Gendered Conflict, Gendered Outcomes: The Politicization of Sexual Violence and Quota Adoption

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Abstract
Sexual violence (SV) in conflict is increasingly politicized at both the international and domestic levels. Where SV in conflict is prevalent, we argue international actors perceive gender to be salient and push for a gendered response. Simultaneously, women mobilize politically in response to the threat to their security that conflict-related SV constitutes, making demands for greater representation in politics with the goal of improving societal conditions for themselves. Jointly, we theorize the pressures from above and below push governments in conflict-affected states toward adopting gender policies. We test this theoretical framework in the case of gender quota adoption. We find that states with prevalent wartime SV indeed adopt gender quotas sooner and at higher rates than states experiencing other civil conflicts and than states experiencing no conflict in the same period. These gender quotas, we further show, are not mere window dressing but actually increase women’s legislative representation.

Keywords
sexual violence, intrastate conflict, civil wars, war outcomes, gender

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Armed conflict is gendered in different ways. Fighting tends to be male-dominated, with battle-age males at highest risk of being killed (Jones 2004; Ormhaug, Meier, and Hernes 2009).¹ Women are disproportionately vulnerable to displacement, poverty, malnutrition, and the collapse of social infrastructure (Buvinic et al. 2013). Probably the most visible gendered violence in conflict—risen exponentially on the international security agenda since the wars in Bosnia and Rwanda—is sexual violence (SV), which primarily targets women.² Existing data show that in all regions of the world government armies, militias and rebel groups perpetrate SV and its prevalence can be massive (Cohen 2013; Cohen and Nordás 2014, 2015).

At the same time, previous research has identified patterns of women’s expanding political, economic, and social activity and increased collective mobilization all over the world (Fuest 2008; Wood 2008; Berry 2015; Tripp 2015; Anderson 2016). Conflict dynamics may change social institutions, interactions, and networks, including gender norms and relations (Wood 2008). Suddenly finding themselves heads of households, women in different conflicts assume greater—and often unprecedented—economic and social responsibilities in their communities (Buvinic et al. 2013). These transformations in gender roles do not halt at the local level. Statistical analyses reveal, on average, higher shares of women’s legislators among states that have emerged from high-intensity civil conflict (Hughes 2009; Hughes and Tripp 2015). How is it possible that women derive such gains under the extremely dire conditions of civil conflict and the (gendered) insecurity it causes?

This study aligns with a growing literature arguing that gains in women’s agency oftentimes do not accrue despite the violence to which armed conflict exposes women, but because of it (Tripp 2015; Berry 2015; Wood 2008; Buvinic et al. 2013; Berry and Lake 2017). Where previous research has considered the impact of conflict violence generally, however, we zone in on the gendered nature of conflict violence that specifically targets women as women: we propose that conflict-related SV (CRSV) elicits simultaneously gendered forms of international pressure and domestic women’s mobilization, which in conjunction may generate change for women. We test the empirical implications of this argument by looking at gender quota adoptions in countries affected by civil conflict with different levels of SV.

SV has become a very salient gender issue in conflict due both to its classification as a war crime and its global politicization. This does not mean that SV is necessarily the most prevalent and egregious violence women face in conflict. Rather, we argue, the exceptional level of attention afforded singularly to this violence as a gendered violence (Meger 2016) makes it the most glaringly visible gender issue in conflict, eliciting strong responses from international actors. A series of United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions (1820, 1888, 1960, and 2106) have made SV central to the global Women, Peace, and Security framework that has developed since 2000. International campaigns against CRSV like the UN’s Stop Rape Now and the United Kingdom’s (UK) Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative have further helped erode the stigma of victimization. Simultaneously, women in conflict-affected settings
have mobilized in response to CRSV, jointly organizing in victims’ associations such as Corporación Mujer Sigue Mis Pasos or Red Nacional de Mujeres Víctimas y Profesionales in Colombia or Synergie des Femmes pour les Victimes des Violences Sexuelles in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Our theoretical argument incorporates these international and domestic mobilization processes as parallel pressures on the government from above and below during and in the aftermath of conflict with prevalent SV. First, given its global visibility, the prevalence of SV highlights to international actors the gendered nature of a conflict and, hence, the need for a gender-sensitive response. Governments presiding over conflict-affected states, in turn, are particularly receptive to international (normative) pressures to ostensibly signal a break with the past and assert their commitment to modernity. Second, women mobilizing in civil society in response to CRSV create pressures on the government from below. Realizing that status quo politics do not safeguard their rights and security, women civil society activists demand greater political influence and representation. In brief, we expect that the more visibly gendered a conflict is (i.e., the more CRSV has been reported), the more likely the adoption of gender policies in the conflict-affected state.

Such gender policies may include, for example, laws against gender-based violence, gender-inclusive inheritance laws, or reforms to enhance women’s representation in politics. While cross-national data on such gender policies are generally scarce, especially over time, data coverage for legislative gender quotas is comprehensive. Gender quota adoption is a useful indicator to test our theoretical argument, as such quotas constitute a straightforward and relatively low-effort government response to pressures for increased women’s political representation. Quotas also have political and normative implications: the adoption of gender quotas can work toward increasing the long-term descriptive and substantive representation of women in the political arena: research shows that the introduction of gender quotas can work toward increasing the long-term descriptive and substantive representation of women in the political arena: research shows that the introduction of gender quotas can disrupt established power structures in essential legislative functions and redirect government spending to public health, an area commonly prioritized by women (Clayton and Zetterberg 2018).

Our approach also resolves the conflicting empirical results of previous scholarship investigating the relationship between conflict and gender quota adoption. Tripp’s (2015, ch. 8) descriptive statistics on the introduction and effectiveness of gender quotas in Africa suggest that states emerging from long, high-intensity internal conflict are more likely to adopt quotas than states unaffected by such war. By contrast, Bush’s (2011) survival analysis of a global sample provides no evidence that conflict itself is associated with quota adoption—rather, it is international pressure in postconflict states that emerges as the crucial factor. We build on the insights provided by both studies but theorize the significance of armed conflict, international pressure (and domestic mobilization) differently. Rather than capturing conflict as a dichotomy (as in Bush 2011) or a scale of intensity in terms of battle deaths (as implied by Tripp 2015 and quantitatively operationalized, e.g., in Hughes.
and Tripp 2015), we insert into the causal story SV as a highly gendered violence that sparks international and domestic mobilization around gender issues.

