

## Chapter 10

### WARS, WIMPS, AND WOMEN: TALKING GENDER AND THINKING WAR

CAROL COHN

I start with a true story, told to me by a white male physicist:

Several colleagues and I were working on modeling counterforce attacks, trying to get realistic estimates of the number of immediate fatalities that would result from different deployments.<sup>1</sup> At one point, we remodeled a particular attack, using slightly different assumptions, and found that instead of there being thirty-six million immediate fatalities, there would only be thirty million. And everybody was sitting around nodding, saying, “Oh yeah, that’s great, only thirty million,” when all of a sudden, I *heard* what we were saying. And I blurted out, “Wait, I’ve just *heard* how we’re talking—*Only* thirty million! *Only* thirty million human beings killed instantly?” Silence fell upon the room. Nobody said a word. They didn’t even look at me. It was awful. I felt like a woman.

The physicist added that henceforth he was careful to never blurt out anything like that again.

. . . . .

During the early years of the Reagan presidency, in the era of the Evil Empire, the cold war, and loose talk in Washington about the possibility of fighting and “prevailing” in a nuclear war, I went off to do participant observation in a community of North American nuclear defense intellectuals and security affairs analysts—a community virtually entirely composed of white men. They work in universities, think tanks, and as advisers to government. They theorize about nuclear deterrence and arms control, and nuclear and conventional war fighting, about how to best translate military might into political power; in short, they create the discourse that underwrites American national security policy. The exact relation of their theories to American political and military practice is a complex and thorny one; the argument can be made, for example, that their ideas do not so much shape policy decisions as legitimate them after

the fact. But one thing that is clear is that the body of language and thinking they have generated filters out to the military, politicians, and the public, and increasingly shapes how we talk and think about war. This was amply evident during the Gulf War: Gulf War “news,” as generated by the military briefers, reported by newscasters, and analyzed by the television networks’ resident security experts, was marked by its use of the professional language of defense analysis, nearly to the exclusion of other ways of speaking.

My goal has been to understand something about how defense intellectuals think, and why they think that way. Despite the parsimonious appeal of ascribing the nuclear arms race to “missile envy,”<sup>2</sup> I felt certain that masculinity was not a sufficient explanation of why men think about war in the ways that they do. Indeed, I found many ways to understand what these men were doing that had little or nothing to do with gender.<sup>3</sup> But ultimately, the physicist’s story and others like it made confronting the role of gender unavoidable. Thus, in this paper I will explore gender discourse, and its role in shaping nuclear and national security discourse.

I want to stress, this is not a paper about men and women, and what they are or are not like. I will not be claiming that men are aggressive and women peace loving. I will not even address the question of how men’s and women’s relations to war may differ, nor of the different propensities they may have to committing acts of violence. Neither will I pay more than passing attention to the question which so often crops up in discussions of war and gender, that is, would it be a more peaceful world if our national leaders were women? These questions are valid and important, and recent feminist discussion of them has been complex, interesting, and contentious. But my focus is elsewhere. I wish to direct attention away from gendered individuals and toward gendered discourses. My question is about the way that civilian defense analysts think about war, and the ways in which that thinking is shaped not by their maleness (or, in extremely rare instances, femaleness), but by the ways in which gender discourse intertwines with and permeates that thinking.<sup>4</sup>

Let me be more specific about my terms. I use the term *gender* to refer to the constellation of meanings that a given culture assigns to biological sex differences. But more than that, I use gender to refer to a symbolic system, a central organizing discourse of culture, one that not only shapes how we experience and understand ourselves as men and women, but that also interweaves with other discourses and shapes *them*—and therefore shapes other aspects of our world—such as how nuclear weapons are thought about and deployed.<sup>5</sup>

So when I talk about “gender discourse,” I am talking not only about words or language but about a system of meanings, of ways of thinking, images and words that first shape how we experience, understand, and

represent ourselves as men and women, but that also do more than that; they shape many other aspects of our lives and culture. In this symbolic system, human characteristics are dichotomized, divided into pairs of polar opposites that are supposedly mutually exclusive: mind is opposed to body; culture to nature; thought to feeling; logic to intuition; objectivity to subjectivity; aggression to passivity; confrontation to accommodation; abstraction to particularity; public to private; political to personal, ad nauseam. In each case, the first term of the “opposites” is associated with male, the second with female. And in each case, our society values the first over the second.

I break it into steps like this—analytically separating the *existence* of these groupings of binary oppositions, from the association of each group with a gender, from the valuing of one over the other, the so-called male over the so-called female, for two reasons: first, to try to make visible the fact that this system of dichotomies is encoding many meanings that may be quite unrelated to male and female bodies. Yet once that first step is made—the association of each side of those lists with a gender—gender now becomes tied to many other kinds of cultural representations. If a human activity, such as engineering, fits some of the characteristics, it becomes gendered.

My second reason for breaking it into those steps is to try to help make it clear that the meanings can flow in different directions; that is, in gender discourse, men and women are supposed to exemplify the characteristics on the lists. It also works in reverse, however; to evidence any of these characteristics—to be abstract, logical or dispassionate, for example—is not simply to be those things, but also to be manly. And to be manly is not simply to be manly, but also to be in the more highly valued position in the discourse. In other words, to exhibit a trait on that list is not neutral—it is not simply displaying some basic human characteristic. It also positions you in a discourse of gender. It associates you with a particular gender, and also with a higher or lower valuation.

