, the male bodies that were initially ridiculed in the sources analyzed in Chapter 9 – were said to have behaved well. Through such representations, the protection of Sweden’s national territory was (re)constructed as a responsibility of men. Conversely, the threatening Other – the Soviet Union – was relationally represented as an example of unreliable masculinity. This Other was represented as having misbehaved, putting it in a shameful position as responsible for the frosty relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union and a perceived dark future for the Baltic Sea region. These representations resemble those made about Soviet unreliability and the humiliated Other, as well as the reliable and winning national Self in media coverage of the submarine crisis analyzed in Chapter 9. The remainder of this section elaborates on the identity representations and policy advocacy of those who either opposed or favored the establishment of an NNWFZ.

Representations of the unreliable Other

When the U137 was discovered in Karlskrona, the Soviet Union had been supporting the establishment of an NNWFZ for quite some time. It had declared a willingness to make the Baltic Sea a “Sea of Peace” in the late 1950s.⁴⁹⁹ The status of the Baltic Sea was central to the establishment of an NNWFZ. After the submarine crisis, the Conservative Party held that for an NNWFZ to be established, it was of the utmost importance that the Baltic Sea was included.⁵⁰⁰ While not initially dismissing the need to create an NNWFZ

⁴⁹⁸ ”Skräll kring ubåten”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1981-11-06.

⁴⁹⁹ Hult, 1986.

⁵⁰⁰ See for example Riksdagens protokoll. 1981/82: 99. ”Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt”, Bildt, Carl (m).

altogether, the Conservative Party emphasized that the U137 had made progress less likely. Arguing that a zone should involve undertakings by the superpowers, the removal of all existing nuclear weapons from the region, and an end to weapons targeting the region, Conservative Party parliamentarian Carl Bildt – who would later lead the party and serve as prime minister in 1991–1994 and foreign minister in 2006–2014 – said that the Soviet Union was striving for the opposite. According to Bildt, an NNWFZ without legally binding commitments by the Soviet Union would only serve the interests of what he positioned as the threatening Soviet Other.⁵⁰¹ Other conservatives made similar claims. For example, the then Conservative Party leader Gösta Bohman claimed:

For many people the intrusion made the Soviet Union, its statements and its promises, appear in a new and completely different light. Of course, this, the most serious violation of our sovereignty since the end of the Second World War, cannot lead to a change in our foreign policy in the long term. It does not really mean a change of the Swedish position as such, but our demand that the Baltic Sea must be part of any treaty on a Nordic Nuclear Weapon-free Zone has gained weight.⁵⁰²

According to Bohman, the submarine intrusion was the most serious violation of Swedish sovereignty since the Second World War. While he did not think that this should change Swedish foreign policy in the long term, he recognized that it should have consequences for Swedish demands in relation to the NNWFZ. Arguing that the U137 had made it clear that the Soviet Union could not be trusted, he stressed that the Baltic Sea had to be included in any future conversations about an NNWFZ. In a similar vein, a Center Party parliamentarian argued that the U137 made it clear that the Soviet Union would have to provide undertakings if it wanted to achieve a zone.⁵⁰³ These statements show how it was argued that the submarine crisis should have consequences for subsequent conversations about the NNWFZ. The 1981 submarine crisis was repeatedly made a reason why it would be foolish of Sweden to work for the establishment of an NNWFZ.⁵⁰⁴

A key feature of the policy advocacy against the NNWFZ was to represent the Soviet Union as unreliable. It was also represented as a serious threat. Such representations positioned the Soviet Union as a threatening and unreliable Other, and drew on notions of fear to make sense of this positioning. For ex-

⁵⁰¹ Riksdagens protokoll. 1981/82: 99. "Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt", Bildt, Carl (m).

⁵⁰² Riksdagens protokoll. 1981/82: 99. "Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt", Bohman, Gösta (m).

⁵⁰³ Riksdagens protokoll. 1981/82: 99. "Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt", Bengtson, Torsten (cp).

⁵⁰⁴ See for example "Lärdom av flottbesök". *Svenska Dagbladet*. 1981-11-07.

ample, in an interview in *Dagens Nyheter*, Conservative Party leader Ulf Adelsohn (who replaced Bohman on October 25, 1981) said: "My trust in the Russians has never been particularly great, and it has not improved since it was revealed that they had nuclear weapons on their submarine."⁵⁰⁵ A Center Party parliamentarian made a similar statement, arguing that the U137 was one example of the "hollowness of Russian words on the Baltic as a Sea of Peace."⁵⁰⁶ The media made similar representations of the Soviet Union. A coverage published in *Svenska Dagbladet* noted:

It was no surprise that the intrusion took place. To anyone with any common sense or elementary knowledge of the military and political realities in our part of the world, it has long been clear that grand communist talk of the Baltic as a 'Sea of Peace' has never been anything more than propaganda. It is a smokescreen that has served to hide the enormous militarization of the Sea of Peace, and the close interest in Swedish territory, from the simple-minded.⁵⁰⁷

From this statement, those with any "common sense" and "elementary knowledge" of world affairs could easily figure out what the Soviet Union was up to, regardless of what it said. Thus, those with common sense would understand that the Soviet Union had no real intention of demilitarizing the Baltic Sea. On the contrary, the Soviet Union was said to have arms in the area that posed a threat to Swedish territory. Hence, those who trusted the Soviet Union were represented as not in possession of common sense or elementary knowledge of world affairs. Furthermore, it was represented as totally unreasonable to make progress with the NNWFZ agenda, as the 1981 submarine crisis was argued to have shown what the Soviet Union was really up to. A similar report published in *Dagens Nyheter* held that:

A reasonable consequence of [the discovery of nuclear weapons on the U137] must be that the empty talk about a Nordic Nuclear Weapon-free Zone is silenced. The absurdity of this propaganda has always been that it – sometimes threatening, sometimes flattering – has been directed at small states without nuclear weapons, by a superpower that solely possesses nuclear weapons in the Baltic, firmly refusing any idea of removing them.⁵⁰⁸

It followed from this statement that talk about an NNWFZ was empty talk, and that those who trusted what was labeled Soviet "propaganda" were naive and simple-minded. Similar statements were made elsewhere.

⁵⁰⁵ "Adelsohn om fredsrörelsen: KGB-agenter vill infiltrera". *Dagens Nyheter*. 1981-11-18.

⁵⁰⁶ Riksdagens protokoll. 1981/82: 99. "Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt", Bengtson, Torsten (cp).

⁵⁰⁷ "Lärdom av flottbesök". *Svenska Dagbladet*. 1981-11-07.

⁵⁰⁸ "Fredsforskare om Norden: Kärnvapenfri zon kan öka krigsrisk". *Dagens Nyheter*. 1983-01-24.

In sum, representations of Soviet unreliability made it possible to conclude that it would be unreasonable to trust the Soviet regime. Such representations made it possible to call for what was relationally represented as “realistic” disarmament engagement. By talking about Soviet unreliability, the Swedish self was relationally positioned as potentially reliable, even though the Swedish nation appeared split. The two sides of this split were represented as those who were simple-minded enough to trust the Soviet regime, and those who were reasonable and realistic, and saw things for what they really were. Hence, representations of the Soviet Union as a threatening and unreliable Other made it possible to create a separation between what was represented as realistic as opposed to the unrealistic disarmament engagement of the national Self.

Responsibilities of the non-nuclear Self

While conservatives held that the Soviet Union could not be trusted and that this should have consequences for Sweden’s position on the NNWFZ, not everyone subscribed to the representation of the Soviet Union as necessarily unreliable or of the zone as unrealistic. For example, the Communist Party insisted that the Soviet Union intended to honor its undertakings in relation to the NNWFZ.⁵⁰⁹ Furthermore, Communist Party politicians, along with some Social Democrats and advocates from the peace movement, stressed that the U137 underscored the urgency of creating an NNWFZ. For example, in 1985 the leader of the Communist Party, Lars Werner, argued that the lesson of the U137 should be that it is “more urgent than ever to establish a nuclear weapon-free zone, to make the whole Baltic free of nuclear weapons.”⁵¹⁰ The opposition leader, Olof Palme, also argued that the knowledge that there were more nuclear weapons in the Baltic sea than had previously been supposed was a reason to intensify efforts to establish an NNWFZ.⁵¹¹ This urgency was also highlighted by peace organizations. In an open letter to Soviet President Brezhnev, Women for Peace (*Kvinnokamp för fred*) criticized the “conscious violation of Swedish territory”, stating that it provoked “anger, dismay – and fear”. According to the letter, the U137 showed that an NNWFZ was necessary not only for Swedish security, but also as it constituted “a realistic first step towards international disarmament.”⁵¹² In contrast to how the U137 appeared in the conservative advocacy analyzed above, the submarine crisis was represented as a reason why the establishment of an NNWFZ was both urgent and necessary.

⁵⁰⁹ Riksdagens protokoll. 1985/86: 99. ”Utrikesdebatt”, Werner, Lars (vpk).

⁵¹⁰ Riksdagens protokoll. 1981/82: 99. ”Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt”, Werner, Lars (vpk).

⁵¹¹ Riksdagens protokoll. 1981/82: 99. ”Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt”, Palme, Olof (s).

⁵¹² Kvinnokamp för fred. ”Fredsörelsen till Brezjnev: ’Ilcka och bestörtning’”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1981-11-07.

One central feature of advocacy in favor of an NNWFZ was how spatial and temporal references were made to Sweden as a nuclear weapon-free state. In an op-ed in *Svenska Dagbladet*, SAP parliamentarian Mats Hellström argued that:

[A] Nordic Nuclear Weapon-free Zone is especially urgent for a country like Sweden, which has categorically abstained from acquiring nuclear weapons and which could be seriously exposed to for example isolated nuclear blackmail by a superpower in times of crisis.⁵¹³

According to Hellström, the fact that Sweden did not possess nuclear weapons made it possible for nuclear weapon states to blackmail Sweden, and he argued that an NNWFZ would ensure that this did not happen. Hence, spatial references were made to Sweden as a nuclear weapon-free state. According to Alva Myrdal, one of the key actors in Swedish disarmament policy, Sweden – as a nuclear weapon-free state – should be loyal to other countries, in particular the NATO members Denmark and Norway, by ensuring that their territories also remained free of nuclear weapons through the establishment of an NNWFZ:

Now when we ourselves have managed to remain free of nuclear weapons, we must be loyal and stand by the countries that strive to remain nuclear weapon-free and to free themselves from foreign nuclear weapons on their soil.⁵¹⁴

According to Myrdal, Sweden's non-nuclear weapon status brought with it a certain responsibility to act in solidarity and ensure the same status for neighboring states. Hence, the spatial referent to the geographical territory of Sweden as a nuclear weapon-free state was linked with a responsibility to act in solidarity with other Nordic states by ensuring their non-nuclear weapon status. Others argued that the freedom from nuclear weapons tasked Sweden with demonstrating that it was possible to live without nuclear weapons and to work for nuclear disarmament. According to peace advocate Maria Bergom-Larsson:

To fight for nuclear abolition is not only an act of solidarity, but a self-evident demand of a country that itself shows that it is possible to live without this weapon of mass murder. The work for a nuclear weapon-free zone is a self-evident consequence of this standpoint.⁵¹⁵

⁵¹³ Hellström, Mats. "Regional avspänning viktig". *Svenska Dagbladet*. 1982-11-05.

⁵¹⁴ Myrdal, Alva. "Alva Myrdal och Arbetarrörelsens fredsforum: 'En varudeklaration'". *Dagens Nyheter*. 1982-08-23.

⁵¹⁵ Bergom-Larsson, Maria. "Maria Bergom-Larsson svarar Wilhelm Agrell. Vår neutralitet måste vara aktiv". *Dagens Nyheter*. 1983-05-27. See also Bergman, Klas. "Svenska fredsröster. Arbetet för fred nu än viktigare". *Dagens Nyheter*. 1981-11-07.

Following her reasoning, the decision to live without nuclear weapons made it necessary to work for the abolition of nuclear weapons, and she argued that the work for an NNWFZ was part of this ambition.

In sum, whether it was described as an act of self-defense, an act of solidarity or a responsibility, those who favored an NNWFZ positioned Sweden as the main spatial referent, its freedom from nuclear weapons as a temporal reference to the decision to abstain from nuclear weapon acquisition, and work to establish an NNWFZ as a central responsibility of the Self.

The making of an enemy within

The debate about the NNWFZ took place in a context where popular protest against the nuclear arms race was a common feature in Sweden and internationally.⁵¹⁶ However, as the debate about the NNWFZ evolved after the submarine crisis, those who favored an NNWFZ – and especially what was referred to as the peace movement – faced heavy criticism from conservatives in parliament. Through this criticism, those who favored an NNWFZ were linked with the Soviet Union and more or less openly accused of running errands for what was represented as the unreliable and threatening Soviet Other. This division resembles the split identified in Chapter 9, and in the sections above, where those who trusted Soviet intentions were represented as unrealistic and naive, while those who did not trust the Soviet Union were represented as realistic and reliable. Representatives of the peace movement in particular were labeled as naive and potentially dangerous in serving the interests of the Soviet Other.

In 1982, Liberal Party Foreign Minister Ola Ullsten called the peace movement a “fuzzy concept” in his foreign policy declaration, arguing that it had a diverse composition and that parts of the movement were running errands for the Soviet regime.⁵¹⁷ This started a parliamentary debate as part of the foreign policy debate on whether the peace movement could be trusted, or if it actually privileged the interests of the Soviet Union. Conservative Party parliamentarians held that it was necessary to distance peace advocacy from communist rhetoric, whereas Social Democrat and Communist Party parliamentarians held that peace engagement was a positive force in an international state of increased tension and nuclear armament.⁵¹⁸ Similar representations featured in the media. Arguing that peace advocates tended to direct their criticism towards the west, editorials published in *Svenska Dagbladet* held that the peace movement had been infiltrated by communists, and that it should redirect its attention away from the west and towards the Soviet Union, protesting against

⁵¹⁶ For research on the international movement against nuclear weapons, see for example Wittner, 2009.

⁵¹⁷ Riksdagens protokoll. 1981/82: 99. ”Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt”, Ullsten, Ola (s).