Our results, covering the period 1990 until 2013, show that focusing on SV as a particularly salient indicator of gendered conflict has explanatory merit. Almost all quota adoptions in civil conflict countries occurred in connection with conflicts where SV was prevalent. Countries experiencing a conflict with high SV were also more prone to adopt gender quotas than countries not experiencing civil conflict in the analysis period. Supplemental analyses lend support to our mechanisms of pressure from above and below. In sum, our study suggests that when we consider gendered outcomes of conflict, we also need to consider the gendered nature of conflict violence.

**Pressure from Above: International Gender Norms**

In this section, we first illustrate the significance of global gender norms in conflict settings and through what channels international actors and pressures affect government responses to adopt gender policies. In making this point, we also discuss empirical evidence of the link between international pressure and gender quota adoption. Next, we lay out our argument as to why SV is a particularly strong “trigger” to activate global gender norms. We thus insert SV into the causal story of international pressure for governments presiding over conflict-affected settings to adopt certain gender policies including gender quotas.

Existing research demonstrates the role international pressure plays in bringing about political gains for women in conflict-affected states. International actors and pressures reinforced the Ugandan and Liberian women’s movements in their attempts to transform the political landscape for women after conflict, including enhancing women’s political representation and influence (Tripp 2015). Similarly, international support strengthened women’s political mobilization and claim-making in postgenocide Rwanda (Berry 2015). Globally, the conditions for increased women’s political representation and participation have steadily improved since the early 1990s. A long process of renegotiating the essence of human rights culminated in a broadening of the human rights discourse to subsume women’s rights within its framework (Fraser 1999). Accordingly, the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action emphasized a commitment to “removing all the obstacles to women’s active participation in all spheres of public and private life through a full and equal share in economic, social, cultural and political decision-making” (UN Treaty Collection 2015, 7).

Sustained transnational activism resulted in the authorization of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), which has since been a key source of women’s political empowerment in (post)conflict situations. UNSCR 1325 calls for enhancing the participation of women in conflict resolution and the postconflict order as well as for gender-sensitive peace operations. The resolution has laid the groundwork for gender concerns, including gender equality and women’s participation, to move
from the sphere of soft policy to the hard policy realm of conflict and international security (Tryggestad 2009). After UNSCR 1325 was passed, procedural changes in UN peacekeeping missions across contexts took off (Hudson 2005), references to women in peace agreements increased (Bell and O'Rourke 2010), and a growing number of states have developed national action plans of varying complexity based on the resolution (Gumru and Fritz 2009).

These patterns point to the strengthening role international pressure can play in promoting gender policies, including those enhancing women’s political representation, in conflict-affected countries. Specifically, we argue that states experiencing or emerging from civil war may adopt gender quotas in response to international pressure primarily for three reasons: (1) because doing so enhances prestige or status, (2) because international organizations and states providing aid create material incentives, and (3) because states succumb to direct intervention.

First, in complying with international gender norms, for example, by adopting gender quotas, states may seek to enhance their position in the international social hierarchy and signal a commitment to modernity (Towns 2012). This is a particularly useful strategy for governments seeking to signal a break with a violent past in an effort to attract international goodwill and donor funding. Rwanda under Paul Kagame is a good example of a postconflict regime successfully marketing itself as a promoter of gender equality to both mask an increasing movement toward authoritarianism and attract high amounts of foreign aid, following the country’s 1994 genocide. In a similar vein, Bush (2011, 114-15) considers the adoption of gender quotas to be an important signal to the international community of an ostensible commitment to liberal democracy—another normative force growing in international esteem and closely intertwined with principles of gender equality. In short, the emerging global normative framework surrounding women’s participation creates incentives for governments to declare a commitment to women’s empowerment, even in the absence of direct international pressures to adopt certain policies.

Second, western states earmark increasingly large sums of their official development assistance for gender-related projects (http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/aidinsupportofgenderequalityandwomensempowerment.htm), and gender concerns gain in prominence in foreign and development policy. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD, 2014) Development Assistance Committee, for example, treats gender as a crosscutting issue in international development policies and evaluates member development policies accordingly. The US Agency for International Development (2012) has a Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy in place that applies to the entire development project cycle from policy formulation to implementation, while the European Union member states signed a Gender Action Plan 2016–2020 emphasizing a “three-pronged approach through targeted actions, effective gender mainstreaming and political dialogue” in development policy (Council of the European Union 2015, 6). The Nordic states and Canada in particular have established a reputation for emphasizing gender issues and women’s empowerment in their foreign and development policies, with Sweden
being the first state to officially adopt a feminist foreign policy in 2015 (Government Services of Sweden 2017) and Canada recently committing to a feminist development policy (http://international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/priorities-priorites/policy-politique.aspx?). In this international environment, the prospect of foreign aid may push conflict-affected states to adopt some gender equality priorities, while technical development cooperation may serve as an additional channel for the diffusion of global gender norms. A recent study in fact suggests that processes of both signaling a commitment to modernity to improve international standing, conditioned by aid dependence, and successful aid interventions targeting women’s empowerment by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee donors help explain the adoption of gender quotas (Edgell 2017).

A third source of the diffusion of global gender norms in (post)conflict states are more direct international interventions, primarily peace operations. UN peace operations have since the authorization of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 increasingly been equipped with gender content in their mandates, relating both to women’s participation and to their protection (Kreft 2017). It is increasingly common for UN peace operations to promote women’s participation in domestic political processes, as Bush (2011) illustrates. In practice, international pressure via peace operations can take different forms. In Kosovo, for example, the interim administration UNMIK imposed a gender quota in 2000, which has since remained in place (https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Gender-Assessment-report-eng.pdf [p. 9]). In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the successive UN missions initiated collaborations with women’s civil society organizations with the goal of improving the electoral process for women in 2004 (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/10year_impact_study_1325.pdf [p. 18]). Collaboration with women’s civil society actors and governments in order to enhance women’s political participation is a frequent feature of UN missions, as, for example, in Liberia (UNMIL; https://unmil.unmissions.org/office-senior-gender-adviser), Mali (MINUSMA; https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/mandate-gender-unit), and Sudan (UNAMID; https://unamid.unmissions.org/gender-advisory-unit).