In stressing that this is a *symbolic* system, I want first to emphasize that while real women and men do not really fit these gender “ideals,” the existence of this system of meaning affects all of us, nonetheless. Whether we want to or not, we see ourselves and others against its templates, we interpret our own and others’ actions against it. A man who cries easily cannot avoid in some way confronting that he is likely to be seen as less than fully manly. A woman who is very aggressive and incisive may enjoy that quality in herself, but the fact of her aggressiveness does not exist by itself; she cannot avoid having her own and others’ perceptions of that quality of hers, the meaning it has for people, being in some way mediated by the discourse of gender. Or, a different kind of example: Why does it mean one thing when George Bush gets teary-eyed in public, and some-

thing entirely different when Patricia Shroeder does? The same act is viewed through the lens of gender and is seen to mean two very different things.

Second, as gender discourse assigns gender to human characteristics, we can think of the discourse as something we are positioned *by*. If I say, for example, that a corporation should stop dumping toxic waste because it is damaging the creations of mother earth, (i.e., articulating a valuing and sentimental vision of nature), I am speaking in a manner associated with women, and our cultural discourse of gender positions me as female. As such I am then associated with the whole constellation of traits—irrational, emotional, subjective, and so forth—and I am in the devalued position. If, on the other hand, I say the corporation should stop dumping toxic wastes because I have calculated that it is causing \$8.215 billion of damage to eight nonrenewable resources, which should be seen as equivalent to lowering the GDP by 0.15 percent per annum, (i.e., using a rational, calculative mode of thought), the discourse positions me as masculine—rational, objective, logical, and so forth—the dominant, valued position.

But if we are positioned *by* discourses, we can also take different positions *within* them. Although I am female, and thus would “naturally” fall into the devalued term, I can choose to “speak like a man”—to be hard-nosed, realistic, unsentimental, dispassionate. Jeanne Kirkpatrick is a formidable example. While we can choose a position in a discourse, however, it means something different for a woman to “speak like a man” than for a man to do so. It is heard differently.

One other note about my use of the term *gender discourse*: I am using it in the general sense to refer to the phenomenon of symbolically organizing the world in these gender-associated opposites. I do not mean to suggest that there is a single discourse defining a single set of gender ideals. In fact, there are many specific discourses of gender, which vary by race, class, ethnicity, locale, sexuality, nationality, and other factors. The masculinity idealized in the gender discourse of new Haitian immigrants is in some ways different from that of sixth-generation white Anglo-Saxon Protestant business executives, and both differ somewhat from that of white-male defense intellectuals and security analysts. One version of masculinity is mobilized and enforced in the armed forces in order to enable men to fight wars, while a somewhat different version of masculinity is drawn upon and expressed by abstract theoreticians of war.<sup>6</sup>

Let us now return to the physicist who felt like a woman: what happened when he “blurted out” his sudden awareness of the “only thirty million” dead people? First, he was transgressing a code of professional conduct. In the civilian defense intellectuals’ world, when you are in professional settings you do not discuss the bloody reality behind the calcula-

tions. It is not required that you be completely unaware of them in your outside life, or that you have no feelings about them, but it is required that you do not bring them to the foreground in the context of professional activities. There is a general awareness that you *could not* do your work if you did; in addition, most defense intellectuals believe that emotion and description of human reality distort the process required to think well about nuclear weapons and warfare.

So the physicist violated a behavioral norm, in and of itself a difficult thing to do because it threatens your relationships to and your standing with your colleagues.

But even worse than that, he demonstrated some of the characteristics on the “female” side of the dichotomies—in his “blurting” he was impulsive, uncontrolled, emotional, concrete, and attentive to human bodies, at the very least. Thus, he marked himself not only as unprofessional but as feminine, and this, in turn, was doubly threatening. It was not only a threat to his own sense of self as masculine, his gender identity, it also identified him with a devalued status—of a woman—or put him in the devalued or subordinate position in the discourse.

Thus, both his statement, “I felt like a woman,” and his subsequent silence in that and other settings are completely understandable. To have the strength of character and courage to transgress the strictures of both professional and gender codes *and* to associate yourself with a lower status is very difficult.

This story is not simply about one individual, his feelings and actions; it is about the role of gender discourse. The impact of gender discourse in that room (and countless others like it) is that some things get left out. Certain ideas, concerns, interests, information, feelings, and meanings are marked in national security discourse as feminine, and are devalued. They are therefore, first, very difficult to *spea*k, as exemplified by the physicist who felt like a woman. And second, they are very difficult to *hear*, to take in and work with seriously, even if they *are* said. For the others in the room, the way in which the physicist’s comments were marked as female and devalued served to delegitimize them. It is almost as though they had become an accidental excrescence in the middle of the room. Embarrassed politeness demanded that they be ignored.

I must stress that this is not simply the product of the idiosyncratic personal composition of that particular room. In other professional settings, I have experienced the feeling that something terribly important is being left out and must be spoken; and yet, it has felt almost physically impossible to utter the words, almost as though they could not be pushed out into the smooth, cool, opaque air of the room.

What is it that cannot be spoken? First, any words that express an emotional awareness of the desperate human reality behind the sanitized

abstractions of death and destruction—as in the physicist’s sudden vision of thirty million rotting corpses. Similarly, weapons’ effects may be spoken of only in the most clinical and abstract terms, leaving no room to imagine a seven-year-old boy with his flesh melting away from his bones or a toddler with her skin hanging down in strips. Voicing concern about the number of casualties in the enemy’s armed forces, imagining the suffering of the killed and wounded young men, is out of bounds. (Within the military itself, it is permissible, even desirable, to attempt to minimize immediate civilian casualties if it is possible to do so without compromising military objectives, but as we learned in the Persian Gulf War, this is only an extremely limited enterprise; the planning and precision of military targeting does not admit of consideration of the cost in human lives of such actions as destroying power systems, or water and sewer systems, or highways and food distribution systems.)<sup>7</sup> Psychological effects—on the soldiers fighting the war or on the citizens injured, or fearing for their own safety, or living through tremendous deprivation, or helplessly watching their babies die from diarrhea due to the lack of clean water—all of these are not to be talked about.