⁵¹⁸ Riksdagens protokoll. 1981/82: 99. ”Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt”.

the behavior of the Soviet Union in what was sarcastically called the “Sea of Peace”.⁵¹⁹ Through such representations, those who advocated for an NNWFZ were labeled communists, or accused of running errands for the Soviet regime. Hence, the threatening Other not only appeared in the form of President Leonid Brezhnev or the Russian Bear, but was also represented as having infiltrated the national Self, creating an enemy within embodied in peace advocates who were assumed to be aligned with the enemy in the east. However, it was also stressed that those who favored an NNWFZ did not necessarily understand that their advocacy privileged the interests of the Soviet Union. For example, a Liberal Party parliamentarian argued:

The peace movement has a threat within itself – forces that are in direct opposition to the very goals and meaning of the peace movement are trying to make their way in it; and with strong economic resources and targeted propaganda strive to make it take the route of one-sided attacks or favor one of the sides in the military power struggle. It is important that the idealistic, strongly engaged people in the peace movement are aware of this threat and keep the peace movement free and independent of all directions.⁵²⁰

Calling on peace advocates to be wary of the communist threat within the movement, such statements represented peace advocates as wide-eyed and in need of a warning. Descriptions of a communist enemy lurking within the peace movement made it possible to label disarmament advocates as both a potential threat to national security due to Soviet influence and too simple-minded to understand what was at stake. However, their behavior was not necessarily described as intentional. In an interview with *Dagens Nyheter*, Conservative Party leader Ulf Adelsohn stated that he did not think that members of the peace movement had bad intentions, but he encouraged them to be observant of those who had, those who were connected with the Soviet Union.⁵²¹ Through such representations, those in the peace movement who advocated for an NNWFZ were represented as having been deceived by the threatening Other – an Other that cartoons and satirical sketches had represented as monstrosly sneaking around in Mother Svea’s private sphere. Aligned with the threatening Other, NNWFZ advocates were represented as, possibly unconsciously, running errands for the nuclear-armed superpower in the east. My interpretation is that such representations drew on paternalistic descriptions of peace advocates as easily fooled, as child-like, unable to see things clearly, and easy targets for Soviet influence. While conventional representations of

⁵¹⁹ Waldemarson, Axel. ”U 137, fredsrörelsen och framtiden”. *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1981-11-07; ”Också en fest”. *Svenska Dagbladet*. 1981-11-01. See also ”Adelsohn om fredsrörelsen: KGB-agenter vill infiltrera”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1981-11-18.

⁵²⁰ Riksdagens protokoll. 1982/83: 98. ”Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt”, Ångström, Rune (fp).

⁵²¹ ”Adelsohn om fredsrörelsen: KGB-agenter vill infiltrera”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1981-11-18.

children are often associated with innocence, these representations positioned them as in need of disciplinary intervention. Self-proclaimed reasonable politicians and media figures, by contrast, appeared as stern, disciplinarian fathers. Following a relational approach, that which did not fit into what was represented as reasonable and grown-up was feminized. In sum, the protection of the national whole was represented as the main responsibility of these reasonable fathers. The nation-family analogy discussed in the theory sections of Part I is central to this analysis.

Another representation of those who favored an NNWFZ was to describe them as blinded by emotional and irrational reasoning. Responding to a question about the NNWFZ in an interview published in *Svenska Dagbladet*, former Defense Minister Eric Krönmark argued:

[A] Nordic zone would not increase Swedish security. [...] People that do not think the issue through, or do not understand the consequences, think that such a zone has to be good. I do not want to reject the idea of a zone, but I think that it is time to reject this Nordic zone because it evolved from an emotional state of mind and is not realistic.”⁵²²

According to Krönmark, those who advocated an NNWFZ based their argumentation on emotion. A military strategist at the defense college, Björn Sandström, argued that most people were unable to discuss security policy in a “relevant way” and that the peace movement had a “head in the sand policy”.⁵²³ Representing military strategists as those able to understand security issues, he positioned peace advocates and those who favored an NNWFZ as unable to understand what it was all about. One element of these kinds of dismissals is how they denigrated those who favored a zone. Writing about the NNWFZ specifically, Sandström claimed that “purely emotionally, the demand for a nuclear weapon-free zone is something that any peace loving person must align themselves with”.⁵²⁴ Describing those who favored such a zone as unable to come to their own conclusions, he made a connection between emotion, peace loving people and the NNWFZ. Similarly, another debater stated that those who “‘refrain from thinking systematically’ and ‘just feel’ that one or other weapon system is ‘good’ or ‘bad’” were irrelevant to the debate, thereby dismissing the NNWFZ proposal as “marginal”.⁵²⁵ Instead of thinking systematically, he represented zone advocates as emotionally driven.

⁵²² ”Försvaret vår fredsrörelse”. *Svenska Dagbladet*. 1982-02-28.

⁵²³ Sandström, Björn. ”Strategisk logik och politiskt hyckleri”. *Svenska Dagbladet*. 1982-03-18.

⁵²⁴ Sandström, Björn. ”Strategisk logik och politiskt hyckleri”. *Svenska Dagbladet*. 1982-03-18.

⁵²⁵ Hamrin, Harald. ”Kjell Goldmann, statsvetare: ’Ensidig nedrustning gynnar inte freden’”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1982-07-23. A similar claim was made by Goldman in Höjeberg, Thomas.

Others, however, refused to stick with simplified representations of emotional disarmament activists and rational military strategists. Commenting that the U137 was armed with nuclear weapons in an interview published in *Svenska Dagbladet* in 1982, Foreign Minister Ola Ullsten said:

There is a dilemma...one is torn between the need for realism and the will to follow emotions that favor an end to rearmament. Sometimes this might seem cold and pragmatic, and distanced from the genuine worries that people have. But that is a role division one has to live with. What one absolutely cannot do is to ignore broad opinion just because its thinking is not as rational or insightful as military strategists or politicians – they don't always think particularly insightfully or rationally either.⁵²⁶

Torn between emotion and realism, Ullsten pinpointed an assumed division that was frequently repeated in subsequent debates about the NNWFZ. This division concerned those who were labeled as driven by morals and emotions, who advocated an NNWFZ, on the one hand, and those who were labeled realistic and were more reluctant or totally opposed the establishment of a zone, on the other. However, Ullsten also recognized that those who opposed the NNWFZ were not necessarily rational either.

As the analysis in Part II of this dissertation demonstrated, those who were most critical of nuclear weapons and called for commitments to disarmament were feminized, labeled emotional and dismissed as irrelevant. Even though emotions such as fear were central to most policy advocacy, women's bodies were labeled more emotional than men's bodies. As in the Swedish nuclear weapon debate, labeling certain arguments as emotional and therefore irrelevant in the debate about the NNWFZ made it possible to feminize and/or reject those arguments. However, the U137 did not just appear in debates on disarmament policy: it was a core feature of broader security debates. These are the topic of the next section.

In Pursuit of Rearmament

As argued in Chapter 9, the U137 stranded in a national context where armed neutrality and non-alliance had served as Sweden's declared foreign policy orientation throughout the cold war rivalry between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The idea that armed neutrality should protect the nation relied on the conviction that it was a masculine duty to protect the nation from foreign intrusion. Through the practice of conscription, compulsory military service was

"Fredsforskare om Norden: Kärnvapenfri zon kan öka krigsriskerna". *Dagens Nyheter*. 1983-01-24.

⁵²⁶ Lindmarker, Ingmar. "Styrandes förnuft är inget att lita på". *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1982-04-11.

part of a lived reality of close to 50 per cent of the adult population, that is, of all men. The media analysis in Chapter 9 examined critical representations of how Swedish politicians and the military – and in effect men – failed in their mission. By portraying politicians and military personnel as passive and incapable, such media representations can be interpreted as a gendered critique of the defensive neutral soldier ideal.⁵²⁷ The state of armed neutrality remained a core element of subsequent foreign policy debates, and it was repeatedly stressed that both neutrality and the armed forces were essential to ensuring the protection of the nation. For example, in 1982, former Conservative Party leader Gösta Bohman stated:

We have reason to strongly emphasize the importance that all democratic parties place on our non-alignment, our strong defense, and our guardianship of the stable and secure political environment here in the North. Those days in October and November down in windy Gåsefjärden should have taught at least some representatives of the Soviet Union how united our people stand around these values and that the many infringements and insults of the kind we have faced only strengthen this united position even more.⁵²⁸

Emphasizing that the Swedish people were united behind non-alignment, a strong defense and “guardianship” of the security environment of the North, Bohman described Swedish security policy as a shared national enterprise, responsible for the protection of the nation from foreign threats. Chapter 3 and Part II of this dissertation concluded that the broad support for armed neutrality made it possible to talk about national unity, and about Swedish security policy as a shared national enterprise.

While the principle on which Swedish security policy relied – a combined security strategy of armed (defense policy) neutrality (foreign policy) – had broad parliamentary support, policy debates after the 1981 submarine crisis increasingly questioned whether the armed forces were sufficiently prioritized in Swedish security policy. For example, conservatives held that while it was necessary to maintain the policy of armed neutrality, defense had to be re-prioritized through increased funding for the armed forces. In the 1984 foreign policy debate, the foreign policy representative of the Conservative Party, Carl Bildt, stated:

A first consequence [of the submarine trespasses] is of course the increased importance of military defense in Swedish security policy. Foreign and defense policy complement each other when it comes to confidence in our chosen security policy, but if our defense policy lags behind the potential to achieve results with our foreign policy seems very limited. Confidence in our chosen non-aligned policy, and in the role we strive to play in the stability of the Nordic

⁵²⁷ See Chapter 10; and Åse, 2016.

⁵²⁸ Riksdagens protokoll. 1981/82: 99. ”Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt”, Bohman, Gösta (m).

region as a whole, increasingly relies on the anticipated strength of our defense efforts.⁵²⁹

Stressing that submarine intrusions had illuminated “the importance of anchoring our foreign policy in the quest for national security, which is also the root and inspiration for our neutrality policy”, Bildt claimed that the role of the armed forces had been downplayed for many years.⁵³⁰ According to Bildt, submarine trespasses made it clear that Sweden had to strengthen its defense organization. Bildt did not just speak in the Swedish Parliament, he also made frequent appearances in the media. In an interview published in *Dagens Nyheter*, Bildt stressed that “[s]ince the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s there has been a tendency to downplay the role of our armed forces in security policy”, and that the military resources that were made available were “not enough to deal with primary security policy tasks, such as the protection of the territory in times of peace.”⁵³¹ Arguing that the main responsibility of the Swedish state was to serve national security interests by protecting the national territory, Bildt again positioned masculinized military defense at the center of security policy, and made political adversaries responsible for what he thought was the downplaying of national defense within security policy. A central argument for increased military funding was linked to the perception that the security situation in the Nordic sphere had become increasingly tense, and that the submarine presence served as a reminder of this situation.⁵³² Arguing that defense policy lagged behind, Bildt proposed increased emphasis on the *armed* dimension of neutrality, thereby privileging a strong defense over foreign policy measures. Using spatial references to Sweden, he simultaneously positioned the Soviet Union as a threatening Other, and made protection the responsibility of military men and politicians. Furthermore, Bildt distanced himself from what he somewhat sarcastically labeled the “morally appropriate” and “politically neat” argumentation of his opponents in the Swedish Parliament.⁵³³ Hence, Bildt argued that those who did not want to strengthen the defense organization were guided by morality. By representing his political adversaries in such a manner, he simultaneously represented himself as the opposite, as rational albeit possibly blunt, as someone who tells it how it is. In a similar way to what has been written above about the labeling

⁵²⁹ Riksdagens protokoll. 1983/84: 103. ”Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt”, Bildt, Carl (m).

⁵³⁰ Riksdagens protokoll. 1983/84: 103. ”Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt”, Bildt, Carl (m).

⁵³¹ Thiessen, Sven. ”Carl Bildt (m): Kärnvapenfri zon ej aktuell”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1984-02-06.

⁵³² Riksdagens protokoll. 1983/84: 103. ”Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt”, Adelson, Ulf (m); Fäldin, Thorbjörn (cp); Wikström, Jan-Erik (fp); Ångström, Rune (fp); Bildt, Carl (m). Similar statements were made in 1985, Riksdagens protokoll. 1984/85: 107. ”Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt”; in 1986, Riksdagens protokoll. 1985/86: 99. ”Utrikesdebatt”; and in 1987, Riksdagens protokoll. 1986/87: 89. ”Utrikesdebatt”.

⁵³³ Riksdagens protokoll. 1983/84: 103. ”Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt”, Bildt, Carl (m).

of NNWFZ advocates as emotional, a relational approach to gender exposes how Bildt drew on gendered representations of a rational masculine Self, as opposed to morally guided and feminized adversaries. By linking rationality with military defense, my conclusion is that this discourse both reconstructed gendered assumptions about military masculinity, and downplayed foreign policy ambitions in relation to defense policy.

One central representation by those who favored increased funding of the armed forces was that armed defense was a necessary obligation in light of the threatening international situation, as embodied by the Soviet submarine. Notions of fear were central to this representation. Talking about an alleged second submarine intrusion in 1984, a Center Party parliamentarian noted:

The unknown in our waters causes fear among the public. We have to take both the unknown and people's fears seriously. [...] I experienced, Mr Chairman, April 9, 1940 in Karlskrona. Then, the seriousness of the threat was felt by the people. The threat today is more uncertain, but that does not make it any less serious.