In sum, there are different channels through which international pressure is exerted on governments presiding over conflict-affected states. Such processes of norm diffusion do not necessarily entail internalization; governments may choose to adopt certain gender policies, such as quotas, for strategic reasons and may even perceive quotas as low-effort and low-cost policies with potentially high payoffs in terms of gains in international prestige. Neither are we suggesting that processes of gender quota adoption occur without friction. Gender quotas can face many challenges before and after adoption because they challenge the male-dominated status quo and their adoption may thus be construed as a zero-sum game (Krook 2016). Moreover, authoritarian states may strategically mobilize public opinion against specific international pressures—pertaining to gender issues or otherwise—in what could be described as a “rally around the flag” effect, especially if the authoritarian government can cast these
pressures as attempts to vilify the state internationally (Gruffydd-Jones 2018). Such elite-level or public resistance against international pressure to adopt gender policies is, in our view, less salient in conflict-affected states. Such states often lack the political stability required for defying international pressures and find themselves in situations of political transition and are as such particularly amenable to the diffusion of international norms (Simmons 2009; Moravcsik 2000).

Obviously, introducing gender quotas has not always been an available policy option. The global and rather rapid diffusion of gender quotas began in the early 1990s (Towns 2012), paralleling the emergence of global gender norms articulated in the Beijing Declaration. Gender quotas have been a tool available to states seeking to signal a commitment to modernity only since 1990. Both our theoretical argument and our empirical analysis are thus temporally bounded to the post-1990 period.

**CRSV as a Trigger for International Pressure**

The novelty of our theoretical argument about pressure from above is that we insert SV into the story. Pressure to adopt gender policies is not uniform, we argue, but varies depending on the extent to which a conflict is perceived as gendered. SV, as the most visible gender issue in conflict, here serves as the primary indicator of gendered conflict for international actors. From this follows that the more prevalent SV is, the stronger is also the international push for gender policies in conflict-affected states such as gender quotas.

That in the evolution of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, SV has emerged as a particularly visible and even politicized gender issue is beyond a doubt. The UN Security Council has passed several resolutions on CRSV specifically (1820, 1888, 1960, and 2106), has since 2009 had a Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict in place, and presides over the interagency campaign *Stop Rape Now: UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict*. As a particularly illustrative example at the country level, the UK hosted a celebrity-attended Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict in 2014 and has with its Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative been heralded as a norm entrepreneur in the area of combatting SV in conflict (Davies and True 2017).

While conflicts are demonstrably gendered in different dimensions, as alluded to in the introduction, women’s protection in conflict—a core pillar of UNSCR 1325—has been associated primarily with SV. International attention and responses to CRSV have reached such levels that scholars have expressed concern that other kinds of violence or the underlying socioeconomic root causes of conflict are sidelined or ignored (Douma and Hilhorst 2012; Mertens and Pardy 2017; Meger 2016). In addition, the growing focus on women’s protection from SV has had a detrimental effect on the strength and universality of the women’s participation norm (Kreft 2017; Barrow 2010), another pillar of UNSCR 1325.

What results, we argue, is the emergence of SV as the foremost gender issue in conflict. CRSV elicits a “gendered” international response, that is, an activation of
the Women, Peace and Security framework, which the disproportionate displacement of women, their particular vulnerability to poverty as a consequence of armed conflict, or their political marginalization—in the absence of a commensurate politicization—are incapable of producing to the same extent. Previous research findings that conflicts with prevalent SV are more likely to receive a peacekeeping operation (Kreutz and Cardenas 2017; Hultman and Johansson 2017) and that gender content in UN peace operation mandates is also more likely in such conflicts (Kreft 2017), are in line with our theory. In short, SV prompts gendered international responses. This amplifies the expediency for governments to demonstrate some commitment to global gender norms, for example, through the adoption of a gender quota. At the same time, governments presiding over conflict-affected countries also face pressures from below.

**Pressure from Below: Women’s Mobilization in Conflict**

In this section, we present our theoretical argument of pressure from below, in the course of which we also discuss empirical evidence linking civil society mobilization to gender quota adoption. Theorizing a link between women’s civil society mobilization and gender quota adoption per se is, as this section shows, not novel. What we contribute, once again, is to insert SV into the story of women’s mobilization in civil society, including their collective push for increased political representation.

SV has been heavily publicized in conflicts such as the civil war in Bosnia in the 1990s or the ongoing armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Yet SV takes the form of a pervasive practice in many conflicts (Wood 2014). While CRSV has many horrific consequences for its victims (Leatherman 2011; Stark and Wessells 2012), recent research also highlights the resilience of victims and women in the face of this violence. Koos (2018) provides evidence of increased prosocial behavior and resilience of Sierra Leonean households affected by CRSV. Kreft (2019) shows that prevalent SV in conflict is correlated with increased women’s civil society mobilization. Her complementary case study of Colombia reveals that collective threat mobilization is an important driver of these patterns of women’s civil society mobilization in response to CRSV.

We draw on this theory of collective threat mobilization (Tilly 1978; Berry 2015) in response to CRSV in developing our argument. Importantly, women do not have to be victims of SV in order to mobilize in response to and around the issue of SV—it is the threat to women as a group, and thus also the threat to themselves as members of this group, that sparks mobilization (Kreft 2019). While our argument is informed by Kreft’s theory, we make two modifications to it.

First, we relax her proposition that women’s collective mobilization is based on a feminist understanding of a continuum of violence grounded in deep-seated, systemic gender inequalities (Kreft 2019, 223-24). Very traditional and/or repressive states limit the ideational and political space for feminist organizing and the extent to
which civil society actors may openly challenge gender relations. In these settings, women would more likely mobilize narrowly in response to the security threat of SV, without this threat being linked—at least openly—to broader patterns of gender discrimination and women’s oppression in society. Women could still join forces in self-help groups, victims’ associations, or nongovernmental organization (NGOs) that lobby the state to enhance women’s security, assist its survivors, and end SV. Examples would be the primarily humanitarian women’s organizations that emerged during the civil war in Bosnia to assist women victims of the conflict (Jenichen 2009; Boric 1997) or the Democratic Republic of the Congo (http://www.womens mediacenter.com/news-features/a-champion-for-congolese-women) and transnational campaigns seeking recognition for women victims of SV in conflict (https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/jun/13/sexual-violence-survivors-launch-global-network; http://www.mukwegefoundation.org/2018/06/20/in-geneva-sexual-violence-survivors-lobby-international-community-for-recognition-and-reparations/). Domestically mobilized women, in short, do not necessarily have to adopt a comprehensively transformative political agenda that seeks to challenge a patriarchal system and that prescribes itself to the wide spectrum of feminist concerns including reproductive rights, access to abortion, the transformation of gender roles, and so on.

