A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction

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The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base. That was because we wished in this first attack to avoid, insofar as possible, the killing of civilians.

- President Harry Truman, August 9, 1945

I heard her voice calling “Mother, Mother.” I went towards the sound. She was completely burned. The skin had come off her head altogether, leaving a twisted knot at the top. My daughter said, “Mother, you’re late, please take me back quickly.” She said it was hurting a lot. But there were no doctors. There was nothing I could do. So I covered up her naked body and held her in my arms for nine hours. At about eleven o’clock that night she cried out again “Mother,” and put her hand around my neck. It was already ice-cold. I said, “Please say Mother again.” But that was the last time.

- A Hiroshima survivor

Introduction

We are reporting on a feminist tradition which we label anti-war feminism. We consider ourselves inheritors of this tradition and draw on it to formulate a position on weapons of mass destruction. To put our position briefly: anti-war feminism rejects both the military and political use of weapons of mass destruction in warfare or for deterrence. It is also deeply critical of the discourses which have framed public discussion of weapons of mass destruction. It calls for ways of thinking that reveal the complicated effects on possessor societies of developing and deploying these weapons, that portray the terror and potential suffering of target societies, and that grapple with the moral implications of the willingness to risk such massive destruction.

Anti-War Feminism

There is no single feminist position on war, armament and weapons of mass destruction. Some feminists fight for women’s right to fight and command fighters; some participate in armed nationalist struggles; some are pacifists; some believe that peace and war are not “women’s issues.” Most feminists do not divorce feminism from national, ethnic, religious, class or other identities and politics which together create their attitudes toward war.

We report on one particular feminist tradition that opposes war-making as a practice and seeks to replace it with practices of non-violent contest and reconciliation. We call this tradition “anti-war feminism,” see ourselves as its inheritors and continuers; despite disagreements with some of its aspects we refer to it as “ours.”
Anti-war feminists’ opposition to the practice of war is simultaneously pragmatic and moral. We have an abiding suspicion of the use of violence, even in the best of causes. The ability of violence to achieve its stated aims is routinely over-estimated, while the complexity of its costs are overlooked. Our opposition also stems from the perception that the practice of war entails far more than the killing and destroying of armed combat itself. It requires the creation of a “war system,” which entails: arming, training, and organizing for possible wars; allocating the resources these preparations require; creating a culture in which wars are seen as morally legitimate, even alluring; and shaping and fostering the masculinities and femininities which undergird men’s and women’s acquiescence to war. Even when it appears to achieve its aims, war is a source of enormous individual suffering and loss. Modern warfare is also predictably destructive to societies, civil liberties and democratic processes, and the non-human world. State security may sometimes be served by war, but too often human security is not.

Though they oppose war as a practice, and some individual anti-war feminists are committed to non-violence, the tradition as a whole is not typically ‘pacifist’ as that term is usually understood. It neither rejects all wars as wrong in principle, nor condemns others just because they resort to violence. Some anti-war feminists support particular military campaigns. As a Northern Irish woman explained to Cynthia Cockburn, “We’ve always given each other a lot of leeway on [violence].” We continue to call these temporary militarists anti-war, because they continue to oppose war-making as a practice, mourn the suffering of all of wars’ victims, and, in the midst of war, imagine the details of a future culture of peace. Although they do not reject violence in principle they are committed to “translating” or “transfiguring violence into creative militant nonviolence.” This requires letting go of “dangerous day dreams whether of promised homes of our own or of an apocalyptic demolition of all walls... [replacing these dreams] with the idea of something we could perhaps really have: a careful and a caring struggle in a well lit space.”

Nor is the feminist anti-war tradition a version of just war theory. In contrast to anti-war feminists who oppose war as a practice even if they support a particular military campaign, just war theorists implicitly accept war as a practice even when condemning particular wars. Just war theory accepts war only as a defense against serious attacks on one’s state or one’s people, or intervention on behalf of other states or people who suffer such aggression (jus ad bellum). Anti-war feminists may agree that the cause is just, but for us it does not automatically follow that war is therefore justified – for at least two reasons. First, while just war theorists claim that war must be a “last resort” after all non-violent alternatives have failed, in our view they barely explore non-violent alternatives once just cause is determined, nor seek to return to non-violent struggle once war has begun. Anti-war feminists continue to explore non-violent alternatives even after war starts, and seek every opportunity to return to nonviolent means of fighting. Secondly, just war theorists tend to abstract particular wars from the war-system on which they rely and which they strengthen, whereas anti-war feminists are acutely critical of the political, economic, social and moral costs of that system.

However just the cause, just war theorists set moral limits to permissible strategies of war (jus in bello). Ideally only armed combatants, or at most, people contributing directly to combat, should
be targeted. Weapons must be able to target discriminately and then should cause only the suffering required to render combatants harmless. Anti-war feminists are skeptical of these “rules of war.” Some argue that they depend upon unworkable abstractions, including, in much contemporary warfare, the central distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Others document the routine, often willful, violation of these rules, beginning with the use of weapons that cannot discriminate. Generally, anti-war feminists, like many pacifists, do not so much argue as point insistently to the facts of suffering and destruction which cannot be limited, in place or time, to battlefield and soldier.⁷

To suggest the distinctive character of our tradition as contrasted with just war and pacifism, we identify four of its constitutive positions.

1. War is a gendered practice

It is a common perception that war-making is an activity primarily engaged in by men, and governed by norms of masculinity. Anti-war feminism both asserts and challenges the association of war and masculinity in at least three ways.

First, anti-war feminists insistently underline the gendered character of war, stressing its domination by men and masculinity, thus making visible what has been taken for granted. But they also stress that women’s labor has always been central to war-making – although it has also consistently been either unacknowledged, or represented as tangential, in order to protect war’s “masculinity.”⁸

Secondly, they challenge the view that war is inherently gendered – in particular, the view that biology renders men “naturally” war-like and war therefore a “natural” male activity. They stress that multiple masculinities (and femininities) are required by the mobilization for war, and argue that the simple link of some “innate” male aggression to the conduct of war is belied both by what men actually do in war⁷ and by many men’s reluctance to fight.⁸ Whatever the role of biology in gender, and gender in war, anti-war feminists identify the association of manliness with militarized violence as the product of specific social processes which they try to analyze and change.⁹

Finally, anti-war feminists not only explore the multiple gendered identities needed for and shaped by the practice of war-making; they also analyze the ways that war-making is shaped by a gendered system of meanings. We understand gender not just as a characteristic of individuals, but as a symbolic system – a central organizing discourse in our culture, a set of ways of thinking, images, categories and beliefs which not only shape how we experience, understand and represent ourselves as men and women, but which also provide a familiar set of metaphors, dichotomies and values which structure ways of thinking about other aspects of the world, including war and security. In other words, we see the ways in which human characteristics and endeavors are culturally divided into those seen as “masculine” and those seen as “feminine,” (e.g., mind is opposed to body; culture to nature; thought to feeling; logic to intuition; objectivity to subjectivity; aggression to passivity; confrontation to accommodation; war to peace;
abstraction to particularity; public to private; political to personal; realism to moral reflection, etc.), and the terms coded “male” are valued more highly than those coded “female.”

Once the gender-coding takes place – once certain ways of thinking are marked as masculine and feminine, entwining metaphors of masculinity with judgements of legitimacy and power – then any system of thought or action comes to have gendered positions within it. For example, we see the devaluation and exclusion of “the feminine” as shaping and distorting basic national security paradigms and policies. And once the devaluation-by-association-with-the-feminine takes place, it becomes extremely difficult for anyone, female or male, to take the devalued position, to express concerns or ideas marked as “feminine.” What then gets left out is the emotional, the concrete, the particular, human bodies and their vulnerability, human lives and their subjectivity.10

The characteristics that are excluded as “feminine” are characteristics of women and men. They are also characteristics that women often ascribe to themselves “as women” and that feminists also sometimes ascribe to women. There is considerable disagreement among feminists, in print and casual conversation, about the degree to which women and men differ from each other, how these differences arise, and whether they are subject to change. Our own understanding of gender has changed over time and is affected by the circumstances in which we reflect and speak. In the circumstances of this discussion we allude to women’s actual differences from men only when describing the distinctive effects of war on women and the particular experiences and insights women themselves say that they would bring to peace negotiations.