But it is not only particular subjects that are out of bounds. It is also tone of voice that counts. A speaking style that is identified as cool, dispassionate, and distanced is required. One that vibrates with the intensity of emotion almost always disqualifies the speaker, who is heard to sound like “a hysterical housewife.”

What gets left out, then, is the emotional, the concrete, the particular, the human bodies and their vulnerability, human lives and their subjectivity—all of which are marked as feminine in the binary dichotomies of gender discourse. In other words, gender discourse informs and shapes nuclear and national security discourse, and in so doing creates silences and absences. It keeps things out of the room, unsaid, and keeps them ignored if they manage to get in. As such, it degrades our ability to think *well* and *fully* about nuclear weapons and national security, and shapes and limits the possible outcomes of our deliberations.

What becomes clear, then, is that defense intellectuals’ standards of what constitutes “good thinking” about weapons and security have not simply evolved out of trial and error; it is not that the history of nuclear discourse has been filled with exploration of other ideas, concerns, interests, information, questions, feelings, meanings and stances which were then found to create distorted or poor thought. It is that these options have been *preempted* by gender discourse, and by the feelings evoked by living up to or transgressing gender codes.

To borrow a term from defense intellectuals, you might say that gender discourse becomes a “preemptive deterrent” to certain kinds of thought.

Let me give you another example of what I mean—another story, this one my own experience:

One Saturday morning I, two other women, and about fifty-five men gathered to play a war game designed by the RAND Corporation.<sup>8</sup> Our “controllers” (the people running the game) first divided us up into three sets of teams; there would be three simultaneous games being played, each pitting a Red Team against a Blue Team (I leave the reader to figure out which color represents which country). All three women were put onto the same team, a Red Team.

The teams were then placed in different rooms so that we had no way of communicating with each other, except through our military actions (or lack of them) or by sending demands and responses to those demands via the controllers. There was no way to negotiate or to take actions other than military ones. (This was supposed to simulate reality.) The controllers then presented us with maps and pages covered with numbers representing each side’s forces. We were also given a “scenario,” a situation of escalating tensions and military conflicts, starting in the Middle East and spreading to Central Europe. We were to decide what to do, the controllers would go back and forth between the two teams to relate the other team’s actions, and periodically the controllers themselves would add something that would ratchet up the conflict—an announcement of an “intercepted intelligence report” from the other side, the authenticity of which we had no way of judging.

Our Red Team was heavily into strategizing, attacking ground forces, and generally playing war. We also, at one point, decided that we were going to pull our troops out of Afghanistan, reasoning that it was bad for us to have them there and that the Afghans had the right to self-determination. At another point we removed some troops from Eastern Europe. I must add that later on my team was accused of being wildly “unrealistic,” that this group of experts found the idea that the Soviet Union might voluntarily choose to pull troops out of Afghanistan and Eastern Europe so utterly absurd. (It was about six months before Gorbachev actually did the same thing.)

Gradually our game escalated to nuclear war. The Blue Team used tactical nuclear weapons against our troops, but our Red Team decided, initially at least, against nuclear retaliation. When the game ended (at the end of the allotted time) our Red Team had “lost the war” (meaning that we had political control over less territory than we had started with, although our homeland had remained completely unviolated and our civilian population safe).

In the debriefing afterwards, all six teams returned to one room and reported on their games. Since we had had absolutely no way to know

why the other team had taken any of its actions, we now had the opportunity to find out what they had been thinking. A member of the team that had played against us said, “Well, when he took his troops out of Afghanistan, I knew he was weak and I could push him around. And then, when we nuked him and he didn’t nuke us back, I knew he was just such a wimp, I could take him for everything he’s got and I nuked him again. He just wimped out.”

There are many different possible comments to make at this point. I will restrict myself to a couple. First, when the man from the Blue Team called me a wimp (which is what it felt like for each of us on the Red Team—a personal accusation), I felt silenced. My reality, the careful reasoning that had gone into my strategic and tactical choices, the intelligence, the politics, the morality—all of it just disappeared, completely invalidated. I could not explain the reasons for my actions, could not protest, “Wait, you idiot, I didn’t do it because I was weak, I did it because it made *sense* to do it that way, given my understandings of strategy and tactics, history and politics, my goals and my values.” The protestation would be met with knowing sneers. In this discourse, the coding of an act as wimpish is hegemonic. Its emotional heat and resonance is like a bath of sulfuric acid: it erases everything else.

“Acting like a wimp” is an *interpretation* of a person’s acts (or, in national security discourse, a country’s acts, an important distinction I will return to later). As with any other interpretation, it is a selection of one among many possible different ways to understand something—once the selection is made, the other possibilities recede into invisibility. In national security discourse, “acting like a wimp,” being insufficiently masculine, is one of the most readily available interpretive codes. (You do not need to do participant observation in a community of defense intellectuals to know this—just look at the “geopolitical analyses” in the media and on Capitol Hill of the way in which George Bush’s military intervention in Panama and the Persian Gulf War finally allowed him to beat the “wimp factor.”) You learn that someone is being a wimp if he perceives an international crisis as very dangerous and urges caution; if he thinks it might not be important to have just as many weapons that are just as big as the *other guy’s*; if he suggests that an attack should not necessarily be answered by an even more destructive counterattack; or, until recently, if he suggested that making unilateral arms reductions might be useful for our own security.<sup>9</sup> All of these are “wimping out.”

