Gender as national interest at the
UN Security Council

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The passage of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on ‘Women and Peace and Security’ in 2000 is largely responsible for stimulating feminist interest in the UN Security Council. The procedures, practices and ideological leanings of the Council have featured prominently in scholarly research on the ‘adoption story’ of the resolution.¹ For instance, Carol Cohn notes that civil society advocates of the passage of UNSCR 1325

combed through every UN document from the institution’s inception, finding every reference in any way relevant to the WPS [Women, Peace and Security] agenda, and provided the Ambassadors with a compendium of ‘agreed language’ which showed the basis for committing themselves to the language of the resolution.²

These accounts identify countries such as Bangladesh, Canada, Jamaica, Namibia, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom as the most receptive of the member states to WPS concerns, recognizing in particular the leadership of Ambassador Anwarul Chowdhury of Bangladesh, the initiatives taken by the Namibian delegation, and the support of the UK delegation. At the same time, these narratives also point out that in response to advocacy efforts of civil society actors, officials from both state delegations and the UN itself ‘pressed realism on the activists, stressing the limits to what the Security Council was likely, at best, to take on board’.³

Such detailed understanding of political imperatives within the Council is valuable not only to practitioners but also to scholars focusing on the WPS agenda; the status and scope of this agenda at the UN cannot be understood without an appreciation of the structure and processes of the Council, and of the

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² Cohn, Mainstreaming gender, p. 4.


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motivations and interests of the member states that contribute to gender-related policy-making in the Council. Yet the kind of attention paid to deliberative politics within the Security Council in the lead-up to the adoption of UNSCR 1325 has been largely missing in the scholarly literature examining subsequent developments in the WPS agenda. The focus has been rather on the constraints imposed by the prevalent security discourse in the Council and by the interests of its member states.4 This article seeks to present a deeper understanding of politics at the Security Council in relation to the institution’s thematic focus on Women, Peace and Security. In doing so, it also contributes to the literature wherein gender has been examined as the subject of multilateral negotiations leading to treaties such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) Home Work Convention, 1996 (No. 177), and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, as well as at the UN world conferences on human rights and women.5 Notably, unlike UN conferences, which are time-bound, the Security Council—in principle—has ‘remain[ed] actively seized’ of WPS issues since 2000; its members have had to contend with the mandate of UNSCR 1325 and its ‘sister’ resolutions.6

Diplomatic activities at the UN tend to be characterized in terms of the ‘seemingly contradictory goals relating to … the competing impulses of promoting national interests and advancing international norms of cooperation’.7 Institutionalized in the form of eight Security Council resolutions and promoted by an active civil society constituency, the WPS agenda lends itself well to the latter frame. This article focuses instead on situating WPS issues in relation to the former, that is, national interests in the Security Council, with particular attention to the fact that gender has increasingly become part of the foreign policy of some UN member states. Using illustrative examples, it draws attention to the projection of member states’ interests in the WPS arena, interests which then—in the light of states’ pivotal role in delineating international security policies at the Council—also shape the WPS agenda.

In its examination of ‘gender as national interest at the UN Security Council’, the article is premised upon a chain of conceptual linkages: diplomatic activities in the Council seek to realize member states’ foreign policy;8 and, foreign policy

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4 See e.g. Laura J. Shepherd, Gender, violence and security: discourse as practice (London: Zed, 2007).
8 Geoffrey Wiseman defines foreign policy as ‘the formulation of a state’s grand strategy or worldview’, and diplomacy as ‘the implementation of that grand strategy or worldview’: Geoffrey Wiseman, ’Diplomatic practices at the United Nations’, Cooperation and Conflict 50: 3, 2015, p. 317 [emphasis in original].
Gender as national interest at the UN Security Council

reflects the national interest of a state. It does not aim to analyse the political processes whereby gender issues in the international sphere have come to feature as a national interest of some states (reflected in their foreign policy), or the contested nature of these issues. It is apparent that the passage of UNSCR 1325 has increased the foreign policy rhetoric around the WPS agenda. It would be of scholarly interest to consider these developments in the context of ‘norm diffusion’, in the light also of an international environment that favours normative commitments to gender equality. Further, the role of domestic and international civil society actors in advocating the inclusion of gender in the foreign policies of member states and their diplomatic activities in international forums has been crucial. However, examining how these aspects have been factored into governments’ increasing acceptance of gender issues in their foreign policy is beyond the scope of this article. The main intention of the article is to highlight member states’ interests underpinning their diplomatic activities around WPS issues in the Council, with the aim of presenting a fuller understanding of political engagements with UNSCR 1325 in its institutional home.