Second, we theoretically and empirically expand Kreft’s study to account for civil society organization pressure on the government to enhance women’s participation in politics. How and why does women’s mobilization in response to CRSV translate into the adoption of gender quotas and women’s gains in national politics? How do we move from collective mobilization in civil society to legal quota adoption? As discussed, some women who perceive a threat to their security or their identities as women will engage in collective, contentious political action. Repeated violations of women’s rights, bodily autonomy, and sexual self-determination will sow a desire for change. Politics is the crucial sphere to which women need access in order to achieve legislative change guaranteeing their physical integrity. The realization that male-dominated, status quo politics does not safeguard women’s security (or their rights more generally) would then spark also activism to expand women’s political representation.

These patterns emerge, for example, in Tripp’s (2015) detailed account of postconflict politics in Africa, in which she sketches how the women’s (peace) movements that emerged and grew during the Ugandan and Liberian civil wars launched successful campaigns for an enhanced role of women in the political sphere, including increased legislative representation. Women who organized collectively during civil war sought to ensure that the changed gender roles and relations in conflict were institutionalized when the violence had subsided and the conflict ended. Tripp also notes that pressures from women’s organizations were important to the adoption of legislative gender quotas in African states generally and in postconflict states specifically. Using cross-tabulations, she provides suggestive evidence that gender quota adoption is more likely in countries emerging from high-intensity conflict
In postgenocide Rwanda, too, women’s mobilization in grassroots groups to ensure satisfaction of basic needs soon transformed into more structured mobilization in official organizations, in demands and claim-making on the state, and in campaigns for enhanced political representation and participation (Berry 2015). Anderson (2016) similarly shows how cohesive women’s movements in different conflict settings have used peace negotiations as a platform to make successful demands for greater political representation and participation. In sum, we argue domestic women’s mobilization, sparked in large part by CRSV, increases demands of women’s organizations to facilitate the entry of women into politics.

Where Tripp’s (2015, ch. 8) descriptive statistics suggest that gender quota adoption is more likely and their effectiveness greater in African states that emerged from high-intensity conflict, we theorize that it is in particular visibly gendered conflict, in terms of high prevalence of SV, that results in higher levels of quota adoption. We provide robust statistical evidence, based on a global sample, for the link between visibly gendered conflict and gender quota adoption.

**Theoretical Model and Hypotheses**

In conjunction, international pressure and domestic women’s mobilization in conflicts with prevalent SV put pressure on governments to introduce gender policies. Governments may be especially incentivized to adopt gender quotas, which constitute a relatively low-effort legal change compared to more wide-ranging reforms. Our theoretical model is visualized in Figure 1.

Our two theorized mechanisms of pressure from above and below may also interact and reinforce each other. In line with international relations theories about
a spiral model (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999) or a boomerang effect (Keck and Sikkink 1999), we expect that domestic civil society actors may invoke global normative frameworks in attempts to lend further legitimacy to their domestic activism and spur international (normative) actors into action. In turn, international actors including donor agencies and international nongovernmental organizations may lend financial, technical, and political support to domestic women’s organizations that is crucial to their success in pressuring the government for change, including the establishment of quotas (Tripp 2015). Women’s international NGOs, in particular, may function as a link between international actors and norms on the one hand and domestic women’s civil society actors on the other. Finally, the global politicization of CRSV also facilitates its politicization domestically. It becomes a more legitimate (and safer) issue for women to mobilize around, especially compared to everyday SV, which generally remains under the radar and is still often perceived as a private issue.³ The potential for domestic mobilization around SV is therefore greater in conflict than in peacetime.

Additionally, high international attention may be a driver of women’s mobilization around this violence to attract some of the large amounts of international funding earmarked specifically for SV (Meger 2016), possibly even for women who would otherwise mobilize around other issues. As a representative of a Colombian women’s organization put it: “right now the topic of sexual violence is in fashion,”⁴ with foreign donors prioritizing this issue over others, thus affecting also domestic political agendas.

We do not expect our theoretical expectations to be affected by whether the government or rebel groups perpetrate most of the SV. For women, the threat to their security is real no matter who the perpetrators are. The international community, for its part, has been so focused on CRSV as an egregious form of violence and a war crime that we do not expect the identity of the perpetrators to play a role in perceptions of a conflict as gendered and the resultant push for a gendered response. What is more, it is very rare that only one armed actor in a conflict perpetrates SV. Of the thirty-seven cases in our data set where prevalent SV was recorded (based on Cohen and Nordås [2014], see below), only six are characterized by “one-sided” SV—four with government- and two with rebel-perpetrated SV. We hence find no evidence that the perpetration of SV is associated with only one specific side in civil conflicts.⁵ Based on these considerations, we formulate the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1:** States with conflicts with prevalent SV adopt gender quotas sooner than states emerging from conflicts with low or no reported SV.

**Hypothesis 2:** States with conflicts with prevalent SV adopt gender quotas sooner than states not experiencing conflict in the same period.
Model and Sample

To test the empirical predictions of our hypotheses, we rely on event history modeling (also called survival analysis). This is a statistical method frequently used in similar studies (see Bush 2011; Anderson and Swiss 2014; Swiss and Fallon 2016). We apply a proportional hazards model to estimate the likelihood of a quota being adopted in a country, given that it had not already been adopted. The model allows us to estimate the effects of specific country characteristics on the time to quota adoption, without having to assume a specific parametric form for the distribution of the time until adoption (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). The proportional hazards model parameterizes the hazard rate, $h(t)$, in the following way:

$$h(t | X_c) = h_0(t) e^{X_c \beta},$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

where $h_0(t)$ is an unspecified baseline hazard function. $X_c$ denotes a covariate matrix for country $c$ where one or more of the covariates may vary over time. Event history modeling relies on creating a “risk set” of observations entering the analysis at a common starting point and exiting the analysis either through experiencing the event (quota adoption in our case) or by reaching the end of the analysis without experiencing the event.

