8

Mainstreaming Gender in UN Security Policy: A Path to Political Transformation?¹

Carol Cohn

In October of 2000, the UN Security Council (SC) unanimously adopted Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security (WPS).² Resolution 1325 is often called a landmark resolution because it represents the first time the SC directly addressed the subject of women and armed conflict, beyond a few passing references to women as victims, or women as a "vulnerable group." It not only recognizes that women have been active in peace-building and conflict prevention but it also recognizes women’s right to participate – as decision-makers at all levels – in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peace-building processes. Further, it calls for all participants in peace negotiations “to adopt a gender perspective,” and “expresses its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations.” Gender perspectives, in this context, are taken to include attention to the special needs of women and girls during disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation, reintegration, and post-conflict reconstruction, as well as measures supporting local women’s peace initiatives. Resolution 1325 recognizes that women are disproportionately victimized in wars and calls upon all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to respect women's rights, to protect women from gender-based violence, and to end impunity for crimes of violence against women and girls. It calls for gender training for peacekeepers and others involved in peace operations. And it calls for better representation of women throughout the UN system itself.

In other words, although "gender mainstreaming" has been official UN policy since 1997,³ Resolution 1325 represents the first time that gender has been mainstreamed in the armed conflict and security side of the UN.⁴ It was the product of a sophisticated feminist initiative – launched by NGOs and later picked up by women’s advocates within the UN. The struggle to move it from rhetorical commitment to practical...
implementation is currently the focus of a massive mobilization of women’s political energies in many different countries. The idea of mobilizing to influence the SC, to get a SC resolution passed, and to then try to change the functioning of the security apparatus of the UN represents a new, daring, and ambitious strategy for anti-war feminists. While feminists internationally have long been active in trying to shape the UN agenda in areas such as development, human rights, and violence against women, the main focus of their work has been the General Assembly (GA) or the substantive Commissions of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) such as the Human Rights Commission and the Commissions on the Status of Women (CSW), Sustainable Development and Social Development. Although the NGOs discussed the possibility of continuing to work in the GA, the SC represented a more potent venue for action. As the primary UN decision-making body in the area of international peace and security, the SC is at the center of UN power. Not coincidentally, it is also an overwhelmingly male and masculinist domain, devoted to the “hardcore” issue of military threats to international peace and security.5

Thus, the initiative to pass and implement 1325 can be seen as a bold move to influence what is arguably the most powerful global governance institution in the area of international peace and security. It can also be seen as a strategy that has channeled tremendous amounts of women’s energies and resources into engagement with the micro-politics, processes, and paradigms of a conservative institution, as well as with interstate diplomatic political machinations. What is certain is that the strategy has provoked an extremely complex process of reciprocal re-shaping, at both individual and organizational levels.

An assessment of the impact of the initiative to pass and implement Resolution 1325 reveals some of the challenges and complexities that feminist political analyses and practice face in the process of engaging with global governance institutions. In this chapter, after providing a brief account of the genesis and diffusion of 1325, I first explore what it means to “assess the impact” of such an initiative, suggesting that it is a far more complex and multifaceted project than it might first appear. Drawing on my study of 1325 and informed by my experiences as both a feminist researcher and a participant observer, I articulate a series of questions meant to tease out some of those many dimensions of impact, both inside the global governance institution and outside its bounds, in an attempt to ensure attention to the full range of actors engaged in and by this initiative when “assessing impact.” I then go on to address just a fraction of those questions, focusing on the question of the degree to which this “policy victory” reflects the original motivations, beliefs and purposes of the NGOs, both the explicitly feminist and the non-feminist, that fostered it, and on the political implications of the discursive strategy used to achieve this victory. I end with a number of personal reflections on the implications of the construction of women as “peacemakers.”

The genesis of 1325

The conceptual roots of 1325 lie in the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action’s chapter devoted to women and armed conflict.6 It was at the 1998 UN CSW debate about the obstacles to implementing that chapter that a group of NGOs, the Women and Armed Conflict Caucus, started to think about taking the issue of “women, peace and security” (WPS) to the SC. Two years later, the 2000 CSW (known as “Beijing +5”) served as the review of the Beijing Platform for Action as a whole, and here again, issues of women and armed conflict became a focus of discussion. In participants’ accounts, the March 2000 International Women’s Day Presidential Statement by (then) Security Council President Anwarul Chowdhury of Bangladesh (2000),7 in which he called for the SC to examine the intersections between gender, peace, and security, emerges as a crucial rhetorical act, which NGOs could then use as legitimization for their assertions that a discussion of women and security could and should be on the SC’s agenda. At the end of the March 2000 CSW, the NGO Working Group on WPS, http://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/ (hereafter “the Working Group”) was formed to advocate for a SC resolution. The six founding members were: Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF); Amnesty International; International Alert; Hague Appeal for Peace; Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children; and Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice.