2. Start from women’s lives

Our second position applies a central tenet of feminist methodology to the particular case of weapons of mass destruction. We attempt to look at war and weapons from the perspective of women’s lives, making women’s experiences a central rather than marginal concern. In the context of war, “women’s lives” has two primary referents: the work women do and the distinctive bodily assaults war inflicts on women.

Women’s work traditionally includes life-shaping responsibilities of caring labor: giving birth to and caring for children, protecting and sustaining ill, frail, or other dependents, maintaining households, and fostering and protecting kin, village, and neighborhood relations. Seen from the standpoint of caring labor, war is at least disruptive and usually destructive. In war women often can’t get or keep the goods on which they depend, whether medicine, cattle, or food. War threatens the well-being, and even existence, of the people, relations, and homes that women maintain.11

Caring labor may be intertwined with or depend upon other labor. In many economies, women “work” to secure the cash to get the goods that “women’s work” requires. Whether or not they are responsible for care, women work for wages in jobs that are lower paid and often in the service of others. In war women’s work typically expands to include “comfort” and prostitution,
low skilled workers/servants, secretaries and many others who keep militaries functioning. Notoriously, war gives some women special job opportunities, training, and experience unavailable elsewhere. Some survive post-war downsizing and the return of men to “their” jobs. But other women are in effect conscripted for dangerous or demeaning work whose effects may also survive the official end of war.

The practice of war implies a willingness to inflict pain and damage on bodies, to “outinjure” in pursuit of war’s aim. Women are no more or less embodied than men; but their bodies are differently at risk. There has been a quantitative shift in the ratio of women to men sufferers as civilian casualties come to outnumber those of the military. Women also suffer sexually more than men, and distinctly. Rape is the conqueror’s reward and taunt. It is a weapon against “woman” and also against the men and community to whom she “belongs.” The woman who becomes pregnant by rape may be seen by the rapist, or may see herself, as forced to join the enemy, to create him. She may fear, and her rapist may hope, that she is contributing to the destruction of her own people.

Given the effects of war on women’s work and the multiple ways that war commits violence against women, it is suspect, at the least, to look for “security” from militaries. Conceptions of security based in the military defense of state borders and interests often mean greater insecurity for women.

3. War is not spatially or temporally bounded.

Anti-war feminism rejects the conception of war as a discrete event, with clear locations, and a beginning and an end. It is not that we fail to distinguish between war and peace, or make distinctions between kinds of violence; but in our vision, and in contrast to much just war theory, it is crucial to not separate war from either the preparations made for it (preparations taken in the widest possible, including the social costs of maintaining large standing armies and the machinery of deterrence), or from its long term physical, psychological, socio-economic, environmental, and gendered effects. This conception of war is sometimes explicit in feminist writings, typically implied by the rhetoric and symbols of feminist movements, and fundamental to our response to conference questions.

Women’s war and post-war stories underlie the unboundedness of war in at least two different dimensions: cultural and practical. Culturally, war is understood as a creation and creator of the culture in which it thrives. War’s violence is not understood as separate and apart from other social practices. There is a continuum of violence running from bedroom, to boardroom, factory, stadium, classroom and battlefield, “traversing our bodies and our sense of self.” Weapons of violence, and representations of those weapons, travel through interlocking institutions – economic, political, familial, technological and ideological. These institutions prepare some people but not others to believe in the effectiveness of violence, to imagine and acquire weapons, to use and justify using force to work their will. They prepare some but not others to renounce, denounce or passively submit to force, to resist or accept the war plans put before them.
Practically, feminists see war as neither beginning with the first gunfire, nor ending when the treaties are signed. Before the first gunfire is the research, development and deployment of weapons; the maintaining of standing armies; the cultural glorification of the power of armed force; and the social construction of masculinities and femininities which support a militarized state. When the organized violence of war is over, what remains is a ripped social fabric: the devastation of the physical, economic and social infrastructure through which people provision themselves and their families; the havoc wrought in the lives and psyches of combatants, noncombatants, and children who have grown up in war; the surfeit of arms on the streets, and of ex-soldiers trained to kill; citizens who have been schooled and practiced in the methods of violence, but not in nonviolent methods of dealing with conflict; “nature” poisoned, burned, made ugly and useless. Typically ‘peace’ includes official ongoing “punishment”—retribution, reparations, domination, and deprivation. At best, even the most laudable treaty is only the beginning of making peace.

4. Alternative Epistemology / The Inadequacy of Dominant Ways of Thinking about War.

Both in philosophy and in “western” thought more generally, “objective” knowledge is produced by socially autonomous reasoners who have transcended institutional constraints, gender identifications, and emotion. Many feminists propose an “alternative epistemology” which stresses that all thinkers are “situated” within “epistemic communities” which ask some but not other questions, and legitimate some but not other ways of knowing. We are each of us also situated by social identities and personal histories. To take an example at hand: some of us address the volume’s questions as heirs of the “victims” of nuclear weapons, or associate ourselves with them. Others are heirs of the attackers. Some address the issue of “proliferation” of nuclear weapons from the situation of a possessor state, others from a situation in which they would find the term “proliferation” inappropriate. None of us speaks from nowhere; there is no phenomenon – including nuclear attack or proliferation – that can be seen independently of the situation of the seers.

Three tenets of this “alternative epistemology” seem especially relevant to our work. Knowing is never wholly separated from feelings. Indeed, in many kinds of inquiry the capacity to feel and to account for one’s feelings is both a source and a test of knowledge. Secondly, as useful as hypothetical thought experiments and imagined scenarios may be, we begin with and return to concrete open-ended questions about actual people in actual situations. Finally, we measure arguments, and ideals of objectivity, partly in terms of the goods which they yield, the pleasures they make possible and the suffering they prevent.

Grounded in this alternative epistemology, anti-war feminists criticize the dominant political/strategic paradigm for thinking about weapons of mass destruction, which we call “technostrategic discourse.” In contrast to just war theory, this discourse is explicitly not centered on the ethics of warfare, but on its material and political practicalities. As a tool for thinking about weapons of mass destruction, it essentially restricts the thinker to three issues: the actual use, i.e. the detonation, of these weapons in state warfare or by terrorists; the physical and
geo-political effects of this use; the deployment of these weapons to deter attacks involving
either conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction. In other words, the concerns of the
dominant strategic discourse are limited to the destructive effects of the weapons when, and only
when they are detonated, and to the possible deterrent effects of possessing these weapons.
There is scant attention to the potential suffering of targeted societies, and no attempt to evaluate
complicated effects on possessor societies of deploying and developing these weapons, nor to
grapple with the moral significance of willingly risking such massive, total destruction.

When anti-war feminists think about wars, they take into consideration the political, social,
economic, psychological and moral consequences of accepting the practice of war. When
assessing weapons, they do not single out or isolate weapons’ physical, military and strategic
effects from their embeddedness in and impact upon social and political life as a whole, nor from
the effects of the discourses which constitute “knowledge” about these weapons. Hence when
asked to think about weapons of mass destruction, we strive to consider the totality of the web of
social, economic, political, and environmental relationships within which weapons of mass
destruction are developed, deployed, used and disposed of – all the while starting from the
perspective of women’s lives. It is not possible to do so from within the bounds of “just war”
and/or “technostrategic” frameworks – yet those are the very discourses which have shaped the
questions we are asked to answer in this volume. Thus, as we respond to the editors’ questions,
we find we need to both think inside their frame, and about the frame itself.