We were on the margins of war at that time. Obviously, it is the same today. Sweden has been at peace for 170 years. That is hardly the case today. We do not want to, but we have to, use weapons. For the first time since the Napoleonic wars, Swedish soldiers have fired their weapons against foreigners and their vehicles on Swedish territory. For the first time in its 300-year history, the naval base in Karlskrona is under attack.⁵³⁴

Making temporal references to the Second World War and Sweden's historical experience of being at peace for 170 years, he argued that the current situation reminded him of his wartime experience, and that peace was no longer a reality. Stating that "the naval base in Karlskrona is under attack", he argued that it had been necessary for the national Self to use weapons against an adversary Other, even though "we do not want to". Having made a temporal reference to Sweden's 170 years of peace, he associated the national Self with peace. This peaceful Self was described as unwilling to use weapons, but the seriousness of the situation demanded that it do so. Hence, the use of weapons was described as a necessary – and involuntary – responsibility of what was labelled "we", a national peaceful Self that wanted to preserve its peaceful status of the past. In a national context where submarine intrusions had been a key topic in foreign policy discussions in both parliament and the media since the U137 intrusion, and in an international context of renewed tension, the Center Party parliamentarian spoke about a war-like situation in which the Swedish Armed Forces fired weapons against what were assumed to be hostile intruders. In this situation, military organization and the use of armed force

⁵³⁴ Riksdagens protokoll. 1983/84: 103. "Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt", Korpås, Sture (c).

were described as a necessity. In a subsequent foreign policy debate, another Center Party representative argued:

I think that it is particularly inappropriate to use defense policy and the defense budget for party political motives. Sweden needs a strong total defense. In order for our neutrality policy to be credible, we need to be able to satisfactorily protect our territory.⁵³⁵

Through this representation, it was described as a fact that Sweden – as a non-aligned state – needed strong armed forces. Spatial references to Sweden and to the responsibilities of military men were central to this claim. This, however, was not described as a point of view: it was considered a fact that could not be questioned with rational arguments, and even labeled as inappropriate to question. Similar descriptions featured in the media. In an exposé of the room for maneuver of a small nation, an unsigned editorial published in *Svenska Dagbladet* stated: “The small nation can essentially choose between two approaches to the great powers: alignment or independence based on its own strength.”⁵³⁶ Since Sweden was a non-aligned state, the maintenance of strong armed forces was portrayed as the only option available. Positioning the national Self as the main spatial referent, it was argued that the main responsibility was to protect the nation from a threatening Other. As Chapter 9 argued, such reasoning relied on the precondition and practice that it was a masculine duty to protect the nation from an assumed threatening Other by military means. Military representatives argued in similar ways. In an interview published in *Dagens Nyheter*, Supreme Commander Lennart Ljung responded to a question about what he thought the U137 meant for Swedish opinion:

I hope and believe that the Swedish people now realize that we are in the middle of the superpowers and that we must have a defense organization in order to remain neutral. If we have a deterrent and a strong defense, we can remain neutral.⁵³⁷

Through such representations the nation was positioned as the main spatial referent, and the main responsibility of political leaders as protecting the borders of the national territory. However, it was not only the nation that was portrayed as in need of protection: neutrality was represented in a similar way. An unsigned editorial in *Dagens Nyheter* argued that:

⁵³⁵ Riksdagens protokoll. 1985/86: 99. ”Utrikesdebatt”, Svensson, Alf (cp).

⁵³⁶ ”Den lilla nationen”. *Svenska Dagbladet*. 1987-12-19.

⁵³⁷ Falkkloo, Bengt. ”ÖB blev förbannad. Visst var vi beredda på våld”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1981-11-07. See also Olsson, Thorwald. ”Viktigt att protesterna hörs”. Ubåtarna ett fall för FN?”. *Dagens Nyheter*, 1983-05-06; and Thiessen, Sven. ”Nils Sköld: Starkt försvar viktig försäkringspremie”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1983-10-17.

The fact is that we have a military obligation to better protect our territory, no matter which threat or which combination of threats we face. [...] The security policy judgment of the defense minister is that if there is a great conflict, the Nordic area will be involved sooner than previously expected. makes it even more important to militarily and politically protect Swedish neutrality and tradition!⁵³⁸

The editorial emphasized the urgency of military and political protection for Swedish neutrality and tradition. Spatial references were made to the Swedish Self, and temporal references were made to the neutrality and tradition of the Self. Protection in what was portrayed as an increasingly challenging situation in the Nordic sphere was represented as the most important responsibility of the Self. Through such statements, a separation was made between the national territory and neutrality, on the one hand, and those tasked with ensuring its protection, on the other. Again, Sweden was positioned as the main spatial referent, and military protection was argued to be the main responsibility. Similar claims were made in parliament. In 1985, Bengt Westerberg of the Liberal Party argued that the “lack of respect – that is shown to the integrity of the territory of affected Nordic countries (...) increases the demands on our ability to protect our neutrality.”⁵³⁹ According to Westerberg, neutrality had to be protected by a “technically advanced and well-educated armed forces.”⁵⁴⁰ By simultaneously positioning the nation and neutrality as that which was to be protected, a distinction was made between those tasked with protecting – men in the armed forces – and those to be protected – the nation *and* the policy of neutrality. My conclusion is that since protection was associated with men and masculinity, that which was to be protected – the nation and neutrality – were relationally represented as in a feminized position and in need of armed masculinized protection.

The dangerous peace movement

While the U137 featured in advocacy in favor of increased resources for the armed forces, others drew different conclusions. As noted above, some argued that it showed the need to strengthen efforts to make serious attempts to limit the nuclear threat through disarmament. Those who favored an increased emphasis on disarmament and foreign policy initiatives, and less emphasis on defense policy, tended to be found on the left of the political spectrum and in what was referred to as the peace movement. In 1984, for example, the leader of the Communist Party, Lars Werner, argued that “[...] the active non-aligned

⁵³⁸ ”Försiktig ubåtsrapport”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1983-09-17.

⁵³⁹ Riksdagens protokoll. 1984/85: 107. ”Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt”, Westerberg, Bengt (fp).

⁵⁴⁰ Riksdagens protokoll. 1984/85: 107. ”Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt”, Westerberg, Bengt (fp).

foreign policy plays a more important role than military defense in Swedish security policy today. I find it necessary to emphasize this, not least in light of the recent submarine hysteria.”⁵⁴¹ According to Werner, while the “submarine hysteria” led some to conclude that defense policy should be prioritized over foreign policy, “active non-alignment” was the most important security-related political tool available. By describing conservative campaigning as submarine hysteria, the Communist Party leader labeled it an unfounded panic, and using gendered language to make his opponent appear in a bad light. Hysteria is a concept long associated with women and femininity, and use of the word can be interpreted as a way of describing an opponent as emotionally driven and close to panic. Throughout the 1980s, the Communist Party argued against increased funding for the military or defense organization, claiming that it was a “typical right wing argument that the only real solution to problems is increased military spending”.⁵⁴² Such statements relied on feminized representations of conservatives and the military, portraying them as emotionally driven and single-minded fools.

Although initiatives aimed at limiting the nuclear arms race were the main concern of peace organizations in the early 1980s, some occasionally argued that Sweden should contribute to international disarmament efforts by reducing Swedish military spending. Chapter 3 has shown that Swedish military spending remained the highest of the European neutral states throughout the cold war.⁵⁴³ In an interview published in *Dagens Nyheter*, Tomas Magnusson, chairperson of the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society, argued:

I would not be surprised if people were more supportive of the armed forces after [the U137 incident]. Such a spontaneous reaction from people is understandable. But the important thing is that we think about the Swedish Armed Forces as part of total world armament.⁵⁴⁴

According to Magnusson, the Swedish defense organization was not an exception in the world, but part of the global military complex. By positioning the Swedish Armed Forces as part of what his organization labeled problematic world armament, he separated the armed forces from the Swedish Self, rejecting it as a necessary feature of protection. Criticizing military campaigns for Swedish rearmament in 1988, the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society

⁵⁴¹ Riksdagens protokoll. 1983/84: 103. ”Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt”, Werner, Lars (vpk).

⁵⁴² Riksdagens protokoll. 1985/86: 99. ”Utrikesdebatt”, Söderqvist, Osvald (vpk).

⁵⁴³ See Chapter 3 and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). *Military Expenditure Database*. <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex> (available 2020-08-05).

⁵⁴⁴ Bergman, Klas. ”Svenska fredsroster. Arbetet för fred nu än viktigare”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1981-11-07.

argued that while the Swedish security policy debate centered around rearmament, the international scenery was characterized by the opposite.⁵⁴⁵

Although rare in the parliamentary debate, some calls were made for Swedish unilateral disarmament. Such calls often indicated that Sweden had a certain responsibility to contribute to disarmament by acting as a role model. In 1982, a Communist Party parliamentarian, Eva Hjelmström, argued:

It is a fact that Sweden has very high military expenditure per capita. While we promote disarmament internationally, we do not follow these recommendations at home. If we are to influence the international setting and show that we are credible, we have to show that we are serious.⁵⁴⁶

Using spatial references to Sweden, Hjelmström argued that Swedish disarmament efforts would be more credible if Sweden acted as a role model for other states by disarming the Swedish Armed Forces. Hence, she represented credible disarmament advocacy as Sweden's main responsibility. Another Communist Party parliamentarian, Hans Göran Franck, argued:

It would be regrettable and wrong if Sweden, in a situation where détente and disarmament is the dominant trend [in world events], chooses rearmament. It would damage the traditional Swedish peace and neutrality profile. Hence, Sweden should not only actively contribute to international disarmament efforts, but also take unilateral initiatives aimed at supporting détente and peace struggles in the North, in the rest of Europe, and in the world.⁵⁴⁷

By arguing that rearmament would “damage the traditional Swedish peace and neutrality profile”, Franck drew on temporal references to what was represented as a Swedish tradition of making peace and disarmament core features of the Swedish national Self. He argued that Sweden should not only contribute to international disarmament efforts, but also take unilateral initiatives in support of détente. Through such representations, spatial referents to the Swedish Self and temporal referents to a peaceful past contributed to the construction of Sweden as a potential role model.

Those who advocated unilateral Swedish disarmament faced heavy criticism and were described as “dangerous” and distanced from the world in which “the rest of us” live. According to Conservative Party parliamentarian Ingrid Sundberg, “[t]he problem with the peace movement – with many of the peace movements – has been that they propose and make unilateral Swedish disarmament their primary goal.”⁵⁴⁸ While agreeing that a campaign against

⁵⁴⁵ Adler, Mats. ”ÖB överdriver hoten”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1989-01-14.

⁵⁴⁶ Riksdagens protokoll. 1981/82: 99. ”Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt”, Hjelmström, Eva (vpk).

⁵⁴⁷ Riksdagens protokoll. 1988/89: 71. ”Utrikesdebatt”, Franck, Hans Göran (vpk).

⁵⁴⁸ Riksdagens protokoll. 1981/82: 99. ”Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt”, Sundberg, Ingrid (m).

the arms race was important, Sundberg held that “it should be a movement based on realistic assumptions, with a clear concept about what the world looks like today and what we want it to look like.”⁵⁴⁹ According to Sundberg, advocates of disarmament had to start from “realistic assumptions”, and calling for unilateral Swedish disarmament did not belong to what she considered realistic. Following a relational approach, she feminized calls for unilateral disarmament, representing them as emotional. In an interview published in *Svenska Dagbladet*, leading defense politicians spoke about the role of peace movements. Liberal Party parliamentarian Lars de Geer said:

The peace movement internationally and in Sweden turns against the super-powers’ nuclear armament. In that sense it has identical goals to our security policy, to prevent a nuclear disaster. Of course, there are groups that advocate unilateral Swedish disarmament and I do not support them.⁵⁵⁰

While stating that he did not agree with those groups that advocated unilateral Swedish disarmament, de Geer professed support for efforts to stop the nuclear arms race between the superpowers. Responding to a question about the new peace movements in Sweden and Europe, Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish Army Nils Sköld said:

There are those that act for peace more generally, and that is positive. The army also acts for peace. The armed forces is in a way our largest peace organization since our task is to strengthen foreign policy and thereby keep the peace. But there are some peace movements that suggest that Sweden’s defense should be dismantled. Those who are behind these movements might be rational but they are still dangerous. They do not live in the same world as the rest of us. If Sweden were to shrink its defense in a dramatic way, this would not decrease but rather increase tension in our part of the world and therefore the risk of war.⁵⁵¹

Sköld argued that peace efforts were positive, but he represented the Swedish Armed Forces as the largest peace organization in Sweden, tasked with strengthening foreign policy and thereby keeping the peace. However, he represented those who wanted to disarm the Swedish Armed Forces in the interests of peace as dangerous, and as different from what he represented as “us”, the collective of Swedes who favored armed defense. His message was clear: as long as peace advocates left the Swedish defense organization alone, they could serve as a positive force and contribute to international disarmament. A separation was thereby made between the Swedish armed forces and the

⁵⁴⁹ Riksdagens protokoll. 1981/82: 99. ”Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt”, Sundberg, Ingrid (m).

⁵⁵⁰ ”Försvaret vår fredsrörelse”. *Svenska dagbladet*. 1982-02-28.

⁵⁵¹ Thiessen, Sven. ”Nils Sköld: Starkt försvar viktig försäkringspremie”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1983-10-17.

armed forces of the Others, and also between sound and dangerous disarmament advocacy. It is important to note, however, that many of those who advocated increased disarmament engagement and a refocus on foreign policy were at the same time in favor of a strong defense organization. In an article published in 1982, Alva Myrdal stressed that she distanced herself from the “negative attitude to the Swedish Armed Forces.”⁵⁵² According to Myrdal, it was important to “make a distinction between demands for international disarmament and Swedish defense policy.”⁵⁵³ Even though some advocated unilateral Swedish disarmament, the majority position held that the policy of armed neutrality had served Sweden well.

Summary

In sum, this chapter has shown how spatial references in disarmament policy advocacy were primarily related to the Swedish national Self. Both sides of the debate – those who favored and those who were opposed to or wary of an NNWFZ – spoke about Sweden and Swedes as something particular. Temporal references were made both to the policy of armed neutrality, and to notions of a peaceful past. However, the national Self also appeared split, especially with regard to representations of responsibility related to the nuances of spatial and temporal representations.

My conclusion is that those who were wary of an NNWFZ and favored increased funding for the armed forces tended to make spatial references to men as protectors of the Swedish nation. In such representations, the U137 was frequently portrayed as a reminder of an assumed threatening Other, and notions of fear were attached to the body of the threatening Other. Furthermore, such representations were central to making the national Self whole. In addition, male bodies were represented as in charge of protection – what appeared to be the main responsibility of the national Self. Through representations of the armed forces as responsible for protection, reliance on the conviction that it was a (masculine) duty to protect the nation through the practice of male conscription was preserved. Furthermore, such representations ruled out women acting as protectors.

Those who favored an NNWFZ argued that the U137 made it clear that the zone was a necessity since it would ensure that nuclear-armed submarines could no longer reach Swedish territory. Spatial and temporal references to Sweden’s decision not to acquire nuclear weapons were used to argue that

⁵⁵² Myrdal, Alva. ”Alva Myrdal och Arbetarrörelsens fredsforum: ’En varudeklaration’”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1982-08-23.

⁵⁵³ Myrdal, Alva. ”Alva Myrdal och Arbetarrörelsens fredsforum: ’En varudeklaration’”. *Dagens Nyheter*. 1982-08-23.

Sweden – as a non-nuclear weapon state – had a certain responsibility to contribute to nuclear disarmament. Hence, support for the NNWFZ was represented as in line with assumptions about the national Self. However, those who opposed the NNWFZ represented their opponents as guided by morality, as irrational, and as running errands for the Soviet Other. Hence, a split was created within the Swedish Self between those who positioned themselves as a masculinized rational Self in their reluctance to cooperate with the unreliable Soviet Other. The Other within the Self was composed of those represented as feminized, as emotional and irrational, who thought that the NNWFZ was the path to follow. In line with the findings of Chapter 9, representations of an aggressive masculine and unreliable Other and feminized Others within Sweden made it possible to talk about a rational Self and to dismiss the NNWFZ proposal and those who favored it.