The drafting and passage of the resolution is ultimately an enormously multifaceted and complex story with many different actors. For the purposes of this chapter, I want to focus on the Working Group and two points that are crucial. First, the entire groundwork for this resolution, including the initial drafting and the political work of preparing SC members to accept that the resolution was relevant to and had precedents in the SC’s work, was done by NGOs. This is perhaps the only SC resolution of which that can be said. The NGOs accomplished this through an extremely sophisticated strategy. They worked to educate the Council, finding as much high-quality relevant literature as they could, and presenting it, along with summaries, to the Council delegations.
They combed through every UN document from the institution's inception, finding every reference in any way relevant to the WPS agenda, and provided the Ambassadors with a compendium of “agreed language” which showed the basis for committing themselves to the language of the resolution. They met with Council members (learning the protocol for how and when to approach them) and also worked to develop relationships with relevant departments of government in the member states' capitals. They supplied information about poorly understood conflicts from women's groups “on the ground,” thus providing Council members with a valuable resource. Toward the end, they brought women from conflict zones to address the Council in an Arria formula meeting, bringing to men who rarely left New York a concrete, personal awareness of both women's victimization in war and their agency. Generally, the Working Group self-consciously decided to position themselves as “helpers” to the Council, rather than confrontational adversaries.

The second crucial point is that although other actors eventually became very important — including the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and individual Council members such as Namibia, Jamaica, and Canada — the Working Group initiated and carried this project for months despite what they felt was a clear message from women’s advocates within the UN that “the time isn’t right, it couldn’t happen, it isn’t worth the effort.” It was not until the NGOs had made considerable political inroads that the advocates inside the UN really signed on to the project. It is one of the ironies of the Working Group’s 1325 success that group members are now accorded much more status and access within the UN, and have closer personal relationships with UN and member state insiders, resulting, I think, in a diminished willingness to take positions or actions that are advised against by UN insiders.

When the resolution was adopted in October 2000, still containing some of the language from their draft resolution, the Working Group was exultant. It was immediately apparent to all of the resolution’s advocates, however, that the work had just begun, and that getting the resolution implemented would be an even more difficult task than getting it passed. So ever since 1325’s passage, feminists inside and outside the UN have put tremendously creative thought and energy into making it a living document — an ongoing commitment for the SC, rather than a one-time rhetorical gesture. Around the UN, 1325 is known as the only resolution that has such an active constituency — and the only one that has an annual anniversary, when there are multiple panel discussions, SC meetings, and other events organized to try to advance the women, peace, and security agenda. Additionally, new groups have been formed within the UN, including the UN Inter-Agency Task-force on Women, Peace, and Security (with members from the Secretariat, as well as NGOs), as well as group of governments called Friends of 1325, to try to bring gender perspectives into the daily procedures and mechanisms of the SC and relevant UN departments.

Throughout this period, the NGO Working Group has not only directed its efforts to changing the practices of the UN itself; it has also focused on making 1325 a known and useful tool for grassroots women’s organizations in conflict zones, via publicizing the resolution in many international venues, and organizing regional consultations and trainings. The UN office of WILPF has created the PeaceWomen website, www.peacewomen.org, to share information among women peace activists from around the world — information about the resolution itself, about UN system, and topics related to women and war, and women’s organizing in specific conflicts. On a bi-weekly basis, news and updates to the website are distributed in the 1325 E-news which reaches thousands of NGOs, governments, and UN staff. One of the PeaceWomen projects is to increase the accessibility and potential impact of the resolution by translating it into as many different languages as possible — 71 as of January 2006 — although some might argue that for 1325 to be maximally useful, it also needs to be translated out of local versions of UN-ese. Two years after PeaceWomen went online, UNIFEM launched a complementary website, www.womenwarpeace.org, to provide national and international actors with timely information on the impact of conflict on women and their role in peace-building and to show how and when gender issues should be addressed in preventive actions and in post-conflict peace-building. One of their primary goals is to foster the inclusion of gender perspectives in resolutions, mandated missions, and debates of the SC and regional organizations focused on peace and security, and in the reports of the Secretary-General, which too often lack attention to specific gender issues in individual countries. The method is to provide high quality information, so that the excuse that “we had no way of knowing” is no longer unavailable.

One of the most interesting aspects of the diffusion of the resolution to grassroots organizations is the variety of ways women “on the ground” have found to make use of it. Resolution 1325 was never designed as an organizing tool for women’s movements; instead, it was shaped as an intervention in the functioning of a global governance institution, and its paragraphs mostly speak to actions to be taken by different actors within the UN system itself (e.g., the Secretary-General, the Department of Peacekeeping operations, and so on), as well as by member states.
Yet women's NGOs in conflict zones have used it in multiple strategic ways, including for consciousness raising amongst their own constituencies about women's right to participate in peace-making and political decision-making more generally; as a tool to try to hold the UN accountable in its peacekeeping operations in their own country; and as a lever for attaining political access and influence with their own local and national governments, by holding their governments accountable to commitments they made at the UN. For example:

- After women from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) heard about 1325 from UNIFEM, they wrote a memorandum to their government, telling them that as signatories to the resolution, they now needed to implement it! For two years, they lobbied extensively for 1325's implementation in the DRC, both nationally and internationally, including writing to the SC. When the UN peacekeeping mission arrived in the DRC in 2000 without a gender component, they lobbied the director of the mission for a gender office and perspective in the mission. Since a Gender Advisor became a part of the mission in March 2002, the women have been working closely with her (and later, the rest of the gender unit) on projects such as translating 1325 into the four official languages and strategies for inserting a gender perspective into all levels of the government.