**Question One**

The first question asks whether our tradition includes general norms governing the use of
weapons in war. It does not. If, as it appears, the question assumes the inevitability, perhaps
even the acceptability, of war making, we do not. And granted the existence of wars, we are
ambivalent about making ethical distinctions between weapons. We recognize that some
weapons, and uses of weapons, are worse than others. Some weapons can be sparingly used and
carefully aimed to cause minimal damage; others cannot. Some weapons may be deliberately
cruel (e.g., dum dum bullets), outlast the occasion that apparently justified them (e.g., land
mines), harm indiscriminately (e.g., cluster bombs, land mines again, or poison gas in a crowded
subway), injure massively and painfully (e.g., incendiary bombs). While respecting these
distinctions, we nonetheless fear that stressing the horror of some weapons diminishes the
horrors that more “acceptable” weapons wreak. For us the crucial question is not, “How do we
chose among weapons?” but rather, “How can we identify and attend to the specific horrors of
any weapon?”.

Moreover, it is striking that the criteria by which some weapons are declared less horrible than
others do not fare well by feminist anti-war criteria. We will consider two kinds – small arms
and light weapons, and high tech weapons aimed precisely from a distance.

“Small arms and light weapons” are weapons light enough to be packed over a mountain on a
mule. Among them are stinger missiles, AK47s, machine guns, grenades, assault rifles, small
explosives, and hand guns. Far more than weapons of mass destruction (WMD), these weapons can allow for distinguishing attackers and combatants from bystanders. Some, such as hand guns, can be accurately aimed to incapacitate without killing a dangerous attacker. Of course the weapons may be misused. But if they are carefully aimed by properly trained gunners they can satisfy conventional moral criteria of doing the least harm commensurate with protection from violence.

If, however, we start looking at weapons from the perspectives of women’s lives, small arms and light weapons become visible as the cause of enormous, sustained and pervasive suffering of very specific kinds. Light weapons are a staple of the arms market, and the principal instrument of violence in armed conflicts throughout the world. They are inexpensive, require little or no training to use, and are easily available, often unregulated by state, military, civic, or even parental authority. They have a long shelf life, travel easily, and therefore can, in the course of time, be traded, turned against various enemies, and brought home.

These weapons are so easy to get, they threaten to turn any conflict – whether between peoples, neighbors, or family members – violent. Women can carry them, but they more often remain the property of men and late adolescent boys, increasing the imbalance of power between men and women.

These weapons can wreak havoc among the relationships women have tended, and destroy women’s capacity to obtain food, water and other necessary staples, to farm and to keep their animals safe. Thus, it is not surprising that current international feminist attention to war is often focused on ethno-nationalist armed conflicts that are fought with light weapons. These wars, brutal in their effects, often in gender-related ways, are undeterred by, indeed unaffected by, the existence of weapons of mass destruction.

Ironically, by contrast with small arms and light weapons, nuclear weapons can in some ways seem attractive. They are expensive and difficult to produce, complicated to deploy, require training if they are to be used, and rarely make their way onto main street or into homes, except as waste material. In the lives of women around the world, it is small arms and light weapons, more than weapons of mass destruction, that constitute a clear and daily present danger.

Consider the “virtues” of a quite different class of weapons, precision-guided munitions (PGMs). Modern, hi-tech precision-guided munitions can reputedly be precisely aimed at carefully selected targets, a virtue often on verbal and graphic display during the Gulf War – although the degree of precision of both weapons and target selection are sometimes more illusory than real. PGMs are typically launched from great distances, the human “targets” invisible to the attacker, and the weapons’ effects transmuted into unreality by video game-like imagery. Neither the attackers nor civilians at home need be aware of the destruction they cause. Moreover, precision-guided munitions on “electronic battlefields” appear to make warfare safer for the warriors who use them.
From our perspective, these virtues, too, become suspect. Critics charge that we – citizens, military, political leaders – are too easily reassured by images of PGMs’ precision. In fact, PGMs are notoriously subject to “mistakes” of judgment, information and technological control. While we agree with these critics, we emphasize two other moral doubts.

With PGMs, not only is the discourse of war abstract, but war-fighting itself becomes increasingly abstract and unreal to those who kill, mutilate, and destroy. Anti-militarists have often seen war as a fiction, an Old Lie, that obscures brutality through patriotic rhetoric, euphemistic language, abstract theories and discourse. To these are now added the abstracted illusion of precision strikes displayed on video screens. By contrast, we consider it a virtue if the brutality of war is evident to the combatants, to those who order them to war, and to the society they represent.

Secondly, we cannot unambivalently applaud the relative safety that PGMs accord those who use them. This safety is purchased by an ignorance of injuries, ultimately an indifference toward “the targets.” We understand the military obligation and human desire to save one’s own fighters. But we cannot praise a weapon for its ability to save “us,” while endangering the lives and destroying the resources of “the enemy” we don’t see, whose humanity we never confront. Indeed, people who reject war, including feminists, refuse to construe an enemy as killable.

By calling into question the criteria by which weapons are judged, we do not in any way minimize the horror of weapons of mass destruction. Women/feminists of our tradition have been protesting the development, testing, deployment, and possible use of nuclear weapons, in particular, since Hiroshima. But anti-war feminism urges that we appreciate the specificity of horror and learn to mourn the damage that each kind of weapon inflicts on both its possessor and the injured. This would be both an expression and a development of our tradition.

**Question Two**

The second question asks us whether it is ever morally permissible to use weapons of mass destruction. We are tempted to answer with only three words: “of course not.”

Rather than pondering the question of when, if ever, it is morally justified to use WMD, we move in two directions. First, we note that anti-war feminists’ energies have not been focused on when to use these weapons, but rather on attempting to explain why, over many years, there has been widespread acceptance of the deployment of nuclear weapons and of the stated willingness to use them. Second, we move to question the question itself.

Anti-war feminist attention to WMD has largely focused on nuclear weapons – their horrors, the urgency of abolishing them, and the question of how anyone could think it sane to develop and deploy them. In this chapter, we, too, write primarily about nuclear weapons – as a reflection of the tradition on which we report, but also because they are the weapons whose magnitude of
destructive power seems distinctive, and to best warrant the description “weapons of mass destruction.” However, as we learned in the course of our research, many elements of the anti-war feminist critique of nuclear weapons hold for chemical and biological weapons as well.

Rather than seeing acceptance of nuclear weapons as a “realistic” acknowledgment of the “technologically inevitable,” anti-war feminists have seen the political and intellectual acceptance of nuclear weapons’ deployment as something to be explained. Some feminists have noted the allure of nuclear weapons, particularly the excitement and awe evoked by actual or imagined nuclear explosions. Some have seen the appeal of exploding or launching nuclear weapons as reflecting and reinforcing masculine desires and identities.22

Several anti-war feminists have focused less on the weapons themselves, and more on the discourse through which the weapons (and their use) are theorized and legitimated. They have written about both the sexual and domestic metaphors that turn the mind’s eye toward the pleasant and familiar, rather than toward images of indescribable devastation. They have identified in nuclear discourse techniques of denial and conceptual fragmentation. They have emphasized the ways that the abstraction and euphemism of nuclear discourse protect nuclear planners and politicians from the grisly realities behind their words. Speaking generally, anti-war feminists invite women and men to attend to the identities, emotions and discourses that allow us to accept the possible use of nuclear weapons.23

Perhaps the most general feminist concern is the willingness of intellectuals to talk-as-usual about nuclear weapons (or about any atrocity). And this brings us back to the issue of the framing of Question Two. The question as it is posed seems in some ways similar to the abstract, distancing thinking that we have criticized – but in which we also participate. There is no mention of the horror, let alone a pause to rest with it. We move, or are moved, quickly to an abstract moral tone: “any circumstances” “might be morally permissible....” and then to comparisons.