In our analysis, countries enter the risk set at year 1990, the start of the global wave of gender quota adoption (Towns 2012). Countries continue in the analysis until they adopt a quota or reach the end point of the analysis period in 2013, having not adopted a quota. Following Bush (2011), we exclude long-term consolidated and developed democracies from our analysis to make the sample more homogeneous. Our final sample consists of 136 countries with a total of 2,642 country-year observations.

Dependent Variable

Our main dependent variable is quota adoption. We used the Global Database of Quotas for Women (available at quotaproject.org) and collected data on the year of adoption of a national legal quota. We focus on national legislative quotas since the adoption of these theoretically should be subject to both pressure from below (women’s political mobilization) and above (as a signal in response to international pressure and norms). In total, fifty-seven countries in our sample adopted a legislative quota between 1990 and 2013. Countries reaching the end of the analysis period without adopting a quota are right-censored.

Independent Variable

Our argument holds that quota adoption is more likely in states that have experienced conflicts with high prevalence of SV. We use data from Cohen (2013) and the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) data set (Cohen and Nordås 2014) to
code all civil conflicts between 1990 and 2013 as either high SV conflicts (HSVC) or low SV conflicts (LSVC). Both data sets code the occurrence of rape (Cohen) and SV (SVAC) on an ordinal scale with the following categories: no reported SV, isolated SV, widespread SV, and systematic SV. Cohen’s data are coded qualitatively based on US State Department human rights reports whereas the SVAC data are equivalently coded based on documents of the US State Department, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch. Whereas Cohen’s data capture any conflict-related rape committed regardless of perpetrator, the SVAC data set contains only SV that can be attributed to a specific perpetrator (government or rebel group). More information on coding rules is available in the respective codebooks. In Online Appendix A, we discuss potential data quality issues with regard to this variable.

As the dividing lines between widespread and systematic SV are hard to establish, and in order to present a more straightforward analysis, we recoded the variables in the following way: Countries get the coding no civil conflict for all years if no civil conflict occurred and for the years before conflict onset, if a conflict occurred later in the analysis period. A country is coded as an LSVC case from the year of conflict onset if no SV was reported during the conflict or if only isolated cases of SV were reported. Countries are coded as an HSVC case from the year of conflict onset, if there were reports of widespread or systematic occurrence of SV during the conflict. The conflict countries keep the conflict coding (LSVC or HSVC) throughout the analysis period, regardless of whether the conflict is still ongoing or has ended. An example will illustrate the approach: Burundi enters the analysis in 1990 as a no civil conflict country. The Burundian civil war broke out in 1993. During the thirteen yearlong war, there were many reports of widespread and systematic SV (see Cohen 2013; Cohen and Nordås 2014). The country is thus coded as an HSVC case from 1993 onward and stays in the analysis up until 2005, when a national legislative gender quota was introduced with the new constitution.

Below, we consider a number of different coding decisions for this variable and show that our results are not dependent on a specific coding choice with regard to the starting year, postconflict period, and so on. In total, twenty-four countries in our sample experienced an LSVC, thirty-seven experienced an HSCV, and seventy-five countries did not experience a civil conflict during the analysis period.

Control Variables

To account for differences in economic development between countries in our sample, we include logged gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (in current [2015] US dollars). Research suggests that the quality of democratic institutions is related to women’s political representation and potentially to quota adoption (Paxton, Hughes, and Painter 2010). We include a measure of the level of democracy that is a combination of data from Polity IV and Freedom House, for maximum coverage (Hadenius and Teorell 2005). The measure ranges from 0 to 10 (most democratic). Bush (2011) argues that quota adoption is often a result of particular types of
international pressure. To account for this, we control for foreign aid dependence in the form of logged total official development assistance and for whether a liberalizing UN peace operation was present in a country in a given year. The latter variable is a dichotomous indicator adopted from Bush (2011). In line with previous studies (see Thames and Williams 2013), we also control for regional quota diffusion. This variable is measured year by year as the percentage of countries in a region with a legal gender quota.

All covariates mentioned in the previous section vary over time. We also include a number of time-invariant covariates. Several studies have argued that proportional electoral systems are associated with the adoption of gender quotas (e.g., Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005). We therefore include a three-category variable indicating if a country has a proportional, majoritarian, or mixed electoral system. The most obvious problem for our analysis would be a variable that is strongly related to both the likelihood of quota adoption and to civil war (referring to both the likelihood and the type of violence during civil war). As discussed above, the intensity of civil conflict has been linked to growth in women’s political representation (Hughes 2009; Hughes and Tripp 2015). We include an indicator variable that equals 0 if a country did not experience a civil conflict during the analysis period, 1 if a country experienced a low-intensity civil conflict (1,000 or fewer battle deaths all recorded years), and 2 if a country experienced a high-intensity conflict during the analysis period (more than 1,000 recorded battle deaths in any year). Finally, we include two variables that potentially could be related to the gendered nature of conflict and/or the likelihood of quota adoption: Islamic heritage and women’s civil liberties in 1990. The inclusion of the former variable accounts for the fact that Muslim countries may have stronger patriarchal orders in general (see Inglehart and Norris 2003). This is a dichotomous variable adopted from Bush (2011). The women’s civil liberties variable is taken from the Varieties of Democracy data set (V-dem; www.v-dem.net). It is an index based on the V-dem country experts’ assessment of women’s freedom of domestic movement, right to private property, freedom from forced labor, and access to justice (see Lindberg et al. 2014 for a discussion of the V-dem data and methodology). We use each country’s value on this variable for the year 1990 to indicate women’s standing in society at the start of our analysis period.

We also conduct a number of additional analyses with only conflict countries. This lets us control for different variables specifically related to the nature of the conflict. Here, we control for conflict duration (in years) and whether the conflict had an ethnic dimension (coded 0 for no ethnic dimension, 1 if the ethnic dimension was ambiguous, and 2 for a strong ethnic dimension to the conflict). For the analyses including only postconflict countries, we include two additional dichotomous variables: whether the conflict ended with a rebel victory and whether the conflict ended with a peace agreement. These two variables are based on Kreutz (2010).
Results

To get an overview of the data, we begin by plotting the survival function for different categories of countries. “Survival” here refers to a country not adopting a gender quota. Figure 2 shows Kaplan–Meier estimates (see Hosmer, Lemeshow, and May 2011) plotted by different country groups.