The prevalence of this particular interpretive code is another example of how gender discourse affects the quality of thinking within the national security community, first, because, as in the case of the physicist who “felt like a woman,” it is internalized to become a self-censor; there are things professionals simply will not *say* in groups, options they simply



will not argue nor write about, because they know that to do so is to brand themselves as wimps. Thus, a whole range of inputs is left out, a whole series of options is foreclosed from their deliberations.

Equally, if not more damagingly, is the way in which this interpretive coding not only limits what is *said*, but even limits what is *thought*. “He’s a wimp” is a phrase that *stops* thought.<sup>10</sup> When we were playing the game, once my opponent on the Blue Team “recognized the fact that I was a wimp,” that is, once he interpreted my team’s actions through the lens of this common interpretive code in national security discourse, he *stopped thinking*; he stopped looking for ways to understand what we were doing. He did not ask, “Why on earth would the Red Team do that? What does it tell me about them, about their motives and purposes and goals and capabilities? What does it tell me about their possible understandings of *my* actions, or of the situation they’re in?” or any other of the many questions that might have enabled him to revise his own conception of the situation or perhaps achieve his goals at a far lower level of violence and destruction. Here, again, gender discourse acts as a preemptive deterrent to thought.

“Wimp” is, of course, not the only gendered pejorative used in the national security community; “pussy” is another popular epithet, conjoining the imagery of harmless domesticated (read demasculinized) pets with contemptuous reference to women’s genitals. In an informal setting, an analyst worrying about the other side’s casualties, for example, might be asked, “What kind of pussy are you, anyway?” It need not happen more than once or twice before everyone gets the message; they quickly learn not to raise the issue in their discussions. Attention to and care for the living, suffering, and dying of human beings (in this case, soldiers and their families and friends) is again banished from the discourse through the expedient means of gender-bashing.

Another disturbing example comes from our relationship with what was then the Soviet Union. Former President Gorbachev was deeply influenced by a (mostly) young group of Soviet civilian defense intellectuals known as “new thinkers.” The new thinkers questioned many of the fundamental bases of security policy as it has been practiced by both the United States and the USSR, and significant elements of Soviet defense policy were restructured accordingly. Intellectually, their ideas posed a profound challenge to the business-as-usual stance of American policy analysts; if taken seriously, they offered an exceptional opportunity to radically reshape international security arrangements. And yet, in at least one instance, American security specialists avoided serious consideration of those ideas through mindless masculinity defamation; for example, “I’ve met these Soviet ‘new thinkers’ and they’re a bunch of pussies.”<sup>11</sup>

Other words are also used to impugn someone's masculinity and, in the process, to delegitimize his position and avoid thinking seriously about it. "Those Krauts are a bunch of limp-dicked wimps" was the way one U.S. defense intellectual dismissed the West German politicians who were concerned about popular opposition to Euromissile deployments.<sup>12</sup> I have heard our NATO allies referred to as "the Euro-fags" when they disagreed with American policy on such issues as the Contra War or the bombing of Libya. Labeling them "fags" is an effective strategy; it immediately dismisses and trivializes their opposition to U.S. policy by coding it as due to inadequate masculinity. In other words, the American analyst need not seriously confront the Europeans' arguments, since the Europeans' doubts about U.S. policy obviously stem not from their reasoning but from the "fact" that they "just don't have the stones for war." Here, again, gender discourse deters thought.

"Fag" imagery is not, of course, confined to the professional community of security analysts; it also appears in popular "political" discourse. The Gulf War was replete with examples. American derision of Saddam Hussein included bumper stickers that read "Saddam, Bend Over." American soldiers reported that the "U.S.A." stenciled on their uniforms stood for "Up Saddam's Ass." A widely reprinted cartoon, surely one of the most multiply offensive that came out of the war, depicted Saddam bowing down in the Islamic posture of prayer, with a huge U.S. missile, approximately five times the size of the prostrate figure, about to penetrate his upraised bottom. Over and over, defeat for the Iraqis was portrayed as humiliating anal penetration by the more powerful and manly United States.

Within the defense community discourse, manliness is equated not only with the ability to win a war (or to "prevail," as some like to say when talking about nuclear war); it is also equated with the willingness (which they would call courage) to threaten and use force. During the Carter administration, for example, a well-known academic security affairs specialist was quoted as saying that "under Jimmy Carter the United States is spreading its legs for the Soviet Union."<sup>13</sup> Once this image is evoked, how does rational discourse about the value of U.S. policy proceed?

In 1989 and 1990, as Gorbachev presided over the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, I heard some defense analysts sneeringly say things like, "They're a bunch of pussies for pulling out of Eastern Europe." This is extraordinary. Here they were, men who for years railed against Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. You would assume that if they were politically and ideologically consistent, if they were rational, they would be applauding the Soviet actions. Yet in their informal conversations, it was not their rational analyses that dominated their response, but the fact that for them, the decision for war, the willingness

to use force, is cast as a question of masculinity—not prudence, thoughtfulness, efficacy, “rational” cost-benefit calculation, or morality, but masculinity.