- Women from Melanesia have formulated a plan of action to implement 1325 at local, regional, and national levels. They have established women's community media as a way to spread information, and to make 1325 a reality at the community level, and have established a quarterly regional magazine, *FemTalk 1325*, to highlight women and peace initiatives in the Pacific region as well as increase awareness of the implementation of 1325.

- Women in Kosovo/a have not only translated 1325 into local languages, but have also translated it out of “UN language” into more accessible terms. Among their many initiatives, they negotiated with a women's group in Italy and got some financial support from the UN to sponsor about 20 shows on TV explaining the resolution. They also organized several roundtables, not only in Kosovo/a, but also in Macedonia and Albania, and built a network around the resolution.

- At their July 9th 2003 conference on democracy in Baghdad, Iraqi women held a workshop in which they explained 1325 to the many participants (including lawyers, university lecturers, and so on) who had never heard of it. At the end of the day, they came up with recommendations, saying that, “We need equality between men and women with regard to rights and responsibilities.” They used 1325 to support their call.

- The Russian Committees of Soldiers' Mothers has used the resolution to support their own claim of legitimacy as actors working for military reform, and as a means to increase their access to institutions of state power. “Now,” according to one activist I interviewed, “when we go to talk to political or military leaders, we take it with us. And because the Russian leadership is now very concerned about their international legitimacy, they feel that they have to listen to us, because that's what the resolution says.”

Viewing the campaign to pass and implement 1325 from the perspective of the gender in global governance framework developed by Meyer and Prügl (1999), it is clear that all three kinds of phenomena they identify have been important dimensions of the development of the “women, peace and security agenda” at the UN. The resolution was born in the interchange between an intergovernmental organization and international NGOs. In the NGOs' organizing and lobbying to influence the SC, they also reached out to women who were diplomatic and political agents in different bodies of the UN, as well as to grassroots women's groups. (Some of the women leaders of the NGOs also eventually took jobs in the UNIFEM.) Ultimately, each of these sets of actors organized activities and structures of their own; they also have come together (along with a few researchers) into what can best be described, in Keck and Sikkink's term, as a transnational advocacy network (TAN) (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). The objectives of this TAN range from the extremely concrete and particular (e.g., make sure the SC mandate for the Haiti peacekeeping operation includes a P5 level gender advisor, with a budget; or make sure that peace-keeping forces get “gender training”), to the fundamental contestation of the rules and discursive practices in international peace and security institutions (e.g., what counts as “security”? Who should be at peace negotiation tables? What are the elements necessary to building sustainable peace?)

**Assessing the impact**

An assessment of the impact of the initiative to pass and implement Resolution 1325 reveals some of the challenges that feminist political analyses and practice face in the process of engaging with global governance institutions. But before looking at those challenges, it is important to pause, and recognize that “assessing the impact” itself
presents quite a challenge. Which impacts, exactly, is it important for us to assess when analysing feminist engagement with global governance institutions? (see also Prügl and True, this book).

In the case of my research on 1325, the impacts that seemed most salient, most important, shifted and multiplied. During my fieldwork with the NGOs and UN entities campaigning for 1325, the impacts that seemed most apparent were the phenomenal success of the "women, peace and security" advocates in transforming some of the SC’s rhetoric around women and war, coupled with the incredibly slow and comparatively minuscule progress in transforming the SC’s, UN Secretariat’s, and member states’ organizational and programmatic practices. The other issue I could not avoid thinking about was the impact on activists of re-shaping their activities and political agenda into a form that would make them acceptable, even attractive and valuable participants in UN policy-shaping processes.

Both of these impact questions – how has the UN changed? how have the activists changed? – are, in a sense, the “close-in” questions, the questions that almost demand one’s attention when intimately engaged in the process. Stepping back a bit, but still deriving the questions out of an empirical study of the 1325 process, it is apparent that there is a more intricate series of questions embedded in each of those two. At the same time, viewing the process from the context of the gender, governance and globalization literature (Waylen and Rai 2004; introduction, this book) suggests a broader range of questions that need to be asked. Put together, these questions comprise a list that might have at least some applicability in assessing the impact of other feminist engagements with institutions of global governance as well. It is not meant to be comprehensive, but rather an illustrative set of questions that I have found useful in seeking a more textured description and analysis of impact, and of what might in the past have been framed in terms of “cooptation versus empowerment.”

**In assessing the impact within the UN . . . .**

1. **To what degree have there been changes at the rhetorical and discursive levels?** Even if the changes appear “merely rhetorical,” what are the social and political processes through which rhetorical change becomes something more than that? How are rhetorical changes connected to experiences that lead to changes in understandings and actions? In what ways are which actors using rhetorical statements (not even commitments – just statements) as a tool to initiate what kinds of political processes?

2. **To what degree have there been changes in organizational policies and practices?** At headquarters? In the field? If there have been changes made, do they depend on the accident of committed actors in the right positions at the right time, or have they been institutionalized?