In conclusion, the findings of this chapter suggest that disarmament debates in the 1980s contributed to the (re)construction of a gendered, nationalized and sexualized split between what was represented as responsible and rational disarmament advocacy, and its relational Other – irresponsible and irrational disarmament advocacy. While those who combined their disarmament advocacy with support for the Swedish Armed Forces were approved of by their critics, albeit possibly represented as guided by moral and emotional thinking, those who favored unilateral Swedish disarmament were heavily criticized. This split has important gender-, nation- and sexuality-based dimensions. Those who positioned themselves as rational relied on representations of masculinized protection in their advocacy, thereby reconstructing the linkage between defense and masculinity. Furthermore, gendered, nationalized and sexualized representations of adversaries that positioned them as in bed with the enemy, as emotionally guided and as a threat to national security were a core feature of the argumentation. Those who favored an NNWFZ, however, also relied on gendered representations of their opponents. Words such as “submarine hysteria” contributed to the emasculation of those who opposed the NNWFZ and were in favor of increased resources for the armed forces. These findings suggest that even though disarmament continued to be a core feature of Swedish security policy throughout the 1980s, gender, nation and sexuality are important for understanding the nuances in the debates about its content. Chapter 11 reveals how the Swedish government’s disarmament policy proceeded in the context of this debate.

11. The Making of a Peaceful Non-nuclear Self

This chapter examines government policy and analyses the simultaneous gendering, nationalization and sexualization of identity and disarmament policy in 1981–1989. During this period, the government constellation changed, which was a rare feature of Swedish cold war politics. After a short period of Center/Liberal/Conservative Party coalition rule in 1976–1982, the Social Democrat Party (SAP) regained its governing position in 1982 and remained in power until 1991.⁵⁵⁴ It was the official policy of all Swedish governments since the decision to start working for an NNWFZ in 1981 that such a zone would be desirable. All government foreign policy declarations delivered throughout the 1980s made reference to an NNWFZ, and it was a common feature in debates – especially in the first half of the decade. The first foreign policy declaration not to mention an NNWFZ was delivered in 1991.⁵⁵⁵ Hence, both the coalition government and the SAP government were positive about the establishment of an NNWFZ. However, the debate about an NNWFZ reached its peak in the early 1980s and declined after 1985.⁵⁵⁶ While the Swedish government did not withdraw its support for an NNWFZ, it was a more common feature of public speeches and media debates in the early 1980s.⁵⁵⁷ The analysis in this chapter draws on the findings in chapters 9 and 10 on the analysis of the gendering, nationalization and sexualization of identity and disarmament policy at the government level.

The Peaceful Self

Previous chapters have shown how representations of the U137, as well as other submarine trespasses in the 1980s, contributed to the construction of an

⁵⁵⁴ As noted in Chapter 3, the SAP formed the government for the major part of the cold war. After a short period of Center/Liberal/Conservative Party coalition rule in 1976–1982, the SAP regained its governing position in 1982 and remained in power until 1991. See Appendix 2.

⁵⁵⁵ Riksdagens protokoll. 1990/91: 67. ”Utrikespolitisk debatt”, Andersson, Sten (s).

⁵⁵⁶ See Figure 1 in Chapter 2.

⁵⁵⁷ See Utrikesdepartementet. *Utrikesfrågor. Offentliga dokument m.m. rörande viktigare svenska utrikesfrågor*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1981–1989. See also Chapter 10.

unreliable and threatening Soviet Other. Representations of an unreliable Other were echoed in advocacy against the establishment of an NNWFZ. Those who favored such a zone were described as wide-eyed, naive and simple-minded, as well as aligned with – or at least running errands for, the Soviet Union. In such representations, the U137 featured as a symbol of Soviet unreliability, and notions of fear were attached to the threatening and unreliable body of the Other.

Representations of the unreliable Other also featured in government statements, especially those made shortly after the submarine intrusion had taken place. Responding to a parliamentary question about an NNWFZ posed by Carl Bildt, Foreign Minister Ullsten claimed that “of course the number of nuclear-armed submarines in the Baltic Sea decreases the reliability of the Soviet Union and its declarations that this sea should become a Sea of Peace.”⁵⁵⁸ Such statements not only linked efforts to create an NNWFZ with the submarine intrusion and notions of Soviet unreliability, but also positioned the Baltic Sea at the center of the debate.⁵⁵⁹ In the 1982 foreign policy declaration, the first one delivered after the U137 intrusion, Ullsten recognized that the Nordic region was the subject of increased interest from both power blocs.⁵⁶⁰ According to Ullsten, “the sneaking around of submarine U137 in Swedish waters” was one example of such interest.⁵⁶¹ Furthermore, he emphasized that an NNWFZ was no short cut to disarmament.⁵⁶² The 1982 report of the Foreign Affairs Committee made similar claims:

Not least the knowledge that there are more nuclear weapons in the Baltic Sea region than was previously thought must increase our efforts to reduce the nuclear weapon threat against our region. It is in this context that the work for a nuclear weapon-free zone should be seen. At the same time, we must be aware

⁵⁵⁸ Utrikesdepartementet. ”Svar den 24 maj av utrikesminister Ullsten på fråga av Carl Bildt om kraven på en kärnvapenfri zon i Norden”. *Utrikesfrågor. Offentliga dokument m.m. rörande viktigare svenska utrikesfrågor 1982*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1983: 125.

⁵⁵⁹ The status of the Baltic Sea within such a zone had caused intense debate in parliament and the media through the 1980s, where the Conservative party maintained that it was essential that the Baltic Sea was formally included. See for example Riksdagens protokoll. 1981/82:99. ”Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt”, Hernelius, Allan; Riksdagens protokoll 1985/86:99. ”Utrikesdebatt”, Söder, Karin. Others argued that international law and the status of international waters made it difficult to make this a prerequisite. See for example Christiansson, Lars, ”Söndagsintervjun”, *Svenska dagbladet*, 1982-11-07.

⁵⁶⁰ Riksdagens protokoll. 1981/82: 99. ”Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt”, Ullsten, Ola (s).

⁵⁶¹ Utrikesdepartementet. ”Anförande den 22 januari av utrikesminister Ola Ullsten vid ’Svensk folkriksdag för nedrustning’”. *Utrikesfrågor. Offentliga dokument m.m. rörande viktigare svenska utrikesfrågor 1982*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1983: 100.

⁵⁶² Utrikesdepartementet. ”Anförande den 22 januari av utrikesminister Ola Ullsten vid ’Svensk folkriksdag för nedrustning’”. *Utrikesfrågor. Offentliga dokument m.m. rörande viktigare svenska utrikesfrågor 1982*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1983: 100.

that the achievement of such a zone, the purpose of which must be to consolidate and strengthen our security, is no short cut to disarmament. If it is established, this would be as a result of progress in the disarmament field.⁵⁶³

In these representations, the U137 featured as an illustration of increased interest in the Nordic region. Furthermore, such representations relied on notions of threat and fear, and this fear was associated with the Soviet Other. At the same time, the coalition government, which remained in power until national elections in September 1982, never officially withdrew its support for the establishment of an NNWFZ.

Following the change of government in 1982, the SAP was reinstalled after a short period in opposition. In an interview about Soviet submarine trespasses in 1983, Prime Minister and SAP leader Olof Palme repeated the claims he had made as opposition leader in 1981 – that the presence of nuclear-armed submarines in the Baltic showed the urgency of establishing an NNWFZ.⁵⁶⁴ In one of his first parliamentary statements as Foreign Minister, Social Democrat Lennart Bodström argued that the government was in favor of an active peace and disarmament policy, and that efforts to establish an NNWFZ were part of this policy.⁵⁶⁵ The SAP continued to support the proposed NNWFZ throughout the 1980s, although the topic faded in both the parliamentary and the media debate during the second half of the 1980s.⁵⁶⁶ In their support for the NNWFZ, SAP government representatives repeatedly represented the proposed zone as one component of the government's work for peace. At the same time, in both debates and policy speeches, government representatives continually aligned themselves with the peace movement. In 1982, for example, Olof Palme said:

The peace movement is a positive force, channeling the increased reluctance and fear of many people in light of the seemingly uncontrolled arms race [...]. Instead of criticizing and fighting this worry we should see the engagement and protests of citizens as a healthy reaction to an unhealthy development. The Social Democratic Party wants to participate in the peace debate and contribute our strength and experience.⁵⁶⁷

⁵⁶³ Utrikesdepartementet. "Utrikesutskottets betänkande den 11 maj 1982 (UU 1981/82: 23)". *Utrikesfrågor. Offentliga dokument m.m. rörande viktigare svenska utrikesfrågor 1982*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1983: 95.

⁵⁶⁴ Ribbing, Magdalena. "Olof Palme. – Vi ska inte gripas av panik". *Dagens Nyheter*. 1983-04-28.

⁵⁶⁵ Utrikesdepartementet. "Svar den 22 november av utrikesminister Lennart Bodström på interpellationer av Ingrid Sundberg och Carl Bildt om svensk nedrustningspolitik och en kärnvapenfri zon i Norden". *Utrikesfrågor. Offentliga dokument m.m. rörande viktigare svenska utrikesfrågor 1982*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1983: 130.

⁵⁶⁶ See Chapter 2.

⁵⁶⁷ Riksdagens protokoll. 1981/82: 99. "Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt", Palme, Olof (s).

In describing the peace movement as a positive force, with reference to the criticisms of the peace movement described above, Palme aligned the SAP with it. In his address to the Nordic People's Parliament in 1985, Bodström recognized that peace organizations had a central place in the work for peace. However, he emphasized that his own political party and the workers movement to which it belonged should be seen as one of the earliest peace movements. Using historical examples of SAP work for peace, he argued that the SAP considered peace organizations its allies in the work for disarmament, such as in efforts to create an NNWFZ.⁵⁶⁸ Throughout the 1980s, SAP government representatives continually represented themselves, and Sweden, as a strong voice for peace and disarmament. Spatial and temporal identity representations were central to this construction, as were representations of the responsibilities of the peaceful Self.

The non-nuclear Self

A core feature of the making of a peaceful Self is linked to temporal references to Swedish tradition. In various ways, the campaigning for disarmament and an NNWFZ was represented as compatible with what was described as Swedish tradition. In a 1985 speech about the NNWFZ to the Nordic Parliamentary Assembly, for example, Palme argued that Swedish support for the NNWFZ was part of a long-term ambition to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to limit the role of nuclear weapons.⁵⁶⁹ Representations of a Swedish tradition of working for disarmament were also related to the Swedish decision not to acquire nuclear weapons. In a speech to the Nordic People's Parliament in 1985, Bodström argued that:

The Swedish Government's work on the zone is linked to a Swedish tradition of many years standing of seeking to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the risk that nuclear weapons will be used. An early and important sign of this attitude was the unilateral decision we made to abstain from acquiring nuclear weapons even though we had a well-developed capability in the field of nuclear technology.⁵⁷⁰

⁵⁶⁸ Utrikesdepartementet. "Utrikesminister Lennart Bodströms anförande den 19 april vid Nordisk folkrikssdag i Jönköping". *Utrikesfrågor. Offentliga dokument m.m. rörande viktigare svenska utrikesfrågor 1985*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1986: 144.

⁵⁶⁹ Utrikesdepartementet. "Statsminister Olof Palmes anförande den 29 november inför det nordiska parlamentarikermötet i Köpenhamn om kärnvapenfri zon i Norden". *Utrikesfrågor. Offentliga dokument m.m. rörande viktigare svenska utrikesfrågor 1985*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1986: 179f.

⁵⁷⁰ Utrikesdepartementet. "Utrikesminister Lennart Bodströms anförande den 19 april vid Nordisk folkrikssdag i Jönköping". *Utrikesfrågor. Offentliga dokument m.m. rörande viktigare svenska utrikesfrågor 1985*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1986: 148f. This tradition was also recognized elsewhere, for example in a report by the Foreign Ministry. See Utrikesdepartementet. "Utrikesdepartementet överlämnar den 17 december rapport om korridorförslaget".

According to Bodström, the work to establish an NNWFZ was part of a tradition based on the Swedish decision not to acquire nuclear weapons. As Chapter 10 shows, those who favored an NNFWZ made spatial and temporal references to Sweden being a nuclear weapon-free state a core feature of identity representations, arguing that this gave Sweden a certain responsibility to work for the establishment of such a zone as part of its international nuclear disarmament engagement. The analysis in this chapter shows how the government associated similar identity representations with the work for an NNWFZ. Hence, temporal references to a Swedish peace and disarmament tradition, and spatial references to the non-nuclear status of its national territory (as well as temporal references to the decision not to acquire nuclear weapons) made it possible to represent the work for an NNWFZ as compatible with Swedish identity.⁵⁷¹ Furthermore, such representations were associated with a responsibility to work for nuclear disarmament. Hence, identity representations were constructed and disarmament policy was made simultaneously. Furthermore, temporal references were also made in relation to the future. In a speech on the Five Continent Initiative (a joint appeal to the nuclear weapon states on behalf of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania) delivered to an international audience in Delhi, Palme represented nuclear disarmament as a necessity to ensure the survival of humankind:

What makes the nuclear age unique is that we have reached a stage where we can eliminate not only ourselves, but also everyone and everything that come after us. The whole human civilization, so rich and amazing, has been developed through thousands of years of human effort, with its art, its literature, its architecture and its traditions, our whole life – all this would simply cease to exist as a result of human madness. (...) We who meet here today come from different parts of the globe, different cultural, social and political systems. But we are united in the ambition to preserve human civilization. It is simply not acceptable that the future of this civilization is only in the hands of five nuclear weapon states. The principle of self-determination must mean that we, the non-nuclear weapon states, have as much right to be the lords of our own destiny. This right is sidelined by the threat to use nuclear weapons, which would cause death and destroy all people. Our message today is that we can never accept an

Utrikesfrågor. Offentliga dokument m.m. rörande viktigare svenska utrikesfrågor 1984. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1985: 126.