Abstract language and a penchant for distinctions are typical of philosophy, intrinsically unobjectionable, often a pleasure. It is continuous abstraction while speaking of actual or imagined horror that disturbs us. Abstract discussion of warfare is both the tool and the privilege of those who imagine themselves as the (potential) users of weapons. The victims, if they can speak at all, speak quite differently:

An account of a nuclear blast’s effects by a US defense intellectual:

[You have to have ways to maintain communications in a] nuclear environment, a situation bound to include EMP blackout, brute force damage to systems, a heavy jamming environment, and so on.24

An account by a Hiroshima survivor:
Everything was black, had vanished into the black dust, was destroyed. Only the flames that were beginning to lick their way up had any color. From the dust that was like a fog, figures began to loom up, black, hairless, faceless. They screamed with voices that were no longer human. Their screams drowned out the groans rising everywhere from the rubble, groans that seemed to rise from the very earth itself.25

It should become apparent then, that our concern about abstract language is not only relevant to the framing of Question Two, but to its content – the justifiability of nuclear weapons’ use – as well. It is easier to contemplate and “justify” the use of nuclear weapons in the abstract language of defense intellectuals than in the descriptive, emotionally resonant language of the victim; from the perspective of the user rather than the victim. Anti-war feminists note that detailed, focal attention to the human impact of weapons’ use is not only considered out of bounds in security professionals’ discourse; it is also delegitimated by its association with the “feminine,” with insufficient masculinity, as is evident in this excerpt of an interview with a physicist:

“Several colleagues and I were working on modeling counterforce nuclear attacks, trying to get realistic estimates of the number of immediate fatalities that would result from different deployments. At one point, we re-modeled a particular attack, using slightly different assumptions, and found that instead of there being 36 million immediate fatalities, there would only be 30 million. And everybody was sitting around nodding, saying, ‘Oh yeh, that’s great, only 30 million,’ when all of a sudden, I heard what we were saying. And I blurted out, ‘Wait, I’ve just heard how we’re talking -- Only 30 million! Only 30 million human beings killed instantly??’ Silence fell upon the room. Nobody said a word. They didn’t even look at me. It was awful. I felt like a woman.”

After telling this story to one of the authors, the physicist added that he was careful to never blurt out anything indicating that he was thinking about the victims again.26 Fear of feeling like a woman (or being seen as unmanly) silently works to maintain the boundaries of a distanced, abstract discourse, and to sustain the tone of Question Two – a tone which invites us to think abstractly, “objectively” about WMD use, without pausing with human particularities, passions and suffering.

**Question Three**

Question Three asks whether it is ethical to develop and deploy WMD as deterrents only. That is, it asks the classic question of whether it is ethical to have weapons and threaten to use them, even if it is not ethical to use those weapons militarily. As the question is framed, then, “development” and “deployment” appear not as phenomena subject to ethical scrutiny unto themselves, but merely as way-stations, as adjuncts subsumed under what is taken to be the core ethical issue, which is seen as deterrence.
This formulation does not work for us. We need to pause and recognize that there are really several questions enfolded in that one. We must not only ask about the ethical status of deterrence, but also whether its entailments – development and deployment – are themselves ethical.27

One of the constitutive positions of anti-war feminism is that in thinking about weapons and wars, we must accord full weight to their daily effects on the lives of women. We then find that the development and deployment of nuclear weapons, even when they are not used in warfare, exacts immense economic costs that particularly affect women. In the words of a recent Indian feminist essay:

“...The social costs of nuclear weaponisation in a country where the basic needs of shelter, food and water, electricity, health and education have not been met are obvious.... Since patriarchal family norms place the task of looking after the daily needs of the family mainly upon women, scarcity of resources always hits women the hardest. Less food for the family inevitably means an even smaller share for women and female children just as water shortages mean an increase in women’s labour who have to spend more time and energy in fetching water from distant places at odd hours of the day.”28

While the US is not as poor a nation as India, Pakistan, or Russia, it has remained, throughout the nuclear age, a country in which poverty and hunger are rife, health care still unaffordable to many, low-cost housing unavailable, with crumbling public schools and infrastructure, all while the American nuclear weapons program has come at the cost of 4.5 trillion dollars.29

In addition to being economically costly, nuclear weapons development has medical and political costs. In the US program, many people have been exposed to high levels of radiation, including uranium miners; workers at reactors and processing facilities; the quarter of a million military personnel who took place in “atomic battlefield” exercises; “downwinders” from test sites; and Marshallese Islanders.30 Politically, nuclear regimes require a level of secrecy and security measures that exclude the majority of citizens, and in most countries, all women, from defense policy and decision-making.31

From the perspective of women’s lives, we see not only the costs of the development of nuclear weapons, but also the spiritual, social and psychological costs of deployment.

One cost, according to some feminists, is that “Nuclearisation produces social consent for increasing levels of violence.”32 Another cost, for many, is that nuclear weapons create high levels of tension, insecurity and fear. As Arundhati Roy puts it, nuclear weapons “[i]nform our dreams. They bury themselves like meat hooks deep in the base of our brains.”33

Further, feminists are concerned about the effect of nuclear policy on moral thought, on ideas about gender, and how the two intersect. Nuclear development may legitimize male aggression,
and breed the idea that nuclear explosions give a ‘virility’ to the nation which men as individuals can somehow also share.

[T]he strange character of nuclear policy-making not only sidelines moral and ethical questions, but genders them. This elite gets to be represented as rational, scientific, modern, and of course masculine, while ethical questions, questions about the social and environmental costs are made to seem emotional, effeminate, regressive and not modern. This rather dangerous way of thinking, which suggests that questions about human life and welfare are somehow neither modern nor properly masculine questions, or that men have no capacity and concern for peace and morality, can have disastrous consequences for both men and women.  

All in all, we find the daily costs of WMD development and deployment staggering high – in and of themselves sufficient to prevent deterrence from being an ethical moral option.

A so-called “realist” response to this judgement might well pay lip-service to the “moral niceties” it embodies, but then argue that deterrence is worth those costs. Or, perhaps to be more accurate, it might argue that the results of a nuclear attack would be so catastrophic that the rest of these considerations are really an irrelevant distraction; deterring a WMD attack on our homeland is the precondition on which political freedom and social life depend, and so it must be thought about in a class by itself.

We make two rejoinders to this claim. First, we note that in the culture of nuclear defense intellectuals, even raising the issue of costs is delegitimized, in large part through its association with “the feminine.” It is the kind of thing that “hysterical housewives” do; something done by people not tough and hard enough to look harsh “reality” in the eye, unsentimentally; not strong enough to separate their feelings from theorizing mass death; people who don’t have “the stones for war.” Feminist analysis rejects the cultural division of meaning which devalues anything associated with women or femininity. It sees in that same cultural valuing of the so-called “masculine” over the so-called “feminine” an explanation of why it appears so self-evident to many that what is called “military necessity” should appropriately be prioritized over all other human necessities. And it questions the assumptions that bestow the mantle of “realism” on such a constrained focus on weapons and state power. Rather than simply being an “objective” reflection of political reality, we understand this thought system as 1) a partial and distorted picture of reality, and 2) a major contributor to creating the very circumstances it purports to describe and protect against.

Second, just as feminists tend to be skeptical about the efficacy of violence, they might be equally skeptical about the efficacy of deterrence. Or, to put it another way, if war is a “lie,” so is deterrence. This is not, of course, to say that deterrence as a phenomena never occurs; no doubt one opponent is sometimes deterred from attacking another by the fear of retaliation. But rather deterrence as a theory, a discourse and set of practices underwritten by that discourse, is a fiction.
Deterrence theory is an elaborate, abstract conceptual edifice, which posits a hypothetical relation between two different sets of weapons systems – or rather, between abstractions of two different sets of weapons systems, for in fact, as both common sense and military expertise tells us, human error and technological imperfection mean that one could not actually expect real weapons to function in the ways simply assumed in deterrence theory. Because deterrence theory sets in play the hypothetical representations of various weapons systems, rather than assessments of how they would actually perform or fail to perform in warfare, it can be nearly infinitely elaborated, in a never ending regression of intercontinental ballistic missile gaps and theater warfare gaps and tactical “mini-nuke” gaps, *ad infinitum*, thus legitimating both massive vertical proliferation and arms racing.