3. **Are there mechanisms in place to facilitate change?** To inform, educate, motivate, empower, reward, and hold accountable? Is there an organizational infrastructure/location to implement and facilitate the process? Does it have economic resources, and organizational status and power? Is it staffed with people who are there because they are knowledgeable and committed, or for some other reason? Are there effective means of communication between different parts of the system, to avoid reinventing the wheel, and to facilitate intra-organizational learning?

**In assessing the impact on women outside the UN . . . .**

4. **Has the resolution (or other kind of policy commitment of an institution of global governance that has been fought for by women) made a difference to women on the ground?** To what extent does a hard-fought, much celebrated “victory” by feminists working in the international arena translate into concrete effects in the lives of the women whose situation was the original motivation for the initiative? That is, has it been operationalized by state and interstate actors? And specifically, in ways that are beneficial to women?

5. **Can the resolution/policy commitment be used by women on the ground as an effective vehicle for their own organizing, mobilization, and political action?** How closely does it serve their purposes and open useful pathways? Does it re-shape their actions in ways that derail them from their own integrally developed purposes and strategies?

6. **What impact has work on the initiative had on the political practices and efficacy of the (often internationally identified) NGOs that initiated it?** How has it affected their use of their human and economic resources, and their political reputation? To what degree has it enhanced or diminished their status and ability to communicate with which actors? How has it affected their own political analyses and priorities, and their ability to act on them? Have some of the NGO activists been recruited into the global governance institution, and if so, what has the impact been on the NGO? What is the background, political experience, and political analysis of the people who replaced them in the NGO?

7. **What were the root values, beliefs, and objectives that motivated this particular initiative/engagement in attempting to influence the global governance...**
institution in the first place, and to what degree does a policy “victory” actually reflect them?

In assessing the impact both within and outside the UN...

8. What kinds of political arguments were used to “sell” this policy innovation to the global governance institution, and how were “women” constructed in the process? What are the implications for women themselves, and for the likelihood of future political successes and failures within the institution?

9. Has the resolution/policy commitment fostered discursive change at the level of foundational concepts? If so, do the operational outcomes of that commitment actually reflect/construct that conceptual re-casting?

Each of these questions arises out of my participant observation in the community of “women, peace and security” advocates in and around the UN; to begin to do justice to discussing them, each would require its own paper. What I will do for the purposes of this book is to focus on the last three, starting with #7; in the process of addressing #7, I will also briefly discuss #9. Then, the last section of the chapter explores some answers to #8, which, of course, is not to say that answering questions 1–6 is not vitally important, but that it is not possible to do it within the confines of this chapter. It would require a more institutionalist focus that would fit more directly into a gender-mainstreaming framework (similar to that used by Chappell and True in this book), whereas I adopt a more discursive approach that provides us with some different but complementary insights.

The strangest dream: gender equality, ending wars, and an end to war

Question #7 asks, “What were the root values, beliefs, analyses and objectives that motivated this particular initiative/engagement in attempting to influence the global governance institution in the first place, and to what degree does a policy ‘victory’ (1325 in this case) actually reflect them?” This is a crucial, and in practice too rarely asked, question. In the space between a group of NGOs’ motivations for action and the actual plan of action they come up with, and, in the space between their plan and the form in which a policy initiative ultimately materializes, multiple factors are at work re-shaping, and usually narrowing, the parameters of the final outcome. Yet, once the policy victory has been won, advocates’ energies tend to be poured into assuring that it is actually implemented. At that point, after months or years of concerted action invested in the initiative, activists are likely to be well aware of some of the initiative’s shortcomings. But at the same time, the activity of stepping back, consciously reconnecting to the original motivations and assessing the kinds of actions they might now suggest, is too often swallowed up in the time-urgent business of trying to hold the governance institution accountable to its commitments.

Asking about the relation between 1325 (and the whole “women, peace and security agenda” it has made possible at the UN) and the objectives of the NGOs that initiated it immediately suggests a further set of questions. One question of particular interest to me is, what were all of the different factors that contributed to constructing the final shape of the resolution? Tracing the path of 1325, from the initial perception that there was problem, to the words on the paper adopted unanimously in October 2000, reveals a myriad of factors at work. Among the most salient: the particular make-up of the NGO Working Group (e.g., which NGOs were members of it, and what were the characteristics of the main activists in each); the boundaries of the SC mandate; the institutional precedent and template set by a prior “thematic resolution” (on children and armed conflict); the Council’s structural division into permanent and non-permanent members; the accident of which countries were on the Council at that time, and their histories; the role of political horse-trading (and the many non-substantive reasons that diplomats might vote for something); and the gender-related policy tools and framings already extant in the UN at the time of the resolution initiative – most critically, the UN’s official adoption of “gender mainstreaming” as an institution-wide policy. Or, in a more abstracted version, understanding this policy outcome requires analysis of political motivations, institutional structures, and discursive framings – all the while being attentive to the serendipity of personal relationships, upon which much of this rests.