The article proceeds in three parts. The first section highlights the structure and processes of the Security Council that circumscribe the position of member states within the institution. Further, it examines the normative turn in the work of the Council in 1999–2000, which included the passage of UNSCR 1325, and the ensuing debates on this development. The second section examines some key ways in which WPS has become part of the contemporary foreign policy of states, in order to further contextualize developments within the Council. The most obvious articulation of this is the ‘feminist foreign policy’ espoused by the Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström and by Hillary Clinton during her tenure as US Secretary of State. WPS-related policies adopted by a range of countries, including ‘middle powers’ and small member states, are also relevant. The third section analyses the interplay of gender and national interest at the Council. It follows the evolution of the WPS agenda at the Council since 2000, pointing to certain ways in which gender as an element in the national interest has featured in the work of member states within this institutional context. As the analysis focuses on the Security Council, the understanding of this agenda is limited to the parameters that have been set within the Council, mainly through the WPS resolutions. The role of individual diplomats, especially in view of the record number of women representatives at the Security Council in 2014, is also examined.

9 Joseph Nye describes national interest as a ‘slippery concept, used to describe as well as prescribe foreign policy’: Joseph S. Nye Jr, ‘Redefining the national interest’, Foreign Affairs 78: 4, July–Aug. 1999, p. 22.
The Security Council and its institutional context

In his discussion on diplomacy and International Relations theory, Sharp writes:

Diplomats tend not to like ‘theory’ … In their experience, the quest for such general propositions invariably ends up treating things as simple that the diplomats believe are complicated (you cannot treat all states as if they were the same), and treating things as complicated that they regard as simple (what is the problem with saying that diplomats serve the national interest?).12

For member states to negotiate the provisions—and the implementation—of UNSCR 1325 and its follow-up resolutions, they need to be able to relate WPS issues to their larger foreign policy goals within the Council. While all member states share certain interests, such as national security and protection of sovereignty, to the extent that their specific goals differ the various states may well adopt varied positions (or not) on the WPS agenda in the Council’s deliberations. This first section of the article sets the stage for this analysis. It makes two points: one, that the structure and processes of the Security Council frame the context within which member states exercise their national interest; and two, that the WPS agenda has been established as a thematic focus of the Council within the past 15 years.13

The distinction between the permanent and non-permanent or elected members of the Security Council is a defining feature of its composition, and the decisive position occupied by the five permanent members (the P5)—each armed with the power of veto—has become an enduring point of contention. At the time of the Council’s foundation, it was understood that the special provisions made for the P5 were necessary to ensure the commitment of the Second World War victors to the United Nations project.14 However, what is noteworthy today is that this unequal configuration has been maintained in spite of profound changes in the international political environment since 1945. The distinction is manifested physically in the presence of a separate consultation room of the P5 ‘located between the Economic and Social Council and Security Council chambers’ at the UN headquarters in New York.15 The P5 have delineated the work of the Security Council in ways that have limited the successful execution of its institutional mandate, namely, the maintenance of international peace and security. Thus, for instance, during the Cold War the Council served primarily as an arena

to maintain the balance of power between the eastern and western blocs; in the 1990s, mass atrocities took place in various parts of the world (most notably in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia) under the Council’s watch; and the resurgence of US exceptionalism following the 2001 terrorist attacks has also resonated within the Security Council. The P5’s dominance of the Council’s deliberations can be traced not simply to the formal powers bestowed upon them, but also in part to other factors, such as long-term institutional memory, and a special relationship with the UN secretariat. Over the years, a number of proposals for reform have been presented, but none has gained much political traction. As the ‘executive organ’ of the UN, the Security Council has maintained its pre-eminent position in international politics, demonstrated every year in the intense campaigns of member states seeking non-permanent membership of the Council.

The longstanding ‘democratic deficit’ of the Security Council is also apparent in its day-to-day practices. While much is made of the Council’s ‘provisional rules of procedure’, these can be easily circumvented in practice. For instance, rule 2 requires the president of the Council to call a meeting if requested by a member of the Council. Yet, despite requests by two non-permanent Council members, Cuba and Yemen, after the first Gulf War began in 1991, an official meeting of the Security Council on the subject was not convened until five weeks after the request was made:

the argument of the Americans and others [who were reportedly instrumental in causing the delay because of concerns that the meeting ‘would provide a forum for Iraq’s friends to make anti-coalition speeches’] was that while they recognized the validity of the rules, the Council had the right and duty to decide on the timing and nature of the meeting.

With regard to the veto power, it is widely noted that its frequency of use has diminished sharply in the post-Cold War period, and it is argued that ‘a spirit of cooperation has prevailed’ in the Council. In practice, differences between member states persist but have been effectively moved out of the public view as negotiations take place—to an even greater degree than before—‘behind the scenes’.

While the dominance of the P5 remains largely unchallenged, changes in the international context within which the Council operates (for instance, the rise of new powers and increasing calls for more democratic international practices) have
injected some openness into its work. The P5 are arguably more mindful of the limits to their legislative power in the Council. As Bruce Cronin and Ian Hurd write, the P5 cannot enforce Security Council resolutions without the support of other states. Informal consultations—where support is gauged and negotiated—have, of course, always been part of the Council’s work; these involve a range of actors including the P5, elected members and troop-contributing countries (on matters relating to specific missions) as well as the secretariat staff; importantly, since the 1990s, the Council has also consulted informally with civil society actors in what are known as ‘Arria formula’ meetings. The formal meetings of the Council have a largely symbolic value, as representatives usually have prior knowledge of the positions of member states as well as the negotiated agreement (if there is one). They also serve to bring states that are not Council members into the deliberations. Sievers and Daws note that the ‘thematic debates’—which take place as open meetings in the Security Council chamber—‘constitute an important outreach to non-Council members, who otherwise have few opportunities to address the Council at formal meetings’. In these multiple ways, then, UN member states have opportunities both to exercise their international responsibility and to advance their national interests at the Security Council.