In the face of this equation, genuine political discourse disappears. One more example: After Iraq invaded Kuwait and President Bush hastily sent U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia, there was a period in which the Bush administration struggled to find a convincing political justification for U.S. military involvement and the security affairs community debated the political merit of U.S. intervention.<sup>14</sup> Then Bush set the deadline, January 16, high noon at the OK Corral, and as the day approached conversations changed. More of these centered on the question compellingly articulated by one defense intellectual as “Does George Bush have the stones for war?”<sup>15</sup> This, too, is utterly extraordinary. This was a time when crucial political questions abounded: Can the sanctions work if given more time? Just what vital interests does the United States actually have at stake? What would be the goals of military intervention? Could they be accomplished by other means? Is the difference between what sanctions might accomplish and what military violence might accomplish worth the greater cost in human suffering, human lives, even dollars? What will the long-term effects on the people of the region be? On the ecology? Given the apparent successes of Gorbachev’s last-minute diplomacy and Hussein’s series of nearly daily small concessions, can and should Bush put off the deadline? Does he have the strength to let another leader play a major role in solving the problem? Does he have the political flexibility to not fight, or is he hell-bent on war at all costs? And so on, ad infinitum. All of these disappear in the sulfuric acid test of the size of Mr. Bush’s private parts.<sup>16</sup>

I want to return to the RAND war simulation story to make one other observation. First, it requires a true confession: *I was stung by being called a wimp*. Yes, I thought the remark was deeply inane, and it infuriated me. But even so, I was also stung. Let me hasten to add, this was not because my identity is very wrapped up with not being wimpish—it actually is not a term that normally figures very heavily in my self-image one way or the other. But it was impossible to be in that room, hear his comment and the snickering laughter with which it was met, and not to feel stung, and humiliated.

Why? There I was, a woman and a feminist, not only contemptuous of the mentality that measures human beings by their degree of so-called wimpishness, but also someone for whom the term *wimp* does not have a deeply resonant personal meaning. How could it have affected me so much?

The answer lies in the role of the context within which I was experiencing myself—the discursive framework. For in that room I was not “simply me,” but I was a participant in a discourse, a shared set of words,

concepts, symbols that constituted not only the linguistic possibilities available to us but also constituted *me* in that situation. This is not entirely true, of course. How I experienced myself was at least partly shaped by other experiences and other discursive frameworks—certainly those of feminist politics and antimilitarist politics; in fact, I would say my reactions were predominantly shaped by those frameworks. But that is quite different from saying “I am a feminist, and that individual, psychological self simply moves encapsulated through the world being itself”—and therefore assuming that I am unaffected. No matter who else I was at that moment, I was unavoidably a participant in a discourse in which being a wimp has a meaning, and a deeply pejorative one at that. By calling me a wimp, my accuser on the Blue Team *positioned* me in that discourse, and I could not but feel the sting.

In other words, I am suggesting that national security discourse can be seen as having different positions within it—ones that are starkly gender coded; indeed, the enormous strength of their evocative power comes from gender.<sup>17</sup> Thus, when you participate in conversation in that community, you do not simply choose what to say and how to say it; you advertently or inadvertently choose a position in the discourse. As a woman, I can choose the “masculine” (tough, rational, logical) position. If I do, I am seen as legitimate, but I limit what I can say. Or, I can say things that place me in the “feminine” position—in which case no one will listen to me.

Understanding national security discourse’s gendered positions may cast some light on a frequently debated issue. Many people notice that the worlds of war making and national security have been created by and are still “manned” by men, and ask whether it might not make a big difference if more women played a role. Unfortunately, my first answer is “not much,” at least if we are talking about relatively small numbers of women entering the world of defense experts and national security elites as it is presently constituted. Quite apart from whether you believe that women are (biologically or culturally) less aggressive than men, every person who enters this world is also participating in a gendered discourse in which she or he must adopt the masculine position in order to be successful. This means that it is extremely difficult for anyone, female *or male*, to express concerns or ideas marked as “feminine” and still maintain his or her legitimacy.

Another difficulty in realizing the potential benefits of recruiting more women in the profession: the assumption that they would make a difference is to some degree predicated on the idea that “the feminine” is absent from the discourse, and that adding it would lead to more balanced thinking. However, the problem is not that the “female” position is totally absent from the discourse; parts of it, at least, albeit in a degraded and

undeveloped form, are already present, named, delegitimated, and silenced, all in one fell swoop. The inclusion and delegitimation of ideas marked as “feminine” acts as a more powerful censor than the total absence of “feminine” ideas would be.

So it is not simply the presence of women that would make a difference. Instead, it is the commitment and ability to develop, explore, re-think, and revalue those ways of thinking that get silenced and devalued that would make a difference. For that to happen, men, too, would have to be central participants.

But here, the power of gender codes’ policing function in the thought process is again painfully obvious. The gender coding not only marks what is out of bounds in the discourse and offers a handy set of epithets to use to enforce those rules. It also links that “subjugated knowledge” to the deepest sense of self-identity. Thus, as was evident with the physicist who felt like a woman, when men in the profession articulate those ideas, it not only makes them mavericks or intellectually “off base”; it challenges their own gender identity. To the degree that a woman does not have the same kind of gender identity issue at stake, she may have stronger sources of resistance to the masculinity defamation that is used to police the thoughts and actions of those in the defense community. She does not have the power to change the fact that her actions will be interpreted and evaluated according to those gender codes, however. And in the defense community, the only thing worse than a man acting like a woman is a woman acting like a woman.