But there is a question that is logically prior to this historical tracing of 1325’s path: what were the motivations of the NGO activists in the first place? The answer is not simple. Public documents suggest that when the idea of a SC resolution was first discussed among the NGOs of the Women and Armed Conflict Caucus, and later the NGO Working Group on WPS, there were two fundamental problems they hoped to find a way to ameliorate – the terrible suffering women experience as victims of war, and the barriers women face in their quests to participate in peace negotiations. These two problems, in turn, were compounded by a third – the absence of any kind of real institutional awareness of women (much less gender analysis) in the parts of the UN specifically mandated to deal
Mainstreaming Gender in UN Security Policy

Carol Cohn 197

with armed conflict and security. So in public accounts, “protection” (of women in war) and “participation” (of women in peace-making and peace-building) appear as the key goals. And the method to achieve these was envisioned as “mainstreaming gender” in the work of the SC.

Interviews and archives suggest a more complex picture in many ways. In the NGO Working Group, as in any coalition, there were a variety of political analyses, self-definitions, and motivations. About the closest one can get to a starting point (as mealy mouthed as this is) is that all Working Group members were concerned with women and war; the terrible things that happen to women in war; the failure of the UN and the international humanitarian aid community to meet women’s needs; the exclusion of women from peace processes; and the failure to see and acknowledge the incredibly hard organizing and peace-building work that women in war zones undertake. And, as NGOs that had war as their concern, and that saw the UN and UN processes as important arenas for action, changing the behaviour of the UN and its member states was seen to be best accomplished through an initiative to transform policy in an institution of global governance. (I stop to note this perhaps self-evident fact because one of the notable absences from the Working Group was that of US feminist NGOs, most of which do not see influencing the UN as a high priority.)

Although all of the Working Group members were concerned about what was happening to women in wars, the majority of Working Group NGOs defined themselves neither as “anti-war,” per se, nor as feminist. Amnesty International defines itself as a “human rights” organization; the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children describes its mission as “working to improve the lives and defend the rights of refugee and internally displaced women, children and adolescents. For both, issues of women’s protection were paramount. International Alert more directly addresses war, but its emphasis is on peace-building (and it now has a program to promote the role of women in peace-building). The Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice was founded to bring feminist perspectives into the founding documents and practices of the International Criminal Court. It is only the Hague Appeal for Peace and the WILPF that are explicitly anti-war, anti-militarist, and pro-disarmament. And of the two, only WILPF also explicitly identifies itself as feminist.

What these differences meant concretely was that although all group members agreed that something had to be done to increase women’s protection and participation, their own conceptual framings for how to do that were quite divergent. Humanitarian and human rights groups talked about themselves as “not political,” (a descriptor that puzzled me for a very long time), and for some of them, anything that smacked of an analysis of the causes of women’s victimization and exclusion was “too political.” (In fact, it was over the “too political” issue that Amnesty actually left the Working Group, although it returned three years later). Certainly, talking about the international arms trade, “militarism,” or even worse, militarism’s relation to masculinities (as WILPF wanted to do) was deemed by these groups to be in the “too political” category. While these same terms might have been “too political” for the Council as well, I think it is significant to note that the self-censorship that was the product of working in this coalition foreclosed even the possibility of conversation with member state delegations about these issues.

It is also important that when addressing causes of war and militarism is “too political” and off the agenda, it radically narrows the range of the kinds of policy initiatives one might take to solve a problem. If rape’s use as a weapon of war is your concern, for example, you can safely contest the meanings of “war crime” or “crimes against humanity.” and hope that through redefining rape as a war crime, rather than a “natural,” “inevitable,” “boys-will-be-boys” inherent aspect of war, there will be some deterrent effect. But if it is off-limits to address the intersections of gender and ethnicity, and the gender regime that makes a physical, sexual attack on a woman a blow against the “honour” of a man and his community, how likely is it that rape will stop being used as a weapon? Or, another example, if sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers is your concern, you can write a Code of Conduct for peacekeeping troops that has a strict prohibition against “fraternization” with local women, and hope that it will be possible to widely train troops about the code, and that commanders will take it seriously. But if it remains off-limits to address the nexus of militarized power, constructions of masculinities, gendered inequalities in access to paid work, and global economic inequality, how likely is it that that Code of Conduct will make a significant difference?

These examples not only demonstrate the narrowed realm policy initiatives that are possible when political analyses of the causes of war, militarism, and armed violence are off the table; they also begin to suggest something about the degree to which the “women, peace and security” agenda both does and does not represent a fundamental contestation of the rules and discursive practices in international peace and security institutions (question #9). The assertions that women have a right to be at the peace table, or that women are central to national and international security, for example, do, in fact, represent fundamental contestations of those rules and practices. Yet they do not, in and of
themselves, address the gender constructs that underwrite war-making as a practice, or the gendered inequalities that underlie women's vulnerability in war and post-conflict settings; thus, they leave many significant rules and discursive practices of international peace and security institutions in place. There are many other examples that merit discussion; for the moment, I will confine myself to two.