Deterrence theory is also a fiction in that it depends upon “rational actors,” for whom what counts as “rational” is the same, independent of culture, history, or individual difference. It depends on those “rational actors” perfectly understanding the meaning of “signals” communicated by military actions, despite dependence on technologies that sometimes malfunction; despite cultural difference and the lack of communication that is part of being political enemies; despite the difficulties of ensuring mutual understanding even when best friends make direct face-to-face statements to each other. It depends on those same “rational actors” engaging in a very specific kind of calculus that includes one set of variables (e.g., weapons size, deliverability, survivability, as well as the “credibility” of their and their opponent’s threats), and excludes other variables (such as domestic political pressures, economics, or individual subjectivity). What is striking from a feminist perspective is that even while “realists” may worry that some opponents are so “insufficiently rational” as to be undeterrollable, this does not lead them to search for a more reliable form of ensuring security, or an approach that is not so weapons-dependent.

Cynthia Cockburn, in her study of women’s peace projects in conflict zones, describes one of the women’s activities as helping each other give up “dangerous day dreams.” From a feminist anti-war perspective, having WMD as deterrents is a dangerous dream. The dream of perfect rationality and control which underwrites deterrence theory is a dangerous dream, since it legitimates constructing a system that only could be (relatively) safe if that perfect rationality and control were actually possible. Deterrence theory itself is a dangerous dream because it justifies producing and deploying WMD, thereby making their accidental or purposive use possible (and far more likely) than if they were not produced at all, nor deployed in such numbers. “Realists” are quick to point out the dangers of *not having* WMD for deterrence when other states have them. Feminist perspectives suggest that that danger only appears so self-evidently greater than the danger of *having* WMD if you discount as “soft” serious attention to the costs of development and deployment.
Question Four

Question four asks: “If some nations possess weapons of mass destruction (either licitly or illicitly) for defensive and deterrent purposes, is it proper to deny such possession to others for the same purposes?”.

We believe that the rampant proliferation of weapons of all kinds, from hand guns to nuclear weapons, is a massive tragedy, the direct and indirect source of great human suffering. Given this starting point, we of course oppose the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. But our opposition does not allow us to give a simple “yes” answer to Question Four as it is posed. Before turning to proliferation as a phenomenon, we must first consider current proliferation discourse.

Proliferation as a Discourse

“Proliferation” is not a mere description or mirror of a phenomenon that is “out there,” but rather a very specific way of identifying and constructing a problem. “Proliferation,” as used in Western political discourse, does not simply refer to the “multiplication” of weapons of mass destruction on the planet. Rather, it constructs some WMD as a problem, and others as unproblematic. It does so by assuming pre-existing, legitimate possessors of the weapons, implicitly not only entitled to those weapons, but to “modernize” and develop new “generations” of them as well. The “problematic” WMD are only those that “spread” into the arsenals of other, formerly non-possessor states. This is presumably the basis for the “licit/illicit” distinction in the question; it does not refer to the nature of the weapons themselves, nor even to the purposes for which they are intended – only, in the case of nuclear weapons, to who the possessor is, where “licitness” is based on the treaty-enshrined “we got there first.”

Thus, use of the term “proliferation” tends to locate the person who uses it within a possessor state, and aligns him or her with the political stance favoring the hierarchy of state power enshrined in the current distribution of WMD. The framing of Question Four. “... is it proper to deny [WMD] possession to others for the same purposes?”, seems similarly based in a possessor state perspective, as it is presumably the possessor states who must decide whether it is proper to deny possession to others.

As we have already stated, we find WMD themselves intrinsically morally indefensible, no matter who possesses them, and we are concerned about the wide array of costs to any state of development and deployment. We therefore reject the discourse’s implicit division of “good” and “bad,” “safe” and “unsafe” WMD, (defined as good or bad depending on who possesses them). Our concern is to understand how some WMD are rendered invisible (“ours”) and some visible (“theirs”); some rendered malignant and others benign.
Here, we join others in noting that the language in which the case against “proliferation” is made is ethno-racist and contemptuous. Generally, in Western proliferation discourse as a whole, a distinction is drawn between “the ‘Self’ (seen as responsible) vs the non-Western Unruly Other.” The US represents itself as a rational actor, while representing the Unruly Other as emotional, unpredictable, irrational, immature, misbehaving. Not only does this draw on and reconstruct an Orientalist portrayal of third world actors; it does so through the medium of gendered terminology. By drawing the relations between possessors and non-possessors in gendered terms – the prudential, rational, advanced, mature, restrained, technologically- and bureaucratically-competent (and thus “masculine”) Self, versus the emotional, irrational, unpredictable, uncontrolled, immature, primitive, undisciplined, technologically-incompetent (and thus “feminine”) Unruly Other – the discourse naturalizes and legitimates the Self/possessor states having weapons which the Other does not. By drawing on and evoking gendered imagery and resonances, the discourse naturalizes the idea that “We” / the US / the responsible father must protect, must control and limit “her,” the emotional, out-of-control state, for her own good, as well as for ours.

This Western proliferation discourse has had a function in the wider context of US national security politics. With the end of the “Evil Empire” in the late 1980s, until the attacks of September 11th, 2001, the US appeared to be without an enemy of grand enough proportions to justify maintaining its sprawling military-industrial establishment. This difficulty was forestalled by the construction of the category of “rogue states” – states seen as uncontrollable, irresponsible, irrational, malevolent, and antagonistic to the West. Their unruliness and antagonism was represented as intrinsic to their irrational nature; if it were not in their “nature,” the US would have needed to ask more seriously if actions on the part of the West had had any role in producing that hostility and disorder.

The discourse of WMD proliferation has been one of the principal means of producing these states as major threats. To say this is neither to back away from our position opposing weapons of mass destruction, nor to assess the degree to which WMD in the hands of “Other” states actually do threaten the US, the “Other” states’ regional opponents, or their own population. But it is an assessment of the role of WMD proliferation discourse in naturalizing and legitimating otherwise-difficult-to-make-appear-rational programs and expenditures such as National Missile Defense.

**Proliferation as a phenomenon**

Within the logic of deterrence theory and proliferation discourse, the phenomenon of WMD proliferation is understandable in two main ways. States either acquire WMD for purposes of aggression – i.e., to use WMD or to threaten their use in acts of aggression, intimidation and/or coercion against other states or populations within their own state. Or states acquire WMD to enhance their own security by deterring an opponent from attack. Within a strategic calculus, either is understood as a “rational” motivation for WMD possession, even if not everyone would view these reasons as equally morally defensible.
Some in the security community have argued that this “realist consensus” about states’ motivations for development of WMD “is dangerously inadequate.” They argue that “nuclear weapons, like other weapons, are more than tools of national security; they are political objects of considerable importance in domestic debates and internal bureaucratic struggles and can also serve as international normative symbols of modernity and identity.” We agree, but would add that the understanding any of those motivations will be incomplete without gender analysis.

We argue that gendered terms and images are an integral part of the ways national security issues are thought about and represented – and that it matters. During the Gulf War, for example, the mass media speculated whether George Bush had finally “beat the wimp factor.” When in the spring of 1998 India exploded five nuclear devices, Hindu nationalist leader Balasaheb Thackeray explained “we had to prove that we are not eunuchs.” An Indian newspaper cartoon “depicted Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee propping up his coalition government with a nuclear bomb. ‘Made with Viagra,’ the caption read.”

Feminists argue that these images are not trivial, but instead deserve analysis. Metaphors which equate political and military power with sexual potency and masculinity serve to both shape and limit the ways in which national security is conceptualized. Political actors incorporate sexual metaphors in their representations of nuclear weapons as a way to mobilize gendered associations and symbols in creating assent, excitement, support for, and identification with the weapons and their own political regime. Moreover, gendered metaphor is not only an integral part of accomplishing domestic power aims. The use of these metaphors also appropriates the test of a nuclear weapon into the occasion for reinforcing patriarchal gender relations.

That a nation wishing to stake a claim to being a world power (or a regional one) should choose nuclear weapons as its medium for doing so is often seen as “natural”: the more advanced military destructive capacity you have, the more powerful you are. The “fact” that nuclear weapons would be the coin of the realm in establishing a hierarchy of state power is fundamentally unremarked, unanalyzed, taken for granted by most (nonfeminist) analysts. Some anti-war feminists, by contrast, have looked with a historical and post-colonial eye, and seen nuclear weapons’ enshrinement of as the emblem of power not as a natural fact, but as a social one, produced by the actions of states. They argue that when the United States, with the most powerful economy and conventional military in the world, acts as though its power and security are guaranteed only by a large nuclear arsenal, it creates a context in which nuclear weapons become the ultimate necessity for and symbol of state security. And when the US or any other nuclear power works hard to ensure that other states don’t obtain nuclear weapons, it is creating a context in which nuclear weapons become the ultimate arbiter of political power.