Finally, I would like to briefly explore a phenomenon I call the “unitary masculine actor problem” in national security discourse. During the Persian Gulf War, many feminists probably noticed that both the military briefers and George Bush himself frequently used the singular masculine pronoun “he” when referring to Iraq and Iraq’s army. Someone not listening carefully could simply assume that “he” referred to Saddam Hussein. Sometimes it did; much of the time it simply reflected the defense community’s characteristic habit of calling opponents “he” or “the other guy.”<sup>18</sup> A battalion commander, for example, was quoted as saying “Saddam knows where we are and we know where he is. We will move a lot now to keep him off guard.”<sup>19</sup> In these sentences, “he” and “him” appear to refer to Saddam Hussein. But, of course, the American forces had *no idea* where Saddam Hussein himself was; the singular masculine pronouns are actually being used to refer to the Iraqi military.

This linguistic move, frequently heard in discussions within the security affairs and defense communities, turns a complex state and set of forces into a singular male opponent. In fact, discussions that purport to be serious explorations of the strategy and tactics of war can have a tone

which sounds more like the story of a sporting match, a fistfight, or a personal vendetta.

I would want to suck him out into the desert as far as I could, and then pound him to death.<sup>20</sup>

Once we had taken out his eyes, we did what could be best described as the “Hail Mary play” in football.<sup>21</sup>

[I]f the adversary decides to embark on a very high roll, because he’s frightened that something even worse is in the works, does grabbing him by the scruff of the neck and slapping him up the side of the head, does that make him behave better or is it plausible that it makes him behave even worse?<sup>22</sup>

Most defense intellectuals would claim that using “he” is just a convenient shorthand, without significant import or effects. I believe, however, that the effects of this usage are many and the implications far-reaching. Here I will sketch just a few, starting first with the usage throughout defense discourse generally, and then coming back to the Gulf War in particular.

The use of “he” distorts the analyst’s understanding of the opposing state and the conflict in which they are engaged. When the analyst refers to the opposing state as “he” or “the other guy,” the image evoked is that of a person, a unitary actor; yet states are not people. Nor are they unitary and unified. They comprise complex, multifaceted governmental and military apparatuses, each with opposing forces within it, each, in turn, with its own internal institutional dynamics, its own varied needs in relation to domestic politics, and so on. In other words, if the state is referred to and pictured as a unitary actor, what becomes unavailable to the analyst and policy-maker is a series of much more complex truths that might enable him to imagine many more policy options, many more ways to interact with that state.

If one kind of distortion of the state results from the image of the state as a person, a unitary actor, another can be seen to stem from the image of the state as a specifically *male* actor.<sup>23</sup> Although states are almost uniformly run by men, states are not men; they are complex social institutions, and they act and react as such. Yet, when “he” and “the other guy” are used to refer to states, the words do not simply function as shorthand codes; instead, they have their own entailments, including assumptions about how men act, which just might be different from how states act, but which invisibly become assumed to be isomorphic with how states act.<sup>24</sup>

It also entails emotional responses on the part of the speaker. The reference to the opposing state as “he” evokes male competitive identity issues, as in, “I’m not going to let him push me around,” or, “I’m not going to let him get the best of me.” While these responses may or may not be

adaptive for a barroom brawl, it is probably safe to say that they are less functional when trying to determine the best way for one state to respond to another state. Defense analysts and foreign policy experts can usually agree upon the supreme desirability of dispassionate, logical analysis and its ensuing rationally calculated action. Yet the emotions evoked by the portrayal of global conflict in the personalized terms of male competition must, at the very least, exert a strong pull in exactly the opposite direction.

A third problem is that even while the use of “he” acts to personalize the conflict, it simultaneously abstracts both the opponent and the war itself. That is, the use of “he” functions in very much the same way that discussions about “Red” and “Blue” do. It facilitates treating war within a kind of game-playing model, A against B, Red against Blue, he against me. For even while “he” is evocative of male identity issues, it is also just an abstract piece to be moved around on a game board, or, more appropriately, a computer screen.

That tension between personalization and abstraction was striking in Gulf War discourse. In the Gulf War, not only was “he” frequently used to refer to the Iraqi military, but so was “Saddam,” as in “Saddam really took a pounding today,” or “Our goal remains the same: to liberate Kuwait by forcing Saddam Hussein out.”<sup>25</sup> The personalization is obvious: in this locution, the U.S. armed forces are not destroying a nation, killing people; instead, they (or George) are giving Saddam a good pounding, or bodily removing him from where he does not belong. Our emotional response is to get fired up about a bully getting his comeuppance.

Yet this personalization, this conflation of Iraq and Iraqi forces with Saddam himself, also abstracts: it functions to substitute in the mind’s eye the abstraction of an implacably, impeccably evil enemy for the particular human beings, the men, women, and children being pounded, burned, torn, and eviscerated. A cartoon image of Saddam being ejected from Kuwait preempts the image of the blackened, charred, decomposing bodies of nineteen-year-old boys tossed in ditches by the side of the road, and the other concrete images of the acts of violence that constitute “forcing Hussein [*sic*] out of Kuwait.”<sup>26</sup> Paradoxical as it may seem, in personalizing the Iraqi army as Saddam, the individual human beings in Iraq were abstracted out of existence.<sup>27</sup>

In summary, I have been exploring the way in which defense intellectuals talk to each other—the comments they make to each other, the particular usages that appear in their informal conversations or their lectures. In addition, I have occasionally left the professional community to draw upon public talk about the Gulf War. My analysis does *not* lead me to conclude that “national security thinking is masculine”—that is, a separate, and different, discussion.<sup>28</sup> Instead, I have tried to show that na-

tional security discourse is gendered, and that it matters. Gender discourse is interwoven through national security discourse. It sets fixed boundaries, and in so doing, it skews what is discussed and how it is thought about. It shapes expectations of other nations' actions, and in so doing it affects both our interpretations of international events and conceptions of how the United States should respond.