First, the NGO framers of 1325, while insisting on building awareness that “women suffer the impact of war disproportionately,” had as one of their main goals the recasting of the image of “women” in the SC. Many of their interactions with SC members, as well as the language they drafted for the resolution, were focused on pruning women out of the “women and children”-as-helpless-victims construct, and constructing women as active agents, already engaged in peacebuilding in civil society. Although “agency” was a word that some of the NGOs used, in the process of the 1325 campaign, “agency” too quickly became narrowed into a new construct, “women as peace-makers.” While this construct has gained quite a bit of rhetorical currency in the UN, it has significant difficulties of its own, not the least of which is that it leaves the construct of “men as naturally aggressive, women as naturally peaceful” firmly in place. I will return to a discussion of some of the troubling consequences of this using this construct in Fragment Two and Fragment Three below. For the moment, however, I think it is fair to say that one success of the 1325 campaign is that it has, in fact, brought women as actors (not just vulnerable victims) into SC discourse.

Second, we should note that while claims for women's rights to “protection” in war and to “participation” in peace-making and peacebuilding are actually quite radical (for all that there should be nothing radical about it), in another light these claims do not represent a contestation of some of the fundamental assumptions of international peace and security institutions. Protecting women in war, and insisting that they have an equal right to participate in the processes and negotiations that end particular wars, both leave war itself in place. That is, it is a kind of late intervention—once the war occurs, we will try to protect women, and we will have them try to help end it—rather than an intervention that tries either to prevent war, or to contest the legitimacy of the systems that produce war—that is, “to put an end to war.” In this sense, it fits comfortably into the already extant concepts and discursive practices of the SC, where the dominant paradigm holds a world made up of states that “defend” state security through military means.

This limitation of the resolution is seen as a problem by some of the actors involved, and not recognized by others—as might have been predicted from the earlier discussion of the different political positioning, self-definitions, and goals of the NGOs involved. Among those who see it as a problem is Cora Weiss, director of Hague Appeal for Peace. She acutely expressed the central dilemma early on, exclaiming in a meeting, “Look, we are not just trying to make war safe for women!” More recently, some 1325 advocates (both in NGOs and the Secretariat) have responded to this limitation by adding a third “P”—that is, they have rebranded the WPS agenda as being about “the 3 P’s”—prevention, protection, and participation. This has certainly an improvement— but not as much of one as it might first appear. Before the agenda-expanding report of the Secretary-General on conflict prevention in 2001, prevention tended to be rather narrowly construed in the SC and the international security community generally—as relating to so-called “early warning mechanisms,” interventionalary forces in an impending genocide, and so on. Although the issue is addressed by the Secretary-General in his reports, prevention of war is all too often not, for example, taken by governments to mean disarmament. Nor is it typically taken to mean the abolition of the military-industrial complex, nor a revolution in gender regimes such that societies are no longer producing one category people seen as having the nurturing, collaborative, empathetic qualities of peace-makers, and another capable of being schooled into thinking that killing, and being killed, is the name of nation is the ultimate badge of honour and manhood. (Cockburn 2004: 224) Even so, when advocates tried to get the narrow “prevention” on the agenda of the 2004 CSW meetings (which again had women and armed conflict as one of its two annual themes, under the agenda item “Women’s equal participation in conflict prevention, management and conflict resolution and in post-conflict peace-building”), they were stymied by other women inside the UN system and in member state delegations, who insisted that one had to be “realistic about accomplishing things,” and that therefore the agenda should be limited to women's participation in peace processes and in post-war electoral processes.

In thinking about the question of whether 1325 actually serves the purposes intended by its NGO originators, I have, thus far, attempted to be quite specific about the ways the different NGOs have named their objectives and framed them in the context of the institution of the SC. At this point, I want to step back and say that essentially, they all wanted to do something that would be good for women, and good for peace.
I think this is a fair generalization, although not all of the NGOs would use this kind of language. So will it be good for women? Will it be good for peace?

In conclusion I want to sketch out some fragments of personal rumination in response to the questions I have raised above.

**Fragment one**

Listening to the speeches of (male) SC ambassadors during the October 2003 day-long SC Open Debate on “Women, Peace and Security in the Context of Peacekeeping Operations,” one might have imagined that feminist dreams and tireless organizing had succeeded in radically remaking the world. The men said:

In our view, only the full participation of women in global affairs can open up greater opportunities for achieving global peace.

(Ambassador Cristian Maquieira, Deputy Representative of Chile to the UN, 29 October 2003; http://www.peacewomen.org/un/SCOpenDebate2003/Chile2003es.pdf.)

Peace is inextricably linked to equality between women and men.


No approach to peace can succeed if it does not view men and women as equally important components of the solution.


When I think about these statements, I am struck by two things. First, the obvious – they do not mean it. This is immediately apparent when you consider, for example, Ambassador John Negroponte’s statement. Any analysis of US foreign and security policies makes it impossible to believe that they are based on the view that “peace depends on men and women as equally important components of the solution.” (I think I need not belabour this point.)

Second, I am not at all sure that I believe it either. I do not actually know if peace – in the way they mean it, as the absence of war – is impossible without gender equality. I am, however, certain that equality between women and men – in the way they mean it, a liberal version of political equality – does not begin to get at the pernicious, pervasive complexities of the gender regimes that undergird not only individual wars themselves, but the entire war system.

**Fragment two**

The rhetorical strategy that has been used to sell the idea that women should have decision-making roles in peace-making and peace-building has largely rested on the “women-as-untapped-resource” or “use-value” argument.