Plot 1 shows the survival function for the full sample: over 40 percent of the countries had adopted a quota at the end of the analysis period. Plots 2 and 3 compare countries with and without a civil conflict. Plot 3 also differentiates the civil conflict countries by conflict intensity. It is clear that the survival curves in plots 2 and 3 follow the same pattern and that the survival curves do not deviate

Figure 2. Estimated survival function for different groups of countries.
substantially from each other. Plot 4 instead groups the conflict countries by LSCV and HSCV. The graph shows a clear divergence between the groups: at the end of the analysis period about 30 percent of the LSVC countries had adopted a quota, while the share of HSVC countries is about 80 percent. This provides suggestive evidence in favor of our hypotheses: while civil conflict in general does not seem to be strongly related to quota adoption, states experiencing civil conflicts with high prevalence of SV seem much more prone to adopt gender quotas. However, to rule out alternative explanations, a more careful analysis is needed. We therefore now turn to the regression models.

Table 1 reports the results for our main specifications of the event history analysis. We report exponentiated coefficients, equaling the hazard ratio. “Hazard” refers to the likelihood of quota adoption in a given year. A hazard ratio of 1 indicates that the hazard rate is unchanged after a one-step increase in the independent variable. A hazard ratio of less than one equals a decrease in the hazard rate, while a hazard ratio of more than one indicates an increase (and hence an increased likelihood of quota adoption). Model 1 is our baseline model, including only the SV variable. The results suggest that compared to countries/years with no civil conflict (the reference category), quota adoption is strongly positively associated with HSVC. LSVC is negatively associated with quota adoption ($\hat{b} = 0.452$), but the estimate does not reach statistical significance ($p = .112$). Model 2 adds all covariates to the model. Although this increases the standard errors for the HSVC estimate, the point estimate in model 2 is larger ($\hat{b} = 3.44, p = .024$). The estimate suggests that quota adoption in a given year is 3.5 times more likely for countries/years in this category, compared to the “no conflict category.” Model 3 codes the SV variable only for the postconflict period. Previous studies have suggested that this period is strongly associated with transformation for women’s legislative representation (e.g., Hughes and Tripp 2015). This makes sense as with the end of conflict often come changes in political systems and institutions. Considering only the postconflict period makes the HSVC estimate even stronger ($\hat{b} = 4.46, p = .002$), while the estimate for LSVC is basically unchanged. The control variables give some support for Bush’s (2011) overall argument: more foreign aid and liberalizing peacekeeping operations are in general positively associated with quota adoption, although the estimates do not always reach statistical significance. In line with previous research, proportional and mixed electoral systems are also positively associated with quota adoptions (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005).

To be able to control for variables more directly related to conflict characteristics, models 4 and 5 are restricted to conflict countries. Model 4 considers the conflict sample over the entire analysis period, divided into HSVC countries and LSVC countries. Apart from controlling for aid flows and peacekeeping operations, this model also controls for whether the conflict had an ethnic dimension. The results reinforce the findings from the previous models: the coefficient for HSVC (5.303) suggests that countries in this group were almost 5.5 times more likely to adopt a gender quota in a given year, compared to the LSVC group (which is now the reference category). In model 5, each country enters
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full Sample</th>
<th>Conflict Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSVC</td>
<td>2.726***</td>
<td>3.442**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.71)</td>
<td>(2.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.460***</td>
<td>(3.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.44)</td>
<td>(3.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.303***</td>
<td>6.990***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSVC</td>
<td>0.452</td>
<td>0.430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.422</td>
<td>Ref</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.59)</td>
<td>(-1.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No civil conflict</td>
<td>Ref</td>
<td>Ref</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/capita (logged)</td>
<td>1.001</td>
<td>0.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(-0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of democracy</td>
<td>1.023</td>
<td>0.977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(-0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-intensity conflict</td>
<td>0.445</td>
<td>0.485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.35)</td>
<td>(-1.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-intensity conflict</td>
<td>0.674</td>
<td>0.756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.71)</td>
<td>(-0.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping operation</td>
<td>2.244*</td>
<td>2.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.81)</td>
<td>(1.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign aid (logged)</td>
<td>1.196*</td>
<td>1.199*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.92)</td>
<td>(1.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional quota diffusion</td>
<td>1.018</td>
<td>1.022*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.56)</td>
<td>(1.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic heritage</td>
<td>1.185</td>
<td>1.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's civil liberties</td>
<td>0.733</td>
<td>0.440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1990)</td>
<td>(-0.46)</td>
<td>(-1.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional electoral</td>
<td>3.358***</td>
<td>4.126***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>system</td>
<td>(3.64)</td>
<td>(3.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed electoral system</td>
<td>2.350***</td>
<td>3.095***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.38)</td>
<td>(2.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-past-the-post</td>
<td>Ref</td>
<td>Ref</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict duration</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguous ethnic</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dimension</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic dimension</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No ethnic dimension</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ref</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel victory</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
the analysis at the year of conflict end. This model is thus only concerned with the postconflict period and only includes conflicts that ended between 1985 and 2013. This model also adds two covariates related to conflict termination: whether the conflict ended in rebel victory and whether there was a peace agreement. In addition, this model controls for the conflict duration. The coefficient for HSVC again comes out strongly positive and highly significant.

In summary, the results speak strongly in favor of our hypotheses. States with conflicts where SV is prevalent are much more prone to adopt gender quotas than both countries that did not experience civil conflict and countries that experienced conflicts where SV was not widespread. We also show that the main results are not dependent on whether we consider the whole conflict period or only the postconflict years, or if we compare only conflict countries or use the full sample. Figure 3 illustrates the main findings based on model 2 from Table 1 by plotting the covariate-adjusted survival functions for different country groups. We further report a wide range of different robustness checks in Online Appendix B. These include several standard tests of the proportional hazards assumption, different coding choices for our independent and dependent variables, and additional or alternative control variables. Our results prove to be robust to all these different tests, models, and specifications. In Online Appendix C, we also provide evidence suggesting that the quotas introduced in HSVC countries were effective in that they increased the descriptive representation of women over time, that is, they were more than mere window dressing.