Changes in the formal composition and procedures of the Security Council have been limited, to say the least. The number of elected members was expanded from six to ten in 1965; the latest version of the Council’s ‘provisional rules of procedure’ dates back to 1983, and uses the masculine pronoun to refer to the representatives as well as the president of the Council. In contrast to such inertia, the mandate of the Security Council has seen rapid and radical change since the 1990s. As the Cold War was reaching its end in the late 1980s, it was called upon to act in a number of conflict arenas that were no longer of interest to the superpowers. With regard to the nature of the Council’s mandate, as Weiss notes, ‘there was virtually a humanitarian tabula rasa’ around this time. Later, Council members adapted to the post-Cold War environment characterized by a more human-orientated understanding of security as well as a broader understanding of UN peacekeeping, which was particularly relevant to the Council’s work. Their interest in WPS issues may be traced to the increasing attention to humanitarian concerns in the 1990s, and was framed by documents such as the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, which viewed women primarily as victims of armed

26 Sievers and Daws, The procedure of the UN Security Council, p. 51.
Gender as national interest at the UN Security Council

Conflict. It was not, however, until the passage of UNSCR 1325 that the WPS agenda was formally placed within the Council’s mandate.

Resolution 1325 on ‘women and peace and security’ was adopted as a thematic resolution of the Security Council along with resolutions on children and armed conflict, protection of civilians in armed conflict, and HIV/AIDS and international peacekeeping operations, also passed during the period 1999–2001. Prior to this, the only ‘thematic’ issues, i.e. those not pertaining to interstate or regional concerns, that had been discussed in the Council had been related to disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorism; 13 such resolutions were adopted during the period 1947–95.

There was certainly an external impetus for the passage of the new thematic resolutions, but the motivations of Council members are also pertinent. At least two explanations have been proposed in this regard. Luck has suggested that these measures were necessary to provide a ‘normative compass to guide their [the Security Council’s and the larger UN membership’s] exploration of new substantive territory [humanitarian, proliferation and terrorist challenges]’; on a more critical note, Otto argues that the resolutions were necessary to provide legitimacy to the Council’s growing intervention in issue areas, such as intrastate conflicts, that had not traditionally been considered within its remit. The latter viewpoint problematizes the apparent attempt by the Council to gain legitimacy through the adoption of thematic resolutions with an explicit normative focus. Indeed, a number of scholars suggest that the P5 may have been seeking to extend their power through the Council. In this debate, Weiss’s conceptualization of the ‘humanitarian impulse’ provides a middle ground: ‘When humanitarian and strategic interests coincide, a window of opportunity opens for those seeking to act on the humanitarian impulse in the Security Council.’

Up until the passage of UNSCR 1820—the second resolution on ‘women and peace and security’—in 2008, there is little evidence of member states’ ‘humanitarian impulse’ behind the WPS agenda in the Council’s deliberations. Limited implementation of UNSCR 1325 and narrow interpretations of its mandate undermined the hopes of WPS advocates who had lobbied for and celebrated the passage of the resolution. Compared to the resolutions on children and


This subject has been widely analysed in the feminist literature on UNSCR 1325. See e.g. Torunn L. Trygggestad, ‘Trick or treat? The UN and implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security’, Global Governance 15: 4, 2009, pp. 539–57.
armed conflict and on protection of civilians, WPS had a slow start. However, not least because of the persistent advocacy of civil society actors such as the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security and the PeaceWomen project of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), WPS did not disappear from the Council’s agenda. Sievers and Daws point out that the ‘open debate’ format has been most frequently used for these three thematic interests of the Council: WPS, children and armed conflict, and the protection of civilians.\(^{37}\) The passage of six additional WPS resolutions has further strengthened this presence. As such, the WPS agenda seems to have done better than the HIV/AIDS theme, which does not have any follow-up resolutions and has not received much attention in the Council’s deliberations in recent years.\(^{38}\) Indeed, since 2007, new thematic topics such as ‘natural resources and conflict’ have been discussed under ‘the umbrella item “Maintenance of international peace and security” … to avoid the proliferation of agenda items adopted for thematic topics which were not likely to be revisited by the Council very often’; WPS does not fall under this rubric.\(^{39}\) Thus, while the trajectory of the WPS agenda in the Council may be debated, its presence in the institutional mandate appears to be secure.