We [at UNIFEM] argue that women should be included because they provide a perspective and offer resources that would otherwise not be considered. We say that this is important because it supports the kind of monitoring (by women’s groups) that is essential to ensure that peace agreements are implemented as intended.22

As I have always understood it, when (natural) resources are tapped, it is to use them, exploit them, transform them into a product of someone else’s design, for someone else’s profit.

And then again, I am told by women in New York and Washington that the use-value argument is used because it works, because it is a much more effective way to get women in the door than talking about “rights.”

And I am told by some women “on the ground” that they could not care less what argument gets them in – just get the damn door cracked open before we all perish.

**Fragment three**

The use-value argument, in turn, rests on a particular construct of women – the construct of women-as-peacemakers. We hear it in the words of women’s advocates:

Women can more readily embrace the collaborative perspective needed to cut through ethnic, religious, tribal and political barriers. They also embrace a more sustainable concept of security.

And the SC echoes this construct:

Women are not just victims of violence. They are often the driving force for peace.


I know that I – who have spent years teaching women’s studies and feminist theory – am extremely uncomfortable with the women-as-peacemaker construct for many, many reasons.

I also know that in many (although by no means all) of the interviews I have done with women grassroots activists from war zones around the world, many of the women – who have spent many years struggling with incredible courage against devastating armed violence – have themselves expressed the same belief in women’s greater ability and motivation to end wars and create sustainable peace.

Feminist theorists and researchers have exhaustively catalogued the dangers of these kinds of constructs for women. They erase differences among and between women. Gender appears as though it were a separable identity from race, class, religion, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, a set of meanings not entwined with other structures of power. Gender appears as a fixed identity, instead of a process, a doing, a making. Resting our claim to legitimacy as a political actor on a construct of who we are and what we can do (for you), rather than on a claim of rights, means that we can easily be excluded (again) when we fail to embody and enact the construct. The construct of difference that we argue makes us fit to participate can be turned into an argument for why it would be dangerous to allow us to participate. And on and on.

We can and should also catalogue the dangers of these constructs for how we understand the making of war and the building of peace.

While I do not think one can begin to understand war without gender; while I understand gender, war, nationalism, ethnicity, religion, capitalist forms of production, and consumption (how long should I make this list?) as mutually constitutive, I fear that “Women-as-peacemakers” place too much of war on gender. And in so doing, actually leaves the dominant political and epistemological frameworks untouched.

I fear that it is the easy way out. That it obscures all the parts of the war system, including, perhaps paradoxically, the working of gender regimes themselves.

To say it another way – If women are peaceful and men are warriors, will putting women in charge of peace work? This is not one of those silly and annoying “what about Margaret Thatcher?” questions. Nor is it one of those equally silly and annoying Francis Fukuyama questions – of how those poor peaceful women will protect themselves from being overthrown by testosterone-driven, power-hungry, war-loving men.25 It is a question about what will happen if peaceable women hold peace talks while:

- the global arms trade continues apace, with 80 percent of the mammoth profits going to the five permanent members of the SC;
- international financial institutions and trade organizations continue to impose policies that foreclose the possibilities of creating a citizenry that can get what it needs without fighting for it, or a citizenry that is free enough from want that its government need not be oppressive to maintain power, or a citizenry democratically empowered enough to not need to turn to religious or political demagogues who promise to give them the kind of life they really want;
- “security” is understood as state security, and huge standing armies and armories are understood as legitimate;
- investments in armaments, arms industries, and private militaries are understood as an inviolate part of free enterprise;
- and when the centrality of gender regimes to all of the above remains largely invisible.

At this point, letting (some) women into decision-making positions seems a small price to pay for leaving the war system essentially undisturbed. And, at the same time, yes, 1325 has the potential to have tremendously important effects on the lives of women who are already being ripped apart in the clutches of war.

Notes

1. I want to thank Felicity Hill for opening so many doors into the world of 1325 for me, as well as for her helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. I also want to thank Ayala Wineman for her extremely able research assistance, and Shirin Rai for her supportive style as editor. Finally, I am grateful to the Ford Foundation, whose generous support made this research possible.


3. The 1997 ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions emphasize the need to incorporate gender perspectives into the mainstream of all areas of the United
Nations’ work, including macroeconomic questions, operational activities for development, poverty eradication, human rights, humanitarian assistance, budgeting, disarmament, peace and security, and legal affairs. The concept of gender mainstreaming was defined as “...the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in any area and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of women as well as of men an integral part of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres, so that women and men benefit equally, and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal of mainstreaming is to achieve gender equality.” E/1997/L.30, 14 July 1997.

4. Gender mainstreaming grew out of women activists’ efforts to ensure that women would be included in and benefit from the programs and projects of international development agencies. When they saw that Women in Development programmes too often resulted in the addition of small, marginal projects for women, while the major development projects proceeded unchanged, they sought a new strategy that would bring women into the mainstream of development activities. By 1995, the Beijing Platform for Action (BPA) established gender mainstreaming as a global strategy for achieving gender equality. While the BPA addresses peace and security issues, in the early years of gender mainstreaming attention was much more focused on development, and then human rights issues. Until 1995’s passage, there was no concentrated effort to apply gender mainstreaming in the security realm. For accounts of the origins of gender mainstreaming, see Hafner-Burton and Pollack (2002); Riddell-Dixon (1999); and True (2003).