**Empirical Support for the Causal Mechanisms**

In this section, we provide some evidence in support of our two causal mechanisms of pressure from above and pressure from below.
Pressure from Above

Previous research has already established that international peacekeeping (Kreutz and Cardenas 2017; Hultman and Johansson 2017) and gender content in UN peace operation mandates (Kreft 2017) are more likely in conflicts with prevalent SV than in other conflicts. Combining Kreft’s data on references to CRSV in, and the gender content of, UN peacekeeping operation mandates with the CRSV and gender quota adoption data (Online Appendix D), lends further support to our theoretical argument. The juxtaposition reveals not only greater UN peace operation presence in conflicts with prevalent SV but also higher attention to women’s participation in UNPKO mandates when SV is explicitly acknowledged, and higher rates of gender quota adoption when SV is high, and here in particular when SV is explicitly acknowledged in UNPKO mandates. As discussed in the theory section, there are several examples of HSVC countries with UN peace operations that pushed for women’s increased political participation that subsequently adopted gender quotas (e.g., Kosovo, Liberia, Sudan). The small number of cases for which we have sufficient data on the UNPKO mandates, however, makes inferential statistics impossible.

To provide some statistical evidence, we instead used data compiled by Kreutz and Cardenas (2017).²¹ Using our main indicator of CRSV (the same as in Table 1, model 4), we again use the Cox model to estimate the time from conflict onset to “international attention” (for conflict countries). The latter variable is coded as 1 for a given country-year if any international actor was involved in a specific conflict by a military intervention, a peacekeeping operation, sanctions, or attempts at

![Figure 3. Covariate-adjusted survival functions for different groups of countries. Based on model 2, Table 1.](image-url)
mediation (see Kreutz & Cardenas 2017). Model 1 in Table 2 shows that interna-
tional attention, as defined in this way, was more likely in HSVC countries (about
3.4 times more likely in a given year), as compared to LSVC countries. In conjunc-
tion, these findings lend support to our theoretical mechanism of increased pressure
from above when CRSV is prevalent.

Pressure from Below

Women’s domestic mobilization has previously been linked to quota adoption (see,
e.g., Tripp 2015; Kang and Tripp 2018). Here, we consider more carefully the role of
CRSV in this mobilization process. We consider two different indicators of women’s
mobilization and coalition building to see whether these outcomes were more pre-
valent in HSVC countries, as predicted by our theory. First, we looked at the logged
number of linkages to international women’s NGOs (WINGOs) in a specific coun-
try-year.22 Second, we used protest data from the Mass Mobilization Data Project
(see www.binghamton.edu/massmobilization/index.html) and looked specifically
for women’s mass mobilization (WMM) in a given country-year. See Online Appen-
dix A for more details about these measures and the statistical models. The results,

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Mechanisms.}
\begin{tabular}{llll}
\hline
 & \textbf{International} & \textbf{WINGOs} & \textbf{WMM} \\
 & \textbf{attention} & \textbf{(Logged)} & \textbf{(Odds Ratios)} \\
\hline
High sexual violence conflict & 3.351** & 0.123* & 4.223*
 & (1.83) & (1.91) & (1.86)
Low sexual violence conflict & Ref & 0.038 & 2.180
 & (0.44) & (1.01)
No civil conflict & Ref & Ref & Ref
Full controls & Yes & Yes & Yes
\hline
\textbf{N} & 341 & 1,966 & 2,642
\textbf{Countries} & 37 & 133 & 136
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textit{Note:} Model 1 estimates a Cox proportional hazard model that is analogous to model 4, Table 1, including
the same control variables and only conflict countries. The outcome variable indicates if international
actors were involved in the conflict by a military intervention, a peacekeeping operation, sanctions, or
mediation attempts. The model hence estimates the time from conflict onset to “international attention,”
as indicated by these measures. Model 2 shows the results from a random effects regression model with
WINGOs (logged) as the outcome variable. Model 3 shows the results from a random effects logistic
regression model with WMM as the outcome variable. The control variables in the latter two models are
identical to model 2, Table 1, but with a continuous time-trend control added. WINGO = international
women’s NGO; NGO = nongovernmental organization; WMM = women’s mass mobilization.

*\(p < .1\).
**\(p < .05\).
***\(p < .01\).
presented below, provide suggestive evidence in favor of our theorized “from below” mechanism (models 2 and 3): on average, both the number of WINGOs and the likelihood of WMM are higher for HSVC countries, compared to both LSVC and no conflict countries.

A closer look at the Colombian case further illustrates our theorized “pressure from below” mechanism. The internal conflict in the South American country, ongoing at varying levels of intensity since the 1960s, is classified in our data as an HSVC (see Online Appendix A). All armed actors, but especially the paramilitary groups, have been known to perpetrate SV against civilians. Women have mobilized extensively in response to CRSV, launching women’s organizations and victims’ associations, and often situating CRSV in a more complex web of gender inequality and women’s issues (Kreft 2019, 224-27).

Author interviews carried out in Bogotá in March 2017 revealed that some organizations, such as Mujeres en la Lucha, later to become part of the women’s organization Casa de la Mujer, and la Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres emerged specifically in response to reports of widespread CRSV against women, in the 1970s and in 1996, respectively. The 1990s in particular saw an upsurge in the establishment of formal women’s organizations in response to, and with the aim of making visible, the differential impact of the armed conflict on women (Domingo, Rocha Menocal, and Hinestroza 2015, 26). While massacres and attacks were already in the public eye, the generally hidden crime of (sexual) violence against women now began to garner the attention of women’s organizations (author interview, March 2017, Bogotá). Civil society engagement with violence against women was often paired with a focus on enhancing the representation and influence of women in conflict resolution and politics, facilitated by the development of a new constitution in 1991, which was part of an attempt to come to terms with the country’s ongoing conflict. Many smaller and informal women’s associations expanded their activism and established formal linkages with the goal of entrenching principles of gender equality, protection from gender-based violence, and greater political participation of women in new laws (Domingo, Rocha Menocal, and Hinestroza 2015).