⁵⁷¹ See for example Riksdagens protokoll. 1981/82: 99. "Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt", Göransson, Olle (s); Utrikesdepartementet. "Statsminister Olof Palmes anförande den 29 november inför det nordiska parlamentarikermötet i Köpenhamn om kärnvapenfri zon i Norden". *Utrikesfrågor. Offentliga dokument m.m. rörande viktigare svenska utrikesfrågor 1985*, Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1986: 181. See also Utrikesdepartementet. "Statsminister Ingvar Carlssons anförande den 27 november om 'Världen efter Reykjavik' i Helsingfors inför Samfundet Finland-Sverige". *Utrikesfrågor. Offentliga dokument m.m. rörande viktigare svenska utrikesfrågor 1986*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1987: 151.

order which in some ways resembles a colonial system where the final destiny of other countries is decided by a few dominant nuclear weapon powers.⁵⁷²

While emphasizing that those behind the appeal had different experiences, Palme stressed that they were united as non-nuclear weapon states in their ambition “to preserve human civilization” from the destructive consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. In representing the national Self as both free from nuclear weapons and aligned with other states in the work to eliminate nuclear weapons, the Other was relationally represented as threatening nuclear weapon states. The Self was represented as both a potential victim of a nuclear war launched by the nuclear capable few, and active and responsible through its disarmament engagement. By comparing the abuses of power of the nuclear weapon states with colonial oppression, Palme argued that it was necessary for the non-nuclear weapon states to control their own destiny and in effect to save human civilization from what he labeled “human madness”. In the same speech, Palme said:

We, the non-nuclear weapon states, have to be heard. We have the right to demand that nuclear weapons will never be used, that the nuclear arms race ends, and that the nuclear weapon states reach an agreement on considerable cuts in their nuclear weapon arsenals.⁵⁷³

Since humanity as a whole would suffer the consequences of nuclear war, Palme represented the work for disarmament as a responsibility of the nuclear weapon-free Self.

Disarmament as a Social Democratic Heritage

The previous section demonstrates that temporal references to Swedish tradition were central to government policy on the NNWFZ. Such references were strongly associated with the SAP, which represented peace and disarmament as both Swedish and part of the social democratic heritage. The work of the Federation of Social Democratic Women (SSKF) in the Swedish nuclear weapon debate, which is analyzed in Part II of this dissertation, was used as an example of this heritage. Even though the SSKF was criticized both internally and externally during the nuclear weapon debate, it was highlighted as a

⁵⁷² Utrikesdepartementet. ”Statsminister Olof Palmes anförande den 28 januari i New Delhi (utdrag)”. *Utrikesfrågor. Offentliga dokument m.m. rörande viktigare svenska utrikesfrågor 1985*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1986: 131f.

⁵⁷³ Utrikesdepartementet. ”Statsminister Olof Palmes anförande den 28 januari i New Delhi (utdrag)”. *Utrikesfrågor. Offentliga dokument m.m. rörande viktigare svenska utrikesfrågor 1985*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1986: 131f. The appeal, also called the Delhi-declaration, was delivered on January 28, 1985. Utrikesdepartementet. ”Delhi-deklarationen (Femkontinentsinitiativet) den 28 januari”. *Utrikesfrågor. Offentliga dokument m.m. rörande viktigare svenska utrikesfrågor 1985*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1986.

historical example of social democratic work for peace. Leading SAP politicians from the past were also described as representative of the linkage between social democracy and peace:

All these social democratic friends [Östen Undén, Torsten Nilsson, Inga Thorsson, Alva Myrdal and Olof Palme] have done this not because they alone are interested in peace and disarmament, but because the feeling that disarmament is necessary is one of our founding values within the labor movement.⁵⁷⁴

Speaking specifically about the NNWFZ, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Pierre Schori argued that disarmament was a key value of the labor movement, and that the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones was in line with past policy priorities. According to Schori, the zone proposal resembled the Undén Plan of the 1960s.⁵⁷⁵ Sten Andersson, who replaced Bodström as Foreign Minister in 1985, compared the Swedish disarmament initiatives of the 1980s with those of the Swedish government in the late 1950s.⁵⁷⁶ Through such temporal references to disarmament engagement in the past, policy performance in the present was described as compatible with the history of the national social democratic Self. Hence, a difference was constructed between the social democratic peaceful Self and threatening international Others, as well as between a conservative national Other that was relationally represented as prone to violence.

The Armed Neutral

Chapter 10 shows how conservatives argued that the U137 incident had exposed how Swedish security policy had been found wanting due to insufficient funding for the armed forces, and called for a strengthening of the Swedish Armed Forces. Those who opposed increased funding for defense were described as irrational and dangerous, and as unable to make sound judgements about world affairs. It was official government security policy – of both the coalition and the SAP governments – to maintain the policy of armed neutrality. In the foreign policy declaration delivered to parliament in 1982, the first after the U137 intrusion, Foreign Minister Ullsten said:

⁵⁷⁴ Riksdagens protokoll. 1981/82: 99. "Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt", Göransson, Olle (s).

⁵⁷⁵ Utrikesdepartementet. "Kabinettssekreterare Pierre Schoris anförande den 3 - 5 oktober på temat kärnvapenavskräckning och gemensam säkerhet i Madridsymposiet om Olof Palme". *Utrikesfrågor. Offentliga dokument m.m. rörande viktigare svenska utrikesfrågor 1986*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1987: 126f.

⁵⁷⁶ Utrikesdepartementet. "Anförande av utrikesminister Sten Andersson vid Centralförbundet Folk och Försvars rikskonferens i Storlien (1987-02-01)". *Utrikesfrågor. Offentliga dokument m.m. rörande viktigare svenska utrikesfrågor 1987*, Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1988: 97f.

Sweden contributes [to world peace] through active involvement in work for disarmament and by a determined recognition of our non-aligned policy, which aims for neutrality in the event of war. Given our circumstances, this policy must be supported by a strong defense. Assaults and violations must be made so costly that it is not seen as beneficial to misuse our territory or our airspace.⁵⁷⁷

In arguing that Swedish neutrality contributed to world peace but that it had to be backed up by a strong defense organization, he stressed that potential enemies had to be convinced that they would have to pay a high price for violating Swedish territory. The Social Democratic opposition backed this claim. Palme described a strong Swedish defense organization as a demonstration of the intention to remain neutral in case of war.⁵⁷⁸ Armed neutrality remained Sweden's official security policy throughout the cold war and was described as a central element of the peaceful Self. For example, in a speech delivered to an international audience in 1985, Prime Minister Palme said:

I come from a small country in Northern Europe, a country lucky enough to have lived in peace for more than 170 years. We believe that our peace of many years can be partly explained by our policy of neutrality: freedom from alliances in peace, in order to remain neutral in the event of war. We also believe that this policy has contributed to the long period of stability in northern Europe.⁵⁷⁹

According to Palme, the policy of neutrality was an important reason for Sweden's long experience of staying out of wars. Hence, this representation relied on temporal references to a peaceful past and neutrality as central features of the Self. This representation is especially interesting since it challenges the representations of neutrality made by those who favored a strengthening of the national armed forces. According to them, it was necessary to strengthen the armed forces in order to protect both the national territory and neutrality. This simultaneously positioned the nation and neutrality as something to be protected. A distinction was made between those tasked with protecting – that is, men in the armed forces – and those to be protected – the policy of neutrality and the population of a nation. The latter was repeatedly depicted in media reporting of the submarine crisis as a female body. Hence, neutrality and the nation were represented as in a feminized position and in need of masculinized protection. In Palme's representation, however, neutrality was labelled that which had ensured Sweden's peaceful past. Such a representation positioned neutrality as a central component of the peaceful Self, and the main reason

⁵⁷⁷ Riksdagens protokoll. 1981/82: 99. "Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt", Ullsten, Ola (s).

⁵⁷⁸ Riksdagens protokoll. 1981/82: 99. "Utrikes- och handelspolitisk debatt", Ullsten, Ola (s).

⁵⁷⁹ Utrikesdepartementet. "Statsminister Olof Palmes anförande den 28 januari i New Delhi (utdrag)". *Utrikesfrågor. Offentliga dokument m.m. rörande viktigare svenska utrikesfrågor 1985*. Stockholm: Allmänna förl., 1986: 131f.

why Sweden had preserved its peaceful status. Hence, in contrast to the potential feminization of neutrality in the rearmament advocacy discussed in Chapter 10, neutrality was represented as a core component of the responsible masculinity ideal connected to peace and disarmament. Meanwhile, the Swedish Armed Forces were similarly represented as a necessary component of Swedish security policy, and the government never discussed unilateral Swedish disarmament. The distinction between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons is key to how it was possible for the Swedish government to appear simultaneously peaceful and heavily armed. Through representations of a nuclear weapon-free national Self and a nuclearized and threatening masculine Other, a difference was constructed between “good” and “bad” weaponry. By emphasizing the devastating consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, and their distinctive character as weapons of mass destruction, it was possible to separate these from the weaponry possessed by the Swedish Armed Forces. The fact that Sweden had willingly abstained from nuclear weapon acquisition, making possible spatial references to the nation as free from nuclear weapons, helped to label nuclear weapons unacceptable.

Summary

Spatial and temporal references to Sweden as a nuclear weapon-free and peaceful Self made it possible to portray disarmament engagement and efforts to establish an NNWFZ as a Swedish responsibility. Spatial references to Sweden as a nuclear weapon-free state assigned a sense of pride to the historical experience of abstaining from nuclear weapon acquisition, confirmed Sweden’s nuclear weapon-free status in the present, and represented engagement with nuclear disarmament and the NNWFZ as a responsibility of the nuclear weapon-free national Self in the present and the future. Temporal references to disarmament initiatives of the past, and to leading former politicians recognized for their disarmament work, contributed to notions of historical continuity. This in turn helped to legitimize the policy of the present. Furthermore, by representing the work for peace and disarmament as a historic social democratic legacy, disarmament was linked to the welfare state project, which Chapter 3 describes as a central component of Swedish national identity throughout the cold war. Taken together, these representations made it possible to talk about Sweden as a united national whole, and a national Self tasked with freeing the world from nuclear weapons. This representation of the Self also relied on relationally organized opposite Others. The nuclear weapon states can be understood as the first and central Other, and as representatives of the “human madness” described in Palme’s Delhi speech.

The positioning of the nuclear weapon states as threatening Others is especially interesting in relation to the findings in Chapters 9 and 10. In sum, my

analysis shows how media representations contributed to the making of what appeared to be an incapable masculine national Self, where male politicians and the military failed to protect national territory from intrusion. Bodily representations of naive male politicians, incapable military personnel and vulnerable – yet sometimes also capable – women, along with emotions related to shame and humiliation, were central features of media representations. However, my analysis also shows how media coverage of the submarine crisis contributed to the making of a monstrous, unreliable and slightly stupid Other – a Soviet adversary that could not be trusted.

In the above analysis, identity representations to some extent resemble those of an unreliable Other. However, through representations of a responsible peaceful Self acting in the interests of all of humanity, a relationally organized monstrous and belligerent Other is constructed – a selfish Other driven by “madness”. I interpret this as the construction of an overly armed and nuclearized Other, and a brutalized and hyper-masculinized Other in need of berating. My analysis also shows how media representations of the submarine crisis made ambiguous representations about failed military masculinity, as well as a small but capable national Self as embodied in Mother Svea. In this light, the national Self that appears in government policy discourses can be interpreted as representations of a responsible and capable Self, resembling images of Svea lecturing Brezhnev about his bad behavior. At the same time, the Self is represented as an active protector of all of humankind. The Self represented can be understood as a responsible protector ideal, as a peaceful and exceptionally responsible masculine Self in contrast to the brutal and monstrous masculinity of the Soviet Other.

Part IV

12. Concluding Remarks

This final chapter reflects on the main conclusions of the dissertation. As is discussed in the introduction, feminist research on nuclear weapons awoke my “feminist curiosity” to analyze a case of nuclear renunciation and disarmament through a feminist lens.⁵⁸⁰ How could any “real man” consider nuclear restraint and advocate disarmament if disarmament, following those nuclear strategists discussed by Cohn, leads to emasculation?⁵⁸¹ The dissertation uses Sweden as a case to analyze nuclear weapon renunciation and disarmament from a feminist angle. As one of the countries that had the opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons – and considered doing so for some time – before deciding to become engaged with international disarmament aims instead, Sweden is an interesting case to study. In arguing that previous feminist theorizing on gender and nuclear weapons has had a single-minded focus on the nuclear weapon states, which has led to binary conceptualizations about gender and nuclear weapon possession, the dissertation uses Sweden as a case for deepening and further elaborating a more nuanced feminist understanding of the gendering of nuclear disarmament policy.

The dissertation shows how gender, nation and sexuality is constructed in policy processes, even when they appear to be “neutral”.⁵⁸² Rather than treating gender as a variable, the study is focused on its co-construction with policy about nuclear weapons and disarmament. The dissertation makes several contributions relevant not only for feminist IR theory, but for nuclear history and IR more broadly. Since the theoretical contributions are interrelated with the empirical findings it is impossible to separate them. On the contrary, it is the empirical investigation of how gender, nation and sexuality have been constructed in specific historical policy processes which makes it possible to theorize about nuclear weapons and disarmament from a feminist perspective. The following discussion about more principal contributions therefore uses examples from the empirical chapters as illustrations of how my analysis feeds into the existing literature. The chapter ends with some final reflections on the advantages of an abductive approach and doing archival work.

⁵⁸⁰ Enloe has elaborated further on the meanings of a feminist curiosity. See Enloe, 2004.

⁵⁸¹ Cohn, 1987: 693.

⁵⁸² Writing about a feminist curiosity, Enloe describes a feminist curiosity as “the sort of curiosity that prompts one to pay attention to things that conventionally are treated as if they were either ‘neutral’ or [...] imagined to be ‘trivial’”. See Enloe, 2004: 220.

Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament and Gender

The main contribution of this dissertation is directed to feminist IR theory and concerns the relationship between gender, nuclear weapons and disarmament. The introduction has discussed how previous feminist research has shown that in contexts where positive associations are made between military strength, masculinity and nuclear weapon possession, it is hard to imagine nuclear renunciation and disarmament as anything other than potential emasculation or feminization.⁵⁸³ Meanwhile, my empirical analysis has shown how neither Swedish disarmament policy, nor the defensive security strategy it was part of, was conceptualized as emasculated or feminized at the national level. On the contrary, my findings suggest that Swedish disarmament policy was strongly associated with certain forms of masculinity. The dissertation thereby suggests that rather than assuming linkages between nuclear weapons possession and masculinity on the one hand, and disarmament and femininity on the other, it is necessary to challenge such binary conceptualizations and scrutinize how both masculinities and femininities, and nuclear weapon and disarmament policy, have been constructed in specific historical contexts. The opposite, to depart from prefixed conceptualizations about gender and policy not only contributes to the reconstruction of gender, but also rules out alternatives to nuclearized, and masculinized, protection logics.