The first part of this section of the article highlighted the decisive role played by member states, particularly the P5, in the work of the Security Council; the second part noted the evolution of thematic interests, especially WPS, that have come to frame the Council’s deliberations in the new millennium. Feminist literature on UNSCR 1325 tends to suggest that this evolution has been facilitated primarily by the work of civil society actors and individual advocates within the UN and member state delegations. While their role has certainly been crucial, matters in the Council—as discussed here—cannot proceed unless the member states are brought on board. In this regard, establishment of the WPS agenda in the Council has an important implication: namely, member states, especially those that seek to engage in the Council’s deliberations, need to devise positions on WPS issues. Further, as examined in the next section, these may well be part of the states’ respective national interests. This being so, examining the intersections between ‘gender’ and ‘national interest’ can offer new insights and opportunities vis-à-vis WPS issues in the Security Council.

**National interest and WPS**

In December 2014, the Swedish foreign minister Margot Wallström announced that her country would follow a ‘feminist foreign policy’ in response to Russia’s aggression in the Baltic states. An article in *Foreign Policy* described it as ‘a perspective that flows from UN Security Council 1325’\(^{40}\). Wallström is reported to have based the approach on ‘three Rs: representation, resources, and respect’—equal


representation of women in international politics, ensuring women’s equal access to resources and ensuring respect for women’s rights. Earlier, as the US Secretary of State between 2009 and 2013, Hillary Clinton had made women’s political concerns central to US foreign policy. Describing this as a feminist foreign policy, columnist Madeleine Bunting noted a particular passage in the edition of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review released by the US State Department during Clinton’s tenure: ‘We are integrating women and girls into everything we do … in all our diplomacy with other governments … in our work on conflict and crisis.’ The former British Foreign Secretary William Hague, admittedly without the track record that Clinton and Wallström hold on gender issues, was instrumental in organizing a prominent diplomatic meeting in June 2014—the ‘Ending sexual violence in conflict’ summit—that can also be linked to the WPS agenda; ‘by the summit’s close, most of the governments represented had endorsed a statement of action “to end one of the greatest injustices of our time”’. While the association of prominent personalities may have made these initiatives more newsworthy, it is clear that WPS has featured as an issue area in the foreign policy articulations of a number of UN member states.

A comprehensive overview of the foreign policy of UN member states is beyond the scope of this article. The examples discussed here nevertheless demonstrate the multiple ways in which WPS has been manifest in states’ foreign policy in recent years outside the Security Council. Further, their selection reflects the traditional association of feminism with foreign policy, which ‘bring[s] attention to so-called “women’s issues”’. As such, the section does not offer a substantive feminist critique of contemporary foreign policy. Nevertheless, within the traditional framing of gender, that is, concern with ‘women’s issues’, in foreign policy, it identifies some prominent ways in which WPS has appeared in these articulations, highlighting also the emergence of national action plans on UNSCR 1325.

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41 Rothschild, ‘Swedish women’.
42 Madeleine Bunting, ‘Clinton is proving that a feminist foreign policy is possible—and works’, Guardian, 16 Jan. 2011.
43 Paul Kirby, ‘Ending sexual violence in conflict: the Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative and its critics’, International Affairs 91: 3, 2015, p. 457. Notably, Kirby highlights the explicit link made between the initiative and an expansion in Britain’s military commitment to fighting Boko Haram in Nigeria, which was announced during the week of the summit.
44 Anne-Marie D’Aoust, ‘Feminist perspectives on foreign policy’, in Robert A. Denemark, ed., The International studies compendium (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), p. 1. D’Aoust refers to reproduction rights and population control as examples. According to her, the other strand of this traditional approach focuses on the ‘political accomplishments of women in the sphere of foreign policy, such as Margaret Thatcher, Indira Gandhi’:
The earliest invocation of the WPS agenda, and the one that received most attention following the passage of UNSCR 1325, related to the US-led ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan. Otto points out that the US government had ignored suggestions from two women’s organizations, WILPF USA and Code Pink, that it use the resolution in formulating its initial strategy, but began to use women’s rights discourse when public interest in the intervention began to wane.46 Less well known, perhaps, is the suggestion that the government of Denmark successfully associated its troop deployment in Afghanistan with the ‘Danish value’ of promotion of women’s rights (along with other normative interests and the rationale of national security).47 Attention to WPS, however, has not been limited to such controversial use in Afghanistan and Iraq. It has featured in humanitarian assistance work and in the articulation of the foreign policy interests of ‘middle powers’ such as Canada, and smaller countries such as Chile and Norway, albeit usually in multilateral contexts. The leadership of Nordic countries in this respect has been widely recognized, particularly in relation to support for the UN’s work in this area both prior to and in the years following the adoption of UNSCR 1325. Norway and Sweden, for instance, were instrumental in organizing the first major study on gender mainstreaming in UN peace operations, popularly known as the ‘Windhoek Declaration’, which was released in May 2000.48 Later, as co-chair of the newly established UN Peacebuilding Commission in 2006, Norway identified the ‘women/gender-equality perspective’ as the first of three priority areas for its tenure.49

Canada was also an early supporter of the WPS agenda. Its ‘commitment to gender equality has historically been robust, yet with greater emphasis on policy and rhetoric than on practice’.50 Seen in conjunction with Canada’s leadership in the development of the concepts of human security and Responsibility to Protect, its role as an ‘advocate for integration of a gender perspective in humanitarian processes, armed conflict and peacebuilding’ seems consistent with its overall foreign policy.51 Australia’s successful bid for a non-permanent seat on the Security Council (occupied in 2013–14) made references to its longstanding participation in


47 Peter Viggo Jakobsen and Jens Ringsmose, ‘In Denmark, Afghanistan is worth dying for: how public support for the war was maintained in the face of mounting casualties and elusive success’, Cooperation and Conflict 50: 2, 2014, pp. 218–19.