In a world where professionals pride themselves on their ability to engage in cool, rational, objective calculation while others around them are letting their thinking be sullied by emotion, the unacknowledged interweaving of gender discourse in security discourse allows men to not acknowledge that their pristine rational thought is in fact riddled with emotional response. In an "objective" "universal" discourse that valorizes the "masculine" and deauthorizes the "feminine," it is only the "feminine" emotions that are noticed and labeled as emotions, and thus in need of banning from the analytic process. "Masculine" emotions—such as feelings of aggression, competition, macho pride and swagger, or the sense of identity resting on carefully defended borders—are not so easily noticed and identified as emotions, and are instead invisibly folded into "self-evident," so-called realist paradigms and analyses. It is both the interweaving of gender discourse in national security thinking *and* the blindness to its presence and impact that have deleterious effects. Finally, the impact is to distort, degrade, and deter roundly rational, fully complex thought within the community of defense intellectuals and national security elites and, by extension, to cripple democratic deliberation about crucial matters of war and peace.

## NOTES

I am grateful to the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Ploughshares Fund for their generous support of my research, and for making the writing of this chapter possible. I wish to thank Sara Ruddick, Elaine Scarry, Sandra Harding, and Barry O'Neill for their careful readings; I regret only that I was not able to more fully incorporate their criticisms and suggestions. Grateful appreciation is due to several thoughtful informants within the defense intellectual community. This chapter was written while I was a fellow at the Bunting Institute, and I wish to thank my sister-fellows for their feedback and support.

1. A "counterforce attack" refers to an attack in which the targets are the opponent's weapons systems, command and control centers, and military leadership. It is in contrast to what is known as a "countervalue attack," which is the abstractly benign term for *targeting* and incinerating cities—what the United States did to Hiroshima, except that the bombs used today would be several hundred times more powerful. It is also known in the business, a bit more colorfully, as an "all-out city-busting exchange." Despite this careful targeting distinction,



one need not be too astute to notice that many of the ports, airports, and command posts destroyed in a counterforce attack are, in fact, in cities or metropolitan areas, which would be destroyed along with the “real targets,” the weapons systems. But this does not appear to make the distinction any less meaningful to war planners, although it is, in all likelihood, less than meaningful to the victims.

2. The term is Helen Caldicott’s, from her book *Missile Envy: The Arms Race and Nuclear War* (New York: William Morrow, 1984).

3. I have addressed some of these other factors in: “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals,” *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 12, no. 4 (Summer 1987): 687–718; “Emasculating America’s Linguistic Deterrent,” in *Rocking the Ship of State: Towards a Feminist Peace Politics*, ed. Adrienne Harris and Ynestra King (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989); and *Deconstructing National Security Discourse and Reconstructing Security* (working title, book manuscript).

4. Some of the material I analyze in this paper comes from the public utterances of civilian defense intellectuals and military leaders. But overtly gendered war discourse appears even more frequently in informal settings, such as conversations defense intellectuals have among themselves, rather than in their formal written papers. Hence, much of my data comes from participant observation, and from interviews in which men have been willing to share with me interactions and responses that are usually not part of the public record. Most often, they shared this information on the condition that it not be attributed, and I have respected their requests. I also feel strongly that “naming names” would be misleading to the extent that it would tend to encourage the reader to locate the problem within individual men and their particular psyches; in this paper I am arguing that it is crucial to see this as a cultural phenomenon, rather than a psychological one.

5. For a revealing exploration of the ways in which gender shapes international politics more generally, see Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

6. See Cynthia Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You? The Militarization of Women’s Lives* (London and Winchester, Mass.: Pandora Press, 1988); and Jean Elshtain, “Reflections on War and Political Discourse: Realism, Just War and Feminism in a Nuclear Age,” *Political Theory* 3, no. 1 (February 1985): 39–57.

7. While both the military and the news media presented the picture of a “surgically clean” war in which only military targets were destroyed, the reality was significantly bloodier; it involved the mass slaughter of Iraqi soldiers, as well as the death and suffering of large numbers of noncombatant men, women, and children. Although it is not possible to know the numbers of casualties with certainty, one analyst in the Census Bureau, Beth Osborne Daponte, has estimated that 40,000 Iraqi soldiers and 13,000 civilians were killed in direct military conflict, that 30,000 civilians died during Shiite and Kurdish rebellions, and that 70,000 civilians have died from health problems caused by the destruction of water and power plants (Edmund L. Andrews, “Census Bureau to Dismiss Analyst Who Estimated Iraqi Casualties,” *New York Times*, March 7, 1992, A7). Other estimates are significantly higher. Greenpeace estimates that as many as 243,000 Iraqi civilians died due to war-related causes (Ray Wilkinson, “Back from the

Living Dead,” *Newsweek*, January 20, 1992, 28). Another estimate places Iraqi troop casualties at 70,000 and estimates that over 100,000 children have died from the delayed effects of the war (Peter Rothenberg, “The Invisible Dead,” *Lies of Our Times* [March 1992]: 7). For recent, detailed reports on civilian casualties, see *Health and Welfare in Iraq after the Gulf Crisis* (International Study Team/Commission on Civilian Casualties, Human Rights Program, Harvard Law School, October 1991), and *Needless Deaths in the Gulf War* (Middle East Watch, 1992). For a useful corrective to the myth of the Gulf War as a war of surgical strikes and precision-guided weaponry, see Paul F. Walker and Eric Stambler, “The Surgical Myth of the Gulf War,” *Boston Globe*, April 16, 1991; and “. . . And the Dirty Little Weapons,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (May 1991): 21–24.