5. At the UN, I have heard the Third Committee of the GA – the committee that works on social, humanitarian, and cultural issues – referred to in-house as the “ladies committee.” In this trivializing framing, there is no question that power, and the “real,” “hard” issues, are seen to reside elsewhere.

6. The Fourth UN World Conference on Women generated the Beijing Platform for Action, which is organized around 12 Critical Areas of Concern, the fifth of which is Women and Armed Conflict. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/peace/platform/plat1.htm. It aims at accelerating the implementation of the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women agreed at Nairobi in 1985.


8. By inviting members of the Security Council to gather over coffee to hear the views of a Bosnian priest in 1993, Ambassador Arria of Venezuela created what has become known as the Arria Formula, an informal exchange between Security Council members and NGOs. The Arria Formula has been used more regularly since 1999 to provide expertise and testimony on thematic issues taken up by the Security Council, in particular on humanitarian issues, the protection of civilians in armed conflict, children and armed conflict, and, more recently on women, peace and security.

9. The speakers were: Isha Dyfan from Sierra Leone; Inonge Mbiluicita-Lewanika from Zambia; Luz Mendez from Guatemala; and Faiza Jama Mohamed from Somalia. Additionally, the Working Group presented a statement.

10. For an extended examination of the ways that activists in WILPF, in particular, changed in response to this closer relation with UN insiders, see Sheri Gibbings (2004).

11. While the anniversary of 1325 is emphasized by advocates as the only one celebrated, other resolutions and issues receive annual attention through being a formal item on the Security Council agenda. If resolution 1325 had contained a date by which the Secretary-General needed to report back to the Council, Women, Peace and Security would have automatically become a regular item on the SC. In the absence of this commitment, advocates make the most of the anniversary.


13. P5 refers to the grading system in the UN, with P standing for Professional, which includes 5 levels. A P5 is the highest Professional level ranking before Director or “D” level posts.

14. In a 2003 article, Jacqui True reframes the question, saying it is “not how feminist scholars and activists can avoid cooperation by powerful institutions, but whether we can afford not to engage with such institutions, when the application of gender analysis in their policymaking is clearly having political effects beyond academic and feminist communities.” True (2003: 368) If we do engage, we need to analyse the complexity of the impacts of that engagement along many different dimensions.

15. For readers who may be unfamiliar with it, "The Strangest Dream" reference is from a song, "Last Night I had the Strangest Dream," written in 1950 by Ed McCurdy. It begins, "Last night I had the strangest dream, I ever dreamed before, I dreamed the world had all agreed to put an end to war. I dreamed I saw a mighty room, and the room was filled with men. And the paper they were signing said they'd never fight again." The song was frequently sung by US peace activists in the 50s, 60s, and 70s. Obviously, for some of us, the room is no longer filled only by men.

16. The gender-mainstreaming literature frequently addresses the question of whether policy-implmenters themselves are keeping in mind gender mainstreaming’s original goal (i.e., gender equality) or the original problem (the pervasive system of gender inequality) (e.g., Meier et al. 2004; Verloo 2002). It also criticizes democrats’ and policy-makers’ lack of continuous reflection upon gender-mainstreaming policies as they are being implemented (e.g., Carney 2004). But the mainstreaming literature tends to ignore the challenge faced by feminist activists in remaining true to their political goals when they are caught up in a mainstreaming policy “victory” that may be very real, but also very compromised.


18. The cynical caveats here: into SC rhetoric far more than daily deliberation or practice; and only at certain times of the year, notably around 1325 anniversary events.
Governing Globalization: Feminist Engagements with International Trade Policy

Debra J. Liebowitz

As I stood in the international terminal of the Cancun, Mexico airport on the afternoon of September 14, 2003, I was struck by how the scene epitomized the condition, complexity, and contradictions of the current debate on globalization. A buzz of energy filled every inch of the space as thousands of people—women and men of every colour, clothed in an incredible array of hues and styles—streamed into the airport following the collapse of the 146 nation World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations. Some of the people who had been inside the conference center just a few hours earlier knew that the negotiations had broken down and that delegates from a number of governments walked out as it became clear that core conflicts among them could not be resolved and consensus could not be reached. However, many inside the conference center, and the thousands of protesters kept out by the fortress-like fencing and the slews of police and military officers blanketing this tourist “Mecca”, had little information about what was actually occurring. In this environment of militarized mistrust, rumors spread like wildfires: “Delegates from the G-211 stormed out”, “G-21 Delegates coordinated an action and all marched out of the negotiations”, “Brazil walked out”, “There was a big demonstration in the conference center”, “The US negotiators called it quits and said the meeting was over”, “backup military forces were called in to quell the riot like atmosphere”, “NGO delegates were arrested”, “Government delegates were arrested”. Strangers talked easily to one another sharing information as we waited in unbelievably long lines. Easily distinguishable by the colour-coded identification badges we still wore around our necks, people pointed out that various government delegates were trying to leave Mexico. In that moment, this observation served as evidence that the rumors were indeed fact.