49 Tryggestad, ‘Trick or treat?’, p. 470.


Gender as national interest at the UN Security Council

the UN’s work on peace and security as well as its commitment to ‘advancing gender equality both at home and abroad’. While highlighting the separation between the two themes maintained in the government’s candidature material, Shepherd and True note that the government’s explicit support for the WPS agenda was later consolidated and expressed in a number of international forums. Canada and Australia are particularly interesting cases in this discussion on foreign policy because their engagement with WPS has fluctuated with changes in leadership. Tiessen and Carrier point out that Canada’s Conservative government under Stephen Harper sought to ‘erase’ the language of ‘gender equality’ from official government material, replacing it with the narrower rhetoric of ‘equality between women and men’; this shift was reflected in its WPS agenda, with references to ‘gender equality’ in earlier drafts deleted from Canada’s national action plan on WPS. In the Australian case, there were concerns about the fate of the WPS agenda when Julia Gillard stepped down from the premiership.

While usually associated with North American and west European countries, gender has also featured in the foreign policy of countries of the global South, not only as recipients of foreign aid but also as contributors to UN peace operations. On the latter point, as D’Aoust has noted, ‘peacekeeping operations are an important component of many countries’ foreign policy, as they involve the international deployment of military troops for purposes other than war’. The ‘mainstreaming’ of gender into UN peace operations has prompted troop-contributing countries (as well as donor and host countries) to adopt explicit positions on the issue. Involvement in regional and other multilateral organizations also appears to be a factor in the engagement of some countries with the WPS agenda. Vietnam is a promising leader within the ASEAN context, having presided over the passage of UNSCR 1889 in the Security Council. More substantively, Chile’s support for the WPS agenda is ‘partially attributed to its membership in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’.

The most direct way in which WPS has featured in the national policies of member states since 2000 is through the adoption of national action plans (NAPs) on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the follow-up resolutions. Denmark

53 Shepherd and True, ‘The Women, Peace and Security agenda’, p. 260. The authors cite, for instance, a senior diplomat’s statement that Australia intended to ‘pursue [its] “gender agenda” [at the Security Council] and this will include work on Women, Peace and Security’: p. 260.
54 Tiessen and Carrier, ‘The erasure of “gender”’, p. 106.
57 Sarah Teitt and Sara E. Davies, ‘Realising commitments to women, peace and security in Southeast Asia’, AP R&I Brief 3: 2, 2013, p. 4.
was the first country to adopt this national mechanism in 2005, and by July 2015 50 member states had adopted NAPs. Governments that have adopted NAPs can be broadly categorized into two groups: first, countries emerging from conflicts that—usually with assistance from UN agencies and donor countries—develop NAPs for their national contexts; second, developed countries whose NAPs are designed to guide their assistance to conflict-affected regions. NAPs developed by the latter set of countries tend to be ‘outward-looking’ and, as Miller and colleagues point out vis-à-vis European NAPs, to appear as foreign policy objectives not least because the process of developing them ‘was led by the ministries of Foreign Affairs’. In their 2014 study of existing NAPs, they also take note of the Republic of Ireland’s more innovative ‘cross-learning’ approach that involved developing partnerships with Northern Ireland, Liberia and Timor-Leste to identify and share the best ways to implement the provisions of the WPS resolutions.

These examples serve to demonstrate that a number of member states have incorporated WPS into their foreign policy and, as such, appear to identify gender—albeit understood primarily in terms of ‘women’s issues’—as being of national interest in the international arena. Further, there is diversity in the ways in which gender is employed in these WPS invocations. The broad-brush analysis conducted above provides three important insights for the more detailed examination of gender and national interest within the Security Council conducted in the next section. First, it presents the international context within which WPS issues appear in the Council. Second, the specific WPS orientation of a member state has an impact upon its contribution to the Council’s deliberations and can in turn affect the Council’s implementation of the WPS resolutions. Indeed, reflecting on her experience as the former Chief Adviser for Peace and Security at UN Women, Anne Marie Goetz notes that the key to bringing about policy change lies with member states that play a decisive role in the international arena. Third, recognition of the differences among the WPS articulations of member states can offer a more nuanced understanding of the political interests underlying the trajectory of the WPS agenda in the Security Council.