Thanks to the concerted efforts of mobilized women, the 1991 constitution included articles guaranteeing gender equality and women’s access to political participation, and women’s organizations were a core driver behind the 2000 quota law reserving 30 percent of public offices for women (United Nations Development Programme, n.d., 34). In the following years, women’s movements continued their activism to improve the legal landscape in the two streams of women’s political participation and violence against women (Domingo, Rocha Menocal, and Hinestroza 2015, 26) and were, such as Red Nacional de Mujeres, actively involved in the formulation of law 1475 (2011), which mandates a 30 percent candidate quota for political parties (author interview, March 2017, Bogotá).

This brief case study illustrates the relationship between mobilization in response to CRSV and the push for women’s legislative representation including quota laws, aided by the political and institutional transformations often occurring in conflict-
affected settings. Similar patterns can be observed in other countries. Tajali (2013) suggests that gender quota adoption in postgenocide Rwanda can be primarily attributed to the lobbying of the women’s movement, which benefited from the postconflict transition phase and an absence of men, while also successfully arguing that the gendered nature of the conflict, especially the targeted rape of women, required a “gendered reconstruction” (p.278). In Bosnia, the humanitarian women’s organizations that emerged during the war in response to (sexual) violence affecting women assumed a more political character in the postwar period, and women’s mobilization played an important role in constitutional changes, including the introduction of a gender quota (Jenichen 2009).

Conclusions

Our results strongly suggest that when considering gendered outcomes of armed conflict, one also has to take the gendered nature of conflict violence into account, as this may elicit gendered forms of mobilization both internationally and domestically. CRSV is a very visible indicator of gendered conflict that primarily targets women as women, and it is therefore our explanatory variable. CRSV has received unprecedented levels of global attention in recent years, in particular since the authorization of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and its follow-up resolutions. We propose that this has made SV the foremost indicator of gendered conflict, and the need for a “gendered” response, in the eyes of international actors. Guided by theories emphasizing the mobilizing potential of threat, we argue that CRSV simultaneously elicits women’s collective mobilization, including for greater women’s representation in politics. As the gendered outcome variable, we focus on gender quota adoption. Gender quotas have the benefits of being easily quantifiable, comparable across countries, and having clear gender implications, often affecting governments’ spending priorities as a result of women’s increased descriptive representation (Clayton and Zetterberg 2018).

In conjunction, we argue international (normative and material pressures) and domestic (civil society mobilization) responses to CRSV urge governments to adopt gender quotas in or after conflict. To test the empirical predictions of this theory, we use survival analysis to model gender quota adoption among countries that did not experience conflict, countries that experienced conflict with low prevalence of SV, and countries that had conflicts with high prevalence of SV between 1990 and 2013. Rates of gender quota adoption are highest in countries affected by prevalent SV. The difference between conflicts with high prevalence of SV and conflicts where SV did not play a major role is particularly striking: of the thirty-one conflict countries that adopted a gender quota during our analysis period, twenty-seven are countries that experienced a conflict with prevalent SV. Our analysis shows that this pattern cannot easily be explained by other factors, such as battle deaths, often used as an indicator of conflict intensity. Supplemental analyses lend support to our theorized causal mechanisms of pressure from above and below in response to CRSV. Jointly,
these results suggest that we need to reconsider how to conceptualize types of conflict and conflict intensity depending on the outcomes we are interested in. Specifically, if we want to examine gender-relevant outcomes, we need to direct our attention to gendered patterns of violence.

Of course, different dynamics may be at play in different contexts. Strong civil society and lower aid dependency would presumably render the domestic mechanism more important, whereas international pressure may be more salient in countries that depend more heavily on foreign aid and have a weaker civil society sector. These are possible extensions of our argument that future research may examine.

Authors’ Note
Both authors contributed equally to this article.

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Supplemental Material
Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes
1. Although women too participate in armed groups around the globe, as combatants or in support roles (Henshaw 2015; Thomas and Bond 2015).
2. For scholarship on conflict-related sexual violence (SV) against men, see, for example, Schulz (2018).
3. Although this perspective may slowly be changing since the global MeToo campaign.
5. The small number of observations for conflicts with “one-sided” SV does not allow a statistical analysis of the relationship between such perpetration patterns and gender quota adoption.
6. Our base sample is the same as in Bush (2011), only dropping in size due to missing data.
7. This corresponds to a coding of 0 (no SV) or 1 (isolated reports) in the Cohen (2013) and Cohen and Nordás (2014) data sets.
8. In Cohen (2013) and Cohen and Nordás (2014), this corresponds to an SV coding of 2 (widespread/common) or 3 (systematic/massive).
9. We use the highest reported occurrence of SV from either data set to classify the conflicts.
10. We also consider a number of alternative codings in the Online Appendix. These include, for example, coding the variable based on the first reported occurrence of SV in each conflict, and only coding the variable for a ten-year postconflict period. These variations do not affect our main results.
11. These data are available at www.oecd.org/dac.
12. Since Bush’s analysis period ends in 2006, we used the same methodology (see Bush 2011, 119) to code the variable up to 2013.
13. Bush’s (2011) argument about international pressure has some resemblance to our argument. We include development assistance and peacekeeping operations as controls to be able to distinguish our argument from Bush’s.
14. This classification is established in the literature (see Melander, Pettersson, andThemnér 2016).
15. Cohen (2013) does, however, not find any statistical evidence indicating that general levels of gender equality affect the use of SV in conflict.
16. This variable is adopted from Cohen (2013) and based on the work of Fearon and Laitin (2003).
17. The time point “0” here refers to the first time the nonconflict countries appear in the sample. In most cases, this is the year 1990. For the conflict countries, 0 refers to the year of conflict onset (or 1990 in the cases when the conflict started earlier than 1990).
18. That is, the SV variable takes on its value for low SV conflict or high SV conflict only after the conflict has ended. End years are based on Cohen (2013) and Cohen and Nordás (2014). The sample includes a few conflicts that were terminated in the late eighties. These countries still enter the analysis (and their postconflict period) in year 1990 in this model.
19. Since we include fewer covariates in this model, we are able to extend the analysis period a few years back in time to include conflicts that were terminated in the late eighties.
20. Both variables are potentially related to large-scale transformations of the political system.
21. The data set was generously provided to us by the authors.
22. Bush (2011) finds this variable to be positively related to quota adoption. The variable is, however, not statistically significant in all her model specifications.
References