For example, my analysis of Swedish disarmament policy in the 1960s shows how the government's disarmament policy primarily drew on identity representations related to nuclear weapon capability. The government represented itself as capable of producing nuclear weapons, and as a technologically sophisticated and advanced expert. Through its focus on nuclear weapon capability, the government represented the Self as developed and technologically advanced. Such representations relied on difference constructed between the developed and capable national Self, and what was relationally represented as the underdeveloped, incapable, and feminized Other non-aligned states. In light of the associations between masculinity, development and technology, and relational representations of the Other as feminized, Swedish disarmament policy was associated with notions of masculinity. Over time, the masculine identity of the potential nuclear-armed state was transformed into a "responsible technical expert" identity associated with masculinity. This means that nuclear weapon renunciation and disarmament were not related to an emasculation or a feminization of the national Self. Instead, the technical expert identity symbolized an adaptation, rather than a rejection, of the masculine identity of the potentially nuclear-armed state. In the 1980s, disarmament was linked with both neutrality and peace, and social democracy and the welfare state project. The Self was represented as a noble masculine protector of all of hu-

⁵⁸³ See for example Cohn, 1987; Cohn, Hill & Ruddick, 2005; Duncanson & Eschle, 2008.

mankind. Such representations of the Self also (co)constructed relationally organized opposite Others. The nuclear weapon states in particular were represented as a threat to all of humanity. Hence, Swedish masculinity was distanced from what was represented as the aggressively masculine appearances of Others, both the monstrous and unreliable Soviet Other, and the over-armed nuclear weapon state Other. Hence, disarmament was associated with righteousness and responsibility, with the identity of a noble and peaceful Swedish masculinity ideal contrasted with offensive Others. Through such representations, the Swedish Self was constructed as a morally superior, responsible protector of all of humankind. Drawing on notions of exceptionalism, a Swedish masculinity ideal was established associated with peace, righteousness and responsibility.

In conclusion, my study has shown how dominant disarmament discourses contributed to the masculinization of the Swedish Self and supported a continued reliance on a defensive form of masculinized protection in security affairs. Both Swedish disarmament policy, and defensive security policy more generally were co-constructed with particular notions of masculinity over time. The defensive character of the Self was represented as morally superior to offensive Other(s), meaning that a difference was constructed between a moral masculinity ideal and what were represented as brutal and immoral masculinity ideals. Such representations drew on – and contributed to the remaking of – a defensive military masculinity ideal. The empirical examples show that a relational approach to gender makes it possible to explore how gender has been constructed in policy, and how notions of masculinity have been established not only in relation to what is represented as feminized, but also in relation to other masculinities from which the Self is distanced. Hence, an open mind towards the relationship between gender, nuclear weapons and disarmament makes it possible to account for nuances.

Gender, War and Peace

This dissertation also feeds into the literature on nuclear history. A central contribution concerns how a relational approach to gender makes it possible to investigate how gender has been made in historical processes and thereby to challenge conventional associations between women and peace on the one hand, and men and war on the other.

My study shows that conventional associations between women and peace and men and war are problematic, not least since the meanings related to war and peace, and to sex and gender, are (re)constructed in historical processes, and differ in various contexts. In the making of Swedish disarmament policy, the national Self was simultaneously associated with *both* masculinity *and* peace. The discussion above has shown how certain notions of masculinity

were co-constructed with disarmament policy. Politicians on all sides of the political spectrum, along with military, media and civil society representatives, made peace a core, and positively valued, component of the masculinized national Self. In debates about the NNWFZ in the 1980s, some even represented the Swedish Armed Forces as Sweden's largest peace organization. Even though such representations can be argued to make the militaristic mandate of the armed forces invisible, and to legitimize sustained reliance on masculinized protection, they also challenge conventional associations between men and war.

Furthermore, in debates about nuclear weapons and disarmament policy, difference was constructed around a national and peaceful Self, and what was represented as belligerent and sometimes monstrous Others. In the nuclear weapon debate, a potential Swedish nuclear weapon was described as inherently different from any possessed by the nuclear weapon states. One advocate of Swedish nuclear weapon acquisition even questioned whether anyone would be threatened by Swedish nuclear weapons, given Sweden's acknowledged peaceful status. Such representations made it possible to argue that Swedish nuclear weapons would be morally justifiable. Furthermore, the Swedish Armed Forces were repeatedly represented as "defensive", and as having no hostile intentions. Temporal references to neutrality and a Swedish peaceful past were central to such representations. Associations between neutrality, peace and the defensive nature of Swedish defense policy made it possible to distance the latter from what were represented as the aggressive security strategies of Others. Those against nuclear weapons also drew on notions of a peaceful past, and representations of the peaceful Self featured in government disarmament policy in the 1960s. In disarmament debates of the 1980s, temporal references to a peaceful past made it possible to construct disarmament engagement around the NNWFZ as a Swedish responsibility.

In conclusion, the empirical findings in this dissertation suggest that representations of a peaceful Self can very well correspond with representations of a masculinized Self. In Sweden, masculinity was strongly associated with peace. On a more principal level, this suggests that rather than assuming linkages between women and peace and men and war, it is important to approach gender as relationally constructed in various policies related to war and peace. Approaching gender as made in specific contexts and co-constructed with policy over time makes it possible to conceptualize gender as ambivalent and constantly (re)constructed, and to challenge the traditionally gendered and masculinized policy alternatives that are likely to lead to the destruction of all of humankind.

History in IR

The empirical findings above suggest that rather than assuming linkages between nuclear weapons possession and masculinity on the one hand, and disarmament and femininity on the other, it is necessary to challenge such binary conceptualizations and investigate how both masculinities and femininities, and nuclear weapon and disarmament policy, have been constructed in specific historical contexts. Hence, a final contribution to feminist IR theory, and to IR studies more broadly, concerns the value of historical analysis and the need to keep an open mind towards both theory and empirical sources. In the introduction to this dissertation I emphasized the value of historical analysis for understanding IR, and the advantages of using historical perspectives and sources in the field. Writing this conclusion, I am even more convinced that historical analysis is an essential component of IR. A study of how gender has been challenged and (re)constructed in historical processes has made it possible to challenge binary conceptualizations of gender that exclude degrees of difference among and between femininities and masculinities. As discussed above, challenging preconceived conceptualizations about gender not only makes it possible to scrutinize ambivalences and nuances, but also to challenge policy priorities. By approaching historical processes as sites for meaning making about both identity and policy, it has been possible to gain a better understanding of the gendering of policy alternatives, and how proceeding with certain policies was permitted while alternatives were left sidelined at the margins. Hence, exploring gender in historical policy processes can provide a better understanding of how societal power orders have simultaneously been constructed and constrained by policy in the past.

As discussed in the introduction, revealing the construction of gender in historical policy processes also makes it possible to understand – and address – the challenges of the present. Following Hansen, investigating the co-constitution of identity and policy in the past facilitates the identification of “discursive fault lines” in the present.⁵⁸⁴ The introduction to this dissertation began with a discussion of Sweden’s 2019 decision not to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Commenting on this decision in a press conference aired on national radio and television, Margot Wallström, a former foreign minister, said:

Sweden is a strong voice in the world for a nuclear weapon-free world, and our country has a long tradition based on sincere political engagement, skilled diplomacy with high-profile people who have worked with these issues over the years, and world-class technical expertise.⁵⁸⁵

⁵⁸⁴ Hansen, 2006: 53.

⁵⁸⁵ Regeringskansliet. ”Utrikesministern redogör för regeringens arbete för kärnvapennedrustning”. 2019-07-12. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8tDaibocMuM> (available 2020-05-07).

The findings of this dissertation shed new light on this argument. According to Wallström, Sweden remains a strong voice for a nuclear weapon-free world, and she drew on spatial references to the geographic territory of Sweden, as well as temporal references to a long tradition – a historical legacy – to make this argument. By mentioning high-profile personalities who have been engaged in disarmament issues for many years, Wallström made yet another temporal reference to the disarmament leadership of the past.

The analysis in this dissertation has shown how Swedish nuclear disarmament engagement began in parallel with a gendered, nationalized and sexualized debate at the national level on whether Sweden should acquire its own nuclear weapon arsenal. During this debate, the government became increasingly engaged in disarmament negotiations at the international level. This engagement was supported by both sides of the nuclear weapon debate and became a unifying policy priority that made it possible to avoid a national split on the nuclear weapon issue. Over time, Swedish disarmament policy was co-constructed with notions of a modernistic and masculinized national Self. This Self was represented as a technological expert. In her quote from 2019, Wallström makes reference to technical skill to argue that nuclear disarmament remains a Swedish priority, and a Swedish responsibility. Talking about “world-class technical expertise”, Wallströms quote is part of a historical tradition of Swedish policymakers representing the Swedish Self as technologically advanced. In the past, such representations have made it possible both to claim a place in disarmament negotiations, and to separate Sweden from other nuclear weapon-free states. Furthermore, as this dissertation has shown, representations of a developed and technologically advanced national Self have been central to the masculinization of disarmament policy in the past. While the gendering of disarmament policy in the present is a topic for future research, the findings of this dissertation suggest that the Swedish decision not to sign the TPNW is in need of further feminist inquiry.

Final Reflections

This dissertation has departed from an abductive approach which has made it possible to adapt the research design according to findings in the sources and to theoretical insights. As discussed in the introduction, such an approach is especially valuable for studies that visit unexplored empirical and theoretical terrains. Since both Swedish disarmament policymaking and feminist theorizing about nuclear renunciation, disarmament and gender are missing elements in the existing literature, an abductive approach is ideal for this study. Furthermore, an abductive approach corresponds well with a feminist curiosity and allows the researcher to be surprised. Writing about the need to take women’s lives seriously and being ready to be surprised, feminist pioneer Cynthia Enloe

argues that to take women's lives seriously "implies listening carefully, digging deep, developing a long attention span, being ready to be surprised."⁵⁸⁶ I especially want to emphasize the need to listen carefully and to embrace surprises in all research. One way to open up for surprises is to do archival work. Even though archives are often systematically organized the confrontation with the contents of volumes often involves surprises. For example, while several volumes in Alva Myrdals archive only contained scientific articles primarily from the US, one contained a letter that was never sent to Inga Thorsson. This letter triggered my feminist curiosity to read Thorssons diaries, which helped me understand the nuances of disarmament policymaking better.

Doing archival work also involves being confronted with texts that sometimes make little sense in the beginning. Listening carefully and including seemingly unrelated theoretical literature based on a feminist curiosity can make it possible to think deeper about unexpected findings and result in new ways of thinking. For example, when I set out to study Swedish disarmament policymaking in the 1960s, I noted that even though policy speeches made references to identity, especially through temporal reference to development and technological skill, I could not get my head around their meanings. Furthermore, reading the personal notes and diaries of key figures in the disarmament debate without searching for anything in particular and certainly not expecting them to be about gender, I realized that this material made me think about both policy and gender in new ways. The density of technical and scientific writing in Alva Myrdals papers, and Inga Thorssons frustration about how disarmament was conceptualized in her diaries, made me curious to dig deeper into how disarmament policy related to the nuclear weapon option. Including feminist literature about modernity and gender made it possible to think more systematically about such references, and to understand how they were key to the gendering of the national Self. This led me to adapt my theoretical framework and to include additional sources.

Furthermore, in my work with the submarine crisis, the presence of bodies and emotion in comics certainly stood out. This material also established gendered, nationalized and sexualized meanings about both policy and the Self (Selves)/Other(s). This made me curious to read literature on emotion and bodies in IR. Insights from this literature made me realize how representations related to emotion and bodies were likewise present in the sources from the 1950s and 60s, even though I had not seen them in my initial reading of the material. Readapting my research design and source selection according to these insights, I ended up with a theoretical framework and primary sources that I did not think about as relevant when I started the research project. On concluding this research project, I cannot enough emphasize the importance of being ready to be surprised both because of the intellectual stimulation it brings about, and because it contributes to unexpected feminist findings.

⁵⁸⁶ Enloe, 2004: 3.

Sammanfattning på svenska

Denna avhandling undersöker svensk nedrustningspolitik om kärnvapen under det kalla kriget ur ett feministiskt perspektiv. Det övergripande syftet är att bidra till en fördjupad förståelse om relationen mellan kärnvapen, nedrustning och genus. Avhandlingen tar avstamp i tidigare feministisk forskning om genus och kärnvapen som har visat hur kärnvapeninnehav historiskt har kopplats samman med en maskulin identitet. Att avstå från kärnvapen och att verka för kärnvapennedrustning blir i sådana kontexter associerat med femininitet och/eller avmaskulinisering. Dock lyser feministisk teoretisering om fall då kärnvapen väljs bort och av aktivt nedrustningsengagemang med sin frånvaro. Mot denna bakgrund undersöker denna avhandling policy om kärnvapen och nedrustning i Sverige under kalla kriget ur ett feministiskt perspektiv. Sverige är ett särskilt intressant fall att studera, eftersom Sverige är en av de stater som har haft möjligheten och länge övervägde att skaffa kärnvapen, men som har valt bort detta alternativ och istället engagerat sig för internationell nedrustning av kärnvapen.

Avhandlingens fokus

Avhandlingens fokus ligger vid hur genus, nation och sexualitet har (re)konstruerats i debatter och policy om kärnvapennedrustning i Sverige under det kalla kriget. De empiriska delarna undersöker hur identitet och nedrustningspolitik om kärnvapen har tagit form, utmanats och omförhandlats över tid, hur tolkningsföreträde har etablerats, samt hur de processer som studeras är genomsyrade av, och har bidragit till att (åter)skapa, föreställningar om genus, nation och sexualitet. Eftersom fokus riktas mot konkurrerande förståelser och etablerande av tolkningsföreträde över tid studeras situationer då nedrustningspolitikens innehåll har debatterats som mest intensivt. En genomgång av de årliga utrikespolitiska deklarationerna och de riksdagsdebatter som följde dem visade att två perioder präglades av särskilt intensiv utrikespolitisk debatt om kärnvapen och nedrustning – debatten om nedrustningspolitikens framväxt jämte den svenska kärnvapendebatten under 1950- och 60-talet, och debatten om nedrustning på 1980-talet efter att en kärnvapenbestyckad sovjetisk ubåt (U137) gick på grund på svenskt territorium, den så kallade ubåtskrisen. Valet att fokusera på dessa två perioder är således empiriskt grundat. De båda periodernas olika karaktär gör det möjligt att analysera vad som hände både när kärnvapenalternativet valdes bort och nedrustningspolitiken tog form

(1954–1968), och hur nedrustningsarbetet fortskred efter att kärnvapenhotet manifesterades i form av en kärnvapenbestyckad ubåt på det svenska territoriet (1981–1989). Eftersom de två perioderna skiljer sig åt har materialvalet anpassats utifrån respektive historisk kontext. De utrikespolitiska deklarationerna och riksdagsdebatterna om desamma utgör en empirisk stomme i båda delarna. I studien av den första perioden används också ytterligare material som återspeglar de två sidorna i debatten. Försvarsmaktens överbefälhavare som var för svenska kärnvapen representerar kärnvapenförespråkarna och det socialdemokratiska kvinnoförbundet (SSKF) som i sin samtid utmålades som ledare för kärnvapenmotståndet representerar motståndarna. Därtill ingår personligt material som dagböcker, korrespondens och anteckningar. I studien av den andra perioden ges material från media en central plats, både i form av debattartiklar, krönikor och ledare, och i form av skämtteckningar. Material som dagböcker och skämtteckningar gör det möjligt att undersöka samhälleliga föreställningar om genus, nation och sexualitet och om policy i sammanhang som inte nödvändigtvis förväntas handa om det. Sammanfattningsvis erbjuder avhandlingen ett teoretiskt och metodologiskt ramverk för att undersöka historiska processer som har lett fram till beslut både om att avstå från kärnvapen och att arbeta för internationell kärnvapennedrustning ur ett feministiskt perspektiv.