Gender in the Security Council

Prior to the passage of UNSCR 1325 in 2000, the Security Council—in spite of the humanitarian turn of the 1990s—appears to have used ‘language on women, gender, or girls’ in only about 4 per cent of its resolutions during the period 1994–99. Indeed, according to the dominant narrative of its adoption, ‘it was outsiders rather than those working within the UN who saw and acted upon the
Gender as national interest at the UN Security Council

opportunity to bring about the Resolution’. Members of the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security organized themselves to ‘educate’ the Council members on the emerging WPS agenda, and also drew out links between the proposed provisions of UNSCR 1325 and strategic interests of the member states. The Arria formula meeting with women from conflict regions convened prior to the adoption contributed to these efforts. Unlike traditional thematic areas under the Council’s consideration, such as non-proliferation and disarmament, the WPS agenda appears to have been relatively unfamiliar to the member states. The perceived disconnect between the Council’s interests and UNSCR 1325 was such that the resolution has even been characterized as a ‘proverbial Trojan Horse’. Yet the Council members would not have passed the resolution unless it had appeared to be strategically useful to do so—the WPS agenda had to fit into their interests. This final section of this article examines a number of ways in which gender has featured in the work of the Security Council’s member states since 2000, as related to but distinct from the institutional decisions and actions of the Council. It focuses on three sets of actors: the permanent and the non-permanent members of the Security Council, and those non-members invited to take part in Council meetings, with particular attention to the countries that contribute troops to UN peace operations.

Given the position that they occupy, the role the P5 members have played is particularly pertinent. Linking the WPS work of the P5 to their broader political interests in the Council, the present author has previously noted that Britain’s and France’s prominent support for UNSCR 1325 can be attributed (in part, at least) to the ‘role that the two countries have adopted for themselves in the Council in response to their declining relative importance in world politics’; that the ‘US and France have focused on “protection” issues in keeping with their broader thematic interests in “protection of civilians in armed conflict” and “children and armed conflict”’; and that China and Russia have been—at best—reluctant supporters, in keeping with their opposition to ‘increasing the scope of the Council in international responses to humanitarian crises or human rights violations’. The adoption by Britain, France and the United States of NAPs on UNSCR 1325 may be connected to their work at the Council. William Hague’s Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative, referred to in the previous section, informed UNSCR 2106 (sponsored by the UK), which became ‘the first [WPS resolution] explicitly to mention men and boys as survivors’. More broadly, it may even be possible to suggest that the ‘protection’ mandate of UNSCR 1325 has garnered most support

within the Council not only because it poses less of a challenge to the institutional thinking on peace and security, as has been suggested in feminist analysis, but also because it has found advocates within the P5, including—importantly—the United States.

Non-permanent members have also left their mark on the WPS agenda at the Security Council. Resolutions 1325, 1889, 2122 and 2242 were adopted while the presidency was held by Namibia, Vietnam, Argentina and Spain respectively. Even before the adoption of UNSCR 1325, the interest of Nordic countries in gender issues was evidenced in Sweden’s sponsorship, as a non-permanent member in 1996, of a ‘Security Council initiative to investigate trafficking in women and peacekeeping’ The role of Namibia, another non-permanent member, in the passage of UNSCR 1325 in 2000 was linked to that year being the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). The ‘visible role’ played by women in UNTAG in 1989–90 in Namibia had highlighted the value that their participation brought to peace and security operations. Canada, a non-permanent member in 2000, was also an ally in the adoption of the resolution, also, in keeping with its broader normative interests at the UN, it took upon itself the role of coordinating the ‘Friends of Resolution 1325’, an informal group of UN member states committed to the implementation of UNSCR 1325. Notably, considering the predominant interest of the Council in ‘protection’, four of the eight WPS resolutions that do not explicitly focus on protection issues were adopted under the presidency of the non-permanent members mentioned above. As a relatively well-established thematic interest of the Council, the WPS agenda also offers an opportunity for Council members to highlight their presence by, for instance, organizing open debates on the theme.

True and Shepherd have pointed out that Australia’s ‘subject-positioning’ of women as agents of peace and security in the material supporting its candidature for a Council seat was later reflected in its statements at the Council in 2013–14, and that this focus set it apart from other WPS initiatives around that time. The time-bound term of the non-permanent members of the Council is quite possibly a factor in their wider interpretations of the WPS agenda.

As mentioned in the first section of this article, UN member states that are not members of the Security Council have opportunities to take part in its deliberations. Countries contributing troops to peacekeeping operations in particular have

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68 Brysk, Global good Samaritans.


70 Greenstock, ‘Illuminating gender’.

71 Sievers and Daws, The procedure of the UN Security Council, p. 51.

called for more dialogue with the Council, and the latter has sought to respond to this call. 73 In this respect, it is worth noting the divergences among the small number of South Asian contributors. On the basis of their analysis of statements made by Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka at WPS open debates, Basu and Sapra have noted that the first three countries, which are major troop contributors, associate the inclusion of women peacekeepers in their contingents with their normative commitment to UN policies, and that the statements of the smaller countries of the region—Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka—are ‘inward-looking’ and highlight the ‘positive transformations within their own countries in relation to the integration of women into the security and development sectors’. 74