An ethical nonproliferation politics?

Finally, after our critique of both the framing and political uses of Western proliferation discourse, and our questioning of the adequacy of the models through which proliferation as a
phenomenon is understood, there remains the question: “If some nations possess weapons of mass destruction (either licitly or illicitly) for defensive and deterrent purposes, is it proper to deny such possession to others for the same purposes?”.

We have spoken of the multiple costs of developing and deploying nuclear weapons to their possessors (Q3) and the immense suffering that weapons of mass destruction would bring. Given what we have said, we should not be indifferent to other states' developing nuclear weapons unless we were indifferent to them. Additionally, as we argue in Q5, we believe that more WMD in more places would make their “accidental” or purposive use by states, as well as their availability to terrorists, more likely. So we are opposed to the development and deployment of any WMD, by any state or non-state actor.

Despite this clear opposition to the spread of WMD, we are uneasy simply answering “no” to the question as it is posed. The question assumes that some states already have WMD, and asks only whether it is proper to deny WMD to others. Denying WMD to others implies maintaining the current international balance of power, in which the West is privileged, politically and economically. As feminists, we oppose the extreme inequality inherent in the current world order, and are troubled by actions which will further enshrine it. But at the same time, we cannot endorse WMD proliferation as a mode of equalization; nor do we see it as an effective form of redress.

Second, we come to the question not only as feminists, but as citizens of the most highly armed possessor state. As such, we must ask: are citizens of possessor states entitled to judge, threaten, allow or encourage the decisions of non-possession states to develop WMD? On what grounds? In what discursive territory? As we have outlined above, we find the existing proliferation discourse too ethno-racist, too focused on horizontal rather than vertical proliferation, and too sanguine about the justifiability of “our” having what “they” are not fit to have.

Our task then, as anti-war feminists, is to learn how to participate in a constructive conversation, eschewing the vocabulary of “proliferation,” learning to listen, perhaps publicizing the warnings that women – and men – are issuing about the multiple costs and risks of WMD in their particular states. As citizens of the most highly armed possessor state, our credibility as participants in this conversation will be contingent upon our committed efforts to bring about nuclear disarmament in our own state, and our efforts to redress the worldwide inequalities that are underwritten by our military superiority.

**Question Five**

Our tradition has advocated and will continue to advocate unilateral reduction in nuclear arms. Our commitment to nuclear disarmament originates in a general understanding of the use and dangers of weapons. We begin by noting that conflict is endemic to human relationships. “Peace” means, among other things, engaging in conflicts, i.e. “fighting,” without actually injuring or damaging others, without trying to do so, at best without being willing to do so.
There will always be something at hand to use as a weapon and threaten the “peace”; it is impossible to create a weaponless scene of conflict. A child’s block, a kitchen knife, a passenger airliner can injure or kill. There is no substitute, then, for learning to fight without resorting to weapons.

But having “real” weapons at hand makes conflict far more dangerous. It makes injuring more likely, whether accidental, deliberate, unwitting or willing. It also tends to expand the scale of injury; e.g., while two airliners hitting the World Trade Center resulted in more than 3,000 deaths, a “small” nuclear warhead dropped on the twin towers would have instantly killed at least 100,000, with another 100,000 deaths in the days that followed. Deliberately relying on weapons – purchasing them, learning to use them, keeping them nearby – makes less likely the development of other strategies of self protection. Once on the scene, weapons may be used in anger or ignorance, just because they are nearby. Weapons injure; insofar as possible they should cleared out.

Nonetheless, individuals and states continue to keep weapons at hand. States and citizens draw lessons from history that show the dangers of disarmament. We believe that the recourse to weapons underestimates their complex costs and dangers. People equate being armed with being safe, unarmored with being vulnerable. They overlook the risk of guns at hand, and exaggerate the protection guns may give. But we understand that the issue of weapons arises from personal experience and collective identities, that it is deeply felt and in no way simple. We would only insist that weapons are never a substitute for negotiation and non-violent fighting, and that they may well hinder their success.

When we turn to weapons of mass destruction we have only three additional comments. First, given the political will, nuclear weapons are among the most easily reduced. The scale of the effort required to produce them, the scientific and technological expertise and financial investment involved, have all militated toward state ownership and control of nuclear weapons. Thus, in contrast to weapons such as small arms – which are unregulated, can travel anywhere, and often become the property of near-children – nuclear weapons are relatively controllable, and so can be selectively destroyed.

Secondly, unilateral disarmament is not an all or nothing matter, in which weapons disappear almost overnight. Would that this were possible. In reality, destroying nuclear weapons would be a massively complicated feat; slow and gradual at best. It is often said, rightly, that the US can never disarm itself completely, can never lose the capacity to develop nuclear weapons. We are saying that the US would lose nothing by beginning to destroy its remaining weapons. It would always have weapons, remain a nuclear “power,” even if it wished otherwise. The example of unilateral disarmament might, on the other hand, lend credibility to the stated desire for a more stable world less endangered by nuclear weapons.
Finally, Bush’s nuclear missile defense, Reagan’s impenetrable shield redux, symbolizes the sense of safety and power that nuclear weapons of all kinds appear to bestow. We know that even if such a shield were technologically feasible, it would be porous, “penetrable”: not only by nuclear warheads on missiles, but by nuclear weapons in suitcases, on boats and in piper cubs; by biological weapons sent through the mail; by chemical weapons sprayed by crop-dusters; by passenger airliners employed as tools of mass destruction. But “giving up” weapons, and giving up the promise (no matter how far-fetched) of a means to defend against them, makes one feel vulnerable – and, thus, by extension, “feminine.” There is nothing shameful – and nothing masculine or feminine – about the desire to be safe and to provide safety for others. But the hope of finding safety in weapons is another “dangerous dream” that nuclear weapons inspire.

**Question Six**

The final question asks us to evaluate current or proposed treaty agreements concerning nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. We are offered a place at the negotiating table, a position few women, probably fewer feminists, have occupied.

For feminists there are two questions: How should we respond to the invitation? And, what should we say about particular treaties if we accept? The second question is not one to which anti-war feminists have a distinctive answer arising from our tradition. It is the first question, whether to come to the table and how to act effectively once there, that traditionally and today preoccupies feminists.

Peacemaking, like war, has been dominated by men. Few women have been asked to participate in negotiations; when asked, it has usually been late, after the agenda was already set. But women are now claiming their place in negotiations. They have participated in the struggles and have a right to be present; many feel that only they will represent women’s distinctive interests.

Getting and accepting an invitation is only the first step in being able to participate effectively. Often women have to overcome outright hostility and ridicule from male participants. When they are treated with courtesy, they may still feel unable to express their concerns, and ignored or dismissed when they try. Even when present in large numbers, women may be unable fully to engage. In South Africa women were welcomed to the peace table, occupied half its seats, but no one had contended with the divisions of work and responsibility in their lives. When negotiations lasted well into the night, no one was taking care of their husbands and children; women who stayed became tense and preoccupied.

Women’s difficulties participating in peace negotiations may be especially marked when the topic is weapons, a subject which, as we have said, is particularly liable to lend itself to abstraction. A report by a woman participant at biological weapons treaty negotiations sounds familiar themes. What counts as “reason” prevailed, what gets coded as “emotions” were excluded. Disturbing concerns, for example, with the effects of a vaccine on troops or the
populace, were labeled “emotional.” Speakers engaged in “cool, detached reasoning about the possible uses of weapons against an adversary.... ‘Useful’ in this context means ability to cause serious loss of life.” Talking about a vaccine’s negative effects was tantamount to “complaining,” “whining,” “carrying on.”