Utgångspunkter

Avhandlingen tar avstamp i tre huvudsakliga antaganden: 1) att konstruktionen av genus, nation och sexualitet är sammanlänkad och central för meningsskapande om både identitet och policy, 2) att identitet och policy konstitueras, och 3) att känslor och kroppsliga representationer bidrar till att skapa mening om identitet och policy å ena sidan, och genus, nation och sexualitet å andra sidan. Genus förstås som en socialt konstruerad kategori och som en grundläggande samhällelig maktordning där det som förknippas med maskulinitet historiskt har värderats högre än det som förknippas med feminitet. Genus manifesteras i både policy och identitetsrepresentationer, och har avgörande betydelse för konstruktionen av feminitet, maskulinitet, sexualitet och mänskliga kroppar. Genom sin manifestering i policy är genus inbäddat i, och får konsekvenser för, politiska diskurser som på ytan kan framstå som neutrala, i den här avhandlingen policy om kärnvapen och nedrustning. Avhandlingen fokuserar på hur genus görs i relation till, och genom, skildringar av nation och sexualitet. Ett talande exempel på relationen mellan genus, nation och sexualitet är hur nationen ofta beskrivs som en heterosexuell kärnfamilj, där män representeras som de som styr och agerar som beskyddare, och kvinnor visar omsorg och blir beskyddade. Denna traditionella beskrivning av kollektiv identitet bygger på samverkan mellan genus, nation och sexualitet, manifesterad i kärnfamiljsidealet.

Att identitet och policy förstås som ko-konstituerad innebär att de inte kan skiljas åt. Identitet förstås som såväl diskursiv som politisk, och som relationell och social. Att beskriva identitet som diskursiv och politisk innebär att identitet skapas genom diskursiva representationer, och att dessa representationer sätter ramar för vilka policys som kan förordas. På liknande sätt förstås policy som en diskursiv praktik. Att identitet skapas relationellt betyder att den kommer till uttryck och därmed konstrueras i relation till vad den inte är, att skillnad görs mellan "jag/vi" och vad som positioneras som "det/de andra". Den sociala dimensionen av identitet innebär att den förstås som kollektiv snarare än individuell, att den skapas i och genom ett kollektivt landskap. Känslor och kroppsliga representationer är centrala i de meningsskapande processer som studeras och bidrar till att befästa kollektiva gemenskaper och därmed identitet.

Avhandlingen tar avstamp i tidigare forskning om neutralitet och välfärd som två centrala delar av både svensk nationell identitet och svensk säkerhetspolitik under det kalla kriget. Alliansfrihet och neutralitet, i kombination med ett relativt starkt försvar (hädanefter väpnad neutralitet), syftade till att skapa säkerhet i externa relationer genom en defensiv säkerhetsstrategi. Välfärdsstaten skulle garantera säkerheten i landet. Neutralitet och välfärd kan alltså förstås som två sidor av samma mynt, med olika, och sammanlänkade, funktioner i att upprätthålla säkerheten. Neutraliteten var starkt kopplad till föreställningar om ett fredligt förflutet medan välfärdsstaten hängde samman med rationalistiska och modernistiska ideal. Min läsning av tidigare forskning om neutralitet och välfärd gör gällande att både neutralitet och välfärd präglades av genus. Den väpnade dimensionen av neutraliteten bidrog till en skyldighet för män att försvara nationen, och skapade en praktik om detsamma. Detta bidrog till att etablera kopplingar mellan män, maskulinitet och försvar. Välfärdsstaten som i synnerhet under vissa perioder bidrog till att möjliggöra kvinnors produktiva arbete bidrog samtidigt till att etablera föreställningar om skillnad mellan män och kvinnor. Vidare har kroppsliga symboler som Moder Svea i kombination med mäns huvudsakliga ansvar för politik och beskydd bidragit till att återskapa ett nationellt heterosexuellt kärnfamiljsideal, där kvinnors kroppar har symboliserat nationen och associerats med passivitet och omvårdnad. Mäns kroppar har samtidigt associerats med aktiva funktioner inom statsapparaten, och gjorts till beskyddare av kvinnor och nationen.

Sammanfattning av empiriska undersökningar

Min empiriska undersökning visar hur den väpnade neutraliteten tog en central plats i debatter om nedrustning. Debattörer på olika sidor hänvisade till neutraliteten, den svenska försvarsmakten, och den defensiva strategi de var del av. Även om tidigare feministisk forskning har kopplat samman både nedrustning och defensiva säkerhetsstrategier med en feminin identitet finns det inget i mitt källmaterial som indikerar att varken nedrustning eller den väpnade neutraliteten kom att associerades med femininitet över tid. Snarare visar

min undersökning hur den svenska nedrustningspolitiken, och den defensiva säkerhetsstrategin den var del av, ko-konstruerades med samhälleliga föreställningar om maskulinitet.

Del II visar hur den svenska kärnvapendebatten skapade vad jag förstår som en nationell splittring, där genus, nation och sexualitet skapade mening om både identitet och policy. De som förespråkade kärnvapenanskaffning såg väpnat försvar som en nödvändighet för att skapa säkerhet i en hotfull värld. Detta byggde på föreställningar om maskulint beskydd, där män med vapen skulle beskydda nationen och dess sårbara invånare. Kärnvapen sågs som en självklar del av detta försvar. Rädsla och beskrivningar av hotfulla andra var en förutsättning för sådana representationer och kärnvapenanskaffning beskrevs som rationellt och nödvändigt. Att vilja avstå från kärnvapenanskaffning beskrevs som grundat i känslor och feminiserades ofta i debatten. Även om argument för kärnvapen bottnade i rädsla kopplades känslor samman med kvinnors kroppar, de kroppar som samtidigt pekades ut som i behov av manligt beskydd. På så vis återskapades föreställningar om manligt beskydd och om kvinnlig sårbarhet i debatten om svenska kärnvapen.

De som var emot svensk kärnvapenanskaffning tog också avstamp i rädsla. Enligt dem var framtida generationers överlevnad avhängig att kärnvapen aldrig mer kom till användning. Kärnvapnens blotta existens pekades ut som ett hot mot mänskligheten, och de kroppar som utsatts för kärnvapen i Hiroshima och Nagasaki gjordes till symboler för detta. Det socialdemokratiska kvinnoförbundet, SSKF, menade att kvinnor som mödrar hade ett särskilt ansvar för kommande generationers överlevnad. På så vis (re)konstruerade de kopplingar mellan kvinnor, reproduktion och omvårdnad å ena sidan, och män och våld å andra sidan. Samtidigt som de var emot att införliva kärnvapen i det svenska försvaret var motståndarna mot kärnvapen övervägande positiva till den väpnade neutraliteten. Det heterosexuella kärnfamiljsideal som den väpnade neutraliteten vilade på utmanades alltså inte, utan (åter)skapades snarare i argumentationen för och emot svenska kärnvapen. Den väpnade dimensionen av neutraliteten sågs inte bara som en nödvändighet, utan även som annorlunda säkerhetspolitiska strategier i andra länder. Mer offensiva säkerhetsstrategier beskrevs som våldsamma, till skillnad från den svenska strategin. De som förespråkade kärnvapen menade att svenska kärnvapen enbart skulle fylla defensiva funktioner, och att de därmed skulle vara fundamentalt skilda från supermakternas kärnvapen. Denna skillnad gjorde det möjligt att beskriva svenska kärnvapen som moraliskt försvarbara, och hänvisningar till fred och neutralitet som centrala delar av svensk historia bidrog till sådana representationer.

I denna kontext växte nedrustning fram som en enande policy-prioritering som båda sidor av kärnvapendebatten kunde stå bakom. Den svenska regeringen blev alltmer engagerad i internationell nedrustning, och i början av 60-talet blev Sverige en av åtta alliansfria stater som tillsammans med stormakterna hade i uppdrag att förhandla om internationell nedrustning i FN:s 18-

nationskonferens om nedrustning. Även om nedrustning växte fram som en till synes outmanad policyprioritering i Sverige visar min undersökning att debatter om nedrustningspolitikens innehåll hängde samman med olika syn på svenska kärnvapen. De som var positiva till svensk kärnvapenanskaffning menade att den svenska nedrustningspolitiken skulle inrikta sig på att nå internationell maktbalans och relativa fördelar för Sverige i förhandlingarna. De menade att Sverige borde bibehålla sin handlingsfrihet att skaffa kärnvapen, både för att i framtiden kunna göra det, och för att sätta press på kärnvapenstaterna i nedrustningsförhandlingar. De som var emot svensk kärnvapenanskaffning menade att Sverige skulle agera som en internationell förebild genom att formellt avstå från kärnvapen. Även om de hade olika utgångspunkter kunde de båda sidorna enas om behovet av internationell nedrustning, vilket också avväjde en splittring av nationen och det heterosexuella kärnfamiljideal den svenska säkerhetspolitiken vilade på. I den svenska regeringens nedrustningspolitiska engagemang gavs det svenska kärnvapenprogrammet en central roll. Genom hänvisningar till Sverige som en potentiell kärnvapenstat skapades bilden av ett högteknologiskt och utvecklat nationellt jag. Skillnad gjordes mellan Sverige och andra icke-allierade stater, som utmålades som naiva och underutvecklade. Associationer mellan Sverige, teknologi och vetenskap bidrog till att konstruera ett modernistiskt och maskulint nationellt jag, relationellt åtskilt från mindre teknologiskt utvecklade och feminiserade andra. På så vis blev den svenska nedrustningspolitiken kopplad till en maskulin identitet under 1960-talet.

Avhandlingens del III undersöker nedrustningspolitiken under och efter ubåtskrisen 1981, när en sovjetisk ubåt (U137) blev strandsatt i Karlskrona skärgård mitt under det kalla kriget. Fokus ligger vid hur debatter om inrättandet av en kärnvapenfri zon i Norden fortskred i ljuset av den strandsatta ubåten. Undersökningen visar hur säkerhetspolitiska diskussioner om försvarsmaktens förmåga satte ramar för hur nedrustningspolitiska debatter fortskred.

I samband med ubåtskrisen var skämtteckningar ett vanligt inslag i tidningar av olika slag. Min undersökning visar att sådana teckningar skapade mening om både genus, nation och sexualitet, och om identitet och policy. Mänskliga kroppar och känslanspelningar var genomgående teman i teckningarna. Ansvariga politiker och soldater visades upp i förlöjligande dager, oförmögna att förstå det hot de var utsatta för. Skam var central i sådana representationer. Även om teckningarna visade upp män som hade misslyckats med sitt uppdrag att beskydda nationen, återskapades samtidigt deras skyldighet att faktiskt göra det. I andra bilder figurerade Moder Svea, en historisk symbol för den svenska nationen i en kvinnas kropp, tillsammans med Sovjetunionens president Leonid Brezjnev (alternativt en björn som symbol för Sovjetunionen). Flera av dessa bilder hade en sexualiserad underton, där Brezjnev våldförde sig på Svea i hennes privata sfär. Sådana bilder bottnade i en våldtäktsreferens, där Svea blev utsatt av en monstruös maskulin andre. De

män som skulle ha beskyddat hennes sårbara kropp lyste med sin frånvaro. Dessa bilder kan förstås som en bredare kritik av den svenska försvarspolitiska förmågan och av den väpnade neutraliteten. I teckningarna framstod dock inte Svea enbart som utsatt och sårbar. I flera av dem tecknades hon som liten men tuff, medan den sovjetiske andre framställdes som ett litet barn i en jättes kropp. I sådana bilder blev den sovjetiske andre dubbelt förnedrad, både som ett barn påkommen på platser där han inte fick vara, och uppläxad av en kvinna. Istället för skam skildrar sådana teckningar svensk stolthet. Den sovjetiske andre representerades också som opålitlig, i synnerhet i relation till ut-sagor om att göra Östersjön till ett Fredens hav. Teckningarna visar alltså ambivalenta skildringar kopplade till nation, genus och kön, med starka sexualiserade undertoner.

Under 1980-talet kom ubåtskränkningar att ta en framträdande plats både i media och i riksdagsdebatt. Sådana kränkningar pekades ut som argument för att öka försvarsanslagen och på så vis stärka den väpnade dimensionen av neutraliteten. Utan ett starkt försvar representerades neutraliteten som sårbar. På så vis gjordes skillnad mellan män med uppdrag att försvara nationen å ena sidan, och nationens sårbara och neutraliteten å andra sidan. Utifrån ett relationellt perspektiv placerades nationen, dess sårbara och neutraliteten i en feminiserad position, i behov av manligt väpnat beskydd. Representationer av en opålitlig andre bidrog även till att undergräva rimligheten i att ingå i en kärnvapenfri zon tillsammans med den kärnvapenbestyckade grannen i öst. Framförallt konservativa röster i riksdag och media menade att U137 visade att det vore naivt att lita på Sovjetunionen, och de utmålade dem som förespråkade en kärnvapenfri zon som styrda av önsketänkande och som potentiellt farliga. Genom att representera zonförespråkarna som mer eller mindre allierade med Sovjetunionen skapades skillnad mellan vad som framstod som ett rationellt "jag" mot zonen, och ett emotionellt och naivt "andra" för zonen. De som förespråkade zonen menade dock att ubåtskränkningar som U137 visade att det var särskilt angeläget att åstadkomma en kärnvapenfri zon i Norden, eftersom den ansågs garantera att historien inte skulle upprepa sig. Vidare talade de om ett särskilt ansvar för Sverige, som kärnvapenfri stat, att bidra till nedrustning och till skapandet av en kärnvapenfri zon i Norden.