Indeed, the open debates offer good opportunities to gauge the positions of countries on WPS issues, especially as in some cases—for instance, the tenth anniversary meeting held in October 2010—those present may include ministerial-level participants. The public meetings also serve as an occasion for detractors of the WPS agenda to voice concerns which are otherwise articulated behind closed doors. In its 2007 statement, Russia warned that ‘an artificial connection between gender questions and the whole gamut of questions under the exclusive purview of the Security Council would lead to imbalance in terms of system-wide coherence and would impede the effective implementation of resolution 1325’. 75 More importantly, perhaps, the country statements can also indicate shifts in the position of UN member states. The case of China, which has become more amenable to the WPS agenda over time, is particularly notable; its attention has tended to focus on the issue of women’s participation in the international peace and security arena. This more positive attitude on China’s part likely follows from its increasing interest in contributing to UN peace operations. 76 India, celebrated for sending the first all-female police unit to the UN mission in Liberia in 2007, had, at the open debate in 2000, ‘supported the participation of women in peace initiatives but not in peace operations; the latter it was argued would lead to “feminization of violence”’. 77

Finally, the Council’s deliberations are shaped not just by what each member state says or does but also, to some extent, by who carries out these activities as its representative. Individual diplomats can play a crucial role. Even as ‘instructions [from state capitals] lie at the basis of the work of any representative on the Security Council’, diplomats are attuned to the diversity of interests and positions in a multilateral setting, and ‘individual efforts’ also become crucial in

77 Basu and Sapra, ‘Women in UN peacekeeping’, p. 11 (emphasis added).
reaching a compromise on an issue. Further, the engagement of non-state actors in diplomatic activities at the UN has led Wiseman and Basu to suggest that diplomats at the UN headquarters are better characterized as members of a ‘diplomatic community’ than as members of a ‘diplomatic corps’. This networked multilateral context appears to provide some room for representatives to exercise their own initiative within the Security Council, albeit within the constraints of the wider national interest and the Council’s institutional attributes, such as the dominance of the P5. For instance, despite Bangladesh not having a track record on WPS issues, its permanent representative Anwarul Chowdhury was the first in the Security Council to make a link between gender equality and international peace and security in his press statement presented in March 2000. Chowdhury is widely regarded as a strong ally by WPS advocates. Britain, while fairly consistent in its support for the WPS agenda, has nevertheless seen some changes in its approach through the tenure of the four permanent representatives who have served during the period 2000–15. While ambassadors Jeremy Greenstock (1998–2003) and Emyr Jones Parry (2003–2007) were strong advocates of UNSCR 1325, the UK appeared to have stepped back during the tenure of John Sawers (2007–2009), but then refocused its attention after the appointment in the latter year of Mark Lyall Grant, described by the US permanent representative Samantha Power as ‘one of the leading advocates in the entire UN system on women, peace and security, and violence against women’.

With regard to diplomats, the Security Council’s own record on gender equality in terms of women’s representation has been notably dismal. Ambassador Jeanne Martin Cissé of Guinea, appointed in 1972, was the first female representative at the Council. Ann Tickner writes that ‘because so few women have served on the Security Council, women’s voices and perspectives have been virtually excluded from major political and security decisions … even though women have a strong history of organizing around issues of war and peace’. Among the country representatives who voted for the passage of UNSCR 1325, Cockburn makes special mention of the Jamaican ambassador Patricia Durrant—the only woman representative on the Council—who ‘prove[d] valuable as a dignified female presence guaranteeing that her male colleagues could not diminish the seriousness of this women’s issue’. In November 2014, when the Security Council included a record number of six female permanent representatives, the scenario looked

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79 Wiseman and Basu, ‘The United Nations’, pp. 329–30. They also identify factors such as the shared ‘community self-image of diplomatic professionalism and political clout back home’ and the ‘cross-fertilization’ and ‘recycling’ of UN diplomats that lend credence to the idea of the UN ‘diplomatic community’.
80 SC/6816. Tryggestad writes that Helga Hernes, the Norwegian foreign ministry’s Special Adviser on Peace-keeping Operations appointed in 1996, was one of the first ambassadors to talk about women’s participation in the international peace and security arena at various UN forums: Tryggestad, ‘Trick or treat?’, p. 470.
81 Bryant, ‘At the UN’.
82 Sievers and Daws, The procedure of the UN Security Council, p. 110.
84 Cockburn, From where we stand, p. 142.
more promising. This situation fuelled some interest in whether diplomacy would be conducted differently owing to the critical mass of women in the Council. Notwithstanding a shared acknowledgement of ‘international sisterhood’ and the belief that women tend to approach their diplomatic work differently, all the female diplomats interviewed by the BBC’s Nick Bryant shared the view expressed by the Nigerian ambassador Joy Ogwu that ‘we [the female diplomats] cannot feminize the national interest’. No academic research has yet been undertaken on the difference that women diplomats have made to the conduct of diplomacy within the Security Council, but clearly the concern to uphold national interest is paramount. Within this context, for diplomats personally committed to WPS issues, factors such as the formalization of the WPS agenda through resolutions such as UNSCR 1325, advocacy by gender advocates from within civil society and the UN, and indeed the growing acceptance of gender in member states’ foreign policies offer opportunities to push the agenda forward.