In discussion of biological weapons, as in issues of proliferation, the dichotomous division between reason and emotion is entwined with a similar division between [Western] Self and [unruly] Other, a particular instance of self and other, Us and Enemy typical of peace and arms negotiation. “One test of belonging and being heard in this group was whether one accepted the nature of the source of the BW problem. Did one accept the identity of the adversary?” That identity was often described in racist terms – e.g., “[they] don’t value human life the way we do” – and these remarks elicited no comment.

‘To belong and speak and be heard’ would mean ignoring the rules and interrupting the cool detached voice of reason. Again the gender discourse system is at work, frustrating these efforts. An objection which acknowledges emotion, which talks about the fate of bodies or lives, becomes an “outburst.” Reason ignores them in order to continue the discussion of weapons and their effects. Outbursts are “feminine”; in the silence that follows an outburst anyone, male or female, can “feel like a woman.” The effect of gender discourse depends upon a person’s complex personal and social identities. But for a feminist, who aims to speak as herself-who-is-a-woman, the accusation of “being a woman” or a wimp has to be poignantly inhibiting.

For feminists struggling to participate effectively, the final insult may be the realization that the negotiations, especially if they are presented as inclusive and democratic, are more ritualistic displays than political action. “In reality, major decisions are made in secret in the capitals, based on calculations that seek military (and increasingly commercial) advantages.” In the words of a male political scientist: “arms control is war by other means.” Real power is always already somewhere else by the time a woman takes her place at the table.

Should women then give up the effort to join in negotiations? It seems that many do. [They] “get intimidated, and don’t put up with it, so they step aside.” But other women in increasing numbers are resisting ridicule and discrimination in order to make their views known. There are many reasons, personal and social, why some women persevere where others do not. Cultural attitudes toward women vary; women are more easily heard when many women are present, especially if they are linked in alliances that include all parties in conflict.

One reason that some women persevere is their belief that they have a distinctive perspective to bring to negotiation. Women participants in peace negotiations have said that they bring to the table an ability to experience of “the severe human consequences of conflict” and a commitment to expose the “underbelly of war.” They stress the importance of speaking openly about pain and fear and loss, of building trust among adversaries, of opening up difficult, divisive issues rather than cloaking them in rhetoric or postponing them. They are apt to “see more clearly the continuum of conflict that stretches from the beating at home to the rape on the street to the
“They witness vivid links between violence, poverty and inequality in daily lives.” They define peace in terms of “basic universal human needs” but advocate practical solutions to the building of peace, focusing on ordinary safety, housing, education and child care.\(^5\)

In sum, these women introduce a perspective that satisfies the criteria of the “feminine” as it functions metaphorically in gender discourse. The women only sometimes compare themselves to men, occasionally with some anger, more often speaking quietly of what they, women, are more likely, often, to believe and do. But it would be hard to *accuse* them of acting like a woman; and, if women are present in sufficient numbers, they may be less vulnerable to the silencing power of gendered national security discourse.

Making treaties is only a small part of making peace. There are virtues in treaty making even when individual treaties are seriously flawed. Negotiating requires structured places in which opponents can talk; signed treaties require further conversation and negotiation. Prolonged negotiations create relations that at the least survive post-treaty crises, and at best may help resolve them. But treaties are no substitute for peace-building processes. They are made in formal contexts where participants are apt to cling to their ethno-national political identities and to keep their eye on political boundaries, rewards, and positions.\(^5\) Among treaties, arms control negotiations, which extrapolate weapons from their context of injury and pain, may be the least amenable to the perspectives attributed to, and claimed by, women.

But if there are to be treaties, if weapons of mass destruction are to be subject to negotiation, then our tradition would encourage the participation of women. This is not because we believe that women offer a perspective “different” from men’s – though that may be the case in many cultures at this historical moment. What gets left out of dominant ways of thinking about weapons – the emotional, the concrete, the particular, the human bodies and their vulnerability, human lives and their subjectivity – is neither masculine nor feminine but human. Rather, we would hope that the power of gender discourse to exclude what is now coded as “feminine” would be weakened by the presence of numbers of women for whom “acting and feeling like a woman” were a matter of course, even sometimes a source of strength, not an occasion for self-doubt and silence.
NOTES

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i From a speech by Harry S. Truman. The full text was published in the New York Times, August 10, 1945, p 12.


iii Certain figures are taken as representatives of anti-war feminism. Images of Kathe Kollwitz’ art work and phrases from Virginia Woolf’s writing appear on postcards and t-shirts. On a deeper look each of these women express complexities of anti-war feminism. Kollwitz, who sent her son “off to war” with flowers and a blessing, slowly and with difficulty achieved an anti-war stance. Woolf, whose imagination was fundamentally shaped by her fear and rejection of war, found her anti-militarism tested by Nazi aggression. Woolf explicitly situated her anti-war feminism within a particular class: “daughters of educated men.” Yet Cynthia Enloe, who studies the effects of masculinist militarization on women’s lives across the globe, finds that Woolf’s Three Guineas (New York, NY: Harcourt Brace 1938) sheds “new light on the subtle practices of militarization” with each new group of students from “the United States, Japan, Mali, Korea, Bulgaria.” [Enloe, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2000.)] The editors of Feminist Studies chose for its post-September 11th cover a photograph of Jane Addams at 70 “campaigning for peace” with her friend Mary McDowell, who, like Addams, was a pacifist, suffragist and unionist. Jean Bethke Elshtain, herself an engaged reporter on and ambivalent participant in anti-war feminism, has just produced a biography of Addams and a “reader” that collects Addams’ writings. Addams was ostracized for reporting that many soldiers were loath to kill, that they could use a bayonet only after they were given ‘dope.’ Were Addams now to become representative, as Kollwitz and Woolf are, she would highlight the typical commitments of anti-war feminism to social justice and to the well-being of men made killers in war.

Our tradition is represented by groups as much as by individuals. Among the most venerable is the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), which was founded in 1915 to protest World War I, and which today is actively involved in disarmament and non-proliferation issues, as well as in advocacy for gender analysis in security affairs at the United Nations. During the Cold War, many women’s movements protested nuclear weapons (see note # 21). Many other women’s protest movements represent some but not all aspects of anti-war feminism. The courageous protest of the Madres of Argentina against a military dictatorship
only gradually became anti-militarist and seems never to have been conventionally feminist. Women in Black began in Israel/Palestine and has moved to many conflict-ridden sites around the world; though it nearly everywhere engages in struggles for peace, its members differ about the extent and generality of its anti-militarism. In armed conflict zones around the world, there are many other women’s peace initiatives and groups, although many would identify themselves as anti-war, fewer would adopt the label “feminist.” An excellent place to start researching these groups is the website “www.peacewomen.org,” which was started to provide a clearinghouse of information and website links for women’s peace groups.


v This is of necessity a brief and simplified account of just war theory. In the extensive literature we recommend particularly Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 2nd Edition (New York: Basic Books, 1992), and The Catholic Bishops’ Letter: “The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response,” Origins, May 19, 1983, vol. 13, no. 1. This letter is distinct in its concern for the effects of the war system. For extensive criticism of just war theory, see Robert Holmes, On War and Morality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), and Duane Cady, From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989). In respect to jus ad bellum, Holmes notes that successive generations respond to perceived threats without regard to their cumulative effect. “In the process most societies become transformed into war systems, geared socially, politically and economically to the maintenance and often celebration of organized violence.” Holmes, p. 12. In regard to jus in bello, Holmes notes that anyone who justifies going to war necessarily justifies the willful injury, maiming, killing, and destruction that are inherent to and intended by war. Holmes, p. 181. For a feminist critique of the Catholic Bishops Letter, see Mary C. Segers, “A Consistent Life Ethic: A Feminist Perspective on the Pro-Peace and Pro-Life Activities of the American Catholic Bishops,” in

Cynthia Enloe has been a pioneer in this field. See her works, including: Does Khaki Become You?: The Militarization of Women's Lives (Boston: South End Press, 1983); Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); and Maneuvers.