I denna kontext fortsatte den svenska regeringen, som 1981 hade uttalat sitt stöd för en kärnvapenfri zon i Norden, att tala i positiva ordalag om zonen. Efter att Socialdemokraterna återtog regeringsmakten 1982 talade de om arbetet för zonen både som förenligt med ett historiskt och fredligt nationellt förflutet, och som djupt förankrat i socialdemokratins. Hänvisningar till den historiska erfarenheten av att avstå från kärnvapenanskaffning och att verka för nedrustning bidrog till att representera nedrustning som ett särskilt svenskt ansvar. På så vis skapades historisk kontinuitet, och nedrustningssträvanden knöts samman med det socialdemokratiska nationella projektet. Skillnad gjordes framförallt mellan det kärnvapenfria nationella jaget och kärnvapenbestyckade andra, där den defensiva säkerhetspolitiska strategin representerades

som fredlig och moraliskt överlägsen kärnvapenstaternas offensiva och kärnvapengrundade säkerhetsstrategier. På så vis etablerades bilden av ett maskulint nationellt jag associerat med moral, ansvar och fred, åtskilt från aggressiva maskulina andra representerade som omoraliska, oansvariga och krigiska.

Huvudsakliga bidrag

Sammanfattningsvis har avhandlingens empiriska kapitel visat hur både den svenska nedrustningspolitiken och den defensiva säkerhetspolitiska strategin var del av hängde samman med konstruktionen av en maskulin identitet. I den svenska nedrustningspolitiken etablerades ett maskulint nationellt jag nära associerat med teknologisk kompetens, moral och ansvar. Skillnad mellan jaget och internationella andra var centralt för denna etablering. Under 60-talet gjordes åtskillnad mellan Sverige och andra icke-allierade, där de andra beskrevs som naiva och tekniskt utvecklade. Sveriges teknologiska kompetens kopplades samman med kärnvapenstaternas, men skillnad gjordes mellan ett ansvarsfullt nationellt jag och kärnvapenstaternas offensiva strategier och kärnvapeninnehav. Under 1980-talet gjordes framförallt skillnad mellan ett moraliskt överlägset – och kärnvapenfritt – nationellt maskulint jag och de kärnvapenbestyckade hotfulla andra. Dessa andra associerades med en aggressiv maskulinitet, vilket betyder att skillnad gjordes mellan maskuliniteter. Skillnad gjordes dock inte bara mellan det nationella jaget och internationella andra, utan även inom nationen. Ett återkommande sätt att skapa sådan skillnad var att tala om rationella och objektiva policyförslag å ena sidan, och känslobaserade och subjektiva förslag å andra sidan. Föreställningar om rationella män och känslomässiga kvinnor var centrala för sådana representationer. Medan maskuliniserade representationer etablerades och gavs tolkningsföreträde över tid marginaliserades de representationer som associerades med en feminin identitet.

Förutom de empiriska bidrag som redogörs för ovan bidrar även avhandlingen teoretiskt till såväl feministiska IR-studier som till kärnvapenhistoria. Eftersom de teoretiska bidragen är avhängiga den empiriska undersökningen går det inte att se dem som åtskilda. Snarare gör den empiriska undersökningen av hur genus, nation och sexualitet har etablerats inom ramen för skapandet av nedrustningspolicy i specifika historiska processer det möjligt att teoretisera om kärnvapen och nedrustning ur ett feministiskt perspektiv. Min poäng är att genus, nation och sexualitet konstrueras i policy, även om policyn vid en första anblick inte ser ut att handla om det.

Ett första teoretiskt bidrag riktas till feministisk IR-teori och rör relationen mellan kärnvapen, nedrustning och genus. Även om tidigare forskning har visat hur nedrustning och att välja bort kärnvapen konstrueras som feminiserat eller avmaskuliniserat i kontexter där positiva associationer görs mellan kärnvapeninnehav och en särskild form av militär maskulinitet finns det inget som säger att nedrustning nödvändigtvis bör förstås som en feminiserad policy.

Min undersökning visar hur den svenska nedrustningspolitiken ko-konstruerades med en maskulin identitet. Istället för att utgå från kopplingar mellan kärnvapeninnehav och maskulinitet å ena sidan och nedrustning och feminitet å andra sidan är det nödvändigt att undersöka hur både genus och policy har utmanats och (åter)skapats i specifika kontexter. Detta är viktigt eftersom motsatsen, att utgå från fastlåsta kategorier inte bara bidrar till att återskapa och upprätthålla dessa kategorier och därmed genus, utan även omöjliggör förändring.

Detta hänger samman med ett bidrag som riktas till kärnvapenhistoria, vilket handlar om behovet av att förstå genus som relationellt konstruerat. Inom traditionella studier kopplas fred ofta samman med kvinnor, medan krig associeras med män. Min undersökning visar att sådana binära och essentialistiskt grundade föreställningar är problematiska, då betydelser kring såväl krig och fred som kön och genus etableras och omförhandlas i historiska processer och skiljer sig åt i olika kontexter. I den svenska nedrustningsdebatten gjordes fred till en central del i konstruktionen av ett maskuliniserat nationellt jag, nära knutet till ansvar och rationalitet. Genom att närma sig genus och policy som konstruerat i specifika kontexter blir det möjligt att visa på ambivalenser och att utmana sådan policy som riskerar leda till mänsklighetens undergång.

Ett tredje bidrag riktas både till IR-feminism och till IR i allmänhet. Detta bidrag handlar om värdet av att undersöka meningsskapande i historiska processer. För att förstå hur genus, nation och sexualitet görs inom policy visar min undersökning på betydelsen av ett öppet angreppssätt i relation till källorna, och att det är nödvändigt att inte gå in med låsta föreställningar. Att arbeta historiskt och att inkludera källor som vanligtvis inte ingår i IR-forskning gör det möjligt att nyansera antaganden om både policy och identitet. Genom att studera meningsskapande i historiska processer har denna avhandling bidragit till en djupare kunskap om ko-konstruktionen av identitet och nedrustningspolicy i Sverige under kalla kriget, och utmanat rådande föreställningar om genus, kärnvapen och nedrustning. Sammanfattningsvis erbjuder avhandlingen ett teoretiskt och metodologiskt ramverk för att undersöka konstruktionen av genus, nation och sexualitet i historiska policyprocesser.

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Appendix 1. Swedish Government Constellations 1951–1989

Table 3. Government constellations in Sweden 1951–1989

		Prime minister	Foreign minister	Disarma- ment repre- sentative	Constellation
1951	1951-	Tage	Östen		Social democrat
1952	1957	Erlander	Undén		
1953					
1954					
1955					
1956					
1957	1957-	Tage	Östen		Coalition: Social demo- crat, Center Party (Bondeförbundet)
1958	1969	Erlander	Undén		
1959			(1957-1962)		
1960					
1961				Alva Myrdal	
1962			Torsten	(1961-1974)	
1963			Nilsson (1962-1969)		
1964					
1965					
1966					
1967					
1968					
1969	1969-	Olof	Torsten Nilsson	Alva Myrdal	Social democrat
1970	1976	Palme	(1969–1971)	(1961-1974)	
1971			Krister Wickman		
1972			(1971–1973)		
1973			Sven		
1974			Andersson (1973–	Inga Thorsson	
1975			1976)	(1974-1982)	
1976	1976-	Thorbjörn	Karin Söder	Inga Thorsson	Coalition: Center, Con- servative, Liberal
1977	1978	Fälldin			
1978	1978-	Ola	Hans Blix	Inga Thorsson	Liberal party
	1979	Ullsten			
1979	1979-	Thorbjörn	Ola Ullsten	Inga Thorsson	Coalition: Center, Con- servative, Liberal
1980	1981	Fälldin			
1981	1981-	Thorbjörn	Ola Ullsten	Inga Thorsson	Coalition: Center, Liberal
	1982	Fälldin			

1982	1982-1983	Olof Palme	Lennart Bodström (1982-1985)	Maj Britt Theorin	Social democrat
1984			Sten Andersson (1985-1986)		
1985					
1986	1986-1987	Ingvar Carlsson	Sten Andersson	Maj Britt Theorin	Social democrat
1988					
1989					

Sources: Regeringskansliet. "Sveriges regeringar under 100 år". <https://web.archive.org/web/20150215002042/http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2460/a/14591> (available 2019-08-03).

Appendix 2. Representation in NPT Review Conferences

Table 4. Heads of Delegations to NPT Review Conferences, 1975–1995

	Year of Review Conference				
	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995
Registered heads of delegations	57	75	85	83	175
Men	55	74	83	77	164
Women	2	1	2	6	11
Men %	96%	99%	98%	93%	94%
Women %	4%	1%	2%	7%	6%
Total %	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Sources: United Nations Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. *Final Document*. Annex VI, List of Delegations.

NPT/CONF/35/I, Geneva 1975. Copy in the possession of the author (web-link no longer active); United Nations Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. *Final Document*. Annex III, List of Participants.

NPT/CONF/II/22/I, Geneva 1980. Copy in the possession of the author (web-link no longer active); United Nations Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. *Final Document*. Annex IV, List of Participants.

NPT/CONF.III/64/I, Geneva 1985. Copy in the possession of the author (web-link no longer active); United Nations Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. *Final Document*. Annex IV: List of Participants.

NPT/CONF.IV/45/I, Geneva 1990. Copy in the possession of the author (web-link no longer active); United Nations Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. *Final Document*. Part II, Documents issued at the Conference. NPT/CONF.1995/32, New York, 1995. Copy in the possession of the author (web-link no longer active).

Table 5. Heads of Delegations and NGO representatives to NPT Review Conferences, 1975–1995

	Year of Review Conference									
	1975		1980		1985		1990		1995	
	State	NGO	State	NGO	State	NGO	State	NGO	State	NGO
Registered heads of delegations/NGO participants	57	50	75	49	85	100	83	87	175	446
Men	55	36	74	28	83	59	77	62	164	261
Women	2	14	1	21	2	41	6	25	11	185
Men %	96%	72%	99%	57%	98%	59%	93%	71%	94%	59%
Women %	4%	28%	1%	43%	2%	41%	7%	29%	6%	41%
Total %	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Sources: United Nations Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. *Final Document*. Annex VI, List of Delegations.

NPT/CONF/35/I, Geneva 1975. Copy in the possession of the author (web-link no longer active); United Nations Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. *Final Document*. Annex III, List of Participants.

NPT/CONF/II/22/I, Geneva 1980. Copy in the possession of the author (web-link no longer active); United Nations Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. *Final Document*. Annex IV, List of Participants.

NPT/CONF.III/64/I, Geneva 1985. Copy in the possession of the author (web-link no longer active); United Nations Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. *Final Document*. Annex IV: List of Participants.

NPT/CONF.IV/45/I, Geneva 1990. Copy in the possession of the author (web-link no longer active); United Nations Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. *Final Document*. Part II, Documents issued at the Conference. NPT/CONF.1995/32, New York, 1995. Copy in the possession of the author (web-link no longer active).

Appendix 3. Images

This appendix includes those images analyzed in Chapter 9 that are not displayed in the chapter. Due to copyright reasons the images feature as part of full pages. The permission to include these pages has been granted by the newspapers.

Chefredaktör och ansvarig utgivare: Bo Strömstedt. Andre redaktör, stf ansvarig utgivare: Olle Petri. Redaktionschef: Staffan Thorsell. Administrativ redaktör: Pelle Ahnstedt. Politisk redaktör: Alf Thore. Veckoställande direktör: Claes Reuterswärd. VD: Åke Ahnström. Gårdfvägsgatan 30, 105 16 Stockholm, telefon 728 30 00. Dagens Nyheter trycker: Schim. Expressens tryckeri, Jönköping.



□ Ola Ullstens och ÖB Lennart Ljungs utbildnings-
koncepter

INVALIDER HUSHANDLAS ARBETSLÄGER

□ Jurij Kiseljov (överst) tar sig fram på en liten flakvagn, med ett slags klotar på händerna. Han förlorade bägge benen i en olycka när han var 16 år. Efter en olycka på sin arbetsplats är Valerij Fejolov (nederst) förslamad i benen. De är bägge aktiva i gruppen för de handikappades rättigheter.

■ ■ För svenska handikapporganisationer borde det nu vara en angelägen uppgift att svara på nödroppet från Moskva och skapa kontakt med den utsatta initiativgruppen.

■ ■ I går såg det ut som om den svenska strategin i fråga om ubåt 137 skulle bli en fullständig framgång.

Under gårdagseftermiddagen inleddes förhö-

get syster på det militära, ubåt 137 på på det exempelöst sätt kranhsvenskt territorium.

"För att skaffa sig visuell (underrättelse) information har USA:s militära underrättelsepersonal ofta öppet brutit mot gällande regler för utlänningar rutt att röra sig i vårt land och bedriva fotografering; man har t.ex. försökt tränga fram till objekt som väckt militärt intresse i för utlänningar stängda zoner."

Semjon Tsvigun, KGB-chefens ställföreträdare, i artikeln "Om de imperialistiska underrättelsetjänsternas ränker" i senaste numret av partitidskriften *Kommunist*.

filmerna går nu i repris i Blekinges skärgård: först "Massor av whisky" och sedan "Borta med vin-
A..."

Kjell Brodda

**Riksdags-
sammanträden**
Onsdagen den 4 november 1981
Kammaren kl. 10.00 (arbetsplanen)
Arbetsmarknadsutsk. kl. 08.30

er bra vill också
den. Sagt och
listlärans bjuds
rikstäckande, en
medelst buss,
värmeverkets
ontorist, runt i
ora.
kommunen i
er, vilket man

— Tänk om hela Sverige var som Mora, utbrast han. Tur att vi här Mora, hade han också kunnat säga med en regeringskollega. Men å andra sidan hade jag ju ingen bandspelare tillgänglig.

A cartoon illustration of a man with glasses and a striped shirt standing on a rocky shore, looking down at a small boat in the water. A signpost is visible on the left. The drawing is simple and sketchy, with a focus on the man's expression and the boat.

Figure A4. “Staffans stollar”, November 18, 1981



How could any “real man” consider nuclear restraint and advocate disarmament if disarmament, following insights from previous feminist research, leads to emasculation? This dissertation uses Sweden as a case for deepening and further elaborating a more nuanced feminist understanding of the gendering of nuclear disarmament policy. As one of the countries that had the opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons – and considered doing so for some time – before deciding to become engaged with international disarmament aims instead, Sweden is an interesting case to study. By understanding disarmament policymaking as historically situated and marked by gendered, nationalized and sexualized power structures in specific contexts, the dissertation contributes new knowledge relevant not only to feminist International Relations (IR) studies, but also to research on nuclear history and IR more generally.



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