As practitioners within civil society and the UN advocating the implementation of the WPS resolutions appreciate, factors such as the profiles of member states in a given year, and indeed the presidency of the Security Council in a given month, can be critical to the realization of the WPS agenda. Yet to date the academic literature has often identified the Council as responsible for the uneven trajectory of the international WPS agenda without paying close attention to the role of its members. Considering not just the pivotal role that member states play in the Council’s work but also the fact that the composition of the Council changes every year—with a set of new non-permanent members replacing some of the old ones—this gap in the literature is limiting for wider WPS analyses. The discussion here has identified specific ways in which the diplomatic work of member states reflects their respective national interests, including in relation to gender. Further, member states’ activities are both constrained and enabled by the institutional context of the Council, as demonstrated in the separate discussions here of the P5, non-permanent members and non-members. This article has taken seriously Sharp’s key insights on diplomacy, cited above: national interest is fundamental to diplomatic work; and all states are not the same.

**Conclusion**

Functioning primarily as a forum for member states to deliberate upon matters of international peace and security, the Security Council—unlike other UN entities related to the WPS agenda such as the secretariat, UN Women and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations—cannot lay claim to being an actor in its own right. Indeed, the use of veto power and other practices such as the use of rhetorical

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85 Bryant, ‘At the UN’. Ogwu’s comment appears to reflect broader concerns about feminism within the diplomatic community. In her article on responses to Wallström’s ‘feminist foreign policy’, Nordberg notes: ‘Within the diplomatic community, where words are carefully chosen so as not to offend, “feminism” is usually avoided, as it risks being perceived as inflammatory and indicative of a stand against men’: Jenny Nordberg, ‘Who’s afraid of a feminist foreign policy?’, *New Yorker*, 15 April 2015, http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/swedens-feminist-foreign-minister (emphasis in original).
statements at public meetings suggest that the Council has been employed as a ‘resource’ by member states to advance their interests. Against this background, generic criticisms of member states have force: these include, for instance, states’ narrow interpretations of the WPS agenda; the mismatch between rhetoric and practice; the low priority accorded to gender issues; and, importantly, the lack of substantive commitments in the form of resources. From a feminist perspective, this largely negative assessment of member states’ role is indisputable. However, as this article has sought to demonstrate, there are differences in how member states approach the WPS agenda within the Council. On the one hand, this approach is framed by the dominant discourse at the Security Council (for instance, the frequent conflation of women and gender) and the broader national imperatives of member states. On the other hand, as discussed in the second section of this article, gender—including in relation to peace and security—is increasingly articulated in states’ foreign policy; and these articulations can be discernible in member states’ positions on WPS issues in the Council. Therefore, a closer examination of Council members, and of their individual policies and practices, is necessary to understand—and indeed contribute to shaping—the trajectory of the WPS agenda at the Council.

In view of the major gaps in implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the past 15 years, it may be tempting to dismiss WPS articulations in foreign policy as ‘mere’ rhetoric. However, these policy interests have been manifested in particular practices in relation to the Council’s work. The article has highlighted a number of such instances. At the outset, Namibia’s role in spearheading the WPS agenda under its presidency of the Council is linked to its own positive experience of women’s participation in UN peacekeeping; Canada’s long-term support was compatible with its promotion of gender equality, human security and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ policy doctrine in the international sphere; French and American interests in the thematic areas of ‘children and armed conflict’ and ‘protection of civilians’ respectively delineated their engagement with the WPS agenda; and on a related note, Norway’s leadership on gender equality reflected its prioritization of women’s issues as co-chair of the Peacebuilding Commission. Conversely, there have been calls to strictly define the scope of the WPS resolutions by China, Russia and other member states which claim that these serve as an excuse for western interventions in weaker states. While this last example serves as an important counterpoint, the previous cases substantiate the main argument of this article that deliberations on WPS in the Security Council are not only framed by the dominant discourse at the Council and galvanized by civil society organizations, but evolve through diplomatic negotiations that reflect the foreign policy interests, including those relating to gender, of member states.

As the ‘adoption story’ in particular suggests, many of these linkages are familiar to WPS advocates at the UN. However, possibly owing to the informal nature of these networks and the prevalence of ‘behind-the-scenes’ consultations,

86 While the Security Council is not an international organization in itself, Ian Hurd’s typology of the international organization as forum, actor and/or resource is useful in highlighting the decisive role that member states play in the Council. See Ian Hurd, ‘Theorizing international organizations: choices and methods in the study of international organizations’, Journal of International Organizations Studies 2: 2, 2011, pp. 7–22.
Gender as national interest at the UN Security Council

access to knowledge about Council members’ WPS deliberations is limited. This information gap is particularly glaring with regard to the work of less powerful non-western member states that do not have the capacity for communication and/or interest in communicating their position to the wider public, as became evident during the research for this article. Further empirical research on the topic could address some of these limitations. In respect of theory, the findings of this article call for a deeper feminist analysis of the Security Council as a deliberative institution as well as of more recent trends in states’ foreign policy on WPS issues, particularly in relation to their impact upon multilateral policy formulation and implementation.