8. The RAND Corporation is a think tank that is a U.S. Air Force subcontractor. In the 1950s many of the most important nuclear strategists did their work under RAND auspices, including Bernard Brodie, Albert Wohlstetter, Herman Kahn, and Thomas Schelling.

9. In the context of the nuclear arms race and the cold war, even though a defense analyst might acknowledge that some American weapon systems served no useful strategic function (such as the Titan missiles during the 1980s), there was still consensus that they should not be unilaterally cut. Such a cut was seen to be bad because it was throwing away a potential bargaining chip in future arms control negotiations, or because making unilateral cuts was viewed as a sign of weakness and lack of resolve. It is only outside that context of hostile superpower competition, and, in fact, after the dissolution of the Soviet threat, that President Bush has responded to Gorbachev’s unilateral cuts with some (minor) American unilateral cuts. For a description and critical assessment of the arguments against unilateral cuts, see William Rose, *US Unilateral Arms Control Initiatives: When Do They Work?* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988). For an analysis of the logic and utility of bargaining chips, see Robert J. Bresler and Robert C. Gray, “The Bargaining Chip and SALT,” *Political Science Quarterly* 92, no. 1 (Spring 1977): 65–88.

10. For a discussion of how words and phrases can stop the thought process, see George Orwell, “Politics and the English Language,” in *A Collection of Essays* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954): 162–76.

11. Cohn, unattributed interview, Cambridge, Mass., July 15, 1991.

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*, July 20, 1991.

14. The Bush White House tried out a succession of revolving justifications in an attempt to find one that would garner popular support for U.S. military action, including: we must respond to the rape of Kuwait; we must not let Iraqi aggression be rewarded; we must defend Saudi Arabia; we cannot stand by while “vital U.S. interests” are threatened; we must establish a “new world order”; we must keep down the price of oil at U.S. gas pumps; we must protect American jobs; and finally, the winner, the only one that elicited any real support from the American public, we must destroy Iraq’s incipient nuclear weapons capability. What was perhaps most surprising about this was the extent to which it was publicly discussed and accepted as George Bush’s need to find a message that “worked”

rather than to actually have a genuine, meaningful explanation. For an account of Bush's decision making about the Gulf War, see Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991).

15. Cohn, unattributed interview, Cambridge, Mass., July 20, 1991.

16. Within the context of our society's dominant gender discourse, this equation of masculinity and strength with the willingness to use armed force seems quite "natural" and not particularly noteworthy. Hannah Arendt is one political thinker who makes the arbitrariness of that connection visible: she reframes our thinking about "strength," and finds strength in *refraining* from using one's armed forces (Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* [New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1969]).

17. My thinking about the importance of positions in discourses is indebted to Wendy Hollway, "Gender Difference and the Production of Subjectivity," in *Changing the Subject*, ed. J. Henriques, W. Holloway, C. Urwin, C. Venn, and V. Walkerdine (London and New York: Methuen, 1984): 227–63.

18. For a revealing exploration of the convention in strategic, military, and political writings of redescribing armies as a single "embodied combatant," see Elaine Scarry, *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984): 70–72.

19. Chris Hedges, "War Is Vivid in the Gun Sights of the Sniper," *New York Times*, February 3, 1991, A1.

20. General Norman Schwarzkopf, National Public Radio broadcast, February 8, 1991.

21. General Norman Schwarzkopf, CENTCOM News Briefing, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, February 27, 1991, p. 2.

22. Transcript of a strategic studies specialist's lecture on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (summer institute on Regional Conflict and Global Security: The Nuclear Dimension, Madison, Wisconsin, June 29, 1987).

23. Several analysts of international relations have commented upon the way in which "the state is a person" in international relations theory and in war discourse. For example, Paul Chilton and George Lakoff, distinguished linguists who study war, offer very useful explorations of the impact of the state-as-a-person metaphor on the way in which we understand the Persian Gulf War. Yet neither of them find it noteworthy that the state is not simply any person, but a *male* person. See Paul Chilton, "Getting the Message Through: Metaphor and Legitimation of the Gulf War" (unpublished paper, 1991); George Lakoff, "The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf" (unpublished paper, 1991).

24. For a lucid and compelling discussion of why it is an error to assume an isomorphism between the behavior and motivations of individuals and the behavior and motivations of states, see Marshall Sahlins, *The Use and Abuse of Biology* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), pp. ix–xv and 3–16.

25. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, "Excerpts from Briefing at Pentagon by Cheney and Powell," *New York Times*, January 24, 1991, A 11.

26. Scarry explains that when an army is described as a single "embodied combatant," injury, (as in Saddam's "pounding"), may be referred to but is "no longer recognizable or interpretable." It is not only that Americans might be happy to imagine Saddam being pounded; we also on some level know that it is

not really happening, and thus need not feel the pain of the wounded. We “respond to the injury . . . as an imaginary wound in an imaginary body, despite the fact that that imaginary body is itself made up of thousands of real human bodies” (Scarry, *Body in Pain*, p. 72).

27. For a further exploration of the disappearance of human bodies from Gulf War discourse, see Hugh Gusterson, “Nuclear War, the Gulf War, and the Disappearing Body” (unpublished paper, 1991). I have addressed other aspects of Gulf War discourse in “The Language of the Gulf War,” *Center Review* 5, no. 2 (Fall 1991); “Decoding Military Newspeak,” *Ms.*, March/April 1991, p. 81; and “Language, Gender, and the Gulf War” (unpublished paper prepared for Harvard University Center for Literary and Cultural Studies, April 10, 1991).

28. For a fascinating treatment of that issue, see Sara Ruddick in this volume.