The moment one looks beyond the simple equation of war-making with aggression, and asks what men actually do when they make war, it is apparent that many of the activities involve no aggression at all. And so the equation of militarized masculinity and aggression holds up no better. For some men at war, masculinity must be inextricably linked to having and firing weapons. But for others, it must inhere in cooking for or cleaning up after soldiers; and for others, masculinity will be found in suits and ties and abstract strategizing. For some men masculinity takes the form of taking risks in order to kill and destroy; for others, it is taking risks for the sake of healing, and for others, masculinity will have little if anything to do with risk-taking, as they sit behind desks far from the frontlines. Some men must find masculinity in their physical capacity to slog through miles of jungle or desert terrain; others must find it in their cognitive capacity to design high tech armaments. Each of these masculinities, and more, are required for war-making. On the multiple masculinities required by war-making, see Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, and Enloe, especially Bananas, Beaches, and Bases and The Morning After.

For men’s reluctance to fight, see Joshua S Goldstein, War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa (California: University of California Press, 2001), especially Ch. 5. The relation between masculinity, aggression and war remains highly controversial. Goldstein provides a lucid, balanced assessment of this debate.

See Enloe, especially Maneuvers and Bananas, Beaches, and Bases; Jacklyn Cock, Women and War in South Africa (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1993).


Carol Cohn and Sarah Ruddick

(Boston: Beacon Press, 1995); Radhika Coomaraswamy, “Reinventing International Law: Women’s Rights as Human Rights in the International Community,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, vol. 28, no. 2 April-June 1996. Cynthia Cockburn reports: “To the women working in the refugee projects of the Yugoslav successor states...it sometimes seems as if the Yugoslav wars of 1992-1995 were wars waged against women...Eighty four percent of the refugees are women and children. Many have been raped and abused as women by male fighters. All come with stories about the destruction of everything they had nurtured: offspring, homes, fruit trees, cows and sheep, small businesses.” Cockburn, The Space Between Us, p. 156.


15 Cockburn, The Space Between Us, p. 8.

16 This is primarily a description of after-effects on societies whose territories have been the site of warfare. But even those societies whose soldiers fight in distant lands suffer related effects. Surviving soldiers may bring home the effects of violence: injured bodies and minds; remorse, rage and despair; habits of aggression and abuse; syndromes of suffering.

17 Chappell, in this volume, 2002.


19 Cohn, “Sex and Death.”

20 Graca Machel makes the same point in the context of talking about war’s effects on children. In The Impact of War on Children: A Review of Progress (NY: UNICEF, 2001), she titles the tenth chapter, “Small Arms, Light Weapons: Mass Destruction,” and writes that “The most widely used weapons of mass destruction are not nuclear or biological - they are the estimated 500 million small arms and light weapons that are fueling bloodshed and mayhem around the world.” p. 119. For a gender perspective on small arms, see Wendy Cukier, “Gender and Small Arms,” presented to Gender Perspectives on Disarmament, United Nations, NY, March 14, 2001; Ginette Saucier, Seizing the Advantage: Integrating Gender into Small Arms Proliferation. (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, forthcoming); Magdalene Hsien Chen Pua, ed., “The Devastating Impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons on the Lives of Women: A Collection of Testimonies” (NY: Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, July 2001); and the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, “Gender Perspectives on Disarmament Briefing Notes # 3: Gender Perspectives on Small Arms,” (NY: United Nations, 2001). The best starting place for exploring small arms issues is the website of IANSA (The International Action Network on Small Arms): http://www.iansa.org.


Hisako Matsubara, Cranes at Dusk (Garden City, New York: Dial Press, 1985). The author was a child in Kyoto at the time the atomic bomb was dropped. Her description is based on the memories of survivors.

Cohn, “Wars, Wimps and Women.”

Feminists are not the only ones who focus on development and deployment as phenomena unto themselves. The Catholic Bishops Letter, for example, explicitly links nuclear weapons spending and poverty.

Sangari et al., “Why Women Must Reject,” p. 48. Some defenders of nuclear weapons argue that nuclear weapons are actually economically beneficial, as a form of “defense on the cheap” (in contrast to the costs of conventional weapons and armies). Sangari et al reject this argument, pointing out that “Nuclearisation will not eliminate the necessity for conventional weapons. On the contrary, by provoking neighboring countries severely, it has made the prospect of conventional warfare far more imminent, and has stepped up military investment altogether.”

In 1995, a study by the Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project Committee was the first systematic attempt to catalog the comprehensive cost of the US nuclear weapons program from inception in 1940 to 1995. When they included the costs to develop, field and maintain the nuclear arsenal and to defend against attacks from nuclear-armed adversaries, the cost was about 4 trillion dollars. That figure did not include the cost of disposing of hundreds of tons of uranium and plutonium. It did not include the money spent on National Missile Defense. Nor did it include the costs of the environmental clean up necessitated by the “unprecedented legacy of toxic and radioactive pollution at dozens of sites and thousands of facilities across the country,” which they estimated would cost at least half a trillion more, where it can be cleaned

30 Schwartz, “Four Trillion Dollars.”

31 This point is made by Sangari et al, “Why Women Must Reject,” p. 47.


33 Roy, “The End of Imagination,” p.101. She writes: “It is such supreme folly to believe that nuclear weapons are deadly only if they’re used. The fact that they exist at all, their very presence in our lives, will wreak more havoc than we can begin to fathom.”


35 Cockburn, The Space Between Us, p.11.


38 For “rogue states,” see Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America's Search for a New Foreign Policy (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995). See also, Wright, “Feminist Tales.”


40 Scott Sagan, for example, has argued that “nuclear weapons programs also serve other, more parochial and less obvious objectives.” Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” International Security, vol. 21, no. 3 (1996/97):54-86. On our view all three of the models Sagan outlines – the “security model,” the “domestic politics model,” and the “norms model” – are seriously weakened by their failure to incorporate gender analysis.


42 Cohn, “Wars, Wimps, and Women.”

43 Arundhati Roy put it this way: “But let us pause to give credit where it’s due. Whom must we thank for all this? The Men who made it happen. The Masters of the Universe. Ladies and gentlemen, the United States of America! Come on up here, folks, stand up and take a bow.
Thank you for doing this to the world. Thank you for making a difference. Thank you for showing us the way. Thank you for altering the very meaning of life.” Roy, “The End of Imagination,” pp. 100-01.

Some Indian feminists have combined this attention to weapons-as-symbols-in-world-power-relations with an analysis of the gendered meanings of power. Basu and Basu argue that the BJP’s decision to explode five nuclear bombs was in part an attempt “to shatter stereotypes about the ‘effeminate’ Indian that date back to the period of British colonialism.” The British particularly disparaged ‘feminized’ Hindu masculinity, while seeing Muslims as “robust and brave.” Basu & Basu, “India: of Men, Women, and Bombs,” p. 39.

44 The term “constructive conversation” was introduced to us through a conversation Carol had with Laura Chasin, the director of the Public Conversations Project. Their website, http://www.publicconversations.org, would be a valuable resource for anyone who is trying to think about political conflict.

45 “Women Building Peace: From the Village Council to the Negotiating Table” is a network of grassroots activists and national and international organizations focused on getting women included in peace processes. See their website, (www.international-alert.org/women) as well as the website of “Women Waging Peace” (www.womenwagingpeace.net), for more information on women’s participation in peace-building efforts, including peace negotiations. In October 2000, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1325 on Women, International Peace and Security, which affirmed the importance of women’s role in peace-building, and stressed the importance of women’s equal participation in all efforts for the promotion of peace and security.


48 Wright, “Feminist Tales.”

49 Wright, “Feminist Tales.”

50 Wright, “Feminist Tales.” She cites Barry Posen, “Military Lessons of The Gulf War--Implications for Middle East Arms Control” in Shai Feldman and Ariel Levite, eds., Arms Control and the New Middle East Security Environment (Jerusalem: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1994), p.64.

51 Hanan Ashrawi, cited in Anderlini, Women at the Peace Table, p.29.
52 Quotes and paraphrases from Anderlini, *Women at the Peace Table*, pp. 29-36 and passim

53 Anderlini, *Women at the Peace Table*. 
